VOL.366,OCTOBER2,2001 437

Garcia vs. Recio

G.R.No.138322.October2,2001.*

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA­RECIO,petitioner,vs.REDERICKA.RECIO,respondent.

Marriages; Husband and Wife; Divorce; Conflict of Laws;Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce, hence, ourcourts cannot grant it, and a marriage between two Filipinoscannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad.—At theoutset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take­offpoints for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide forabsolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriagebetween two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorceobtainedabroad,becauseofArticles15and17oftheCivilCode.Inmixedmarriages involvingaFilipinoanda foreigner,Article26ofthe Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequentmarriageincasethedivorceis“validlyobtainedabroadbythealienspouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” A divorce obtainedabroadbyacouple,whoarebothaliens,mayberecognizedinthePhilippines, provided it is consistentwith their respective nationallaws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Before a foreign divorcedecree can be recognized, the party pleading it must prove thedivorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign lawallowing it.—Acomparisonbetweenmarriageanddivorce,asfaraspleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v.Romillo, Jr.decreesthat“aliensmayobtaindivorcesabroad,whichmay be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are validaccordingtotheirnationallaw.”Therefore,beforeaforeigndivorcedecreecanberecognizedbyourcourts, thepartypleading itmustprove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to theforeign lawallowing it.Presentationsolelyof thedivorcedecree isinsufficient.

_______________

*THIRDDIVISION.

438

438 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Garcia vs. Recio

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Before a foreign judgment isgiven presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first bepresented and admitted in evidence.—Respondent, on the otherhand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a publicdocument—a written official act of an Australian family court.Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and dueexecution.Respondentisgettingaheadofhimself.Beforeaforeignjudgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the documentmust first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorceobtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed thebest evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decreepurportstobeawrittenactorrecordofanactofanofficialbodyortribunalofaforeigncountry.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Proof of Foreign Public orOfficial Records; Requisites.—Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule132,ontheotherhand,awritingordocumentmaybeprovenasapublicorofficialrecordofaforeigncountrybyeither(1)anofficialpublication,or(2)acopythereofattestedbytheofficerhavinglegalcustodyofthedocument.IftherecordisnotkeptinthePhilippines,such copymust be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by theproperdiplomaticorconsularofficerinthePhilippineforeignservicestationedintheforeigncountryinwhichtherecordiskept,and(b)authenticatedbythesealofhisoffice.Thedivorcedecreebetweenrespondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic oneissued by anAustralian family court.However, appearance is notsufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidencemustbedemonstrated.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A party’s failure to objectproperly renders a foreign divorce decree admissible as a written actof the court of another State.—Fortunately for respondent’s cause,when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted inevidence,counselforpetitionerobjected,nottoitsadmissibility,butonly to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local CivilRegistry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was

admissible, subject to petitioner’s qualification. Hence, it wasadmitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,petitioner’s failure to object properly rendered the divorce decreeadmissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney,Australia.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Citizenship; A former Filipinois no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquiresanother State’s citizenship.—Compliance with the quoted articles(11,13and52)oftheFamilyCodeisnotnecessary,respondentwasno longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquiredAustraliancitizenshipin1992.Natu­

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Garcia vs. Recio

ralizationisthelegalactofadoptinganalienandclothinghimwiththe political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalizedcitizens, freed from theprotective cloak of their former states, dontheattiresof theiradoptivecountries.BybecominganAustralian,respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and thevinculum juristhathadtiedhimtoPhilippinepersonallaws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The burden of proof lies withthe party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in theprosecution or defense of an action; Where a divorce decree is adefense raised by a party, the burden of proving the pertinentforeign law validating it falls squarely upon him.—Theburdenofprooflieswith“thepartywhoallegestheexistenceofafactorthingnecessaryintheprosecutionordefenseofanaction.”Incivilcases,plaintiffshavetheburdenofprovingthematerialallegationsofthecomplaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendantshavetheburdenofprovingthematerialallegationsintheiranswerwhentheyintroducenewmatters.Sincethedivorcewasadefenseraised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinentAustralianlawvalidatingitfallssquarelyuponhim.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; Our courts donot take judicial notice of foreign laws—like any other facts, theymust be alleged and proved.—It is well­settled in our jurisdictionthatourcourtscannottakejudicialnoticeofforeignlaws.Likeanyother facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian maritallawsarenotamongthosemattersthatjudgesaresupposedtoknow

