24

Social Movements and the Dynamics of Collective Action

Bert Klandermans, and Jacquelien van Stekelenburg

Abstract

This essay chapter is devoted to the mechanisms of engagement and disengagement in

collective action as they are currently conceived in social and political psychology.

Dynamics of collective action are decomposed into dynamics of demand, supply, and

mobilization. Dynamics of demand are about people and their motives, dynamics of

supply about organizations and their appeals, and dynamics of mobilization about the

convergence of demand and supply. So far, the core business of political psychology has

been the demand- side of protest. This essaychapter describes five core concepts

affecting collective action participation: grievances, efficacy, identity, emotions, and

embeddedness. As for the supply side of protest and mobilization, new research lines

(framing, the perceptions of the socio-political context, and the role of social media for

dynamics of mobilization and participation) are discussed. The essaychapter closes with a

discussion of new directions research methodology has taken.

Keywords

social movement, participation, disengagement, engagement, collective action, dynamics,

demand and supply, protest, mobilization, grievances, efficacy, identity, emotions,

embeddedness

Protests in the “new” democracies in Ccentral Europe about “stolen elections,” street

demonstrations in the “old” democracies against austerity measures, ongoing protests in

the Arab world for more democracy, and occupied city squares throughout the world to

charge againstdenounce inequality and to claim demand better governance.: Almost daily

our news media report on how people try to influence politics in contentious manners.

This is not to say that political protest is something people regularly do. In fact,

participants in political protest are most of the time a minority. Even mass mobilization

rarely encompasses more than a few percent points of the population. This raises a

question that has always occupied students of social movements and collective action,

especially social and political psychologists: Why do some individuals participate in

collective action while others don’t? The answer to that question is less obvious than

many assume.

In 1965 Mancur Olson published his Logic of Collective Action. The core of the

book was the argument that rational actors will not take part in collective action unless

selective incentives persuade them to do so. Olson’s reasoning was soon applied to social

movement participation, as it helped to explain why so often people do not participate in

social movements despite the interest they have in the achievement of the movement’s

goals. Movement scholars argued that movement goals are collective goods. Therefore, if

the goal is achieved, people will enjoy the benefits irrespective of whether they have

participated in the effort. In view of a goal for which achievement is uncertain, but for

which benefits—if materialized—can be reaped anyway, rational actors will take a free

ride, so the Olsonian reasoning goes.

The problem with Olson’s logic of collective action is that indeed it provides an

explanation for why people do not participate in collective action (although one of us

demonstrated that non-participation often has reasons other than free riding—

Klandermans, 1988), but fares poorly in explaining why people do participate. While we

are writing, the world witnesses the uproar in the Arab world, worldwide protests against

austerity measures, and the Occupy- movement demonstrating if anything that people do

protest. A recurring criticism is that Olson’s model assumes that individuals make their

decisions in isolation, as if there are no social media, no other people with whom they

interact, with whom they feel solidary, and by whom they are kept to their promises. Yet,

Olson’s dilemma of collective action can serve well to argue thatexplain why

participation in collective action cannot be taken for granted even if it seems to be in

someone’s interest. This is the paradox that lies at the roots of the argument we will

unfold in the pages to come. We propose a political psychology of collective action

participation. In doing so, we will introduce dynamics of collective action of

engagement, sustainable participation, and disengagement. But, we will begin with a

definition of social movements and collective action, the phenomena we are interested in.

1. Defining Social Movements and Collective Action

“Social movements are collective challenges by people with common purposes and

solidarity in sustained interaction with elites and authorities” (Klandermans, 1997, p. 2;

Tarrow, 1998, p. 4). This definition includes three key elements that deserve elaboration.

First, social movements are collective challenges. They concern disruptive collective

direct action against elites, authorities, other groups, or cultural codes. There is an

obvious reason why this is the case. Social movements typically though not always

encompass people who lack access to politics. Had they had access, there would have

been no need for a social movement. Disruptive collective action forces authorities to pay

attention to the claims brought forward. Second, it concerns people with a common

purpose and solidarity. Social movement participants rally behind common claims,; they

want authorities to do something, to change a state of affair or to undo changes. Such

common claims are rooted in feelings of collective identity and solidarity. Third, isolated

incidents of collective action are not social movements. Only sustained collective action

turns contention into a social movement.

Although movement participants are a minority, several authors have observed

that movement types of action has become more frequent over the last 30 years (Jenkins,

1995; Mayer, 2013; but see McCarthy, Rafail, & Gromis, 2013 for diverging figures on

the U.nited S.A.tates; Meyer & Tarrow, 1998; Neidhart & Rucht, 1993; van

Stekelenburg, & Boekkooi, 2013; 2010). Others have argued that social movements have

become a regular phenomenon in democratic societies (Goldstone, 2003; Johnston,

2011). Some of these authors have labelled this trend “movimentization of politics”

(Neidhardt & Rucht, 1993), while others coined the term “movement society” (Meyer &

Tarrow, 1998; Johnston, 2011). This is also observed at the individual level by Dalton,

and colleaguesVan Sickle, and Weldon (2009). With data from the 1999–2002 wave of

the World Values Survey (WVS), they demonstrate that political protest is seemingly a

ubiquitous aspect of politics in contemporary advanced industrial societies, and that its

use may be spreading to less developed nations as well.

Engaging in social movements most of the time implies taking part in some form

of collective action. In the words of Wright, and colleaguesTaylor, and Moghaddam

(1990) an individual takes part in collective action “any time that [s/he or he] is acting as

a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the

entire group.” Wright (2001) proposes a simple taxonomy of possible forms of political

action. In response to some political issue, people can chose to stay inactive; if they get

into action, they can engage in individual or collective action; and collective action can

be non-contentious or contentious. Participation can further be distinguished in terms of

duration (ad hoc versus sustained) and effort (weak versus strong) (Ffigure 024.1).

[Insert Figure 024.1]

Some activities require little effort, others a lot, and some are limited in time,

while others are unlimited. Activities in the low- effort/limited duration square typically

require large numbers to make any impression on policy makers. It does not make much

sense to have a petition with only ten10 signatures; you need thousands if not hundreds

of thousands. People know this, and thus, for them to be motivated it is important to

know that some threshold level will be reached. Therefore, an important element of the

persuasion strategy must be how to convince people that enough other people will

participate. Activities in the high- effort/unlimited duration square, on the other hand,

must solve the free- rider dilemma. For high- effort/long duration activities it usually

suffices to have only a few participants who are willing to make an effort. As a

consequence, many people can afford to take a free ride. Willingness to participate in this

type of activity thus implies readiness to give 90% or more of the supporters that free

ride. The social psychological dynamics vary, as the story of thresholds and free riders

illustrate. Attempts to explain (non-)participation must thus take into account the kind of

activity we are talking about.

In this essaychapter we focus on individuals—what are their fears, hopes, and

concerns? What are the choices they make, and the motives they have? These questions

bring us to the level of analysis of the individual and therefore to the realm of political

and social psychology. Obviously, other disciplines like sociology and political science

have social movements and collective action as their study object too,; in this

essaychapter we will focus on the political psychological approach and will point to

literature from sociology and political science where applicable. People live in a

perceived world. They respond to the world as they perceive and interpret it. Indeed, this

is what a political psychology of social movements and collective action is about—trying

to understand why people who are seemingly in the same socio-political configuration

respond so different. As political psychology explores the causes of the thoughts,

feelings, and actions of people―and primarily how these are influenced by socio-

political context―it has a lot to offer to the study of protest participation. Indeed, context

matters. Therefore, issues questions we want to discuss ask as well areinclude the

following: How are citizens embedded in their social environment, and how does that

influence their political orientation and behavior? What kind of supply of politics do

citizens encounter? In this essaychapter we concentrate on movement politics, but we

must not forget that movement and party politics are counterparts and that contextual

factors influence whether citizens choose to employ the one or the other.

2. Why Social Movements Emerge

In this essaychapter we concentrate on why individuals participate in movement

activities. The question of why social movements come into being and why they have

become common practice is not our focal question. There is a rich literature available on

that matter (for instance, Buechler, 2000; della Porta & Diani, 2006; Klandermans, 2001;

McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Meyer & Tarrow,

1998; Snow, Soule, & Kriesi, 2004; Tarrow, 2011). For our purpose it suffices to

summarize the global answers that have been forwarded, in brief: because people are

aggrieved, because people have the resources to mobilize and seize the political

opportunity to protest, and because their collective identities politicize. These answers

parallel the history of theoretical approaches to collective action. Research began in the

fifties1950s and sixties1960s with classical theories such as symbolic interactionism,

structural functionalism, and relative deprivation theory. Buechler (2000) classified these

theories as classical collective behavior theories, a category that he characterizes as

theories that understand social movements as a reaction to social stress, strain, or

breakdown. The direct causes of collective behavior are seen as rooted in individuals who

are experiencing various forms of discontent or anxiety. Basically, discontent is viewed

as the origins of protest. In social movement literature these theories have also been

labeled also “breakdown theories,” which alludesd to the fact that theyresearchers

conceived of social movements as indicators of the existence of major cleavages in a

society and of societal tension or even breakdown as a consequence. The works of

Blumer (1951), Turner and Killian (1987), Smelser (1962), and Davies (1962), and Gurr

(1970) are classic examples of this research tradition. The first two are associated with

symbolic interactionism, describing social movements as phenomena emerging in the

interaction between dissatisfied people. Smelser is associated with structural

functionalism, an approach that defines social movements as a process to restore

equilibrium in a society. Davies and Gurr brought relative deprivation to the field,

explaining the emergence of social movements from high levels of relative deprivation in

a society. But it was obvious that many aggrieved people never engage in protest. Indeed

in the early seventies1970s protagonists of resource mobilization theory began to argue

that grievances are ubiquitous and that the real question is not so much what makes

people aggrieved but what makes aggrieved people participate in social movements

(McCarthy & Zald, 1976; Oberschall, 1973).

