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TORTS and DAMAGES 3 MANRESAAtty. ESPEJO CLASS CASE DIGESTS

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BATACLAN vs MEDINA (102 Phil 181)

By: Hanna

FACTS: Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952, a bus

of Medina Transportation, operated by its owner, MarianoMedina, left the town of Amadeo Cavite on its way to PasayCity, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon.

There were about eighteen passengers,including the driver and conductor. Among the passengerswere Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of thedriver, Felipe Lara, seated to the right of Bataclan, anotherpassenger apparently whom the witnesses just called Visaya,apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side ofthe driver, and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seatedjust behind the four last mentioned.

At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning,

while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus,Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began tozig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of theroad and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed toleave the bus the best way they could, others had to behelped or pulled out, while the three passengers seatedbeside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan andthe woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could notget out of the overturned bus. Some of the passengers, afterthey had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moansfrom inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help fromBataclan and Lara, who said they could not get out of the bus.

There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not thepassengers already free from the wreck, including the driverand the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricateand rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle,but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in theneighborhood.

After half an hour, came about ten men,one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with awick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These menpresumably approach the overturned bus, and almostimmediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all butconsuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped

inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasolinebegan to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the sideof the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of thebus and the ground under and around it, and that the lightedtorch brought by one of the men who answered the call forhelp set it on fire.

That same day, the charred bodies of the fourdeemed passengers inside the bus were removed and dulyidentified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his

widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her fiveminor children, brought the present suit to recover fromMariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplarydamages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awardedP1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100

the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan toPasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. The triacourt was of the opinion that the proximate cause of thedeath of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, butrather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and hisco-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the timethe fire started, Bataclan, though he must have sufferedphysical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and sodamages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physicainjuries suffered by him.

ISSUES:1 Whether or not the proximate cause of the death o

Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, butrather, the fire that burned the bus.

2 Whether or not the carrier was negligent.

RULING:

1. No. As to the first issue, the court disagrees to the opinionof the trial court that the proximate cause of the death ofBataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the

fire that burned the bus, including himself and his copassengers who were unable to leave it. A satisfactorydefinition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffsappellants in their brief. It is as follows:

. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuoussequence, unbroken by any efficient interveningcause, produces the injury, and without which theresult would not have occurred.' And morecomprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is thatacting first and producing the injury, eitherimmediately or by setting other events in motion, al

constituting a natural and continuous chain oevents, each having a close causal connection withits immediate predecessor, the final event in thechain immediately effecting the injury as a naturaand probable result of the cause which first actedunder such circumstances that the personresponsible for the first event should, as an ordinaryprudent and intelligent person, have reasonableground to expect at the moment of his act or default

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that an injury to some person might probably resulttherefrom.

The Court does not hesitate to hold that theproximate causewas the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that whenthe vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its

back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was notunnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with alighted torch was in response to the call for help, made notonly by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver andthe conductor themselves, and that because it was dark(about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a lightwith them, and coming as they did from a rural area wherelanterns and flashlights were not available; and what wasmore natural than that said rescuers should innocentlyapproach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescuerequested from them. In other words, the coming of the menwith a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequenceof the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its

passengers and the call for outside help. As such theproximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturningof the bus through the negligence of the defendant and hisagent.

2. Yes the carrier was negligent. The burning of the bus canalso in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier,through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness,the driver and the conductor were on the road walking backand forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must haveknown that in the position in which the overturned bus was,

gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tankand soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside fromthe fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area,can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yetneither the driver nor the conductor would appear to havecautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring thelighted torch too near the bus. The failure of the driver andthe conductor to have caution the rescuers not to bringlighted torch near the bus, constitutes negligence on the partof the agent under the provisions of the Civil Code,particularly, Article 1733, 1759, and 1763 thereof.

RODRIGUEZA vs MANILA RAILROAD (G.R. No. 15688)

By: Mernil

Nature of the Action:

It is an action instituted jointly by RemigioRodriguezaand three others to recover a sum of money fromManila Railroad Company as damages resulting from a firekindled by sparks from a locomotive engine owned by thedefendant company which caused the burning of the housesof the plaintiffs.