by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial noticemust be exercisedwith caution, and every reasonable doubt uponthesubjectshouldberesolvedinthenegative.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In its strict legalsense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for acause arising after marriage; A decree nisi or an interlocutory order—a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce—is in effect thesame as a separation from bed and board, although an absolutedivorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period duringwhich no reconciliation is effected.—Respondent’s contention isuntenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legaldissolutionofalawfulunionforacausearisingaftermarriage.Butdivorcesareofdifferent types.Thetwobasiconesare (1)absolutedivorceora vinculo matrimonii,and(2)limiteddivorceora mensaet thoro. The first kind terminates themarriage,while the secondsuspendsitandleavesthebondinfullforce.Thereisnoshowinginthecaseatbarwhichtypeofdivorcewasprocuredbyrespondent.Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree—aconditionalorprovi­

440

440 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Garcia vs. Recio

sional judgmentofdivorce. It is ineffect thesameasaseparationfrombedandboard,althoughanabsolutedivorcemayfollowafterthe lapseoftheprescribedperiodduringwhichnoreconciliation iseffected. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court mayundersome foreignstatutesandpractices, still restrict remarriage.Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited bystatute; thus, the guilty party in a divorcewhichwas granted onthegroundofadulterymaybeprohibitedfrommarryingagain.Thecourtmayallowaremarriageonlyafterproofofgoodbehavior.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; A divorce decree doesnot raise a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to thecivil status of the person presenting it where no proof has beenpresented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained underthe foreign law.—We also reject the claim of respondent that thedivorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptiveevidence as tohis civil status based onSection 48,Rule 39 of theRules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been

presentedonthe legaleffectsof thedivorcedecreeobtainedunderAustralianlaws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Certificate of Legal Capacity; Thelegal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the nationallaw of the party concerned; The certificate of legal capacitymentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code is sufficient to establishthe legal capacity of a foreign national—a duly authenticated andadmitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity tomarry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriagelicense.—Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacityrequired by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submittedtogether with the application for a marriage license. According toher,itsabsenceisproofthatrespondentdidnothavelegalcapacityto remarry. We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contractmarriageisdeterminedbythenationallawofthepartyconcerned.The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code wouldhave been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent,had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated andadmittedcertificateisprimafacieevidenceoflegalcapacitytomarryonthepartofthealienapplicantforamarriagelicense.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The absence of a certificate oflegal capacity is merely an irregularity in complying with theformal requirements for procuring a marriage license, anirregularity which will not affect the validity of a marriagecelebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued without thatcertificate.—In passing, we note that the absence of the saidcertificateismerelyanirregularityincomplyingwiththefor­

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Garcia vs. Recio

malrequirementforprocuringamarriagelicense.UnderArticle4ofthe Family Code, an irregularity will not affect the validity of amarriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issuedwithoutthatcertificate.(Vitug,Compendium,pp.120­126;Sempio­Diy,Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines,1997reprint,p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code of the PhilippinesAnnotated, 1990 ed., p. 42;Melencio Sta.Maria, Jr.,Persons andFamily Relations Law,1999ed.,p.146.).

Same; Same; Same; Same; A divorce decree does not ipso facto

clothed a divorcee with the legal capacity to remarry—he must stilladduce sufficient evidence to show the foreign State’s personal lawgoverning his status, or at the very least, he should still prove hislegal capacity to contract the second marriage.—Basedontheaboverecords, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then anaturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marrypetitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner’scontention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorcedecree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity toremarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence toshow the Australian personal law governing his status; or at thevery least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the secondmarriage.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court may not declare thesecond marriage of a divorcee null and void on the ground ofbigamy where there is a possibility that, under the foreign law, thedivorcee was really capacitated to remarry as a result of the divorcedecree—the most judicious course is to remand the case to the trialcourt to receive evidence, if any, which show the divorcee’s legalcapacity to remarry.—Neither can we grant petitioner’s prayer todeclarehermarriagetorespondentnullandvoidonthegroundofbigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, hewas really capacitated tomarrypetitioner as a direct result of thedivorcedecree.Hence,webelievethatthemostjudiciouscourseistoremandthiscasetothetrialcourttoreceiveevidence,ifany,whichshowpetitioner’slegalcapacitytomarrypetitioner.Failinginthat,thenthecourta quomaydeclareanullityoftheparties’marriageon the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence twoexisting marriage certificates, which were both obtained in thePhilippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987andtheother,inCabanatuanCitydatedJanuary12,1994.

PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtofCabanatuanCity,Br.28.

ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.

442

442 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Garcia vs. Recio

Olivia Velasco­Jacobaforpetitioner.Anarica De Jesus Castilloco­counselforpetitioner.Gomez and Associatesforrespondent.

PANGANIBAN,J.:

Adivorceobtainedabroadbyanalienmayberecognizedinour jurisdiction,providedsuchdecree isvalidaccordingtothe national law of the foreigner. However, the divorcedecreeandthegoverningpersonal lawof thealienspousewhoobtainedthedivorcemustbeproven.Ourcourtsdonottake judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence,like any other facts, both the divorce decree and thenational law of the alien must be alleged and provenaccordingtoourlawonevidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of theRules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999Decision

1 and theMarch 24, 1999 Order

2 of the Regional

TrialCourtofCabanatuanCity,Branch28, inCivil CaseNo.3026­AF.TheassailedDecisiondisposedasfollows:

“WHEREFORE,thisCourtdeclaresthemarriagebetweenGraceJ.Garcia andRederickA. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 atCabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarryunderexistingandapplicablelawstoanyand/orbothparties.”

3

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above­quotedDecision.

_______________

1PennedbyJudgeFelicianoV.Buenaventura;Rollo,pp.7­9.2Rollo,p.10.3Ibid.,p.9.

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VOL.366,OCTOBER2,2001 443

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The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to EdithaSamson,anAustraliancitizen,inMalabon,Rizal,onMarch1, 1987.

4 They lived together as husband and wife in

Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce,

purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by anAustrianfamilycourt.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australiancitizen, as shown by a “Certificate of AustralianCitizenship” issued by the Australian government.

6

Petitioner—a Filipina—and respondent were married onJanuary12,1994inOurLadyofPerpetualHelpChurchinCabanatuan City.

7 In their application for a marriage

license,respondentwasdeclaredas“single”and“Filipino.”8

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondentlived separately without prior judicial dissolution of theirmarriage. While the two were still in Australia, theirconjugalassetsweredividedonMay16,1996,inaccordancewiththeirStatutoryDeclarationssecuredinAustralia.

9

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint forDeclarationofNullityofMarriage

10 inthecourta quo, on

the ground of bigamy—respondent allegedly had a priorsubsistingmarriageatthetimehemarriedheronJanuary12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent’smarriagetoEdithaSamsononlyinNovember,1997.

InhisAnswer, respondent averred that, as far back as1993,hehadrevealedtopetitionerhispriormarriageandits subsequent dissolution.

11 He contended that his first

marriagetoanAustralian

________________

4Rollo,p.37.5Ibid.,p.47.6Id.,p.44.7Id.,p.36.8Annex“1”;TemporaryRollo,p.9.9 The couple secured anAustralian “StatutoryDeclaration” of their

legalseparationanddivisionofconjugalassets.SeeAnnexes“3”and“4”

ofRespondent’sComment;Rollo,p.48.10Id.,pp.33­35.11Id.,p.39.

444

444 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Garcia vs. Recio

citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree

obtained in Australia in 1989;12 thus, he was legally

capacitatedtomanypetitionerin1994.OnJuly 7, 1998—or about five years after the couple’s

weddingandwhilethesuitforthedeclarationofnullitywaspending—respondent was able to secure a divorce decreefrom a family court in Sydney, Australia because the“marriageha[d]irretrievablybrokendown.”

13

RespondentprayedinhisAnswerthattheComplaintbedismissedonthegroundthatitstatednocauseofaction.

14

TheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralagreedwithrespondent.15

Thecourtmarkedandadmittedthedocumentaryevidenceof both parties.

