Bad faith prosecution without the hope of getting a valid conviction

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714, 13 L.R.A.N.S. 932, 14 Am.Ann.Cas. 764 (U.S.Minn.,Mar 23, 1908)

It would seem to be clear that the attorney general, under his power existing at common law, and by virtue of these various statutes, had a general duty imposed upon him, which includes the right and the power to enforce the statutes of the state, including, of course, the act in question, if it were constitutional. His power by virtue of his office sufficiently connected him with the duty of enforcement to make him a proper party to a suit of the nature of the one now before the United States circuit court.It is further objected (and the objection really forms part of the contention that the state cannot be sued) that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin criminal proceedings, by indictment or otherwise, under the state law. This, as a general rule, is true. **But there are exceptions. When such indictment or proceeding is brought to enforce an alleged unconstitutional statute, which is the subject-matter of inquiry in a suit already pending in a Federal court, the latter court, having first obtained jurisdiction over the subject-matter, has *162 the right, in both civil and criminal cases, to hold and **455 maintain such jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts, until its duty is fully performed. Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537-542-544, 47 L. ed. 584-586, 587, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 398. But the Federal court cannot, of course, interfere in a case where the proceedings were already pending in a state court. Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366-370, 21 L. ed. 287-290; Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 148, 43 L. ed. 399, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119.Where one commences a criminal proceeding who is already party to a suit then pending in a court of equity, if the criminal proceedings are brought to enforce the same right that is in issue before that court, the latter may enjoin such criminal proceedings. Davis & F. Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207, 47 L. ed. 778, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 498. In Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223-241, 49 L. ed. 169-177, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18, it is remarked by Mr. Justice Day, in delivering the opinion of the court, that it is well settled that where property rights will be destroyed, unlawful interference by criminal proceedings under a void law or ordinance may be reached and controlled by a decree of a court of equity. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418, distinctly enjoined the proceedings by indictment to compel obedience to the rate act.These cases show that a court of equity is not always precluded from granting an injunction to stay proceedings in criminal cases, and we have no doubt the principle applies in a case such as the present. Re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 211, 31 L. ed. 402, 406, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 482, is not to the contrary. That case holds that, in general, a court of equity has no jurisdiction of a bill to stay criminal proceedings, but it expressly states an exception, unless they are instituted by a party to the suit already pending before it, and to try the same right that is in issue there. Various authorities are cited to sustain the exception. The criminal proceedings here that could be commenced by the state authorities would be under the statutes relating to passenger or freight rates, and their validity is the very question involved in the suit in the United States circuit court. The right to restrain proceedings by mandamus is based upon the same foundation and governed by the same principles.*163 It is proper to add that the right to enjoin an individual, even though a state official, from commencing suits under circumstances already stated, does not include the power to restrain a court from acting in any case brought before it, either of a civil or criminal nature, nor does it include power to prevent any investigation or action by a grand jury. The latter body is part of the machinery of a criminal court, and an injunction against a state court would be a violation of the whole scheme of our government. If an injunction against an individual is disobeyed, and he commences proceedings before a grand jury or in a court, such disobedience is personal only, and the court or jury can proceed without incurring any penalty on that account.The difference between the power to enjoin an individual from doing certain things, and the power to enjoin courts from proceeding in their own way to exercise jurisdiction, is plain, and no power to do the latter exists because of a power to do the former.It is further objected that there is a plain and adequate remedy at law open to the complainants, and that a court of equity, therefore, has no jurisdiction in such case. It has been suggested that the proper way to test the constitutionality of the act is to disobey it, at least once, after which the company might obey the act pending subsequent proceedings to test its validity. But in the event of a single violation the prosecutor might not avail himself of the opportunity to make the test, as obedience to the law was thereafter continued, and he might think it unnecessary to start an inquiry. If, however, he should do so while the company was thereafter obeying the law, several years might elapse before there was a final determination of the question, and, if it should be determined that the law was invalid, the property of the company would have been taken during that time without due process of law, and there would be no possibility of its recovery.Another obstacle to making the test on the part of the company might be to find an agent or employee who would disobey *164 the law, with a possible fine and imprisonment staring him in the face if the act should be held valid. Take the passenger-rate act, for instance: A sale of a single ticket above the price mentioned in that act might subject the ticket agent to a charge of felony, and, upon conviction, to a fine of $5,000 and imprisonment for five years. It is true the company might pay the fine, but the imprisonment the agent would have to suffer personally. It would not be wonderful if, under such circumstances, there would not be a crowd of agents offering to disobey the law. The wonder would be that a single agent should be found ready to take the risk.If, however, one should be found, and the prosecutor should elect to proceed against him, the defense that the act was invalid, because the rates established by it were too low, would require a long and difficult examination **456 of quite complicated facts upon which the validity of the act depended.Such investigation it would be almost impossible to make before a jury, as such body could not intelligently pass upon the matter. Questions of the cost of transportation of passengers and freight, the net earnings of the road, the separation of the cost and earnings within the state from those arising beyond its boundaries, all depending upon the testimony of experts and the examination of figures relating to these subjects, as well, possibly, as the expenses attending the building and proper cost of the road, would necessarily form the chief matter of inquiry, and intelligent answers could only be given after a careful and prolonged examination of the whole evidence, and the making of calculations based thereon.All material evidence having been taken upon these issues, it has been held that it ought to be referred to the most competent and reliable master to make all needed computations, and to find therefrom the necessary facts upon which a judgment might be rendered that might be reviewed by this court. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167, 44 L. ed. 417, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 336. From all these considerations it is plain that this is not a proper suit for investigation by a jury. Suits for penalties, or indictment*165 or other criminal proceedings for a violation of the act, would therefore furnish no reasonable or adequate opportunity for the presentation of a defense founded upon the assertion that the rates were too low and therefore the act invalid.We do not say the company could not interpose this defense in an action to recover penalties or upon the trial of an indictment ( St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649, 39 L. ed. 567, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 484), but the facility of proving it in either case falls so far below that which would obtain in a court of equity that comparison is scarcely possible.To await proceedings against the company in a state court, grounded upon a disobedience of the act, and then, if necessary, obtain a review in this court by writ of error to the highest state court, would place the company in peril of large loss and its agents in great risk of fines and imprisonment if it should be finally determined that the act was valid. This risk the company ought not to be required to take. Over eleven thousand millions of dollars, it is estimated, are invested in railroad property, owned by many thousands of people, who are scattered over the whole country, from ocean to ocean, and they are entitled to equal protection from the laws and from the courts, with the owners of all other kinds of property,-no more, no less. The courts having jurisdiction, Federal or state, should, at all times, be opened to them as well as to others, for the purpose of protecting their property and their legal rights.All the objections to a remedy at law as being plainly inadequate are obviated by a suit in equity, making all who are directly interested parties to the suit, and enjoining the enforcement of the act until the decision of the court upon the legal question.An act of the legislature fixing rates, either for passengers or freight, is to be regarded as prima facie valid, and the onus rests upon the company to prove its assertion to the contrary. Under such circumstances it was stated by Mr. Justice Miller, *166 in his concurring opinion in Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418-460, 33 L. ed. 970-982, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 209, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 462, 702, that the proper, if not the only, mode of judicial relief against the tariff of rates established by the legislature or by its commission is by a bill in chancery, asserting its unreasonable character; and that until the decree of the court in such equity suit was obtained, it was not competent for each individual having dealings with a carrier, or for the carrier in regard to each individual who demands its services, to raise a contest in the courts over the questions which ought to be settled in this general and conclusive manner. This remedy by bill in equity is referred to and approved by Mr. Justice Shiras, in delivering the opinion of the court in St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649, 659, 666, 39 L. ed. 567, 570, 573, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 484, although that question was not then directly before the court. Such remedy is undoubtedly the most convenient, the most comprehensive, and the most orderly way in which the rights of all parties can be properly, fairly, and adequately passed upon. It cannot be to the real interest of anyone to injure or cripple the resources of the railroad companies of the country, because the prosperity of both the railroads and the country is most intimately connected. The question of sufficiency of rates is important and controlling; and, being of a judicial nature, it ought to be settled at the earliest moment by some court, and when a Federal court first obtains jurisdiction it ought, on general principles of jurisprudence, to