Resource mobilization theorists saw social movements as normal, rational,

institutionally rooted political challenges by aggrieved people. Differential availability of

resources explains in their eyes why some aggrieved people become involved in social

movements while others don’t. It was argued that people need resources to stage

collective political action, and a key- resource for such action is organizations and

networks that exist among the affected population (so-called indigenous organizations,

Morris, 1984). Applying an economic metaphor, McCarthy and Zald (1976) made the

distinction between social movements (beliefs that represent a preference for change in a

society), social movement organizations (organizations that identify with a social

movement), social movement industries (social movement organizations that belong to

the same social movement), and social movement sectors (all social movement industries

in a society). Within the resource mobilization framework, participation in collective

action was analyzed in terms of the costs and benefits associated with it. Rational choice

models of behavior (Klandermans, 1984; Oberschall, 1973; Opp, 1988) and Olson’s

theory of collective action (1965) were employed as models to explain individuals’

participation and non-participation in collective action. When the potential benefits

outweigh the anticipated costs, people opt to participate. Paradoxically, the same

deprivation that might motivate people to stage collective action might deprive them of

the resources needed for such action. Indeed, it was proposed that external resources

could tip the balance. Soon a variant of resource mobilization theory developed within

political science—the political process approach—which proposed that political

opportunities available to aggrieved groups with the resources to take action make the

difference (McAdam, 1982). Political opportunities are “those consistent—but not

necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the political environment that provide

incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations of

success and failure.” (Tarrow, 1998, p. 85). Among the many aspects of the political

environment that have been referred to as factors influencing success expectations are the

strength of the state, the level of repression, the party system, the degree of access to

policy, and the dividedness of elites.

In the late ’1980s and early ’1990s, partly as the result of exchanges between

American and European social movement scholars (Klandermans, Kriesi, & Tarrow,

1988), an interest began to develop in the cognitive and affective origins of social

movements. In response to the structuralist approach of the then dominant paradigms—

resource mobilization and political process theories—social movement scholars from

various angles began to highlight the processes of interaction, the symbolic definition and

negotiation among participants, opponents, and bystanders of collective action.

Grievances, resources, and opportunities are all relevant needed for social movements to

develop, but these scholars hold, that they are also the result of the presence of social

movements. They are in the eyes of the beholder and thus socially constructed.

Moreover, researchers working from this perspective argued that aggrieved people might

have the resources and opportunities to protest, but they still need to construct a

politicized collective identity to engage in collective political action. Over the last decade

and a half this new approach to collective action has been elaborated in studies of

framing, collective identity, and emotions in the context of social movements. Together

they have been labeled social constructionist approaches to protest. Snow and his

colleagues, Rochford, Worden, and Benford (1986) were among the first to elaborate on

the role of cognitive processes in their treatment of frame alignment—that is, attempts by

movement organizers to persuade people to adopt the movement’s reading of the

situation. At the same time, Melucci (1989) began to point to the importance of collective

identity (Cohen, 1985). In social psychology, scholars began to elaborate social identity

theory and intergroup emotions theory (see *Huddy’s essay[oxfordhb-9780199760107-e-

023]*, chapter 23, this volume). Soon cognition and identity began to proliferate in social

movement literature (see Morris & McClurg Mueller, 1992 for an overview of scholarly

work at that time). The most recent social constructionist attempt to move away from

structural approaches such as resource mobilization and political process concerns the

role of emotions in collective action (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polleta, 2001; van

Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007). By way of conclusion it suffices to assert that

social constructionism has carved out its own niche as a legitimate approach to the

analysis of social movements (Buechler, 2000, p. 54).

In sum, breakdown theories, resource mobilization and political process theories,

and social constructionist theories all tried to account for the emergence of social

movements in our societies. All agree that somehow grievances are at the roots of social

movements and contention, but they diverge in their explanations of what makes

aggrieved people protest. While breakdown theories offer little in terms of mobilization

processes beyond high levels of discontent, resource mobilization and political process

theory point to resources and political opportunities as factors in the environment that

impact on the formation and fate of social movements. Social constructionists, on the

other hand, focus more on processes of interaction and sense-making among the

aggrieved as internal factors stimulating the emergence of social movements. The

remainder of this essaychapter will be devoted to the mechanisms of engagement and

disengagement in collective action as they are currently conceived in social and political

psychology.

3. The Dynamics of Collective Action

Dynamics of collective action can be decomposed into dynamics of demand, supply, and

mobilization (Klandermans, 2004). Dynamics of demand are about people and their

motives, dynamics of supply about organizations and their appeals, and dynamics of

mobilization about the convergence of demand and supply. Although the three are

interdependent, each concerns different aspects of the dynamics of collective action,

refers to different mechanisms, and relates to different literatures.

The demand side of collective action concerns characteristics of a social

movement’s mobilization potential. What is its demographic and political composition?

Which collective identities does it comprise? What are the shared grievances and

emotions? What is the composition of its organizational field; and to what extent are

individuals socially and virtually embedded? The supply side of collective action

concerns the characteristics of the movement. Is it strong; is it effective? Is it likely to

achieve its goals at affordable costs? Does it have charismatic leaders? Is it an

organization people can identify with? What does its action repertoire look like? Does it

stage activities that are appealing to people? Which ideology does the movement stands

for, and what constituents of identification does it offer? Demand and supply do not

automatically come together. In thea market economy, marketing is employed to make

sure that the public is aware of a supply that might meet its demand. Mobilization is—so

to sayspeak—the marketing mechanism of the movement domain. The study of

mobilization concerns such matters as the effectiveness of (persuasive) communication,

the influence of social networks, and the role of new media such as the Internet,

(smart)phones, and social media.

Studies of participation tend to concentrate on mobilization and to neglect the

development of demand and supply factors. Yet, there is no reason to take either for

granted. To be sure, grievances abound in a society, but that does not mean that there is

no reason to explain how grievances develop and how they are transformed into a

demand for protest. Nor does the presence of social movement organizations in a society

mean that there is no need to understand their formation and to investigate how they

stage opportunities to protest and how these opportunities are seized by aggrieved people.

Between the paradigms a division of labor seems to exist in terms of the study of

demand and supply. Whereas resource mobilization and political process theorists

typically study supply factors, social constructionists study demand- factors, and all three

study mobilization. As we are concentrating on the study of collective action in social

and political psychology, we will put an emphasis on demand and mobilization, but we

cannot do without a brief discussion of the dynamics of supply.

3.1. Dynamics of Demand

Little is known about how exactly demand is formed. A few decades ago Klandermans

introduced the distinction between consensus mobilization and consensus formation

(1984; 1988). While consensus mobilization concerns “the deliberate attempts to spread

the view of a social actor among parts of the population,” consensus formation concerns,

“the unplanned convergence of meaning in social networks and subcultures”

(Klandermans, 1988, p. 175). Gamson (1992) in his Talking Politics shows that people

use any kind of information source if they talk with their friends about politics.

Employing time-series analysis Vliegenthart (2007) demonstrated for the issues of

immigration and integration that in a complex interplay between real- life events, media

attention, debates in the parliament, and debates between politicians, public opinion is

formed and converted into anti-immigrant party support in the Netherlands. In research

she has yet to report on, van Stekelenburg investigates how, in a newly built

neighbourhood, demand for protest develops as a function of the development of formal,

informal, and virtual networks. These days the Internet and social media play a crucial

role in this regard (Earl & Kimport, 2011; van Stekelenburg, Petrovic, Pouw, Limburg,

& Nederlof, 2012).

Indeed, the formation of demand is a process that takes place in social interaction.

Individuals are embedded in formal, informal, and virtual networks, which in turn are

embedded in multi-organizational fields. Taylor (2013) proposes the concept of

“discursive communities” to signify these settings in which consensus formation takes

place. Understanding the formation of demand in a society requires insight in these

processes of consensus mobilization and formation. We will return to the subject in our

section on mobilization.

3.1.1. Grievances.

Grievances concern “outrage about the way authorities are treating a social problem”

(Klandermans, 1997, p. 38). In The Social Psychology of Protest, while expanding on this

definition, Klandermans made the distinction between illegitimate inequality, suddenly

imposed grievances, and violated principles. The notions of suddenly imposed grievances

and violated principles, in fact, originate in the sociological social movement literature.