16 After they submitted their respective

memoranda,thecasewassubmittedforresolution.17

Thereafter,thetrialcourtrenderedtheassailedDecisionandOrder.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on thegroundthat thedivorce issued inAustraliawasvalidandrecognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriageended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essentialelementofthemarriage;thatis,respondent’s alleged lack oflegal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based itsDecision onthedivorcedecreeobtainedbyrespondent.TheAustraliandivorce had ended themarriage; thus, therewas nomoremaritaluniontonullifyorannul.

Hence,thisPetition.18

______________

12AmendedAnswer,p.2;Rollo,p.39.13Id.,pp.77­78.14Id.,p.43.15Rollo,pp.48­51.16TSN,December16,1998,pp.1­8;Records,pp.172­179.17RTCOrderofDecember16,1998;ibid.,p.203.18ThecasewasdeemedsubmittedfordecisiononJanuary11,2000,

upon thisCourt’s receiptof theMemorandumforpetitioner, signedby

Atty. Olivia Velasco­Jacoba. TheMemorandum for respondent, signed

by

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VOL.366,OCTOBER2,2001 445

Garcia vs. Recio

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for ourconsideration:

“1

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decreeobtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated hisfirst marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him tocontractasecondmarriagewiththepetitioner.

“2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalizedAustralian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marryconstitutesabsenceofasubstantialrequisitevoidingthepetitioner’smarriagetotherespondent.

“3

ThetrialcourtseriouslyerredintheapplicationofArt.26oftheFamilyCodeinthiscase.

“4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregardingArts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as theapplicableprovisionsinthiscase.

“5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorcedecree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso factocapacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing arecognitionofthe judgmentgrantingthedivorcedecreebeforeourcourts.”

19

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of thisDecision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1)whether the divorce between respondent and EdithaSamsonwasproven,and(2)whetherrespondentwasproventobelegallycapacitatedtomanypetitioner.Becauseofourrulingon these two, there isnomorenecessity to takeuptherest.

_______________

Atty. Gloria V. Gomez of Gomez and Associates, had been filed on

December10,1999.19Petitioner’sMemorandum,pp.8­9;Rollo,pp.242­243.

446

446 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Garcia vs. Recio

The Court’s Ruling

ThePetitionispartlymeritorious.

First Issue: Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitionerassailsthetrialcourt’srecognitionofthedivorcebetween respondent andEditha Samson. CitingAdong v.Cheong Seng Gee,

20 petitioner argues that the divorce

decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be givenrecognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of theexistence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce,and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds thatrespondentmiserablyfailedtoestablishtheseelements.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph ofArticle26oftheFamilyCode,marriagessolemnizedabroadare governed by the law of the place where they werecelebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Coderequires the presentation of the foreign law to show theconformity of the marriage in question to the legalrequirements of the place where the marriage wasperformed.

Attheoutset,welaythefollowingbasiclegalprinciplesasthetake­offpointsforourdiscussion.Philippinelawdoesnot provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannotgrant it.

21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be

dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because ofArticles15

22and17

23ofthe

_______________

2043Phil.43,49,March3,1922.21RubenF.Balane,“FamilyCourtsandSignificantJurisprudencein

FamilyLaw,”Journal of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,1st&2nd

Quarters,2001,Vol.XXVII,No.1,p.25.22 “ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the

status,conditionandlegalcapacityofpersonsarebindinguponcitizens

ofthePhilippines,eventhoughlivingabroad.”23“ART.17.Theformsandsolemnitiesofcontracts,wills,andother

public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in

whichtheyareexecuted.

xxxxxxxxx

“Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and

those which have for their object public order, public policy and good

cus­

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VOL.366,OCTOBER2,2001 447

Garcia vs. Recio

CivilCode.24InmixedmarriagesinvolvingaFilipinoanda

foreigner,Article2625oftheFamilyCodeallowstheformer

to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is“validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitatinghim or her to remarry.”

26 A divorce obtained abroad by a

couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in thePhilippines, provided it is consistentwith their respectivenationallaws.

27

A comparison betweenmarriage and divorce, as far aspleadingandproofareconcerned,canbemade.Van Dorn v.Romillo, Jr. decrees that “aliens may obtain divorcesabroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,provided they are valid according to their national law.”