be permitted to finish the inquiry and make a conclusive judgment, to the exclusion of all other courts. This is all that is claimed, and this, we think, must be admitted.Finally, it is objected that the necessary result of upholding this suit in the circuit court will be to draw to the lower Federal courts a great flood of litigation of this character, where one Federal judge would **457 have it in his power to enjoin proceedings by state officials to enforce the legislative acts of the state, either by criminal or civil actions. To this it may be answered, in the first place, that no injunction ought to be granted unless in a case reasonably free from doubt. We *167 think such rule is, and will be, followed by all the judges of the Federal courts.And, again, it must be remembered that jurisdiction of this general character has, in fact, been exercised by Federal courts from the time of Osborn v. Bank of United States up to the present; the only difference in regard to the case of Osborn and the case in hand being that in this case the injury complained of is the threatened commencement of suits, civil or criminal, to enforce the act, instead of, as in the Osborn Case, an actual and direct trespass upon or interference with tangible property. A bill filed to prevent the commencement of suits to enforce an unconstitutional act, under the circumstances already mentioned, is no new invention, as we have already seen. The difference between an actual and direct interference with tangible property and the enjoining of state officers from enforcing an unconstitutional act, is not of a radical nature, and does not extend, in truth, the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject-matter. **In the case of the interference with property, the person enjoined is assuming to act in his capacity as an official of the state, and justification for his interference is claimed by reason of his position as a state official. Such official cannot so justify when acting under an unconstitutional enactment of the legislature. So, where the state official, instead of directly interfering with tangible property, is about to commence suits which have for their object the enforcement of an act which violates the Federal Constitution, to the great and irreparable injury of the complainants, he is seeking the same justification from the authority of the state as in other cases. The sovereignty of the state is, in reality, no more involved in one case than in the other. The state cannot, in either case, impart to the official immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States. See Re Ayers, 123 U. S. 507, 31 L. ed. 230, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164.This supreme authority, which arises from the specific provisions of the Constitution itself, is nowhere more fully illustrated than in the series of decisions under the Federal habeas *168 corpus statute ( 753, U. S. Rev. Stat. U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 592), in some of which cases persons in the custody of state officers for alleged crimes against the state have been taken from that custody and discharged by a Federal court or judge, because the imprisonment was adjudged to be in violation of the Federal Constitution. The right to so discharge has not been doubted by this court, and it has never been supposed there was any suit against the state by reason of serving the writ upon one of the officers of the state in whose custody the person was found. In some of the cases the writ has been refused as matter of discretion; but in others it has been granted, while the power has been fully recognized in all. Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 29 L. ed. 868, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 734; Re Loney (Thomas v. Loney) 134 U. S. 372, 33 L. ed. 949, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 584; Re Neagle (Cunningham v. Neagle) 135 U. S. 1, 34 L. ed. 55, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 658; Baker v. Grice, 169 U. S. 284, 42 L. ed. 748, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 323; Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276, 43 L. ed. 699, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 453; Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U. S. 499, 502, 45 L. ed. 639, 640, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 455; Reid v. Jones, 187 U. S. 153, 47 L. ed. 116, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 89; United States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, 200 U. S. 1, 50 L. ed. 343, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229; Re Lincoln, 202 U. S. 178, 50 L. ed. 984, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 602.It is somewhat difficult to appreciate the distinction which, while admitting that the taking of such a person from the custody of the state by virtue of service of the writ on the state officer in whose custody he is found is not a suit against the state, and yet service of a writ on the attorney general, to prevent his enforcing an unconstitutional enactment of a state legislature, is a suit against the state.There is nothing in the case before us that ought properly to breed hostility to the customary operation of Federal courts of justice in cases of this character.The rule to show cause is discharged and the petition for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari is dismissed.

Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.(La.),Jul 31, 1972)

Defendant in a pending state criminal prosecution brought action to enjoin state prosecutor from further prosecution of the case. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Christenberry, J., ordered issuance of permanent injunction, 328 F.Supp. 390, and the state prosecutor appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wisdom, Circuit Judge, held that upon showing that the perjury prosecution was brought in bad faith and for purposes of harassment after defendant in that prosecution took the stand and was acquitted in conspiracy prosecution, further prosecution of the perjury action was properly enjoined; and that it was not necessary that irreparable injury be independently established.Affirmed.West Headnotes[1] Courts 106 508(7)106 Courts 106VII Concurrent and Conflicting Jurisdiction 106VII(B) State Courts and United States Courts 106k508 Injunction by United States Court Against Proceedings in State Court 106k508(2) Restraining Particular Proceedings 106k508(7) k. Criminal Proceedings. Most Cited Cases Civil rights statute created exception to statute prohibiting injunction against pending state court prosecutions. 28 U.S.C.A. 2283; 42 U.S.C.A. 1983.[2] Courts 106 508(7)106 Courts 106VII Concurrent and Conflicting Jurisdiction 106VII(B) State Courts and United States Courts 106k508 Injunction by United States Court Against Proceedings in State Court 106k508(2) Restraining Particular Proceedings 106k508(7) k. Criminal Proceedings. Most Cited Cases **Showing of bad faith or harassment in the institution of a state criminal prosecution is equivalent to a showing of great and immediate irreparable injury for purposes of comity restraints on issuance of federal injunctions against pending state criminal prosecutions; **irreparable injury need not be independently established.[3] Courts 106 508(7)106 Courts 106VII Concurrent and Conflicting Jurisdiction 106VII(B) State Courts and United States Courts 106k508 Injunction by United States Court Against Proceedings in State Court 106k508(2) Restraining Particular Proceedings 106k508(7) k. Criminal Proceedings. Most Cited Cases There is a federal right to be free from bad faith state prosecutions.[4] Federal Courts 170B 858170B Federal Courts 170BVIII Courts of Appeals 170BVIII(K) Scope, Standards, and Extent 170BVIII(K)5 Questions of Fact, Verdicts and Findings 170Bk855 Particular Actions and Proceedings, Verdicts and Findings 170Bk858 k. Civil Rights Cases. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 106k406.3(13))In action under civil rights statutes to enjoin pending state perjury prosecution, finding that bringing of perjury charge against plaintiff after he took the stand and was acquitted in a conspiracy prosecution in which sole state witness offered to show plaintiff's presence at conspiratorial meeting was unable to identify him as having been present was in bad faith and for purpose of harassment was not clearly erroneous in light of evidence, inter alia, that at the time the perjury charge was filed there were no new witnesses available against plaintiff. 42 U.S.C.A. 1983, 1985; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 52(a), 28 U.S.C.A.[5] Courts 106 508(7)106 Courts 106VII Concurrent and Conflicting Jurisdiction 106VII(B) State Courts and United States Courts 106k508 Injunction by United States Court Against Proceedings in State Court 106k508(2) Restraining Particular Proceedings 106k508(7) k. Criminal Proceedings. Most Cited Cases While showing of a threat of repeated prosecutions is an alternative path to federal injunctive relief against pending state criminal prosecution, **such showing is not necessary where bad faith or harassment is established.[6] Courts 106 508(7)106 Courts 106VII Concurrent and Conflicting Jurisdiction 106VII(B) State Courts and United States Courts 106k508 Injunction by United States Court Against Proceedings in State Court 106k508(2) Restraining Particular Proceedings 106k508(7) k. Criminal Proceedings. Most Cited Cases Where state perjury prosecution was instituted in bad faith by state prosecutor and for purposes of harassment after defendant in the state prosecution had taken the stand and been acquitted in a conspiracy prosecution, federal district court properly enjoined state prosecutor from further prosecution of the action.*114 WISDOM, Circuit Judge:In this case the district court found that Jim Garrison, District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana, in bad faith and for purposes of harassment brought a criminal prosecution for perjury against Clay Shaw. 328 F.Supp. 390 (1971). The court found that the prosecution would cause great and irreparable injury to Shaw and enjoined the district attorney and his staff from further prosecution of the pending criminal action. 328 F.Supp. at 404. We affirm: the findings were not clearly erroneous; they meet the special circumstances requirements of younger v. Harris, 1971, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669.[1] The district court held also that Title 42 U.S.C. 1983 was an express exception to the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. 2283. The Supreme Court has now confirmed the correctness of this view. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705, 1972.I. The FactsClay Shaw was active in business and civic affairs in New Orleans and for twenty years was Managing Director of the International Trade Mart, an organization for the promotion of business and cultural activities between New Orleans and foreign countries. The prosecution for perjury grew out of the State's unsuccessful attempt to convict Shaw of conspiracy to assassinate President John F. Kennedy. The State charged that Shaw, who took the stand in his own defense, perjured himself when he denied having known either Lee Harvey Oswald or David Ferrie, the alleged co-conspirators in the assassination plot. The plaintiff relies, in part, on the fear of multiple prosecutions, that is, the first was for conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy; the second was for perjury; a third and fourth may be in store for him. The district court agreed with the plaintiff.FN1 Based on the facts showing the district attorney's relentless harassment of Shaw, the trial judge could fairly infer that Shaw ran the risk of additional prosecutions. We feel, however, that it is unnecessary to go beyond the bad faith nature of the perjury prosecution to affirm the judgment. In reaching that conclusion we cannot ignore the first prosecution; that prosecution is an inseparable part of the factual *115 context within which the second prosecution should be considered. The perjury charge was based on Shaw's testimony in the conspiracy trial. Garrison's theory of the assassination and the trial itself were widely publicized. Whatever ambitions he may have had as the man who solved the Kennedy assassination crumbled to bits when the jury came in with a verdict of not guilty.FN1. The district court found:This court is not dealing with a single good-faith criminal prosecution wherein allegations of unconstitutional procedures are made. This court is dealing with a case of continuing harassment and multiple prosecutions, with the likelihood that such harassment and prosecution will continue in the future, unless abated by direct federal court intervention. Herein lies the unique nature of this case and the resulting impotency of traditional avenues of relief. If plaintiff is forced to stand trial for perjury, takes the stand and is acquitted, this court has no doubt but that plaintiff will be charged anew on the basis of statements made by him from the witness stand. A request for relief in this subsequent prosecution would be met with the same arguments put forth by the defendant in the instant proceeding and so on ad infinitum. Surely at some point plaintiff's precious constitutional rights must be vindicated. 