Facts:

Defendant Manila Railroad Company operates a linethrough the district of Daraga in the municipality of Albaythat on January 29, 1918, one of its trains passed over said

line and a great quantity of sparks were emitted from thesmokestack of the locomotive and fire was therebycommunicated to four houses nearby belonging to the fouplaintiffs respectively and the same were entirely consumedIt is alleged that the defendant Railroad Company wasconspicuously negligent in relation to the origin of said fire infailing to exercise proper supervision over employees incharge of the locomotive, in allowing the locomotive whichemitted these sparks to be operated without having thesmokestack protected by some device for arresting sparks andin using a fuel of inferior quality.

On the other hand, the sole ground which the

defense is rested is that the house of Rodrigueza stood partlywithin the limits of the land owned by the defendantcompany. It further appears that after the railroad track waslaid, the company notified Rodrigueza to get his house off theland of the company and to remove it from its exposedposition. Rodrigueza did not comply with this suggestionthough he promised to put an iron roof on his house which henever did. Instead he changed the materials of the main roofto nipa, leaving the kitchen and media-aguas covered withcogon. Upon this fact it is contended that there wacontributory negligence on the part of Remigio Rodrigueza inhaving his house partly on the premises of the Railroad

Company,and for that reason the company is not liable.

Issue: Whether or not Rodrigueza is guilty of contributorynegligence

Ruling:

It is to be inferred that the house of Rodriguezalready stood upon before the Railroad Company laid its line

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over this course and there is no proof that Rodrigueza hadunlawfully intruded upon the railroads property in the act ofbuilding his house. What really occurred undoubtedly is thatthe company upon making its extension had acquired theland only leaving the owner of the house free to remove it.Hence he cannot be considered to have been a trespasser in

the beginning. Rather, he was there at the sufferance of thedefendant company and so long as his house remained in itsexposed position, he undoubtedly assumed the risk of anyloss that might have resulted from fires occasioned by thedefendans locomotives if operated and managed withordinary care. But he cannot be held to have assumed the riskof any ldamage that might result from the unlawful acts ofthe defendant. Nobody is bound to anticipate and defendhimself against the possible negligence of another. Rather hehas a right to assume that the other will use the care of theordinarily prudent man.

In the situation under consideration the proximate

and only cause of the damage that occurred was thenegligent act of the defendant in causing the fire. Thecircumstance that Rodriguezas house was partly ontheproperty of the defendant company and therefore indangerous proximity to passing locomotives was anantecedentcondition that may in fact have made the disasterpossible, but the circumstance cannot be imputed to him ascontributory negligence destructive of his right of actionbecause, first, the condition was not created by himself,secondly, because his house remained on the area bytoleration and therefore with the consent of the RailroadCompany and thirdly, because even supposing the house to

be improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendantin negligently destroying it. The circumstance that thedefendant company, upon planting its line near the house ofRodrigueza, had requested him to remove it, did not converthis occupancy into trespass or impose upon him anyadditional responsibility over and above what the law itselfimposes in such situation. In this connection it must beremembered that the company could at any time haveremoved said house in the exercise of the power of eminentdomain but it elected not to do so.

Therefore, a railroad company, admittedly guilty ofnegligence in allowing sparks to escape from a locomotive

engine, by means whereof fire destroys houses near its track,is liable for the damage and the owner of a house thusconsumed by the fire cannot be said to be guilty ofcontributory negligence, in relation to such fire merelybecause his house is built partly on the land of the railroadcompany especially where the house on the same spot priorto the laying of the railroad track.

MCKEE vs IAC (211 SCRA 517)

By Gibb

At around 9 to 10 a.m. in January 1977 in Pulong Pulo

Bridge,

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a head-on collision took place between anInternational cargo truck, Loadstar2, and a Ford Escort carresulting in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee andLoida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKeeChristopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, alpassengers of the Ford Escort.

Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which wasloaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kiloswas traveling southward from Angeles City to San FernandoPampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, onthe other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from SanFernando.

When the Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from thesouthern approach of the bridge, 2 boys suddenly dartedfrom the right side of the road and into the lane of the carmoving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all theway to the other side or turn back.

Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to theleft and entered the lane of the truck. He then switched onthe headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafterattempted to return to his lane. But before he could do sohis car collided with the Loadstar truck. The collisionoccurred in the lane of the Loadstar truck, which was theopposite lane, on the said bridge.

As a result of the accident, 2 civil cases were filedfor damages for the death and physical injuries sustained bythe victims boarding the Ford Escort as well as a criminacase against Galang.