28

Therefore,beforeaforeigndivorcedecreecanberecognizedbyourcourts,thepartypleadingitmustprovethedivorceasafactanddemonstrateitsconformitytotheforeignlawallowing it.

29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is

insufficient.

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toms shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments

promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a

foreigncountry.”24 Tenchaves v. Escano, 15 SCRA 355, 362, November 29, 1965;

Barretto Gonzalez v. Gonzalez,58Phil.67,71­72,March7,1933.25 “Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were

solemnized,andvalidthereassuch,shallalsobevalidinthiscountry,

exceptthoseprohibitedunderArticles35(1),(4),(5),and(6),36,37,and

38.(71a)

“Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is

validlycelebratedandadivorceisthereaftervalidlyobtainedabroadby

thealienspousecapacitatinghimorhertoremarry,theFilipinospouse

shall have capacity to remarry underPhilippine law.” (As amended by

EO227,prom.July27,1987)26Cf Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139, 143­144, October 8,

1985;andPilapil v. Ibay­Somera,174SCRA653,663,June30,1989.27Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,supra.28Ibid.,p.143.29 For a derailed discussion of Van Dorn, see Salonga, Private

International Law, 1995 ed., pp. 295­300. See also Jose C. Vitug,

Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence,1993ed.,p.16.

448

448 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Garcia vs. Recio

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can beadmitted in evidence, it must first comply with theregistration requirements underArticles 11, 13 and 52 oftheFamilyCode.Thesearticlesreadasfollows:

“ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of thecontractingpartiesshallfileseparatelyaswornapplicationforsuchlicensewith the proper local civil registrarwhich shall specify thefollowing:

xxxxxxxxx“(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous

marriagewasdissolvedorannulled;xxxxxxxxx”“ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been

previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish,instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the lastprecedingarticle,thedeathcertificateofthedeceasedspouseorthejudicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree ofannulmentordeclarationofnullityofhisorherpreviousmarriage,

“(a)

xxx.“ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of

themarriage,thepartitionanddistributionofthepropertiesofthespouses, and the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimesshall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries ofproperty;otherwise,thesameshallnotaffecttheirpersons.”

Respondent,ontheotherhand,arguesthattheAustraliandivorcedecreeisapublicdocument—awrittenofficialactofanAustralianfamilycourt.Therefore,itrequiresnofurtherproofofitsauthenticityanddueexecution.

Respondentisgettingaheadofhimself.Beforeaforeignjudgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, thedocument must first be presented and admitted inevidence.

30Adivorceobtained

_______________

30“SEC. 19. Classes of documents.—For the purpose of their

presentationinevidence,documentsareeitherpublicorprivate.

“Publicdocumentsare:

The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the

sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public

officers,whetherinthePhilippines,orofaforeigncountry.

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VOL.366,OCTOBER2,2001 449

Garcia vs. Recio

abroadisprovenbythedivorcedecreeitself.Indeedthebestevidenceofajudgmentisthejudgmentitself.

31Thedecree

purportstobeawrittenactorrecordofanactofanofficialbodyortribunalofaforeigncountry.

32

UnderSections24and25ofRule132,ontheotherhand,awritingordocumentmaybeprovenasapublicorofficialrecord of a foreign country by either (1) an officialpublication, or (2) a copy thereof attested

33 by the officer

having legal custody of thedocument. If the record isnotkeptinthePhilippines,suchcopymustbe(a)accompaniedbyacertificateissuedbytheproperdiplomaticorconsularofficer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in theforeign country in which the record is kept, and (b)authenticatedbythesealofhisoffice.

34

(a)

_______________

xxxxxxxxx.31 Burr W. Jones, Commentaries on the Law of Evidence in Civil

Cases,Vol.IV,1926ed.,p.3511;§3,Rule130oftheRulesonEvidence

provides that “when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a

document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original

documentitself.”32 “SEC. 19. Classes of documents.—For the purpose of their

presentationinevidence,documentsareeitherpublicorprivate.Public

documentsare:

The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the

sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public

officers,whetherinthePhilippines,orofaforeigncountry.

xxxxxxxxx.”