Walsh (1983) coined the first and Kriesi (1993) the second. Suddenly imposed

grievances—such as the establishment of a waste incinerator or a highway trajectory—

are powerful mobilizers, as are violated principles. Illegitimate inequality is dealt with in

the literatures on relative deprivation and social justice. Relative deprivation theory holds

that feelings of relative deprivation result from a comparison of one’s situation with a

certain standard—one’s past, someone else’s situation, or an ideological standard such as

equity or justice (Folger, 1986). If a comparison results in the conclusion that one is not

receiving what one deserves, a person experiences relative deprivation. The literature

further distinguishes between relative deprivation based on personal comparisons (i.e.,

individual deprivation) and relative deprivation based on group comparisons (i.e., group

deprivation; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996). Research demonstrates that group relative

deprivation is particularly important for engagement in collective action (Major, 1994),

but work by Foster and Matheson (1999) suggests that so- called “double deprivation,”

that is, a combination of group and individual deprivation, is even more effective. On the

basis of a meta-analysis, Vvan Zomeren et al., Postmes, and Spears (2008) conclude that

the cognitive component of relative deprivation (i.e., the observation that one receives

less than the standard of comparison) has less influence on action participation than does

the affective component (i.e., such feelings as dissatisfaction, indignation, and discontent

about outcomes).

Social psychologists have applied social justice theory to the study of social

movements (Tyler & Smith, 1998). The social justice literature distinguishes between

two classes of justice judgments: distributive and procedural justice. Distributive justice

is related to relative deprivation in that it refers to the fairness of outcome distributions.

Procedural justice, on the other hand, refers to the fairness of decision-making procedures

and the relational aspects of the social process, that is, whether authorities treat people

with respect and can be trusted to act in a beneficial and unbiased manner (Tyler & Lind,

1992). Research has found that people care more about how they are treated than about

outcomes. Based on these findings, Tyler and Smith (1998) propose that procedural

justice might be a more powerful predictor of social movement participation than

distributive justice; that is what we found indeed both in our research in South Africa

(Klandermans, Roefs, & Olivier, 2001) and among migrants in the Netherlands and New

York (Klandermans, Van der Toorn, & van Stekelenburg, 2008).

Political trust and political cynicism further influence the formation of grievances.

Folger (1986) argues that perceived inequalities will not turn into discontent if people

trust responsible actors (mostly authorities) to deal with the problem. Indeed, we found in

our research in South Africa that relative deprivation is substantially reduced when

people display trust in government (Klandermans et al., 2001). On the other hand, if

people are cynical about politics, feelings of injustice are more likely to turn into

contestation, as our migrants study demonstrated (Klandermans et al., Van der Toorn, &

van Stekelenburg, 2008).

Table 024.1 summarizes what grievances are strong motivators: suddenly

imposed grievances, group and double deprivation rather than individual deprivation,

procedural justice rather than distributive justice, the emotional component of grievances

rather than the cognitive component, violated principles and threatened interests, and

political cynicism rather than trust.

[Insert Table 024.1]3.1.2. Efficacy.

It would be hard to deny that people who are part of a movement’s mobilization potential

are aggrieved, but as we know meanwhile grievances do not provide a sufficient reason

to participate in collective action. Therefore, the key question of any grievance theory to

address is: why do some aggrieved people protest, while others do not? The first to raise

that question to argue so were the resource mobilization theorists in the 1970s and 1980s

(e.g., Oberschall, 1973; McCarthy and Zald, 1976) and a social psychological expansion

thereof by (Klandermans, (1984). More recently, in a large comparative study based on

WVS surveys, Dalton and colleagueset al. (2009) found that grievances are weak

predictors of protest. Rather than aggrieved people, it areis those who possess political

skills and resources who generally protest more, independent of their level of grievances.

The underlying political psychological concept is efficacy. People are more likely to

participate in movement activities when they believe this will help to redress their

grievances at affordable costs (Klandermans, 1984). The more effective an individual

believes collective action participation to be, the more likely the person is to participate.

Van Zomeren, and his colleaguesSpears, Fischer, and Leach (2004) propose efficacy as

the core of what they call problem- focused coping—one of the two pathways to

collective action they define, the other being emotion- focused coping, with group-based

anger at its core (see below). In a cross-national study Corcoran et al., Pettinicchio, and

Young (2012) demonstrated the significant role of efficacy for protest participation

across 48 countries. Qualifying the assertions of political process approaches, these

authors report important contextual influences. Feelings of efficacy make people more

likely to participate in collective action, especially if they are faced with closed political

opportunities. But for those who feel efficacious, opportunities or lack of repression don’t

make any difference. Efficacious people participate in collective action no matter what

the opportunities are. Indeed, opportunities or absence of repression only make fatalistic

people take part in collective action. The authors report that social embeddedness is of

crucial importance for the generation and role of feelings of efficacy in that respect. We

will come back to that later.

3.1.3. Identity.

Next to efficacy, identity, specifically collective identity, became an important concept in

the social movement literature in the past 25 years. Melucci was among the first to

emphasize the significance of collective identity (1981). In the years to follow the

concept began to gain prominence in the social movement literature (see Stryker, Owens,

& White, 2000). Meanwhile, social psychologists began to explore the role of group

identification in movement participation (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Simon et al., 1998;

de Weerd & Klandermans, 2000; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Stürmer & Simon, 2004)

and concluded that the more one identifies with a group involved in a protest activity, the

more likely one is to take part in that activity.

A complicating matter in this respect is the fact that people simultaneously hold

multiple identities, while movements tend to emphasize a single identity and refer to a

single place in society. As a consequence, people may experience thatbeing steered in

different directions by conflicting identities steer behavior in different directions (cf.

Kurtz, 2002). Individuals might find themselves under cross-pressure when two groups

they identify with are on opposite sides of a controversy (e.g., union members faced with

the decision to strike against their own company). Indeed, workers who go on strike or

movement activists who challenge their government are often accused of being disloyal

to the company or the country. This problem is especially relevant in the case of protest

participation by immigrants, these days specifically Muslim immigrants, which can easily

be (mis)interpreted as disloyalty to their new country of residence. González and Brown

(2003) coined the term “dual identity” to point to the concurrent workings of supra- and

subordinated identities. They argue that identification with a subordinate entity (e.g.,

ethnic identity) does not necessarily exclude identification with a supraordinate entity

(e.g., national identity). In fact, they claim that dual identity is a healthy configuration, as

it implies sufficient identification with one’s subgroup to experience basic security and

sufficient identification with the overarching group to preclude divisiveness.

There is evidence that indeed people who hold a dual identity are more satisfied

with their situation than people who do not (González & Brown, 2003; Simon, 2010).

Furthermore, studies of Spanish and Dutch farmers, South African citizens, and

immigrants in the Netherlands and New York suggest that individuals who report holding

a dual identity wereare more satisfied with their social and political situation than those

who do not hold a dual identity (Klandermans et al., 2001; Klandermans, Sabucedo, &

Rodriguez, 2004; Klandermans et al., 2008). However, if they are dissatisfied,

individuals who hold a dual identity wereare more likely to participate in collective

action.

Simon and his students (Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008) have

argued that a politicized collective identity is by definition a dual identity. In 2001 Simon

and Klandermans published their influential paper on the politicization of collective

identity (PCI). In order to become the vehicle of collective action, collective identity

must politicize, they argued. Shared grievances, common enemies, and a search for third

-party support are the building stonesblocks of PCI the authors refer to. Some sense of

identification with the superordinate political entity seems to be a basic requirement of

social and political mobilization in that it ensures that this entity is acknowledged as

one’s own social or political habitat or arena. More specifically, to the extent that one

identifies with the superordinate entity, one should feel entitled to make political claims,

because identity confers rights. Similarly, one should feel motivated to get actively

involved in the political game, because it becomes one’s own game, and one should feel

encouraged to approach third parties as potential allies, because they can be viewed as in-

group members at the superordinate level, so (Simon and Ruhs, (2008). Politicization

divides people’s social environment into allies and opponents and results in polarization.

Polarization concerns the process of distancing of the opposing camps. The more

polarized the relationship becomes, the less deviation from own opinions and actions is

accepted and the more opinions and acts of the opponents are rejected. Eventually, this

may result in radicalization. Simon suggests that in a polarized situation, to the extent

that PCI is a dual identity including identification with the superordinate polity, PCI has a

pacifying effect on politicization and associated collective action in that it prioritizes

normative claims and actions (i.e., claims and actions that stay within the limits of

normative acceptance in the larger polity). In contrast, collective identities lacking this

pacifying effect, such as separatist identities based on more exclusive cultural, ethnic, or

religious allegiances, should be more prone to non-normative escalation and

radicalization.