328 F.Supp. at 403. Shaw testified:Originally when I was charged, as you know, you, as my attorney, counseled me that I need not take the stand and that no inference would be drawn from the fact that I did not take the stand, but I knew I was not guilty of this charge, so I did take the stand, and then of course I was found not guilty, and then I found myself facing perjury charges arising out of my testimony given at the conspiracy trial. If I had not taken the stand, I would not be charged with perjury today, yet I took the stand in my own defense because I knew I was innocent.Yet I was charged with perjury because of the very truthful testimony that I gave, and I see no reason to believe that if I take the stand in the new proceedings in my own defense and testify again truthfully as I did in the conspiracy trial the District Attorney will not have me reindicted for perjury for this testimony that I will give.On November 22, 1963, President John F. Kennedy was assassinated. Less than forty-eight hours later, Jack Ruby shot and killed the accused assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald. Oswald had spent the summer of 1963 in New Orleans. Learning of this, the district attorney for Orleans Parish conducted an investigation of Oswald's activities in New Orleans. As a result of this investigation, David Ferrie, allegedly an acquaintance of Oswald's, was arrested and turned over to the F.B.I. for questioning.FN2 Ferrie died in February, 1967.FN2. In his book, Heritage of Stone, an exhibit, Garrison states that his office had been informed that Oswald and Ferrie were associated together in the Civil Air Patrol in New Orleans.Not until November 1966 did Garrison resume his investigation of the Kennedy assassination. The resumption apparently was triggered by the release of the Warren Commission's report on the assassination. Garrison testified at the hearing below that the Federal Government had not been looking into it [the assassination] honestly, and that it had been a fake investigation . . .Garrison first interviewed Shaw in connection with the investigation in December 1966. In his testimony in the district court Garrison offered no explanation for the initial interrogation of Shaw. On March 1, 1967, Shaw was arrested and charged with conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.At the time of Shaw's arrest, according to James L. Alcock, Garrison's chief prosecuting attorney, the State's only witness against Shaw was Perry Raymond Russo. Garrison learned about Russo, and found him in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, as the result of a newspaper article in which Russo was quoted as having made several statements concerning David Ferrie. After Assistant District Attorney Sciambra interviewed Russo in Baton Rouge, Garrison had Russo brought to New Orleans where he was given sodium pentothal, subjected to hypnosis, and again interrogated. Two days later, Shaw was arrested.On March 1, 1969, a unanimous state court jury, after fifty-five minutes of deliberation, found Shaw not guilty of the charge that he conspired to assassinate President Kennedy. The verdict culminated a forty-day trial. On March 3, 1969, the next working day, Garrison signed an information charging Shaw with the crime of perjury. The information charged that Shaw perjured himself when, in testimony at the conspiracy trial, he denied having known David Ferrie or Lee Harvey Oswald.II. The Proceedings BelowOn January 18, 1971, the date of the state court perjury trial, Shaw applied to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for a temporary restraining order enjoining Garrison from prosecuting the perjury charge. Shaw invoked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1343(3) and 1343(4) for a cause of action based on 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985 and under the Constitution of the United States. Shaw alleged that he suffered and will continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury as the result of the state perjury prosecution brought in bad faith and in furtherance of Garrison's scheme of harassment and intimidation of [Shaw]. The district court refused to issue a temporary restraining order, and Shaw applied to this Court for emergency relief. This Court ordered the district court to hold a hearing on Shaw's request for injunctive relief. Meanwhile, the state case was continued until January 20, 1971. On remand, the district*116 court issued a temporary restraining order pending a hearing on the preliminary injunction set for January 25, 1971.The hearing lasted three days. The district court received fifty-five exhibits and heard eighteen witnesses on behalf of Shaw. Garrison offered no proof. FN3FN3. As to Garrison's failure to offer proof, the district court said:The burden of proof is, of course, upon the plaintiff Shaw to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of exceptional and unusual circumstances that would justify this court's intervention. . . . When the plaintiff's evidence constitutes a prima facie case, the burden is on the defendant of going forward with any evidence to rebut the plaintiff's case. . . . In this case the defendant Garrison offered no proof, apparently relying on the supposed inability of Shaw to sustain his burden and that even if Shaw did, he would not be entitled to any relief by this court. In those instances where the plaintiff proved certain facts by a preponderance of the credible evidence, and the defendant failed to rebut those facts either on cross-examination or by offering contrary evidence, this court has accepted those facts as true. 328 F.Supp. at 395.III. The Ruling BelowOn May 27, 1971, the district court issued a permanent injunction restraining Jim Garrison, District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans, his assistants, employees, agents and all persons in active concert and participation with him from further prosecution of the pending criminal action entitled State of Louisiana v. Clay L. Shaw, No. 208-260. 328 F.Supp. at 404. In a thoroughly considered opinion the experienced district judge made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Characterizing the facts as unique and bizarre, the court held: [T]he perjury charge was brought in bad faith and for purposes of harassment . . . such bad faith constitutes irreparable injury which is great and immediate. 328 F.Supp. at 400. Thus, the court concluded that the special circumstances' requirements of YoungerFN4 were met and that Shaw was entitled to relief. 328 F.Supp. at 393.FN4. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 91 S.Ct. 758, 27 L.Ed.2d 696 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216, 91 S.Ct. 777, 27 L.Ed.2d 792 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 91 S.Ct. 674, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 1971, 401 U.S. 200, 91 S.Ct. 769, 27 L.Ed.2d 781.As to Garrison's prosecution of Shaw for conspiracy, the district court found bad faith and harassment on the following facts:**(1) The court found a serious question concerning the basis for Garrison's decision to investigate the assassination of President Kennedy.Apparently, his jurisdiction was based on Oswald's activities in New Orleans in the summer of 1963. However, it is strange indeed that, nearly three years after the assassination, Garrison would decide to undertake an investigation of such gravity merely because he disagreed with the findings of the Warren Commission and Oswald had spent some time in New Orleans. 328 F.Supp. at 394. William A. Gurvich, an experienced investigator and Executive Director of an established detective agency in New Orleans, testified that Garrison solicited his help in conducting the investigation. He worked on this project for about six months. Gurvich testified that he resigned because he believed the investigation to be a fraudulent, criminal act.(2) There was no basis for Garrison's initial interrogation of Shaw. Just how [Shaw] . . . was first selected to be interviewed by [Garrison] . . . when he was not a suspect is *117 another unanswered question in this case. [Garrison] . . . offered no evidence to show any basis or cause for his office's interrogation of [Shaw] . . . concerning such a shocking crime. 328 F.Supp. at 394.(3) The extreme measures the state resorted to in extracting information from Perry Raymond Russo and the use of his testimony at the trial were incompatible with the American System of Justice. Russo was given sodium pentothal and subjected to hypnosis to obtain a degree of corroboration of what Russo had allegedly related to Garrison's assistant about a conspiratorial meeting. Yet the report of Garrison's assistant, Sciambra, who interviewed Russo, made no mention of any conspiratorial meeting involving Shaw. The district court stated:It should be borne in mind that the memorandum which [Garrison's assistant] . . . wrote on his return from Baton Rouge did not mention any such meeting . . . [S]ubstantial doubts are raised regarding the validity and objectivity of the state's case when a prosecuting attorney resorts to the use of such extraordinary tactics as were employed by Garrison on Russo. A fair inference to be drawn is that these ex parte procedures were used to implant into Russo's mind a story implicating the plaintiff in an alleged conspiracy plot. This could have been accomplished by post-hypnotic suggestion. This inference is supported by the fact that Garrison immediately moved to arrest and charge Shaw based solely on Russo's questionable, vague story. Such hasty action on the part of the defendant without submitting the matter, at that time, to the grand jury demonstrates ulterior motives. 328 F.Supp. at 395. Russo's testimony at trial was significantly different from the testimony he gave at the preliminary hearing. For instance, at the preliminary hearing Russo stated unequivocally that Shaw was present at a conspiratorial meeting; in the trial Russo was unable to identify Shaw as having been present at the alleged meeting.FN5 In the trial in the district court Russo invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege when asked the precise questions he had previously answered in state court proceedings. The district court concluded:FN5. Lieutenant O'Donnell a member of the New Orleans Police Department for nineteen years testified that he attempted to give Russo a lie detector test . . .. . . It was not successful. However, O'Donnell stated he took the machine's attachment from Russo's body and continued on with the interview. According to O'Donnell, Russo told him that he did not know if Shaw was at David Ferrie's apartment the night of the alleged meeting to plot the assassination. Russo stated that if he were pressed for an answer, he would have to say that Shaw was not present. He further stated to O'Donnell that he was under a great deal of pressure and that he was sorry that he ever got involved in this mess. O'Donnell testified that he gave Garrison both an oral and written account of his interview with Russo. The written report was filed into evidence in this case by the plaintiff. O'Donnell said Garrison became enraged when he made his report and insinuated that O'Donnell had sold out to the press or * * * to someone.The defendant Garrison did not make available to the plaintiff's counsel the report of Lt. O'Donnell. Instead, he withheld it despite the fact that its subject matter pertained directly to statements that were pertinent to the credibility of Russo, the only witness upon whose story Shaw had been arrested. 