33“Sec.25.What attestation of copy must state.—Wheneveracopyof

a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the

attestationmust state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of

the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The

attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if

therebeany, or ifhebe the clerk of a courthavinga seal,under the

sealofsuchcourt.”34 “Sec.24.Proof of official record.—Therecordofpublicdocuments

referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any

purpose,maybeevidencedbyanofficialpublicationthereoforbyacopy

attestedbytheofficerhavingthe legalcustodyof therecord,orbyhis

deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,

withacertificatethatsuchofficerhasthecustody.Iftheofficeinwhich

the record iskept is ina foreign country, the certificatemaybemade

byasecretaryoftheembassyor legation,consulgeneral,consul,vice­

consul,or

450

450 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Garcia vs. Recio

ThedivorcedecreebetweenrespondentandEdithaSamsonappears to be an authentic one issued by an Australianfamily court.

35 However, appearance is not sufficient;

compliancewiththeaforementionedrulesonevidencemustbedemonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent’s cause, when the divorcedecreeofMay18,1989wassubmittedinevidence,counsel

forpetitioner objected,not to its admissibility, but only tothe fact that ithadnotbeen registered in theLocalCivilRegistryofCabanatuanCity.

36Thetrialcourtruledthatit

wasadmissible,subjecttopetitioner’squalification.37Hence,

it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by thejudge. Indeed, petitioner’s failure to object properlyrendered thedivorcedecreeadmissible asawrittenact oftheFamilyCourtofSydney,Australia.

38

Compliancewiththequotedarticles(11,13and52)oftheFamily Code is not necessary, respondent was no longerbound by Philippine personal laws after he acquiredAustraliancitizenshipin1992.

39Naturalizationisthelegal

actofadoptinganalienandclothinghimwiththepoliticalandcivilrightsbelongingtoaciti­

_______________

consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the

Philippinesstationedintheforeigncountryinwhichtherecordiskept,

andauthenticatedbythesealofhisoffice.”

See alsoAsiavest Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 539, 550­551,

September 25, 1998;Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. v. National

Labor Relations Commission,161SCRA122,133­134,May6,1988.35Thetranscriptofstenographicnotesstatesthattheoriginalcopies

of the divorce decrees were presented in court (TSN, December 16,

1998,p.5;records,p.176),butonlyphotocopiesofthesamedocuments

wereattachedtotherecords(Records,IndexofExhibits,p.1.).36TSN,December15,1998,p.7;records,p.178.37TSN,December16,1998,p.7;records,p.178.38People v. Yatco,97Phil.941, 945,November28, 1955;Marella v.

Reyes,12Phil.1,3,November10,1908;People v. Diaz,271SCRA504,

516,April18,1997;De la Torre v. Court of Appeals,294SCRA196,203­

204,August14,1998;Maunlad Savings & Loan Asso., Inc. v. Court of

Appeals,G.R.No.114942,November27,2000,pp.8­9,346SCRA35.39Art.15,CivilCode.

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Garcia vs. Recio

zen.40Naturalizedcitizens,freedfromtheprotectivecloakof

their former states, don the attires of their adoptivecountries.BybecominganAustralian, respondentseveredhisallegiancetothePhilippinesandthevinculum juristhat

hadtiedhimtoPhilippinepersonallaws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to proveAustraliandivorce law fallsuponpetitioner, because she is thepartychallengingthevalidityofaforeignjudgment.Hecontendsthatpetitionerwassatisfiedwiththeoriginalofthedivorcedecreeandwascognizantofthemarital lawsofAustralia,becauseshehadlivedandworkedinthatcountryforquitealong time.Besides, theAustraliandivorce law isallegedlyknownbyPhilippinecourts;thus,judgesmaytakejudicialnoticeofforeignlawsintheexerciseofsounddiscretion.

Wearenotpersuaded.Theburdenofprooflieswith“thepartywhoallegestheexistenceofafactorthingnecessaryintheprosecutionordefenseofanaction.”

41 Incivil cases,

plaintiffs have the burden of proving the materialallegationsof thecomplaintwhenthosearedeniedby theanswer; and defendants have the burden of proving thematerial allegations in their answer when they introducenewmatters.

42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by

respondent,theburdenofprovingthepertinentAustralianlawvalidatingitfallssquarelyuponhim.

Itiswell­settledinourjurisdictionthatourcourtscannottake judicialnotice of foreign laws.