3.1.4. Emotions.

Recent work in sociology and social and political psychology has brought emotions to

the study of social movements (Goodwin et al., 2001; Jasper, 1998; van Stekelenburg,

2006; van Zomeren et al., 2004). For those of us who have been part of protest events or

watched reports on protest events in the news media, this is hardly surprising. Indeed, it

is hard to conceive of protest detached from emotions. Emotions can be avoidance or

approach oriented. Fear, which makes people refrain from taking action, is an example of

an avoidance- oriented emotion. Anger is an approach oriented emotion and is known to

be an antecedent of protest participation (Vvan Zomeren et al., 2004). There appears to

be a relation between emotions and efficacy. When people do not feel efficacious, they

are more likely to experience fear; feeling efficacious, on the other hand, is associated

with experiencing anger (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Findings from our study

among migrants confirm this,: feelings of efficacy reinforced anger and reduced fear,

while Iin their turn anger fostered collective action participation, while fear undermined

it (Klandermans et al., 2008). Van Zomeren et al. (2004) show that anger is an important

motivator of protest participation of disadvantaged groups. Leach and colleagues (2007)

examined readiness for political action amongst advantaged Australians to oppose

government plans to redress disadvantaged Aborigines. They found that symbolic racism

and relative deprivation evoked group-based anger, which in turn promoted willingness

for political action. But advantaged group members can also perceive the in-group

advantage as unfair and feel guilt and anger about it. Anger related to in-group advantage,

and to a lesser degree guilt, appears to be a potent predictor for protest (Leach, Iyer, &

Pedersen et al., 2006). Anger, guilt, and fear are not the only three emotions relevant in

the context of movement participation; indeed other emotions such as hope and despair

are proposed as well (D. Gould, 2009; Sturmer Stürmer & Simon, 2009; Taylor, 2013).

Anger moves people to adopt a more challenging relationship with authorities than

subordinate emotions such as shame and despair (Verta Taylor, 2009) or fear

(Klandermans et al., 2008).

In explaining different tactics, efficacy appears to be relevant, too. Anger is

mainly observed in normative actions were efficacious people protest. However, in non-

normative violent actions contempt appears to be the more relevant emotion (Fischer &

Roseman, 2007; Tausch, Becker, Spears, & Christ, 2008). This suggests two emotional

routes to protest (cf. van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010): an anger route based on

efficacy leading to normative action, and a contempt route when legitimate channels are

closed (Wright et al., 1990) and the situation is seen as hopeless, invoking a “nothing to

lose” strategy leading to non-normative protest (Kamans, Otten, & Gordijn, 2010).

3.1.5. An Integrating Framework.

Strikingly, a comprehensive framework integrating identities, grievances, and emotions

into a single model was lacking for a long time. Recently, however, Simon et al. (1998),

Vvan Zomeren et al. (2008), and van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2007; 2009, 2011)

have each attempted to build such models. The three models these authors forwardedhave

offered have in common that they distinguish various pathways to collective action.

While Simon et al. distinguish an instrumental and identity pathway, and Vvan Zomeren

et al. distinguish between an emotion- and a problem- focused pathway, van

Stekelenburg and Klandermans distinguish instrumentality, identity, ideology, and anger

as determinants of participation in collective action. Central to all three models are

processes of identification; in order to develop the shared grievances and shared emotions

that characterize demand, a shared identity is needed. Similarly, all three models include

an instrumentality component with efficacy as a key- aspect. In a comparison of the three

models Vvan Zomeren and his colleagueset al. concluded that injustice, identity, and

efficacy each contributed to the explanation of collective action participation (2008).

[Insert Figure 024.2]Figure 024.2 depicts our summary of the various models. As dependent variable

we took the strength of the motivation to participate in collective action. Motivational

strength results from group-based anger, and instrumental and/or ideological motivation.

Instrumental and ideological motivation each result from grievances and feelings of

efficacy shared with a group that the individual participants identify with. Grievances

may originate from interests and/or principles that are felt to be threatened. The more

people feel that interests of the group and/or principles that the group values are

threatened, the angrier they are and the more they are prepared to take part in collective

action to protect their interests and/or to express their indignation. Whether a specific

level of motivation turns into actual participation depends also on the supply of

opportunities to act.

3.2. Dynamics of Supply

Social movement organizations are more or less successful in satisfying demands for

collective political participation, and we may assume that movements that are

successfully supplying what potential participants demand gain more support than

movements that fail to do so. Movements and movement organizations can be compared

in terms of their effectiveness in this regard. This is not to say that it is easy to assess

effectiveness (Giugni, 1998,; 2004; Giugni, McAdam, & Tilly, 1999). Measures of effect

differ (f.i.e.g., impact on and access to polity, impact on public opinion, attention of mass

media) and people’s assessment of effectiveness differs as well. A movement

organization’s effectiveness can also be assessed on its ability to provide selective

incentives (McCarthy & Zald, 1976; Oliver, 1980). Nonetheless, movement

organizations try to convey the image of an effective political force. They can do so by

pointing to the impact they have had in the past, or to the powerful allies they have. Of

course, they may lack all this, but then, they might be able to show other signs of

strength. A movement may command a large constituency, as witnessed by turnout on

demonstrations, or by membership figures, or large donations. It may comprise strong

organizations with strong charismatic leaders who have gained respect, and so on..

The political system and the organizational field movement organizations are

embedded in may also show considerable variation that influences the supply- side of

movement participation. Repressive political environments may increase the costs of

participation considerably: people may lose friends, they may risk their jobs or otherwise

jeopardize their sources of income, they may be jailed, and they may even lose their lives

(Davenport, Johnston, & Mueller, 2005; Tilly, 1978).

An important element of the supply- side of participation is the provision of

information about the behavior of others. Social networks—real and virtual—are of

strategic importance in this respect, because it is through these networks that people are

informed about the behavior or intentions of others (Chew, 1999; Earl & Kimport, 2011;

Kim & Bearman, 1997; Oegema & Klandermans, 1994; Passy, 2001). In his paper on the

Chinese student movement of 1989, Zhao (1998) gives a striking illustration of this

mechanism. He describes how the ecological circumstance that most students in Beijing

live in the same part of town made the success of the movement in terms of mobilization

literary visible in the streets in front of the dormitories. In the virtual world, social media

such as Face book do the same (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2012)

Movements offer the opportunity to act on behalf of one’s group. This is the most

attractive if people identify strongly with their group (de Weerd & Klandermans, 1999;

Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Klandermans, 2002; Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer & Simon,

2004). Interestingly, all these studies show that identification with the more exclusive

group of movement participants is far more influential than identification with the more

inclusive category. Indeed, in addition to the opportunity to act on behalf of the group,

collective political action participation offers further constituents of identification: the

leader of the movement; the movement’s cause; the people in the movement, the

movement organization, or the group one is participating in. Not all these sources of

identification are always equally appealing. Movement leaders can be more or less

charismatic, or the people in the movement can be more or less attractive. Moreover,

movements and movement organizations may be, and in fact often are, controversial. As

a consequence, movement participants are frequently stigmatized (Klandermans &

Mayer, 2006; Linden & Klandermans, 2006). Within the movement’s network, this is, of

course, completely different. There the militant does have the status society is denying

him or her. Indeed, it is not uncommon for militants to refer to the movement

organization as a second family, a substitute for the social and associative life society

wasis no longer offering them (Orfali, 1990; Tristan, 1987). Movement organizations not

only supply sources of identification, they also offer all kinds of opportunities to enjoy

and celebrate the collective identity: marches, rituals, songs, meetings, signs, symbols,

and common codes (see Stryker, Owens, & White et al., 2000 for an overview).

Social movements play a significant role in the diffusion of ideas and values

(Eyerman & Jamison, (1991). Rochon (1998) makes the distinction between “`critical

communities’,” where new ideas and values are developed, and “`social movements’,”

thatwhich are interested in winning social and political acceptance for those ideas and

values. “`In the hands of movement leaders, the ideas of critical communities become

ideological frames’” (Rochon, 1998, p. 31), so Rochon. Through processes such as

consensus mobilization (Klandermans, 1988), framing (Snow et al., 1986), or dialogue

(Steinberg, 1999) movements seek to disseminate their definition of the situation to the

public at large. Such definitions of the situation have been labelled “`collective action

frames’” (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997). Collective action frames can be defined

in terms of injustice—that is, some definition of what’s wrong in the world; identity—

that is, some definition of who is affected and who is responsible; and agency—that is,

some beliefs about the possibilities toof changeing society. We may assume that people

who join a movement come to share some part of the movement’s ideas and values.

Social movements do not invent ideas from scratch; they build on an ideological

heritage as they relate their claims to broader themes and values in society. In so doing

they relate to societal debates that have a history of its own, and that history is usually

much longer than that of the movement itself. Gamson (1992), for example, refers to the

“themes” and “counterthemes” that in his view exist in every society. One such paired of

a theme and countertheme he mentions, is “self-reliance” vs.versus “mutuality,” that is,

the belief that individuals must take care of themselves versus. the belief that society is

responsible for it’s less fortunate members. In a study of the protests about disability

payments in the Netherlands we demonstrated how in the Netherlands these two beliefs

became the icons that galvanized the debates (Klandermans & Goslinga, 1996). While

“self-reliance” became the theme of those favouring restrictions inon disability payments,

“mutuality” was the theme of those who defended the existing system. Another example

is what Tarrow (1998) calls “rights frames”: human rights, civil rights, women’s rights,

animal rights, and so on., Iin other words, collective action frames that relate a

movement’s aims to some fundamental rights frame. For decades Marxism has been such

an ideological heritage from the past movements identified with, positively by embracing

it or negatively by distancing themselves from it. In a similar vein, fascism and nNaziism

form the ideological heritage right-wing extremism must come to terms with either by

identifying with it or by keeping it at a distance.