328 F.Supp. at 395-396.Normally no inference can be drawn when one invokes a right secured to him by the Constitution. However, in the circumstances of this case the court believes that it can and it does draw the narrow inference from Russo's action, that even today, he at least has substantial doubts as to the truthfulness of the testimony he gave in state court. 328 F.Supp. at 396.(4) Garrison used funds received from private sources to pursue his investigation of Shaw. A group known as *118 Truth or Consequences was formed in February 1967 to solicit and contribute funds to Garrison's investigation. The evidence is overwhelming that these funds were used in preparation for Shaw's conspiracy trial. 328 F.Supp. at 397. The group, all friends of Garrison, made it clear that they expected results. Garrison gave them results in the form of the prosecution of Clay Shaw-for conspiracy and for perjury.(5) The manner of Shaw's arrest is described by the district court as follows:Garrison carefully set the stage for Shaw's arrest, which took place at approximately 5:30 P.M., four and a half hours after Shaw voluntarily appeared in Garrison's office. During this time, a representative of Life Magazine photographed Shaw through a two-way mirror unbeknownst to him. The hallway outside the defendant's office on the second floor of the New Orleans Criminal Courts Building had mysteriously become congested with newsmen, photographers, television camera crews, and members of the general public. Shaw was led handcuffed into the hallway, where he was shoved and pushed through the crowd to reach an elevator leading to the basement of the building and then to Central Lockup. All of this appeared on television. Shaw could have been taken down in a private elevator located in Garrison's office, but this would not have afforded the publicity Garrison was obviously seeking. Shaw's arrest and the manner in which it was effected was outrageous and inexcusable. The only conclusion that can be drawn from Garrison's actions is that he intentionally used the arrest for his own purposes, with complete disregard for the rights of Clay Shaw. 328 F.Supp. at 399.(6) Garrison's pretrial conduct showed a total disregard of Shaw's rights. 328 F.Supp. at 399. He held press conferences and issued press releases during the pretrial period. Garrison even released information to the press that he had refused to give to Shaw. [T]he action of Garrison in releasing information to the press while denying it to Shaw clearly reveals that . . . [ Garrison] was not prosecuting Shaw in good faith. 328 F.Supp. at 399.The district court also found bad faith and harassment in the events relating to the perjury prosecution.(1) No witness who testified at the hearing before the district court, including Garrison, could recall an instance where a defendant who took the stand and was acquitted was later charged with perjury.(2) No perjury charges were filed against State witnesses although their testimony at the conspiracy trial contradicted their testimony previously given.(3) The chief prosecuting attorney at the state conspiracy trial testified that at the time the perjury charge was filed there were no witnesses available other than those who were available at the conspiracy trial. 328 F.Supp. at 400.(4) Garrison has a significant financial interest in the continued prosecution of Clay Shaw:Garrison's book, Heritage of Stone, concerns his investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. Defendant also has a contract to write three additional books. It is obvious that the sale of defendant's book may be promoted by the publicity resulting from the continued prosecution of Clay Shaw. **It provides a means whereby defendant himself may profit, and also repay the substantial obligations owed to one of his financial backers. The court finds that this desire for financial gain is among the motives which prompt the continued prosecution of Clay Shaw. 328 F.Supp. at 400.The State's case against Shaw for conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy turned on the testimony of Perry *119 Russo. No one knew better than Garrison how unreliable Russo was. If he had ever any faith in Russo's credibility, it must have vanished when he heard Russo testify. Russo was equally important in the State's case against Shaw for perjury. And any hope of winning that case vanished when Russo, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege, declined to answer any questions when put on the stand in the trial in the district court. In view of the extreme lengths Garrison went in the first place to persuade Russo to corroborate the alleged conspiracy theory, it is a fair inference that he knew Russo would be as ineffective in the second trial as he was in the first. Moreover, considering also the extreme lengths to which Garrison went for the purpose of proving his case, it is a fair inference that he well knew that Russo would take the Fifth.Hobbs v. Thompson, 5 Cir. 1971, 448 F.2d 456, 465. In Younger, the Supreme Court defined the prerequisites-special circumstances-which must be present before a federal court will issue an injunction against a pending state criminal proceeding. Reviewing the prior cases, the Court concluded:**In all of these case the Court stressed the importance of showing irreparable injury the traditional prerequisite to obtaining an injunction. In addition, however, the Court also made clear that in view of the fundamental policy against federal interference with state criminal prosecutions, even irreparable injury is insufficient unless it is both great and immediate. 401 U.S. at 46, 91 S.Ct. at 751.[2][3] In the present case we are asked to clarify the meaning of irreparable injury. Shaw argues that a *120 showing of bad faith prosecution or prosecution for the purpose of harassment establishes the requisite irreparable injury. Garrison, on the other hand, contends that a showing of bad faith or harassment is insufficient; he argues that irreparable injury must be independently established. **We hold, as the language of Younger makes clear, that a showing of bad faith or harassment is equivalent to a showing of irreparable injury for purposes of the comity restraints defined in Younger, because there is a federal right to be free from bad faith prosecutions.FN7 Irreparable injury need not be independently established.FN7. Irreparable injury is not merely inferred; irreparable injury for the purposes of Younger is conclusively shown by a showing of bad faith or harassment.In Younger, the Court repeatedly spoke of good faith and bad faith prosecution in such a manner as to indicate that a showing of bad faith was sufficient, although not necessary,FN8 to establish irreparable injury. Quoting from Watson v. Buck, 1941, 313 U.S. 387, 400, 61 S.Ct. 962, 85 L.Ed. 1416, 1423, citing Beal v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Corp., 1941, 312 U.S. 45, 61 S.Ct. 418, 85 L.Ed. 577, 579, the Court said, No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts'. 401 U.S. at 46, 91 S.Ct. at 751, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (emphasis supplied). Similarly, quoting from Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 1943, 319 U.S. 157, 164, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324, 1330, the Court stated, It does not appear from the record that petitioners have been threatened with any injury other than that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith . . . 401 U.S. at 47, 91 S.Ct. at 752 (emphasis supplied). Also, in speaking of Dombrowski v. Pfister, 1965, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22, the Court said that the circumstances presented in that case as viewed by the Court sufficiently establish the kind of irreparable injury, above and beyond that associated with the defense of a single prosecution brought in good faith, that had always been considered sufficient to justify federal intervention. 401 U.S. at 48, 91 S.Ct. at 752 (emphasis supplied).FN8. There may, of course, be extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment. For example, as long ago as the Buck case, supra, [Watson v. Buck, 1941, 313 U.S. 387, 61 S.Ct. 962, 85 L.Ed. 1416] we indicated:It is of course conceivable that a statute might be flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it. 313 U.S., at 402, 61 S.Ct., at 967. Other unusual situations calling for federal intervention might also arise, but there is no point in our attempting now to specify what they might be. 401 U.S. at 53, 91 S.Ct. at 755. See also Younger v. Harris, supra, 401 U.S. at 54, 91 S.Ct. 746 (Stewart J., with whom Harlan, J. joined, concurring).**Bad-faith harassment can, of course, take many forms, including arrests and prosecutions under valid statutes where there is no reasonable hope of obtaining conviction, see e. g., Cameron v. Johnson, supra, 390 U.S. [611] at 621, 88 S.Ct. [1335] at 1340, 20 L.Ed.2d 182, and a pattern of discriminatory enforcement designed to inhibit the exercise of federal rights, see, e. g., Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201 (CA 5 1963). Perez v. Ledesma, supra, 401 U.S. at 118, 91 S.Ct. at 693, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (Brennan, J., with whom White, J. and Marshall, J. joined, concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Dyson v. Stein, the Court stressed that the existence of such irreparable injury was a matter to be determined carefully under the facts of each case. 401 U.S. at 203, 91 S.Ct. 769, 27 L.Ed.2d 781.Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 88 S. Ct. 1335, 20 L. Ed. 2d 182, 1968 U.S. LEXIS 1879 (1968)Action for judgment declaring Mississippi antipicketing law to be void on its face and for permanent injunction against enforcement of the statute. A three-judge District Court, 244 F.Supp. 846, dismissed the complaint. The United States Supreme Court, 381 U.S. 741, 85 S.Ct. 1751, 14 L.Ed.2d 715, vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration. The three-judge District Court, 262 F.Supp. 873, then dismissed the complaint with prejudice, and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Brennan, held that the law was not void for vagueness or over-breadth, and that federal injunction against enforcement was properly denied where it appeared that there was no **harassment, **intimidation, or **oppression of accused, but that they had been arrested and were being prosecuted in good faith for their deliberate violation of statute.Affirmed.[1] Disorderly Conduct 129 101129 Disorderly Conduct 129k101 k. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 129k1, 110k13.1(3), 110k13) Disorderly Conduct 129 111129 Disorderly Conduct 129k111 k. Parades, Demonstrations, and Picketing in General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 129k1, 110k13.1(3), 110k13)Mississippi antipicketing law prohibiting picketing which obstructs or unreasonably interferes with free ingress or egress to and from public buildings and property is not void for vagueness. Code Miss.1942, 2318.5.[2] Constitutional Law 92 117892 Constitutional Law 92X First Amendment in General 92X(B) Particular Issues and Applications 92k1178 k. Government Property or Facilities. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 92k91) Constitutional Law 92 208592 Constitutional Law 92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Press 92XVIII(V) Judicial Proceedings 92XVIII(V)1 In General 92k2085 k. In General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 92k90.1(3), 92k90)Prohibition of conduct which obstructs or unreasonably interferes with ingress or egress to or from courthouse does not abridge constitutional liberty since such activity bears no necessary relation to freedom to distribute information or opinion.Disorderly Conduct 129 101129 Disorderly Conduct 129k101 k. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 129k1, 110k13.1(3), 110k13) Disorderly Conduct 129 111129 Disorderly Conduct 129k111 k. Parades, Demonstrations, and Picketing in General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 129k1, 110k13.1(3), 110k13)Mississippi antipicketing law, prohibiting picketing which obstructs or unreasonably interferes with free ingress or egress to or from public buildings or property is not void as overbroad. Code Miss.1942, 2318.5.[6] Courts 106 508(7)106 Courts 106VII Concurrent and Conflicting Jurisdiction 106VII(B) State Courts and United States Courts 106k508 Injunction by United States Court Against Proceedings in State Court 106k508(2) Restraining Particular Proceedings 106k508(7) k. Criminal Proceedings. Most Cited Cases Federal injunction against enforcement of Mississippi antipicketing law was properly denied where statute was not void on its face and it appeared that there was no harassment, intimidation, or oppression of accused, but that they had been arrested and were being prosecuted in good faith for their deliberate violation of statute. Code Miss.1942, 2318.5.[8] Courts 106 508(7)106 Courts 106VII Concurrent and Conflicting Jurisdiction 106VII(B) State Courts and United States Courts 106k508 Injunction by United States Court Against Proceedings in State Court 106k508(2) Restraining Particular Proceedings 106k508(7) k. Criminal Proceedings. Most Cited Cases **Record in proceeding to enjoin enforcement of Mississippi antipicketing law did not support contention that prosecutions were bad faith attempts to harass accuseds' exercise of protected expression with no intention of pressing charges or **obtaining convictions, despite claims that accused had been entrapped by failure to make arrests on other occasions, that the evidence was insufficient to secure convictions, and that parades had been permitted. Code Miss.1942, 2318.5.[10] Courts 106 508(7)106 Courts 106VII Concurrent and Conflicting Jurisdiction 106VII(B) State Courts and United States Courts 106k508 Injunction by United States Court Against Proceedings in State Court 106k508(2) Restraining Particular Proceedings 106k508(7) k. Criminal Proceedings. Most Cited Cases Mere possibility of erroneous application of state criminal statute does not amount to irreparable injury necessary to justify federal injunction; issue of guilt or innocence is for state court at criminal trial and state need not prove accused guilty in federal proceeding to escape finding that state had no expectation of securing valid convictions.[4][5] Dombrowski recognized, 380 U.S., at 483-485, 85 S.Ct., at 1119-1120, the continuing validity of the maxim that a federal district court should be slow to act where its powers are invoked to interfere by injunction with threatened criminal prosecutions in a state court. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 162, 63 S.Ct. 877, 880, 87 L.Ed. 1324; see Zwickler v. Koota, supra, 389 U.S., at 253, 88 S.Ct., at 398. Federal interference with a State's good-faith administration of its criminal laws is peculiarly inconsistent with our federal framework and a showing of special circumstances' beyond the injury incidental to every proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith is requisite to a finding of irreparable injury sufficient to justify the extraordinary remedy of an injunction. 380 U.S., at 484, 85 S.Ct., at 1119, 1120. We found such special circumstances' in Dombrowski. The prosecutions there begun and threatened were not, as here, for violation of a statute narrowly regulating conduct which is intertwined with expression, but for alleged violations of various sections of excessively broad Louisiana statutes regulating expression itself-the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law and the Communist Propaganda Control Law. These statutes were challenged as overly broad and vague regulations of expression. Despite state court actions quashing arrest warrants and suppressing evidence purportedly seized in enforcing them, Louisiana officials continued to threaten prosecutions of Dombrowski and his co-appellants under them. In that context, we held that a case of the threat of irreparable injury required by traditional doctrines of equity was made *619 out. 380 U.S., at 490, 85 S.Ct., at 1123. We held further that the sections of the Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law (for alleged violations of which indictments had been obtained while the case was pending in the federal court) were patently unconstitutional on their face, and remanded with direction to frame an appropriate injunction restraining prosecution of the indictments.[6] In short, we viewed Dombrowski to be a case presenting a situation of the impropriety of (state officials) invoking the statute in bad faith to impose **1340 continuing harassment in order to discourage appellants' activities * * *. 380 U.S., at 490, 85 S.Ct., at 1123. In contrast, the District Court expressly found in this case that there was no harassment, intimidation, or oppression of these complainants in their efforts to exercise their constitutional rights, but they were arrested and they are being prosecuted in good faith for their deliberate violation of that part of the statute which denounces interference with the orderly use of courthouse facilities by all citizens alike. 262 F.Supp., at 876, see also 244 F.Supp., at 848-849. We cannot say from our independent examination of the record that the District Court erred in denying injunctive relief.[7][8] Any chilling effect on the picketing as a form of protest and expression that flows from good-faith enforcement of this valid statute would not, of course, constitute that enforcement an impermissible invasion of protected freedoms. Cox v. State of Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. at 564, 85 S.Ct. at 480. Appellants' case that there are special circumstances' establishing irreparable injury sufficient to justify federal intervention must therefore come down to the proposition that the statute was enforced against them, not because the Mississippi officials in good faith regarded the picketing as violating the statute, **but in bad faith as harassing appellants' exercise of protected expression with no intention of pressing the charges or **with no expectation of obtaining*620 convictions, knowing that appellants' conduct did not violate the statute. We agree with the District Court that the record does not establish the bad faith charged. This is therefore not a case in which * * * a federal court of equity by withdrawing the determination of guilt from the state courts could rightly afford (appellants) any protection which they could not secure by prompt trial and appeal pursued to this Court.' Douglas v. City of Jeannette, supra, 319 U.S. at 164, 63 S.Ct. at 881. **We have not hesitated on direct review to strike down applications of constitutional statutes which we have found to be unconstitutionally applied to suppress protected freedoms. See Cox v. State of Louisiana, supra; Wright v. State of Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 83 S.Ct. 1240, 10 L.Ed.2d 349; Edwards v. State of South Carolina, supra.[9] Appellants argue that the adoption of the statute in the context of the picketing at the courthouse, and its immediate enforcement by the arrests on April 10 and 11, provide compelling evidence that the statute was conceived and enforced solely to bring a halt to the picketing. Appellants buttress their argument by characterizing as indefensible entrapment the enforcement of the statute on April 10 against picketing conduct which county officials had permitted for almost three months along the march route marked out by the officials themselves. This argument necessarily implies the suggestion that had the statute been law when the picketing started in January it would not have been enforced. There is no support whatever in the record for that proposition. The more reasonable inference is that the authorities believed that until enactment of the statute on April 8 they had no choice but to allow the picketing. In any event, upon the adoption of the law, it became the duty of the authorities in good faith to enforce it, and to prosecute for picketing that violated that law. Similarly, insofar as appellants argue that selective enforcement was shown by the failure to arrest *621 those who were picketing from April 11 to May 18, the short answer is that it is at least as reasonable to infer from the record that the authorities did not regard their conduct in that period as violating the statute. Indeed, the fact that no arrests were made over that five-week period is itself some support for the District Court's rejection of appellants' primary contention that appellees used the statute in bad faith to discourage the pickets **1341 from picketing to foster increased voter registration of Negro citizens.[10] Nor are we persuaded by the argument that, because the evidence adduced at the hearing of the pickets' conduct throughout the period would not be sufficient, in the view of appellants, to sustain conviction on a criminal trial, it was demonstrated that the State had no expectation of securing valid convictions. Dombrowski v. Pfister, supra, 380 U.S. at 490, 85 S.Ct. at 1122. This argument mistakenly supposes that special circumstances' justifying injunctive relief appear if it is not shown that the statute was in fact violated. But the question for the District Court was not the guilt or innocence of the persons charged; **the question was whether the statute was enforced against them with no expectation of convictions but only to discourage exercise of protected rights. The mere possibility of erroneous application of the statute does not amount to the irreparable injury necessary to justify a disruption of orderly state proceedings. Dombrowski v. Pfister, supra, 380 U.S. at 485, 85 S.Ct. at 1120. The issue of guilt or innocence is for the state court at the criminal trial; the State was not required to prove appellants guilty in the federal proceeding to escape the finding that the State had no expectation of securing valid convictions.FN11 Appellants say that the picketing was nonobstructive,*622 but the State claims quite the contrary, and **the record is not totally devoid of support for the State's claim.FN11. See 244 F.Supp., at 849: (T)his Court indicates nothing as to the guilt or innocence of the plaintiffs * * *; 262 F.Supp., at 876: We do not sit in this proceeding to determine the guilt or innocence of the plaintiffs * * *.Appellants argue that selective enforcement was shown by the evidence that subsequent to the arrests of the pickets parades were held in Hattiesburg during which the streets of the downtown area, including the locale of the courthouse, were cordoned off during daytime business hours and the sidewalks were obstructed by crowds of spectators during the parades. But this statute is not aimed at obstructions resulting from parades on the city streets. All that it prohibits is the obstruction of or unreasonable interference with ingress and egress to and from public buildings, including courthouses, and with traffic on the streets or sidewalks adjacent to those buildings. There was no evidence of conduct of that nature at any other place which would have brought the statute into play, let alone evidence that the authorities allowed such conduct without enforcing the statute.Affirmed.