During the trial, evidence revealed that the driverof the Truck was speeding resulting in the skid marks itcaused in the scene of the accident. The lower court foundGalang guilty in the criminal case, but the civil cases weredismissed.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction ofGalang, and reversed the decision in the civil cases, ordering

the payment of damages for the death and physical injuriesof the McKee family.

On MR, the CA reversed its previous decision and ruled infavor of the owners of the truck

1along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San

Fernando, Pampanga2

owned by Tayag and Manalo, driven by Galang3

driven by J ose Koh

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ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the owner and driver of the Truck were responsible forthe collision

Ruling:

THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION WAS THESPEEDING OF THE TRUCK SHOWING ITS NEGLIGENCE

Based on the test of negligence, no negligencecould be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinaryprudent man would have tried to avoid running over thetwo boys by swerving the car away from where they wereeven if this would mean entering the opposite lane.Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural courseto take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lanewould be several meters away and could very well slowdown, move to the side of the road and give way to theoncoming car.

Moreover, under what is known as the emergencyrule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger,and is required to act without time to consider the bestmeans that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger,is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt whatsubsequently and upon reflection may appear to have beena better method, unless the emergency in which he findshimself is brought about by his own negligence"

Considering the sudden intrusion of the 2 boys intothe lane of the car, the Court finds that Jose Koh adoptedthe best means possible in the given situation to avoidhitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear

that he was not guilty of negligence

In any case, assuming arguendo that Jose Koh isnegligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was theproximate cause of the collision. Galang's negligence isapparent in the records. He himself said that his truck wasrunning at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along thebridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridgeis only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of theCivil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligentif at the time of the mishap, he was violating any trafficregulation

Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of lastclear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is adoctrine in the law of torts which states that thecontributory negligence of the party injured will not defeatthe claim for damages if it is shown that the defendantmight, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence,have avoided the consequences of the negligence of theinjured party. In such cases, the person who had the lastclear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solelyresponsible for the consequences thereof

Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule thatit was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exertordinary care to avoid the collision which was in law, theproximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truckdriver, Tayag and Manalo are, under Article 2180 of the CiviCode, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages

The presumption that they are negligent flows from thenegligence of their employee. That presumption, however, isonly juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possibledefense is that they exercised all the diligence of a goodfather of a family to prevent the damage, which they failedto do.

TAYLOR vs MANILA (16 Phil 8)

By; Shermin

This is an action to recover damages for the loss of an eye andother injuries. The defendant is a foreign corporation engagedin the operation of a street railway and an electric lighsystem in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at theeastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the cityof Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plantmay be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridgeimpassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of the island.

The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he receivedthe injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of amechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy ofhis age, and having considerable aptitude and training inmechanics.

On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy namedManuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed thefootbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visitingone Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who andpromised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engineFinding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters

the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity andperhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to havetaken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about thecompany's premises.

After watching the operation of the travelling crane used inhandling the defendant's coal, they walked across the openspace in the neighborhood of the place where the companydumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here theyfound some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scatteredon the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and

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appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attachedto it two long thin wires by means of which it may bedischarged by the use of electricity. They are intended for usein the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have inthemselves a considerable explosive power. After somediscussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to

take them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung themon stick, of which each took end, and carried them home.After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl namedJessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to thehome of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series ofexperiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wiresinto an electric light socket and obtained no result. They nexttried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel lookedfor a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened oneof the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with ayellowish substance they got matches, and David held the capwhile Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An

explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to allthree. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a matchto the contents of the cap, became frightened and started torun away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had hishand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the faceby several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injuredhis right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate itsremoval by the surgeons who were called in to care for hiswounds.

No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendantcompany to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering andwalking about its premises unattended, when they felt

disposed so to do. There is evidence that any effort ever wasmade to forbid these children from visiting the defendantcompany's premises, although it must be assumed that thecompany or its employees were aware of the fact that theynot infrequently did so.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff may recover damages.