The supply side of collective action is not static or a constant. In fact, it has to be

constructed again in every mobilization campaign again. McAdam et al. (1996) have

defined this phenomenon as mobilizing structures, that which are “those collective

vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in

collective action” (McAdam et al., 1996:, p. 3). Mobilizing structures are the connecting

tissue between organizers and participants. At any time, all kinds of groups,

organizations, and networks that exist in a society can become part of a mobilizing

structure. However, none can be assumed to automatically become part of it. Networks

need to be adapted, appropriated, assembled, and activated by organizers in order to

function as mobilizing structures (Boekkooi, Klandermans, & van Stekelenburg, 2011).

Many studies have shown that networks are important in explaining differential

recruitment and mobilization (e.g., Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Snow, Zurcher, &

Ekland-Olson, 1980; Walgrave & Klandermans, 2010). Assembling a mobilizing

structure is an important step in the process of micromobilization. Which organizations

join the mobilizing coalition is an important predictor of who will participate in the

protest (e.g., Heaney and Rojas, 2008). Most studies assessing organizational affiliations

show that organizations predominantly mobilize their own members. Similarly, networks

tend to reach those who are embedded in their structures. Thus, organizers thatwho

assemble different mobilizing structures, be itthey coalitions of formal organizations, or

networks of informal networks, or both, reach different subsets of a movement’s

mobilization potential (Boekkooi et al., 2011).

Roggeband and Duyvendak (2013) raise the question of whether traditional

networks and organizations such as parties, unions, or churches have lost their mobilizing

force and are being replaced by light communities and highly fluid mobilizing structures.

They suggest that more and more people avoid “heavy” long- term engagements and

leave more formal institutions for looser engagements in informal, sometimes temporary,

or issue-specific networks. As they also see a change from “identity politics” to “issue

politics,” these authors speculate that the emergence of “light” communities will be

accompanied by a process of individualization resulting in a shift from collective to

individual action. It woulddoes not come as a surprise that the Internet and virtual

networks are central in their reasoning. Although the authors admit that much of their

argument is speculative, developments like these raise important questions for social

movement researchers.

In processes of framing social movements, organizations work hard to turn

grievances into claims, to point out targets to be addressed, to create moral outrage and

anger, and to stage events where all this can be vented. They weave together a moral,

cognitive, and ideological package and communicate that appraisal of the situation to the

movement’s mobilization potential. In doing so, social movement organizations play a

significant role in the process of construction and reconstruction of collective beliefs and

in the transformation of individual discontent into collective action. Grievances can be

framed in terms of violated interests and/or violated principles. We demonstrated that

campaigns that emphasize the violation of interests more likely resonate with

instrumental motives, while campaigns that emphasize the violation of principles more

likely resonate with ideological motives (van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, & van Dijk, et

al., 2009). With the concept of resonance we have entered the terrain of mobilization.

3.3. Mobilization

Mobilization is the process that gets the action going,; demand and supply would remain

potentials if processes of mobilization woulddid not bring the two together. Social

networks are indispensable in the processes of mobilization. Individual grievances and

feelings are transformed into group-based grievances and feelings within social networks.

As early as 1965, Almond and Verba observed a positive correlation between active

engagement in voluntary associations and political efficacy. Hence, a movement’s

mobilization potential can be described in terms of the social capital accumulated in it.

Lin (1999, p. 35) defined social capital as “resources embedded in a social structure

which are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions.” Paxton (2002) argued that

associational life accumulates social capital, which “provides space for the creation and

dissemination of discourse critical of the present government, and it provides a way for

active opposition to the regime to grow” (p. 257).

3.3.1. Social Embeddedness.

The concept of social capital has important implications for advancing our

understanding of the role of social embeddedness in protest participation.

Exploring the impact of social capital takes into account the social context in

which the decision to participate or not is taken. As a set of relationships, social

capital has many different attributes, which are categorized into three

components: a structural, a relational, and a cognitive component (Nahapiet &

Ghoshal, 1998). The structural component of social capital refers to the presence

or absence of network ties between actors, and it essentially defines who people

can reach. Structural social capital encourages cooperative behavior, thereby

facilitating mobilization and participation. The relational component of social

capital concerns the kinds of personal relationships people have developed

through a history of interaction (Granovetter, 1973). It focuses on the particular

relationships people have, such as respect, trust, and friendship. The structural

position may be necessary, but it does not appear sufficient to help individuals

overcome the collective action dilemma. Relational capital implies what people

are actually able to receive in terms of informational, physical, and emotional

support. When trust is built between people, they are more willing to engage in

cooperative activity through which further trust can be generated (on trust: Lind

& Tyler, 1988; on respect: Simon & Stüurmer, 2003). The third—cognitive—

component is defined as those resources providing shared representations,

interpretations, and systems of meaning. It constitutes a powerful form of social

capital in the context of protest (and politics in general, as *Huckfeldt and

colleagues, Mondak, Hayes, Pietryka, & Reilly[oxfordhb-9780199760107-e-

021]*, chapter 21, this volume, argue). The cognitive dimension is in protest

literature referred to as raised consciousness—a set of political beliefs and action

orientations arising out of an awareness of similarity (Gurin, Miller, & Gurin,

1980, p. 30). Consciousness- raising takes place within social networks. It is

within these networks that individual processes such as grievance formation,

strengthening of efficacy, identification, and group-based emotions all synthesize

into a motivational constellation preparing people for action and building

mobilization potential. Both resource mobilization theory and political process

theory emphasize the structural component, the role of social networks, especially

as mobilizing structures (Diani & McAdam, 2003; Kitts, 2000; McAdam et al.,

1996). Social constructivistic approaches put more emphasis on the relational and

cognitive component.

Part of the infra-structure of a movement’s mobilization potential is the

communication networks that connect individuals. Walgrave and Klandermans (2010)

demonstrate how open and closed communication channels and weak and strong ties

weave a web of connections that influence how easy or difficult it is to reach a

movement’s mobilization potential. Francesca Polletta and her collaborators, Chen,

Gardner, and Motes suggest that the Internet plays an important role in grievance

formation (2013). This corroborates van Stekelenburg and Klandermans’s observation

that technologies such as mobile phones, the Internet, Facebook, etc.and so on, played a

crucial role in the mobilization of high school students in the Netherlands in a protest

campaign against educational policy (2012).

Social embeddedness―be it in formal, informal, or virtual networks―plays a

pivotal role in the context of protest, but why? The effect of interaction in networks on

the propensity to participate in politics is contingent on the amount of political discussion

that occurs in social networks and the information that people are able to gather about

politics as a result (McClurg, 2003). Klandermans et al. (2008) provide evidence for such

mechanisms: immigrants who felt efficacious were more likely to participate in protest

provided that they were embedded in social networks, especially ethnic networks, which

offer an opportunity to discuss and learn about politics. In other words, this is where

people talk politics and thus where the factuality of the sociopolitical world is

constructed and people are mobilized for protest. Being integrated in a network increases

the chances that one will be targeted with a mobilizing message and that people are kept

to their promises to participate. For example, people with friends or acquaintances

thatwho are already active within social movements are more likely to take part in

movement actions than others (R. Gould, 1993; Klandermans, 1997). Social networks

function as communication channels, discursive processes take place to form consensus

that makes up the symbolic resources in collective sense-making (Gamson, 1992), and

people are informed of upcoming events and social capital as trust and loyalty

accumulates in networks to provide individuals with the resources needed to invest in

protest.

3.3.2. The Process of Mobilization.

Mobilization is a complicated process that can be broken down into several, conceptually

distinct steps. Klandermans (1988) proposed to break the process of mobilization down

into consensus and action mobilization. Consensus mobilization refers to dissemination

of the views of the movement organization, while action mobilization refers to the

transformation of those who adopted the view of the movement and turned into active

participants. The more successful consensus mobilization has beenis, the larger the pool

of sympathizers a mobilizing movement organization can draw from. In their frame

alignment approach to mobilization Snow and Benford and their colleagues elaborated

consensus mobilization much further (see Benford, 1997 for a critical review; and Snow,

2004 for an overview). Klandermans and Oegema (1987) broke the process of action

mobilization further down further into four separate steps: people (1) people need to

sympathize with the cause, (2) need to know about the upcoming event, (3) must want to

participate, and (4) and they must be able to participate (see Ffigure 024.3).

[Insert Figure 024.3]Each step brings the supply and demand of protest closer together until an

individual eventually takes the final step to participate in an instance of political protest.