Cox v. State of La., 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (U.S.La., Jan 18, 1965)

Defendant was convicted of violating Louisiana statute punishing picketing near a courthouse. The Nineteenth Judicial District Court of the Parish of East Baton Rouge entered judgment, and the defendant appealed. The Louisiana Supreme Court, 245 La. 303, 158 So.2d 172, affirmed the judgment, and the defendant appealed. The United States Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Goldberg, held that where highest police officials of city, in presence of sheriff and mayor, in effect told demonstrators led by defendant that they could meet across street from courthouse, 101 feet from courthouse steps, but could not meet closer to courthouse, due process did not permit conviction of defendant under statute punishing picketing near courthouse.Judgment of Louisiana Supreme Court reversed.Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Harlan dissented.[12] Constitutional Law 92 452592 Constitutional Law 92XXVII Due Process 92XXVII(H) Criminal Law 92XXVII(H)3 Law Enforcement 92k4521 Conduct of Police and Prosecutors in General 92k4525 k. Reliance on Official Assurance as to Legality of Conduct. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 92k257)Where highest police officials of city, in presence of sheriff and mayor, in effect told demonstrators led by defendant that they could meet across street from courthouse, 101 feet from courthouse steps, but could not meet closer to courthouse, due process did not permit conviction of defendant under statute punishing picketing near courthouse. LSA-R.S. 14:401.[13] Obstructing Justice 282 6282 Obstructing Justice 282k6 k. Obstructing or Interfering with Judicial Proceedings. Most Cited Cases Where highest police officials of city, in presence of sheriff and mayor, in effect told demonstrators led by defendant that they could meet across street from courthouse, sheriff's subsequent order to defendant to leave, because officials erroneously concluded that defendant had threatened a breach of the peace, did not remove prior grant of permission to meet and did not justify conviction of defendant, who refused to leave, for violating statute punishing picketing near courthouse. LSA-R.S. 14:401; U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 1, 14.[14] Constitutional Law 92 143092 Constitutional Law 92XIV Right of Assembly 92k1430 k. In General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 92k90.1(2), 92k90) Constitutional Law 92 184592 Constitutional Law 92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Press 92XVIII(K) Protests and Demonstrations in General 92XVIII(K)1 In General 92k1845 k. In General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 92k90.1(2), 92k90)Constitutional command of free speech and assembly is basic and fundamental and encompasses peaceful social protest. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 1, 14.Mr. Justice GOLDBERG delivered the opinion of the Court.Appellant was convicted of violating a Louisiana statute which provides:Whoever, with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice, or with the intent of influencing any judge, juror, witness, or court officer, in the discharge of his duty pickets or parades in or near a building housing a court of the State of Louisiana * * * shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. LSA-Rev.Stat. s 14:401 (Cum.Supp.1962).This charge was based upon the same set of facts as the disturbing the peace and obstructing a public passage charges **479 involved and set forth in 85 S.Ct. 453, ante, and was tried along with those offenses. Appellant was convicted on this charge also and was sentenced to the maximum penalty under the statute of one year in jail and a $5,000 fine, which penalty was cumulative with those in No. 24. These convictions were affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, 245 La. 303, 158 So.2d 172. Appellant appealed to this Court contending that the statute was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him. We noted probable jurisdiction, 377 U.S. 921, 84 S.Ct. 1222, 12 L.Ed.2d 214.I.We shall first consider appellant's contention that this statute must be declared invalid on its face as an unjustified restriction upon freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Wright v. State of Ga., 373 U.S. 284, 83 S.Ct. 1240, 10 L.Ed.2d 349 (U.S.Ga., May 20, 1963)

Prosecution for breach of the peace. The City Court of Savannah entered judgments of conviction and the defendants brought error. The Supreme Court of Georgia, 217 Ga. 453, 122 S.E.2d 737, affirmed and certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, held that there was no showing that Negro defendants, ordered to leave municipally owned park and thereafter charged with breach of the peace, had adequate notice that their conduct in peacefully playing basketball at park was prohibited by breach of peace statute.Reversed.[5] Obstructing Justice 282 7282 Obstructing Justice 282k7 k. Obstructing or Interfering with Performance of Duties of Ministerial Officers. Most Cited Cases One cannot be punished for failing to obey command of police officer if that command is itself violative of Constitution.[6] Constitutional Law 92 326792 Constitutional Law 92XXVI Equal Protection 92XXVI(B) Particular Classes 92XXVI(B)8 Race, National Origin, or Ethnicity 92k3262 Government Property, Facilities, and Funds 92k3267 k. Recreation and Entertainment Facilities. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 92k217(1), 92k219)Police officer's command, given with intent to enforce racial discrimination in park, that Negro defendants should leave city owned park violated Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.[7] Constitutional Law 92 329792 Constitutional Law 92XXVI Equal Protection 92XXVI(B) Particular Classes 92XXVI(B)8 Race, National Origin, or Ethnicity 92k3296 Criminal Law 92k3297 k. In General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 92k223, 92k250)Negro defendants could not constitutionally be convicted of violation of breach of the peace statute for refusal to leave municipally owned park where police officers' order to leave was violative of defendants' rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Code Ga., 26-5301; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.[8] Criminal Law 110 13.1110 Criminal Law 110I Nature and Elements of Crime 110k12 Statutory Provisions 110k13.1 k. Certainty and Definiteness. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 110k13.1(2.5), 110k13.1(2), 110k13)Generally worded statute which is construed to punish conduct which cannot constitutionally be punished is unconstitutionally vague to extent that it fails to give adequate warning of boundary between constitutionally permissible and constitutionally impermissible applications of statute.[9] Constitutional Law 92 352192 Constitutional Law 92XXVI Equal Protection 92XXVI(E) Particular Issues and Applications 92XXVI(E)4 Government Property, Facilities, and Funds 92k3521 k. Control and Use in General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 92k212)Possibility of disorder by others cannot justify exclusion of persons from place if they otherwise have constitutional right, founded upon Equal Protection Clause, to be present. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.[10] Disorderly Conduct 129 132129 Disorderly Conduct 129k129 Challenges and Resistance to Authority 129k132 k. Disobedience in General; Failure to Disperse. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 62k8 Breach of the Peace)Evidence was insufficient to show that Negro defendants, who were asked to leave municipally owned park, were guilty of breach of peace because their peacefully playing there was likely to cause breach of peace by others. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; Code Ga., 26-5301.[11] Disorderly Conduct 129 132129 Disorderly Conduct 129k129 Challenges and Resistance to Authority 129k132 k. Disobedience in General; Failure to Disperse. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 62k8 Breach of the Peace)Evidence was insufficient to show that Negro defendants, ordered to leave municipally owned park, had been guilty of breach of peace because park rule reserved playground for use of younger people at that time where neither existence nor posting of such rule had been proved. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; Code Ga., 26-5301.[12] Disorderly Conduct 129 101129 Disorderly Conduct 129k101 k. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 62k8 Breach of the Peace) Disorderly Conduct 129 132129 Disorderly Conduct 129k129 Challenges and Resistance to Authority 129k132 k. Disobedience in General; Failure to Disperse. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 62k8 Breach of the Peace) Disorderly Conduct 129 140129 Disorderly Conduct 129k140 k. Other Particular Conduct. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 62k8 Breach of the Peace)There was no showing that Negro defendants, ordered to leave municipally owned park and thereafter charged with breach of the peace, had adequate notice that their conduct in peacefully playing basketball at park was prohibited by breach of peace statute. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; Code Ga. 26-5301.[13] Constitutional Law 92 450592 Constitutional Law 92XXVII Due Process 92XXVII(H) Criminal Law 92XXVII(H)2 Nature and Elements of Crime 92k4502 Creation and Definition of Offense 92k4505 k. Certainty and Definiteness in General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 92k258(2), 92k258)Conviction under criminal enactment which does not give adequate notice that conduct charged is prohibited is violative of due process. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.Mr. Chief Justice WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.Petitioners, six young Negroes, were convicted of breach of the peace for peacefully playing basketball in a public park in Savannah, Georgia, on the early afternoon of Monday, Januay 23, 1961. The record is devoid of evidence of any activity which a breach of the peace statute might be thought to punish. Finding that there is no adequate state ground to bar review by this Court and that the convictions are violative of due process of law secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, we hold that the judgments below must be reversed.Only four witnesses testified at petitioners' trial: the two arresting officers, the city recreational superintendent, and a sergeant of police. All were prosecution witnesses. No witness contradicted any testimony given by any other witnesses. On the day in question the petitioners were playing in a basketball court at Daffin Park, Savannah, Georgia. The park is owned and operated by the city for recreational purposes, is about 50 acres in area, and is customarily used only by whites. A white woman notified the two police officer witnesses of the presence of petitioners in the park. They investigated, according to *286 one officer, because some colored people were playing in the park. I did not ask this white lady how old these people were. As soon as I found out these were colored people I immediately went there. The officer also conceded that I have never made previous arrests in Daffin Park because people played basketball there * * *. I arrested these people for playing basketball in Daffin Park. One reason was because they were negroes. I observed the conduct of these people, when they were on the basketball Court and they were doing nothing besides playing basketball, they were just normally playing basketball, and none of the children from the schools were there at that particular time. The other officer admitted that petitioners were not necessarily creating any disorder, they were just shooting at the goal, that's all they were doing, they wasn't disturbing anything.' Petitioners were neat and well dressed. Nevertheless, the officers ordered the petitioners to leave the park. One petitioner asked one of the officers by what authority he asked them to leave; the officer responded that he didn't need any orders to come out there * * *. But he admitted that it is (not) unusual for one to inquire why they are being arrested.' When arrested the petitioners obeyed the police orders and without disturbance entered the cruiser to be transported to police headquarters. No crowd assembled.The recreational superintendent's testimony was confused and contradictory. In essence he testified that school children had preference in the use of the park's playground facilities but that there was no objection to use by older persons if children were not there at the time. No children were present at this time. The arrests were made at about 2 p.m. The schools released their students at 2:30 and, according to one officer, it would have been at least 30 minutes before any children could have reached the playground. The officer also stated that he *287 did not know whether the basketball court was reserved for a particular age group and did not know the rules of the City Recreational Department. It was conceded at the trial that no signs were posted in the park indicating what areas, if any, were reserved for younger children at particular hours. In oral argument before this Court it was conceded that the regulations of the park were not printed.**1243 The accusation charged petitioners with assembling for the purpose of disturbing the public peace * * *. and not dispersing at the command of the officers. The jury was charged, with respect to the offense itself, only in terms of the accusation and the statute.FN1 Upon conviction five petitioners were sentenced to pay a fine of $100 or to serve five months in prison. Petitioner Wright was sentenced to pay a fine of $125 or to serve six months in prison.FN1. The statute, Ga.Code Ann., 1953, s 26-5301, provides:Unlawful assemblies.-Any two or more persons who shall assemble for the purpose of disturbing the public peace or committing any unlawful act, and shall not disperse on being commanded to do so by a judge, justice, sheriff, constable, coroner, or other peace officer, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.[1][2] Petitioners' principal contention in this Court is that the breach of the peace statute did not give adequate warning that their conduct violated that enactment in derogation of their rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. This contention was plainly raised at the trial, both in a demurrer to the accusation and in motions for a new trial, and was pressed on appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court. Both the demurrer and new trial motions raised a number of other issues. The Georgia Supreme Court held that error in the denial of the motions for a new trial could not be considered because it was not properly briefed on the appeal. But the court nevertheless*288 seemed to pass upon the claim because it had been raised in the demurrer,FN2 and affirmed the convictions. 217 Ga. 453, 122 S.E.2d 737. Certiorari was granted. 370 U.S. 935, 82 S.Ct. 1580, 8 L.Ed.2d 806.FN2. The Georgia court refused to consider two of the constitutional claims asserted in the demurrer. But these allegations charged only unconstitutional administration of the statute. It is well settled in Georgia that the constitutionality of the statute upon which the charge is based may be attacked by demurrer. The Georgia Supreme Court, over 65 years ago, held that (u)nder the general demurrer (to the accusation) the constitutionality of the law under which the accused was arraigned is brought in question. Newman v. State, 101 Ga. 534, 536, 28 S.E. 1005 (1897). This rule was later qualified to require the defendant to set out the ground of his attack with particularity in the demurrer. See, e.g., Henderson v. Georgia, 123 Ga. 465, 466, 51 S.E. 385, 386. In numerous cases it has been assumed that a constitutional objection on the ground of vagueness may properly be made by demurrer. Teague v. Keith, 214 Ga. 853, 108 S.E.2d 489; Harris v. State, 191 Ga. 243, 12 S.E.2d 64; Carr v. State, 176 Ga. 747, 169 S.E. 201; Dalton v. State, 176 Ga. 645, 169 S.E. 198; Carr v. State, 176 Ga. 55, 166 S.E. 827, 167 S.E. 103; Hughes v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 162 Ga. 246, 134 S.E. 42. See also Henderson v. State, 113 Ga. 1148, 39 S.E. 446. In other cases the Georgia Supreme Court has held that certain procedures, other than a demurrer, do not constitute the proper method to attack the constitutionality of the statute upon which the charge or claim was based.In each of these cases the Georgia court specifically stated that a demurrer would constitute a proper procedural device. Eaves v. State, 113 Ga. 749, 758, 39 S.E. 318, 321; Boswell v. State, 114 Ga. 40, 41, 39 S.E. 897; Hendry v. State, 147 Ga. 260, 265, 93 S.E. 413, 415; Starling v. State, 149 Ga. 172, 99 S.E. 619; Savannah Elec. Co. v. Thomas, 154 Ga. 258, 113 S.E. 806; Moore v. State, 194 Ga. 672, 22 S.E.2d 510; Stone v. State, 202 Ga. 203, 42 S.E.2d 727; Loomis v. State, 203 Ga. 394, 405, 47 S.E.2d 58, 64; Flynt v. Dumas, 205 Ga. 702, 54 S.E.2d 429; Corbin v. State, 212 Ga. 231, 91 S.E.2d 764; Renfroe v. Wallace, 214 Ga. 685, 107 S.E.2d 225.Respondent does not argue that an adequate state ground exists insofar as petitioners' claim of vagueness was raised in the demurrer.Since there is some question as to whether the Georgia Supreme Court considered petitioners' claim of vagueness *289 to have been properly raised in the demurrer,FN3 we prefer to rest our jurisdiction upon a firmer foundation. We hold, **1244 for the reasons set forth hereinafter, that there was no adequate state ground for the Georgia court's refusal to consider error in the denial of petitioners' motions for a new trial.At p.289,

In this case the Georgia Supreme Court held that error in the denial of the motions for a new trial could not be considered because (t)here was no argument, citation of authority, or statement that (the grounds for reversal stated in the new trial motions) * * * were still relied upon. The court found the applicable rule, as laid *290 down in Henderson v. Lott, 163 Ga. 326 (2), 136 S.E. 403, (to be) * * *: Assignments of error, not insisted upon by counsel in their briefs or otherwise, will be treated by this court as abandoned. A mere recital in briefs of the existence of an assignment of error, without argument or citation of authorities in its support, and without a statement that it is insisted upon by counsel, is insufficient to save it from being treated as abandoned. 217 Ga., at 454-455, 122 S.E.2d, at 740. Presumably the court was restating the requirements of s 6-1308 of the Georgia Annotated Code of 1935. That section provides: All questions raised in the motion for new trial shall be considered by the appellate court except where questions so raised are expressly or impliedly abandoned by counsel either in the brief or upon oral argument. A general insistence upon all the grounds of the motion shall be held to be sufficient.[4] To ascertain the precise holding of the Georgia court we must examine the brief which the petitioners submitted in connection with their appeal. It specifically assigned as error the overruling of their motions for a new trial. And in the section of the brief devoted to argument it was stated:Plaintiffs-in-Error had assembled for the purpose of playing basketball and were in fact only playing basketball in a municipally owned park, according to the State's own evidence. Nevertheless, they were arrested and convicted under the said statute which prohibited assemblies for the purpose of disturbing the public peace or committing any unlawful act. Where a statute is so vague as to make criminal an innocent act, a conviction under it cannot be sustained. Murray Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840). * * * Plaintiffs-in-Error**1245 could not possibly have predetermined from the wording of *291 the statute that it would have punished as a misdemeanor an assembly for the purpose of playing basketball.'Obviously petitioners did in fact argue the point which they press in this Court. Thus the holding of the Georgia court must not have been that the petitioners abandoned their argument but rather that the argument could not be considered because it was not explicitly identified in the brief with the motions for a new trial. In short the Georgia court would require the petitioners to say something like the following at the end of the paragraph quoted above: A fortiori it was error for the trial court to overrule the motions for a new trial. As was said in a similar case coming to us from the Georgia courts, this would be to force resort to an arid ritual of meaningless form. Staub v. City of Baxley, supra, 355 U.S. at 320, 78 S.Ct. at 281. The State may not do that here any more than it could in Staub. Here, as in Staub, the state ground is inadequate. Its inadequacy is especially apparent because no prior Georgia case which respondent has cited nor which we have found gives notice of the existence of any requirement that an argument in a brief be specifically identified with a motion made in the trial court. (A) local procedural rule, although it may now appear in retrospect to form part of a consistent pattern of procedures * * *, cannot avail the State here, because petitioner(s) could not fairly be deemed to have been apprised of its existence. Novelty in procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this Court * * *. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, supra, 357 U.S. at 457, 78 S.Ct. at 1169. We proceed to a consideration of the merits of petitioners' constitutional claim.II.[5][6]