HELD: NO. Counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laiddown in many of the courts of last resort in the United Statesin the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" caseswhich provide that:

In a typical cases, the question involved has

been whether a railroad company is liable for aninjury received by an infant of tender years, whofrom mere idle curiosity, or for the purposes ofamusement, enters upon the railroad company'spremises, at a place where the railroad companyknew, or had good reason to suppose, childrenwould be likely to come, and there foundexplosive signal torpedoes left unexposed by therailroad company's employees, one of whichwhen carried away by the visitor, exploded and

injured him; or where such infant found uponthe premises a dangerous machine, such as aturntable, left in such condition as to make itprobable that children in playing with it wouldbe exposed to accident or injury therefrom andwhere the infant did in fact suffer injury in

playing with such machine.In these, andin greatvariety of similar cases, the great weight ofauthority holds the owner of the premisesliable.

While we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant'sproperty without defendant's express invitation opermission would not have relieved defendant fromresponsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, withouother fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to thenegligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under althe circumstances of this case the negligence of thedefendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was

not the proximate cause of the injury received by theplaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking"attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on theother hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cuttingopen the detonating cap and putting match to its contentswas the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultantinjuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendanttherefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thusincurred.

In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was awell-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally andphysically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea

as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanicadraftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and therecord discloses throughout that he was exceptionally welqualified to take care of himself. The evidence of recordleaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on thewitness stand, he well knew the explosive character of thecap with which he was amusing himself. The series ofexperiments made by him in his attempt to produce anexplosion, as described by the little girl who was presentadmit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge thecap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts toexplode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of

his endeavors brought about by the application of a match tothe contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what hewas about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that hehad reason to anticipate that the explosion might bedangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years ofage, who was within him at the time when he put the matchto the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.

We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficientcapacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to

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which he exposed himself when he put the match to thecontents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that hisage and his experience qualified him to understand andappreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree ofcaution which would have avoided the injury which resultedfrom his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by

him must be held to have been the direct and immediateresult of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it maybe true that these injuries would not have been incurred butfor the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the capsexposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act wasthe proximate and principal cause of the accident whichinflicted the injury. The immediate cause of the explosion, theaccident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own actin putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having"contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of itsdetermining factors, he cannot recover."

RAKES vs. ATLANTIC GULF (7 Phil. 359)

By: Carmel

FACTS:

Plaintiff is an employee of the defendant whose work is totransporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to thecompany's yard near the malecon in Manila. The transport

involves the use of three cars, upon which were piledlengthwise seven rails, eachweighing 560 pounds, so that theends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured tothe cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent themfrom slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff,the men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides.According to that defendant, some of them were also in front,hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water'sedge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted orupset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking hisleg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee. Itwas also found that a portion of the track was sagging due to

the recent typhoon, which defect was brought to theattention of the foreman (also defendants employee), butwas not attended to until the occurrence of the incident inquestion.

Defendant however contended that plaintiff wasequally negligent for walking by the side of the car despitegeneral prohibitions from his superior, and plaintiffsdisobedience constitutes contributory negligence for whichhe cannot claim damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not plaintiffs contributory negligence can bahim from claiming damages.

HELD:

No, plaintiffs contributory negligence does not bar him fromrecovering damages from defendant, however, suchcontributory negligence operates to reduce defendantsliability.

There is nothing in the evidence to show that theplaintiff did or could see the displaced timber underneath thesleeper. The claim that he must have done so is a conclusiondrawn from what is assumed to have been a probablecondition of things not before us, rather than a fair inference

from the testimony. The sagging of the track this plaintiff didperceive, but that was reported in his hearing to the foremanwho neither promised nor refused to repair it. His lack ofcaution in continuing at his work after noticing the slightdepression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as toconstitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severeAmerican rule.

Both the officers of the company and three of theworkmen testify that there was a general prohibitionfrequently made known to all the gang against walking by theside of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated theprohibition before the starting of this particular load. If so, the

disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in dangercontributed in some degree to the injury as a proximatealthough not as its primary cause. This conclusion presentsharply the question, What effect is to be given such an act ocontributory negligence? Does it defeat a recovery, accordingto the American rule, or is it to be taken only in reduction ofdamages?

Difficulty seems to be apprehended in decidingwhich acts of the injured party shall be considered immediatecauses of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must bebetween the accident and the injury, between the event itselfwithout which there could have been no accident, and those

acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, butcontributing under review was the displacement of thecrosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the eventgiving occasion for damages that is, the shinking of thetrack and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act ofthe plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did nocontribute, although it was an element of the damage whichcame to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place whollyor partly thorough his act of omission of duty, the last wouldhave been one of the determining causes of the event o

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accident, for which he would have been responsible. Wherehe contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of itsdetermining factors, he can not recover. Where, inconjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to hisown injury, he may recover the amount that the defendantresponsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a

sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.