The first step accounts for the results of consensus mobilization. It distinguishes divides

the general public into those who sympathize with the cause and those who do not. A

large pool of sympathizers is of strategic importance, because for a variety of reasons

many a sympathizer never turns into a participant. The second step is equally obvious as

crucial; it divides the sympathizers into those who have been the target of mobilization

attempts and those who have not. The third step concerns the social psychological core of

the process. It divides the sympathizers who have been targeted into those who are

motivated to participate in the specific activity and those who are not. Finally, the fourth

step differentiates the people who are motivated into those who end up participating and

those who do not.

In their research on the mobilization campaign for a peace demonstration

Klandermans and Oegema (1987) found that three- quarters of the population of a

community south of Amsterdam felt sympathy for the movement’s cause. Of these

sympathizers, three- quarters were somehow targeted by mobilization attempts. Of those

targeted, one- sixth was were motivated to participate in the demonstration. And finally,

of those motivated, one- third ended up participating. The net result of these different

steps is some (usually small) proportion of the general public that participates in protest.

With each step smaller or larger numbers drop out, but the better the fit between demand

and supply, the smaller the number of dropouts.

3.3.3. Mobilization with Minimal Organization.

Sometimes the demand for protest can be so overwhelming that very little is needed to

bring large numbers onto the streets. In the context of the massive indignation regarding

the kidnapping and serial killing of children by Dutroux and judicial errors in Belgium in

dealing with it, television and newspapers sufficed as mobilizing actors (Walgrave &

Manssens, 2000). Yet, the mobilizing power of the media should not be overestimated

(Kingdon, 1984). They only have the power to mobilize in case of so-called consensual

issues (Verhulst, 2011), that is, issues whichthat root in suddenly imposed grievances

whichthat evoke a communal sense of repulsion and indignation. Examples are the death

of a child caused by drunken driving (McCarthy & Wolfson, 1996) or senseless violence

(Lodewijkx, Kersten, & Vvan Zomeren, 2008). The salience and the consensual character

of the issues compensate for the lack of organizational brokerage, making mobilization

via the mass media possible. Similarly, Walgrave & Klandermans (2010) report findings

from a the anti-Iraq war demonstration against the Iraq war revealing that appeals via

mass media were the more effective in countries with high levels of opposition against

the war.

Mobilization with minimal organization has become more effective with the

appearance of virtual networks and social media. In November 2007, we conducted a

study on protests staged in the absence of any form of organization (van Stekelenburg &

Boekkooi, 2013; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2012). That week in November

20,000 Dutch secondary school pupils took onto the streets protesting the deteriorating

quality of their education. ItThe movement took the shape of protests by several groups

geographically scattered and diffused over a period of time that were in promptu

impromptu mobilized and short- lived. They were initiated by the stereotypical guy- next

-door, Kevin, whose call for action was “virally” spread via face-to-face personal and

virtual networks (e.g. MSN, social network sites). Via mobile phones, videos of unrest

waswere uploaded on YouTube, and the YouTube films facilitated frame-alignment. In

nearly real-life time, would-be protesters came to share grievances and emotions with

actual protesters. Questions related to expected participation of others were instantly

answered by the uploaded films and instant messages. Social media, smartphones, and

YouTube facilitated organizing without organizations.

The secondary school protests are examples of so- called connective rhizomatic

mobilization action (cf. Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans,

2012). Mobilization for Rhizomatic connective action mobilization moves from one

person to another―individually, as part of a larger Cc.email list, via a listserv, or a social

network such as Facebook or MySpace. In a process that continues to reproduce itself,

the message is copied and redistributed. An original sender cannot know where or when

the message stops travelling, stops being copied and redistributed, stops being translated.

Messages with higher degrees of resonance will be dispersed in greater densities. The

Arabian revolutions from Tunisia to Syria and earlier the Green Protests in Iran are all

examples of the power of rhizomatic mobilizationconnective action. The working of

these new forms of mobilization is far from clear. What at first sight seems mobilization

without organization at first sight, may in hindsight appears to be more organized than

presumed. For the time being, there are more questions than answers.

4. Dynamics of Sustained Participation

Most research on protest concerns a comparison of participants and non-participants in a

specific instance of participation at a specific point in time—be it a demonstration, a

boycott, a sit- in, a rally, or a petition. In terms of our participation typology, this

concerns short- term, most of the time low- risk or little effort participation, and

sometimes high risk or effort. We argue that such short-term activities have different

motivational dynamics than sustained participation, be it low or high risk or effort. Our

research among long-term extreme right activists corroborates that assumption

(Klandermans & Mayer, 2006). Life-history interviews with long-term extreme right

activist in Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands reveal that such

activism has significant impact on someone’s life and sometimes comes with serious

measures of stigmatization. Therefore, long-term activists tend to be true believers;

otherwise someone would not be prepared to take such consequences (Van Laer, 2011).

Nonetheless, even true believers do not always take the repercussions of their activism

easily.

A movement has only a limited number of core activists. For example, 5%–10%

of the membership of the Dutch labor unions is core activists. Empirical evidence

suggests that most core activists are perfectly aware of the fact that they are giving 90%

or more of the movement’s supporters a free ride, but do not care. On the contrary, this is

what seems to motivate them to take the job (Oliver, 1984). They care so much for the

movement’s cause that they are prepared to make that effort knowing that most others

won’t. Indeed, for 29% of the core activists within Dutch unions, this was the single most

important motivation for their sustained participation.

Becoming a long-term activist is to a large extent a matter of biographical

availability. After all, sustained participation requires discretionary time for an extended

period. The concept of biographical availability was proposed by McAdam in his study

of participation in the Mississippi Freedom Summer (McAdam, 1988). What McAdam

had in mind was freedom from other societal commitments. “If college students are

uniquely free of life-course impediments to activism, the Freedom Summer applicants

were freer still. And the actual volunteers were the freest of all” (Goldstone & McAdam,

2001). Indeed, participants in the Mississippi Freedom Summer Campaign were students

who were biographically available. But in terms of a life history, there is more than

available time, there is also mental availability, that is, susceptibility to the ideas a

movement is propagating.

Activism frequently persists despite pessimism regarding the action’s ostensible

goals (Louis, 2009). Why do people continue participating in movements even if it does

not effectuate their goals? Drury and Reicher (2009) suggest that participation generates

a “positive social-psychological transformation.” They argue that participation

strengthens identification and induces collective empowerment. The emergence of an

inclusive self-categorization as “oppositional” leads to feelings of unity and expectations

of support. This empowers people to offend authorities. Such action, they continue,

defines the participant’s oppositional identity vis á visvis-à-vis the dominant out-group.

Protest participation strengthens empowerment and politicization, paving the path to

sustained participation. Sustained participation need not necessarily take the form of the

same activity all the time. People often go from one activity to another, sometimes from

one movement to another, and in so doing build activist careers (Andrews, 1991).

Paths to sustained participation vary. Linden and Klandermans (2007) distinguish

four trajectories: revolutionaries, wanderers, converts, and compliants. The first two

trajectories are instances of biographical continuity (Roth, 2003), that is, life histories

whereby participation appears as the logical result of political socialization from

someone’s youth onwards. Be it that rRevolutionaries are convinced right-wingers early

on, while wanderers are lifelong political homeless, wandering from the one political

shelter to the other. The latter two are examples of conversion (Blee, 2002), trajectories

that imply a break with the past—in the case of converts because some critical events

made their minds turn; in the case of compliants because a significant other persuaded

them to become involved.

Critical events are supposed to play a crucial role in both continuity and

conversion. In the context of biographical continuity the event means the last push or pull

in a direction in which the person is already going, whereas in the context of conversion

the event means an experience that marks a change of mind. Obviously, such conversion

does not come out of the blue. It is rooted in a growing dissatisfaction with life as it is.

The critical event is the last push toward change. Teske (1997) describes the example of

a journalist who ends up in front of the gate of a nuclear weapons plant and whose

experience with the authorities’ suppressive response to that demonstration turns him into

an activist. The story of this journalist made clear that on the one hand it was no accident

that he ended up at that gate, but on the other hand, had the demonstration not taken that

dramatic turn, it would not have had this impact on his life.

Sustained participation is surprisingly absent in the social movement literature. —

Ssurprisingly, because long-term participants keep the movement going. Knowing the

motives, conditions, and mechanisms that facilitate or hinder people to become and

continue to be activists is essential for social movements to secure continuity. Therefore,

understanding the mechanisms whichthat make people become activists and persist in

their activism, and which make protest veterans terminate their active involvement, is of

crucial importance not only theoretically, but also for understanding the growth and

decline of social movement involvement.

5. Dynamics of Disengagement

The dynamics of sustained participation in social movements have a clear counterpart,

namely, the dynamics of disengagement. Indeed, the sustainability of a fit between

demand and supply is by no means obvious. Why do people defect from the movement

they have worked for so hard for? Surprisingly little attention has been given to that

question. Compared to the abundant literature on why people join movements, literature

on why they exit is almost nonexistent (but see Fillieule, 2012; Fillieule & Broqua,

2005). The Gguiding principle of our discussion of disengagement is the following

simple model shown in (Ffigure 024.4).