HYPERLINK \l "Document1zzF71963125357"[7]

HYPERLINK \l "Document1zzF81963125357"[8] Three possible bases for petitioners' convictions are suggested. First, it is said that failure to obey the command of a police officer constitutes a traditional form of breach of the peace. Obviously, however, one cannot be punished*292 for failing to obey the command of an officer if that command is itself violative of the Constitution. The command of the officers in this case was doubly a violation of petitioners' constitutional rights. It was obviously based, according to the testimony of the arresting officers themselves, upon their intention to enforce racial discrimination in the park. For this reason the order violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54, 79 S.Ct. 99, 3 L.Ed.2d 46, affirming 5 Cir., 252 F.2d 122. The command was also violative of petitioners' rights because, as will be seen, the other asserted basis for the order-the possibility of disorder by others-could not justify exclusion of the petitioners from the park. Thus petitioners could not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to obey the officers. If petitioners were held guilty of violating the Georgia statute because they disobeyed the officers, this case falls within the rule that a generally worded statute which is construed to punish conduct which cannot constitutionally be punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute. Cf. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117; see also Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 68 S.Ct. 514, 92 L.Ed. 644.[9][10] Second, it is argued that petitioners were guilty of a breach of the peace because their activity was likely to cause a breach of the peace by others. The only evidence to support this contention is testimony of one of the police officers that The purpose of asking them to leave was to keep down trouble, which **1246 looked like to me might start-there were five or six cars driving around the park at the time, white people. But that officer also stated that this was (not) unusual traffic for that time of day. And the park was 50 acres in area. Respondent *293 contends the petitioners were forewarned that their conduct would be held to violate the statute. See Samuels v. State, 103 Ga.App. 66, 118 S.E.2d 231. But it is sufficient to say again that a generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished, is unconstitutionally vague.And the possibility of disorder by others cannot justify exclusion of persons from a place if they otherwise have a constitutional right (founded upon the Equal Protection Clause) to be present. Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154, 82 S.Ct. 1188, 8 L.Ed.2d 395; Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 174, 82 S.Ct. 248, 257, 7 L.Ed.2d 207; see also Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 80-81, 38 S.Ct. 16, 20, 62 L.Ed. 149.[11] Third, it is said that the petitioners were guilty of a breach of the peace because a park rule reserved the playground for the use of younger people at the time. However, neither the existence nor the posting of any such rule has been proved. Cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228, 78 S.Ct. 240, 242, 2 L.Ed.2d 228. The police officers did not inform them of it because they had no knowledge of any such rule themselves. Furthermore, it is conceded that there was no sign or printed regulation which would give notice of any such rule.[12][13] Under any view of the facts alleged to constitute the violation it cannot be maintained that petitioners had adequate notice that their conduct was prohibited by the breach of the peace statute.It is well established that a conviction under a criminal enactment which does not give adequate notice that the conduct charged is prohibited is violative of due process. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888; Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322; United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298, 65 L.Ed. 516; see also United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 83 S.Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561.Reversed.U.S.Ga. 1963.

**31Comment Note.--Conviction of criminal offense without evidence as denial of due process of law, 80 A.L.R.2d 1362 (1961)

3526Comment Note.--Impeachment of witness by evidence or inquiry as to arrest, accusation, or prosecution, 20 A.L.R.2d 1421 (1951)

Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (U.S.S.C., Feb 25, 1963)

Prosecution of group of Negroes for breach of the peace. From an adverse judgment of the General Sessions Court of Richland County, South Carolina, the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, 239 S.C. 339, 123 S.E.2d 247, affirmed, and certiorari was granted. The United States Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Stewart, held that arrest, conviction and punishment of group of Negroes for breach of the peace by marching peacefully on sidewalk around State House grounds to publicize their dissatisfaction with discriminatory actions against Negroes infringed their constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances.Reversed.Mr. Justice Clark dissented.[2] Disorderly Conduct 129 111129 Disorderly Conduct 129k111 k. Parades, Demonstrations, and Picketing in General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 62k1(7) Breach of the Peace, 92k274.1(5)) Constitutional Law 92 143192 Constitutional Law 92XIV Right of Assembly 92k1431 k. Government Property. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 92k274.1(5)) Constitutional Law 92 143592 Constitutional Law 92XV Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances 92k1435 k. In General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 92k274.1(5)) Constitutional Law 92 181392 Constitutional Law 92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Press 92XVIII(H) Law Enforcement; Criminal Conduct 92k1813 k. Breach of the Peace; Unlawful Assembly. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 92k274.1(5))Arrest, conviction, and punishment of group of Negroes for breach of the peace by marching peacefully on sidewalk around State House grounds to publicize their dissatisfaction with discriminatory actions against Negroes infringed their constitutionally protected rights of **free speech, **free assembly, and **freedom to petition for redress of their grievances. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 1, 14.[3] Constitutional Law 92 385192 Constitutional Law 92XXVII Due Process 92XXVII(A) In General 92k3848 Relationship to Other Constitutional Provisions; Incorporation 92k3851 k. First Amendment. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 92k274.1(1), 92k274(1), 92k2)The freedoms given by the First Amendment are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the states. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 1, 14.[4] Constitutional Law 92 180092 Constitutional Law 92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Press 92XVIII(H) Law Enforcement; Criminal Conduct 92k1800 k. In General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 92k274.1(1))A state cannot make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.[5] Constitutional Law 92 403492 Constitutional Law 92XXVII Due Process 92XXVII(G) Particular Issues and Applications 92XXVII(G)1 In General 92k4034 k. Speech, Press, Assembly, and Petition. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 92k274.1(1))A statute which upon its face, and as authoritatively construed, is so vague and indefinite as to permit punishment of political discussion is repugnant to guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.Prosecution of group of Negroes for breach of the peace. From an adverse judgment of the General Sessions Court of Richland County, South Carolina, the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, 239 S.C. 339, 123 S.E.2d 247, affirmed, and certiorari was granted. The United States Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Stewart, held that arrest, conviction and punishment of group of Negroes for breach of the peace by marching peacefully on sidewalk around State House grounds to publicize their dissatisfaction with discriminatory actions against Negroes infringed their constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances.Reversed.Mr. Justice Clark dissented.[2] Disorderly Conduct 129 111129 Disorderly Conduct 129k111 k. Parades, Demonstrations, and Picketing in General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 62k1(7) Breach of the Peace, 92k274.1(5)) Constitutional Law 92 143192 Constitutional Law 92XIV Right of Assembly 92k1431 k. Government Property. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 92k274.1(5)) Constitutional Law 92 143592 C