PHOENIX vs IAC (3-10-87)

By: Kath

FACTSIn the early morning of 15 November 1975 at about 1:30a.m. private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his wayhome from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, thegeneral manager of a marketing corporation. During thecocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot ortwo" of liquor. He was driving his Volkswagen car and hadjust crossed the intersection when his car headlights (in hisallegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on"bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck loomingsome 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck,owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix

Construction Inc., was parked on the right hand side ofGeneral Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a personfacing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car wasproceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck wasparked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such amanner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking theway of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere nearthe dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlierthat evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U.Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of hisemployer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carriedout early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he

tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but itwas too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As aresult of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuriesincluding some permanent facial scars, a "nervousbreakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.

Dionisio commenced an action for damages in theCourt of First Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that thelegal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligentmanner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck

entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix andCarbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximatecause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in drivingfast at the time of the accident, while under the influence ofliquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew passPhoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare

in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not Dionisio may recover damages

from Phoenix.

Held: YES. There are four factual issues that need to belooked into: (a) whether or not private respondent Dionisiohad a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night(b) whether Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before

the collision with the dump truck; (c) whether Dionisio hadpurposely turned off his car's headlights before contact withthe dump truck or whether those headlights accidentallymalfunctioned moments beforethe collision; and (d) whetheDionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident.

As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear thatno curfew pass was found on the person of Dionisioimmediately after the accident nor was any found in hiscar.On the second issue, it was found out that Dionisio's cawas "moving fast" and did not have its headlights on. As tothe third related issue, evidence shows that Dionisiopurposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the

intersection so as not to be detected by the police in thepolice precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knewwas not far away from the intersection. A fourth and finaissue relates to whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the timeof the accident. The evidence here consisted of the testimonyof Patrolman Cuyno to the effect that private respondentDionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from hissmashed car and brought to the Makati Medical Center in anunconscious condition. This testimony has to be taken inconjunction with the admission of Dionisio that he had taken"a shot or two" of liquor before dinner with his boss thatnight. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient toshow that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence o

liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an actof reckless imprudence. 8 There simply is not enoughevidence to show how much liquor he had in fact taken andthe effects of that upon his physical faculties or upon hisjudgment or mental alertness. We are also aware that "oneshot or two" of hard liquor may affect different peopledifferently.

The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstancesoutlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was

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negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying homethat night and driving faster than he should have been.Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near theintersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streetsand thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askewand sticking out onto the road lane.

Nonetheless the legal and proximate cause of the accidentand of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent

manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words,

the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was areasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel'snegligence on the one hand and the accident andrespondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put ina slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car withthe dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequenceof the truck driver's negligence. We hold that privaterespondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory,"that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury

remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and thatconsequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages

though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts(Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).

G.R. No. 133323 March 9, 2000

ALBERTO AUSTRIA, vs.COURT OF APPEALSby: Haj

Facts:

On July 9, 1989 at around 7:00 P.M. along theOlongapo-Gapan Road in the vicinity of barangay Cabetican,Bacolor, Pampanga, the appellant Alberto Austria was drivinghis Ford Fiera with ten (10) passengers.

One of the vehicle's tire suddenly hit a stone lying inthe road, while thus cruising, which caused the appellant to

lose control and collide with the rear of an improperly parkedcargo truck trailer driven by accused Rolando M. Flores. As aresult of the collision, five (5) passengers suffered varyingdegrees injuries.

While trial ensued, accused truck driver Rolando M.Flores remained at-large.The the trial court found theaccused (Alberto Austria) guilty beyond reasonable doubt ofthe crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in SeriousPhysical Injuries.

Defendant Austria timely appealed his convictionbefore the Court of Appeals. The latter affirmed the lowecourt's decision with modification only with respect to thepenalty of imprisonment and amount of damages.

Hence, an appeal to the Supreme Court.