43 Like any other facts,

theymustbeallegedandproved.Australianmarital lawsare not among thosematters that judges are supposed toknowbyreasonoftheirjudi­

_______________

40 Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the

Philippines: A Commentary,1996ed.,p.566.41Ricardo J.Francisco,Evidence: Rules of Court in the Philippines,

secondedition,p.382.42Ibid.,p.384.43Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,G.R.No.119602,

October6,2000,p.7,342SCRA213.

452

452 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Garcia vs. Recio

rial function.44 The power of judicial notice must be

exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon

thesubjectshouldberesolvedinthenegative.

Second Issue: Respondent’s Legal Capacity toRemarry

Petitionercontendsthat,inviewoftheinsufficientproofofthedivorce,respondentwaslegallyincapacitatedtomarryherin1994.Hence,sheconcludesthattheirmarriagewasvoidab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree,which was validly admitted in evidence, adequatelyestablished his legal capacity to marry under Australianlaw.

Respondent’s contention isuntenable. In its strict legalsense,divorcemeansthelegaldissolutionofalawfulunionfor a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are ofdifferenttypes.Thetwobasiconesare(1)absolutedivorceora vinculo matrimony,and(2)limiteddivorceora mensa etthoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while thesecondsuspendsitandleavesthebondinfullforce.

45There

isnoshowinginthecaseatbarwhichtypeofdivorcewasprocuredbyrespondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutorydecree—aconditionalorprovisionaljudgmentofdivorce.Itis in effect the same as a separation from bed and board,althoughanabsolutedivorcemayfollowafterthe lapseofthe prescribed period during which no reconciliation iseffected.

46

Evenafterthedivorcebecomesabsolute,thecourtmayunder some foreign statutes and practices, still restrictremarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriagemaybelimitedbystatute;thus,theguiltypartyinadivorcewhichwasgrantedonthe

_______________

44Francisco, p. 29, citingDe los Angeles v. Cabahug, 106 Phil. 839,

December29,1959.4527 A CJS,15­17,§1.46Ibid.,pp.611­613,§161.

453

VOL.366,OCTOBER2,2001 453

Garcia vs. Recio

groundofadulterymaybeprohibitedfrommarryingagain.Thecourtmayallowaremarriageonlyafterproofofgoodbehavior.

47

Onitsface,thehereinAustraliandivorcedecreecontainsarestrictionthatreads:

“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decreebecomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits theoffenceofbigamy.”

48

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorceobtainedbyrespondentmayhavebeenrestricted.Itdidnotabsolutelyestablishhislegalcapacitytoremarryaccordingtohisnationallaw.Hence,wefindnobasisfortherulingofthe trial court, which erroneously assumed that theAustraliandivorceipso factorestoredrespondent’scapacitytoremarrydespitethepaucityofevidenceonthismatter.

Wealso reject the claimof respondent that thedivorcedecree raises a disputable presumption or presumptiveevidenceastohiscivilstatusbasedonSection48,Rule39

49

oftheRulesofCourt,forthesimplereasonthatnoproofhasbeen presented on the legal effects of the divorce decreeobtainedunderAustralianlaws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacityrequiredbyArticle21oftheFamilyCodewasnotsubmittedtogetherwith

_______________

4727ACJS,625,§162.48Rollo,p.36.49“SEC.48.Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—Theeffectof

a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having

jurisdictiontorenderthejudgmentorfinalorderisasfollows:

xxxxxxxxx

“(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the

judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between

thepartiesandtheirsuccessorsininterestbyasubsequenttitle.

“In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by

evidenceofawantofjurisdiction,wantofnoticetotheparty,collusion,

fraud,orclearmistakeoflaworfact.”

454

454 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Garcia vs. Recio

theapplicationforamarriagelicense.Accordingtoher,itsabsenceisproofthatrespondentdidnothavelegalcapacitytoremarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contractmarriage is determined by the national law of the partyconcerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of theFamily Code would have been sufficient to establish thelegal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it incourt. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate isprimafacieevidenceoflegalcapacitytomarryonthepartofthealienapplicantforamarriagelicense.