Insufficient gratification in combination with declining commitment produces a

growing intention to leave. Eventually, some critical event tips the balance and makes the

person quit. Obviously, the event itself only triggers the final step. Against that

background, its impact may be overestimated. After all, it was the decline in gratification

and commitment that causes defection; the critical event only precipitated matters.

[Insert Figure 24.04]

5.1. Insufficient Gratification.

The integrated motivational framework presented at the end of the demand- section

distinguishes three fundamental motives tofor participateion: identification, instrumental,

and ideological motivation. Social movements may supply the opportunity to fulfill these

demands, and the better they do, the more movement participation turns into a satisfying

experience. However, movements may also fall short on each of these motives. The

Mmost likely reason it is for movements to fall short in terms ofis inadequate

instrumentality. Although it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of social movements, it

is obvious that many a movement goal is never reached. Opp (1988) has argued that

indeed people are very well aware of the fact that movement goals are not always easy to

achieve, but that they reason that nothing happens in any event if nobody takes any

action. Yet, sooner or later some success must be achieved for instrumental motivation to

continue to fuel participation. In addition to not being achieved, movement goals may

lose their urgency and enddrop lower aton the societal agenda. Finally, the individual

costs or risks of participation may be too high compared to the attraction of the

movement’s goals. Repression adds to the costs and might make participation too costly

for people (Tilly, 1978).

Movements offer the opportunity to act on behalf of one’s group. This is the most

attractive if people identify strongly with their group. But the composition of a movement

may change, and as a consequence people may feel less akin to the others in the

movement (Whittier, 1997). Schisms are another reason why movements fail to satisfy

identity motives. Sani and Reicher (1998) and Catellani et al. (2006) demonstrate that

schisms result from fights over the core identity of a movement and that people who

leave no longer feel that they can identify with the movement. Finally, people occupy a

variety of positions in society, and consequently identify with a variety of collectives. A

change in context may make the one collective identity more and the others less salient,

and, therefore identification with a movement may wither. For example, in their study of

farmers’ protests in the Netherlands and Spain, Klandermans et al., Sabucedo, Rodriguez,

and de Weerd (2002) observed that in Spain during a campaign for local and provincial

elections the identification with other farmers declined.

Social movements provide the opportunity to express one’s views. This is not to

say that they are always equally successful in that regard. Obviously, there is not always

full synchrony between a movement’s ideology and a person’s beliefs. Indeed, many a

movement organization ends in fights between ideological factions, andwith schisms and

defection as a consequence (Gamson, 1975).

5.2. Declining Commitment.

Movement commitment does not last by itself. It must be maintained via interaction with

the movement, and any measure that makes that interaction less gratifying helps to

undermine commitment. Downton and Wehr (1997) discuss mechanisms of social

bonding whichthat movements apply to maintain commitment. Leadership, ideology,

organization, rituals, and social relations, which make up a friendship network, each

contribute to sustaining commitment, and the most effective context is, of course, a

combination of all five. Although not all of them are equally well researched, each of

these five mechanisms areis known from the literature on movement participation as a

factors whichthat fosters people’s attachment to movements. For example, it is known

from research on union participation that involving members in decision-making

processes increases commitment to a union. Taylor and Whittier (1995) demonstrated

how rituals in lesbian movement groups strengthened the membership’s bond to the

movement. Unions and other movement organizations have developed allmany kinds of

services for their members to make membership more attractive. Selective incentives

may seldom be sufficient reasons to participate in a movement, but they do increase

commitment.

5.3. The Role of Precipitating Events.

When gratification falls short and commitment declines, an intention to leave develops.

Yet, this intention to leave does not necessarily turn into leaving. Many participants

maintain a marginal level of participation for extended periods until some critical event

makes them quit. For example, Goslinga (2002) calculated that a stable 25% of the

membership of Dutch labor unions considered leaving. Such critical events can have

many different appearances, and sometimes even appear trivial. When some decades ago

Dutch labor unions changed to a different system of dues collection and members had to

sign toan agreement withto participate in the new system, quite a few members choose

not to sign. A Cchangeing of address may be seized as an opportunity to leave the

movement, simply by not renewing contacts in the new place of residence. More

substantial reasons might be a conflict with others in the organization, disappointing

experiences in the movement, a failed protest, and so on.

5.4. Disengagement versus Radicalization.

When a movement declines, many activists quit. But becoming inactive is not the only

response to movement decline. Indeed, radicalization appears as an alternative response

to movement decline (della Porta, 1995). Although violence tends to be present from the

very beginning of a protest cycle, the more dramatic forms of violence occur when the

mass phase of the protest cycle is over (della Porta, 1995). Violence as mobilization

declines, is attributed to people’s dissatisfaction with protest outcomes and their attempts

to compensate for the “reduction in numbers” (della Porta, 1995), At the same time the

repression apparatus becomes more effective towards the end of a cycle. Against that

background, sustained participation can take the form of radicalization, making radical,

sustained participation and disengagement different sides of the same coin.

6. Conclusion

Almost 10 years haveA decade has passed since the first edition of the Handbook of

Political Psychology was published. In those 10 yyears protest participation has gained

the interest of social and political psychologists. This resulted in a whole host of studies,

of which we have tried to take stock in this essaychapter. DidHas this thatburgeoning

scholarship moved the field ahead? Let us return to the unanswered questions

Klandermans closed with in 2003. These were questions concerning the formation of

demand and supply and how they affect mobilization; questions about the relative weight

of instrumentality, identity, and ideology and how these motivations interact; and

questions about the role of identity in the context of movement participation, the

formation of collective identity, and the politicization of collective identity. Equally

understudied were the roles of ideology and emotions, and despite all the work done on

networks, their exact roles remained unclear. Little was known about leadership in social

movements, and, finally, many unanswered questions regarded sustained participation,

commitment, disengagement, and the life course.

SureIndeed, we have made progress with regard to the dynamics of demand,

especially the role of identity, emotions, and motivation. Compared to 10 yearsa decade

ago, the social and political psychology of protest has become richer, more sophisticated,

and more rooted in state- of- the- art social and political psychology. Yet, students of

social movements have for too long neglected social and political psychology. At the

same time, social and political psychologists have for too long neglected to study such

phenomena as social movements and collective action. As a consequence, social

movement scholars are not aware of new developments in social and political

psychology, while social and political psychologists are unaware of the many

unanswered questions that they could help to find an answer to. We hope this

essaychapter has been useful in exemplifying what political psychology has to offer to

the study of social movements and where we stand.

So, where are we heading the next 10 years? The oOne then unanswered question

a decade ago that remainsed largely unanswered concerns sustained participation,

disengagement, and the life course. Basically, many of the same questions are still

waiting for answers. Fillieule (2005) edited a volume on disengagement, (unfortunately

for English-language scholars, in French, which makes the work less accessible to the

non-French community). More generally, the theme of sustained participation raises

another underexplored issue, namely the personal consequences of movement

participation. But in recent studies Drury et al. (2005), (Drury, Cocking, Beale, Hanson,

& Rapley, 2005; Drury &and Reicher, 1999,; 2000;, 2009), ; Louis (2009), and van

Zomeren and colleagues (20121) have begun to investigate the individual consequences

of participation in collective action.

This brings us to probably the most important challenge of the political

psychology of protest, namely to move from static de-contextualized explanations of

protest to more dynamic, contextualized models of protest. In 2007 we made a plea for

more dynamic models (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2007). We argued that a

more dynamic approach would provide the opportunity to study mechanisms through

concepts like identification, participation motives, efficacy, emotions, and feelings of

injustice as consequence and antecedent of collective action. This approach is not easy,

as Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje observes: “From an investigational point of view, it is

difficult to deal with a variable that, at the same time, can be a dependent and an

independent variable, can develop over time or change across contexts” (Ellemers,

Spears, & Doosje, 1999, p. 3). Yet, studying protest participation in a more dynamic way

would do more justice to the theoretical and empirical richness of the concepts and may

be crucial to gain better insights in the processes at hand (cf. McAdam et al., 2001). An

example of such a dynamic model, nextin addition to those we discussed in the previous

pages, is Vvan Zomeren et al.’s dual pathway model of protest (van Zomeren, 2012; van

Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012). These authors introduce a dynamic model that

integrates many common explanations of collective action (i.e., group identity,

unfairness, anger, social support, and efficacy). The model conceptualizes collective

action as the outcome of two distinct processes: emotion-focused and problem-focused

coping. The former revolves around the experience of group-based anger, while the latter

revolves around beliefs in the group’s efficacy. The model makes explicit the dynamic

nature of collective action by explaining how undertaking collective action leads to the

reappraisal of collective disadvantage, thus inspiring future collective action. Tausch and

colleagues are among the first to report empirical findings on how emotions affect the

dynamic nature of collective action participation. They show that protest participants

experience more out-group-directed anger and contempt, and self-directed positive affect.