It is worthy to note that Petitioner faults respondentcourt for its failure to appreciate and give credence to histestimony that when the accident occurred, the petitionewas driving along the Olongao-Gapan road on the laneproperly belonging to him and driving at a moderate speedPetitioner cites the case of Phoenix Construction, Inc. vIntermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 393 (1987), which healleges, contains a set of almost identical facts. Further, heclaims that the other driver's negligence in parking his vehiclecaused the collision. He asserts that the truck driver, RolandoFlores, negligently parked his trailer truck with the rear endprotruding onto road, without any warning device. This being

so, he should not be held responsible for Flores' negligence.Issue: WON petitioner was negligent

Held: YES

The Court finds no palpable factual error that wouldwarrant a reversal of the appellate courts' factuadetermination in this wise:

In his direct examination, the appellantadmitted that he saw the trailer at adistance of about six (6) meters but at thesame time stated that the distance of thefocus of the vehicle's headlight in dim

position was twenty (20) meters. Theseinconsistent statements, taken togethewith his claim on cross-examination that hesaw the trailer only when he bumped itonly show that he was driving much fastethan thirty (30) kilometers per hourAssuming that he was driving his vehicle atthat speed of thirty (30) kilometers pehour, appellant would have not lost controof the vehicle after it hit the stone beforethe collision. Under these circumstancesthe appellant did not exercise the necessary

precaution required of him. He wasnegligent. 9

While we note similarities of the factual milieu ofPhoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Courttothat of the present case, we are unable to agree withpetitioner that the truck driver should be held solely liablewhile the petitioner should be exempted from liability. InPhoenix, we ruled that the driver of the improperly parkedvehicle was liable and the driver of the colliding ca

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contributorily liable. We agree with the respondent court inits observation on the petitioner's culpability: "That he had noopportunity to avoid the collision is of his own making and[this] should not relieve him of liability." Patently, thenegligence of the petitioner as driver of the Ford Fiera is theimmediate and proximate cause of the collision.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and theassailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

AMADO PICART v. FRANK SMITH, JR.

G.R. No. L-12219, 15 March 1918

By: Dats

FACTS:

On 12 December 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at SanFernando, La Union, Amado Picart was riding on his ponyover said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, FrankSmith Jr. approached from the opposite direction in anautomobile, going at the rate of about 10 or 12 miles perhour. As Smith neared the bridge he saw a horseman on itand blew his horn to give warning of his approach. Hecontinued his course and after he had taken the bridge he

gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him thatthe man on horseback before him was not observing the ruleof the road. Picart saw the automobile coming and heard thewarning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty ofthe apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled thepony closely up against the railing on the right side of thebridge instead of going to the left. As the automobileapproached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being theproper side of the road for the machine. In so doing Smithassumed that the horseman would move to the other side.The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider hadmade no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that thepony was apparently quiet, Smith, instead of veering to the

right while yet some distance away or slowing down,continued to approach directly toward the horse withoutdiminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, therebeing then no possibility of the horse getting across to theother side, Smith quickly turned his car sufficiently to theright to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railingwhere it was then standing; but in so doing the automobilepassed in such close proximity to the animal that it becamefrightened and turned its body across the bridge with its headtoward the railing. In so doing, it was struck on the hock of

the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb wasbroken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with someviolence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. Picartreceived contusions which caused temporaryunconsciousness and required medical attention for severadays.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Smith is guilty of negligence.

RULING:

Yes. Smith, in maneuvering his car in the manner describedwas guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligationto repair the damage done. In the nature of things the controof the situation had passed entirely to Smith, and it was his

duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeingthat there were no other persons on the bridge, to take theother side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse toavoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, Smith ranstraight on until he was almost upon the horse. When Smithexposed the horse and rider to this danger he was negligentin the eye of the law.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence ina particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendantin doing the alleged negligent act use that person would haveused in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty ofnegligence.

What would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in agiven situation must of course be always determined in thelight of human experience and in view of the facts involved inthe particular case. Abstract speculation cannot be of muchvalue; as reasonable men govern their conduct by thecircumstances which are before them or known to them, andhence they can be expected to take care only when there issomething before them to suggest or warn of danger.Reasonable foresight of harm is always necessary beforenegligence can be held to exist. In fine, the proper criterionfor determining the existence of negligence in a given case isthis: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in

the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that aneffect harmful to another was sufficiently probable towarrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against itsconsequences.