50

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence thatproves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. AreviewoftherecordsbeforethisCourtshowsthatonlythefollowingexhibitswerepresentedbeforethelowercourt:(1)for petitioner: (a) Exhibit “A”—Complaint;

51 (b) Exhibit

“B”—Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio(Filipino­Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) onJanuary 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;

52 (c)

Exhibit “C”—Certificate ofMarriageBetweenRederickA.Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) onMarch 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;

53 (d) Exhibit

“D”—Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan CityCertification that no information of annulment betweenRederickA.RedoandEdithaD.Samsonwasinitsrecords;

54

and(e)Exhibit“E”—CertificateofAustralianCitizenshipofRederickA.Recio;

55(2)forrespondent:(a)Exhibit“1”—

_______________

50 In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is

merely an irregularity in complying with the formal requirement for

procuring amarriage license.Under Article 4 of the Family Code, an

irregularitywillnotaffect thevalidity of amarriage celebratedon the

basis of a marriage license issued without that certificate. (Vitug,

Compendium, pp. 120­126; Sempio­Diy,Handbook on the Family Code

of the Philippines, 1997 reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family

Code of the Philippines Annotated,1990ed.,p.42;MelencioSta.Maria,

Jr.,Persons and Family Relations Law,1999ed.,p.146.).51Records,pp.1­3.52Ibid.,p.4.53Id.,p.5.

54Id.,p.180.55Id.,pp.170­171.

455

VOL.366,OCTOBER2,2001 455

Garcia vs. Recio

AmendedAnswer;56 (b)Exhibit “2”—FamilyLawAct1975

DecreeNisiofDissolutionofMarriageintheFamilyCourtof Australia;

57 (c) Exhibit “3”—Certificate of Australian

CitizenshipofRederickA.Recio;58 (d) Exhibit “4”—Decree

Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court ofAustralia Certificate;

59 and Exhibit “5”—Statutory

Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A.RecioandGraceJ.GarciaReciosinceOctober22,1995.

60

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude thatrespondent,whowasthenanaturalizedAustraliancitizen,waslegallycapacitatedtomarrypetitioneronJanuary12,1994.Weagreewithpetitioner’scontentionthatthecourtaquo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso factoclothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarrywithoutrequiringhimtoadducesufficientevidencetoshowtheAustralianpersonallawgoverninghisstatus;orattheveryleast,toprovehislegalcapacitytocontractthesecondmarriage.

Neither canwe grant petitioner’s prayer to declarehermarriage to respondent null and void on the ground ofbigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australianlaw,hewasreallycapacitatedtomarrypetitionerasadirectresultofthedivorcedecree.Hence,webelievethatthemostjudiciouscourseistoremandthiscasetothetrialcourttoreceive evidence, if any, which show petitioner’s legalcapacitytomarrypetitioner.Failinginthat,thenthecourta quomaydeclareanullityoftheparties’marriageontheground of bigamy, there being already in evidence twoexistingmarriagecertificates,whichwerebothobtainedinthePhilippines,oneinMalabon,MetroManiladatedMarch1,1987andtheother, inCabanatuanCitydatedJanuary12,1994.

WHEREFORE,intheinterestoforderlyprocedureandsubstantialjustice,weREMANDthecasetothecourta quofor the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusivelyshowrespondent’s

_______________

56Id.,pp.84­89.57Id.,pp.181­182.58Id.,pp.40­41.59Id.,p.183.60Id.,pp.184­187.

456

456 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Garcia vs. Recio

legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, ofdeclaring the parties’ marriage void on the ground ofbigamy,asabovediscussed.Nocosts.

SOORDERED.

Melo (Chairman), VitugandSandoval­Gutierrez, JJ.,concur.

Case remanded to trial court for reception of evidence.

Notes.—OnceprovedthatawifewasnolongeraFilipinocitizenatthetimeofherdivorcefromherhusband,thenshecould very well lose her right to inherit from the latter.(Quita vs. Court of Appeals,300SCRA406[1998])

TherulinginPeople v. Mendoza,95Phil.843(1954)andPeople v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957) that no judicialdecreeisnecessarytoestablishtheinvalidityofamarriagewhichisvoidab initiohasbeenoverturned—theprevailingruleisfoundinArticle40oftheFamilyCode.(Te vs. Courtof Appeals,346SCRA327[2000])

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457

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