Out-group anger and contempt, rather than self-directed positive affect, inspire future

collective action (Becker, Tausch, & Wagner, 2011). In yet another study―a two- wave

longitudinal field study―they examined how emotional responses to success and failure

of collective action inspire future collective action (Tausch & Becker, 2012). They found

that both pride (in relation to success) and anger (in response to failure) motivated future

collective action. While anger stemming from failure predicted future protest directly,

pride resulting from success enhanced feelings of efficacy whichthat inspired future

actions. These few examples are an excellent start for the years to come,; taking the

dynamic nature of collective action seriously will shed light on the many unanswered

questions related to sustained participation and disengagement, —and indeed on

theanother question: pProtest, and then what? (Louis, 2009)?.

Next toIn addition to antecedents and consequences of protest, our plea for

dynamic models also alludes to the thorny issue of causality. Indeed, the majority of the

findings and relations we reported isare based on correlational data. Correlational data

can be interpreted in causal terms based on the theories we have, but cannot demonstrate

causality. Take, for instance, the relation between efficacy, embeddedness, and protest.

Based on social capital theories, we interpreted our correlational data in causal terms,:

that is, the more embedded people are, the more efficacious they feel and the more they

protest. However, are more efficacious people more inclined to become members of

organizations, or do people become more efficacious in their networks? We simply do

not know. Social psychologists attempt to overcome the problem of causality by

employing experimental methods. These experiments have a high internal validity, and

have the potential to make strong causal statements. However, laboratory experiments are

often detached from natural settings, resulting in low ecological validity. Indeed, are

students in the lab who report high strong intentions to protest, really willing to take onto

the streets? We cannot be sure about it. First of all, this is because the correlation

between intentions and actual participation is moderate at best (Oegema and

Klandermans, 1994), but perhaps more important, because we simply do not know

whether artificially created grievances, identification, and efficacy are comparable to

real- life indignation stemming from imperiled interests or violated principles. In a

longitudinal field study in a natural setting we seekare seeking to address this issue of

causality (van Stekelenburg et al., 2012). Longitudinal data arewere collected in a newly

built Dutch neighborhood. Within approximately a month of their arrival inhabitants

received a questionnaire pursued bywith 4four follow-up surveys, which encompasses

predictors of protest, several protest intentions, and actual participation and network

questions. Thus, we monitor the development of demand and supply of protest as it starts

from scratch. This means moving beyond correlation studies and studies of isolated

individuals in surveys or laboratories (see also *Huckfeldt and colleagueset al.[oxfordhb-

9780199760107-e-021]*, chapter 21, this volume). In that way, we hope to be able to

shed more light on causality issues in protest participation.

The second challenge we envision is to develop protest models whichthat

incorporate contextual variation. Little political psychological research has focused on

the subjective experience of meso- and macro-level factors. Nonetheless, at the meso- or

macro level, variables can be identified that affect peoples’ subjective interpretations of

their situation in terms of identities, opportunities, or constraints and injustice. Koopmans

and Statham (2000) and Roggeband (2002, 2004), for example, acknowledged that the

dynamics of participation are created and limited by characteristics of the national

contexts in which people are embedded. Collective action participation is context-

dependent (van Stekelenburg et al., 2009), but political psychology theories are not

always good inat taking that into account and in conceptualizing how contextual factors

impact on social psychological mechanisms. In a large- scale study of participation in

street demonstrations in different countries and on different issues, we seeksought to

assess the combined impact of national and mobilizing context on who participates in

street demonstrations (Klandermans et al., 2010). In that way, we hoped to be able to

demonstrate the context-dependency of action participation.

One such matter of contextualization concerns the conceptualization of political

protest, i.e.that is, social movement participation (movement politics) vis a visvis-à-vis

that other form of political behaviour, namely participation in the electoral arena (party

politics). Movement politics centers around active participation in protest events, such as

mass demonstrations, occupations of public sites, boycotts, blockades, and riots. The

modal form of participation in the electoral arena consists of a vote for a candidate

(person or party) who seeks a public office. In a recent paper, reflecting on the state- of-

the- art of the study of contentious politics, McAdam & Tarrow (2013) observe that

scholars of social movements have largely neglect to pay attention to elections, while on

the other hand election researchers have failed to include social movements in their

designs. Two assumptions regarding party and movement politics are encountered in the

literature (Hutter, 2010) are:. (1) The two reinforce each other—people who engage in

party politics are more likely to engage in movement politics as well and vice versa. In

statistical terms one would expect a positive correlation. (2) The two alternate—that is,

people who participate in the one activity are less likely to participate in the other (a

negative correlation). Recently, Hutter (2010) proposed and found empirical support for a

third option, namely, that (3) the two follow a logic of their own (hence, no correlation).

We take as our point of departure that any kind of arrangement between movement and

party politics is conceivable. Movements and parties may compete, complement each

other, or collaborate (Goldstone, 2003; Johnston, 2011). If movements institutionalize,

citizens may opt for party politics, a decision which then reflectsed in electoral successes

and declining protest activity. Conversely, if party politics fail, citizens may resort to

movement politics, a change reflected in declining votes and rising protest activity. We

know that all these options exist and are actually practiced by citizens who want to

influence politics (cf. Teorell et al., Torcal, & Montero, 2007), but we know very little

about the conditions and mechanisms that make citizens want to influence politics and to

take the one option or the other.

We propose that the relative importance of movement and party politics is context

dependent (see also McAdam & Tarrow, 2013). Figure 024.5 maps the political

landscape citizens are faced with if they want to influence the state. Socio-political

context can be described in terms of political opportunities and cleavages that divide

citizens along lines of interests and principles. The social cleavages that are prevalent in a

society shape its multi-organizational field. Political parties and movement organizations

are embedded in such organizational fields. Within the multi-organizational field,

movements and parties assemble mobilizing structures that offer opportunities to

participate in politics—party politics, movement politics, or both (supply of politics).

Citizens who want to promote or protect their interest or principles (demand of politics),

may take one or more of these opportunities to act. Capitalizing on their abilities to

mobilize, the political parties and movement organizations are more or less able to put

pressure on the state.

[Insert Figure 024.5]Evidence underscores the context dependency of the relative importance of

movement and party politics. McAdam and Tarrow (2013) illustrate this with examples

of thefrom U.S. history of how electoral politics have influenced protest politics and vice

versa. In the U.nited St.ates, so these authors argue, protest politics increasingly

interferes in electoral politics. They refer to the Tea Party movement as an example. In

Europe they observe the opposite pattern. Movements institutionalize into parties, while

parties professionalize. As a consequence, there is a growing gap between politicians and

citizens, which in its turn resultsed in the growth of populist parties. Hutter (2010)

similarly observed the growth of populist parties, but interprets this development as a

consequence of processes of globalization. Hutter’s observation is donemade in the

context of a study regarding the question of how electoral politics relates to protest

politics. Building on a study in six European countries, he observes three patterns of

relations between the two forms of politics: congruence—more contestation in the

electoral arena goes with more contestation in the protest arena; counterweight—more

contestation in the electoral arena comes with less contestation in the other; different

logic—the direction of the relationship differs depending on the political orientation of

the actors involved.

Burstein (1999) suggests that as long as public opinion is unified and clear,

politicians do not need social movement organizations to define their politics. This

implies that movement politics gains significance if public opinion on an issue is

polarized or diffuse. In other words, according to this reasoning the social movement

sector has grown so much because Western societies have become less hegemonic. A

different sort of reasoning takes the movement sector’s relative effectiveness as its point

of departure (Giugni et al., 1999; Jenkins, 1995). If party politics fails, movement politics

takes over, and, indeed, compared to working one’s way through the political institutions,

contentious collective actions can be remarkably effective provided that the right

ingredients are in place., Aas so convincingly demonstrated by the “Colored

Revolutions” and the events in the Arab world.1. Indeed, some twenty20 years ago one of

us estimated on the basis of an overview of various literature reviews that approximately

one- third of the instances of collective political action had some degree of success

(Klandermans, 1989). We are not aware of similar estimates for political parties, but we

may assume that experiencing success encourages similar actions in the future, while

seeing others succeed is an incentive to try oneself (Eisinger, 1973; see Tuneisia and

Egypt for recent examples). And yet another process of reasoning, reveals that protest is

the continuation of party politics, because, as Dalton and colleagues show, protesters are

those citizens who already have access to party politics (Dalton et al., 2009).

In other words, evidence underscores that citizens attempt several routes to

political influence, but so far, it is inconclusive and unclear on who takes what route and

how that choice is influenced by contextual variation. As political psychology explores

the causes of the thoughts, feelings, and actions of people―and primarily how these are

influenced by socio-political context―we believe it has a lot to offer to future work

whichthat will attempt to incorporate contextual variation in protest models.

Note

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Figure 24.1

The process of participation (Klandermans, 1997)

Figure 24.2

Motivational dynamics of collective action participation

Figure 24.3

The process of action mobilization (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987).

Figure 24.4

The dynamics of disengagement

Figure 24.5

Routes to political influence

Table 24.1

Strongly Motivating Grievances

Suddenly imposed grievances

Group and double deprivation

Procedural justice

The emotional component of grievances

Violated principles and threatened interests

Political cynicism

1 , aAlthough the failed revolutions in Azerbaijan and Syria also reveal what happens when

the right ingredients are not in place….