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GLAN PEOPLES LUMBER HARDWARE vs NLRC

G.R. No. 70493 May 18, 1989

By: Harvey

FACTS:

Engineer Orlando Calibo, Agripino Roranes and MaximoPatos were on the jeep

owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries Inc.

Calibo was driving the car as they were approaching theLizada Bridge towards the

direction going to Davao City.

At about that time, Paul Zacarias was driving a truckloaded with cargo. The truck just crossed the said bridgecoming from the opposite direction of Davao City andbound

for Glan, South Cotabato.

At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the jeep andthe truck collided and as a consequence of which Calibodied while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries.Zacarias was unhurt.

A civil suit was filed by the wife of Calibo against Zacariasand the owner of the truck

At the lower court, the case was dismissed for the plaintifffailed to establish the negligence by preponderance ofevidence. The court highlighted that moments before thecollision, the jeep was zigzagging.

Zacarias immediately submitted himself to policeinvestigation while Roranes and Patos refused to beinvestigated. Zacarias presented more credible testimonyunlikeRoranes and Patos.

The evidence showed that the path of the truck had skidmarks which indicated that the driver applied brakes. Thecourt accepted the evidence that even if there wasnegligence on the part of Zacarias who intruded about 25centimeters to the lane of Calibo, the latter still had the lastclear chance to avoid the accident.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and ruled in

favor of the plaintiff. Ths was on the grounds that Zacariassaw the jeep already at about 150 meters and Zacarias didnot have a drivers license at the time of the incident. TheAppellate Court opined that Zacarias negligence gave rise tothe presumption of negligence on the part of his employerand their liability is both primary and solidary.

ISSUE:

Whether Zacarias should have an actionable responsibilityfor the accident under the rule of last clear chance.

HELD: NO.

The evidence indicates that it was rather Engineer Calibosnegligence that was the

proximate cause of the accident. Assuming there was anantecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias, the physicafacts would still absolve him of any actionable

responsibility under the rule of the last clear chance.

From the established facts, the logical conclusion emergesthat the driver of the jeep

has the clear chance to avoid the accident.

The respondents have admitted that the truck was alreadyat a full stop when the jeep plowed into it. And they havenot seen fit to deny or impugn petitioners imputation thathey also admitted the truck had been brought to a stopwhile thejeep was still 30 meters away. From these facts thelogical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had

what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last cleachance to avoid the accident. While still at that distance othirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn oswerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which thedriver of the jeep had sufficient time to do while running at30 kilometersper hour.

In those circumstances, his duty was to seize thatopportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposedright to expect, as the appellate court would have it, thetruck to swerve and leave him in a clear path.

The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as a validand complete defense to accident liability today as it didwhen invoked and applied in the 1918 case of Picart vSmith.

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PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS vs. BAESA (179 SCRA 384)

BY: Donni

Facts:

The spouses Baesa, their four children, the Icospouses, the latters son and seven other people boarded apassenger jeep to go to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the5thwedding anniversary of the Baesa spouses. The jeep wasdriven by David Ico.

Upon reaching the highway, the jeep turned rightand proceeded to Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph.While they were proceeding towards Malalam River, aspeeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its regular route toManila, encroached on the jeepneys lane while negotiating a

curve, and collided with it.As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for one

daughter, as well as David Ico, died, and the rest sufferedfrom injuries. Ambrosio Ramirez, the driver of the bus, ranand was never seen after the accident. Maricar Baesa, thesurviving daughter, through her guardian filed separateactions for damages arising from quasi-delict againstPANTRANCO.

PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late DavidIcos (the driver)alleged negligence as a proximate cause ofthe accident, invoked the defense of due diligence in theselection and supervision of its driver. The RTC ruled in favor

of Baesa, which was upheld by the CA.

The petitioner now contends that the CA erred in notapplying the doctrine of the last clear chance against thejeepney driver. Petitioner contends that under thecircumstances, it was the driver of the jeep who had the lastclear chance to avoid the collision and was thereforenegligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care andcompetence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm.

Issue: 1. Does the doctrine of last clear chance apply?

2. Was the defense of the diligence of a good father of afamily was properly invoked?

Held:

1. No. The doctrine applies only in a situation wherethe plaintiff was guilty of a prior or antecedent negligence butthe defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid theimpending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all theconsequences

Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invokedfor the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff

who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although itmay also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages.

It is the petitioners position that even assumingarguendo, that the bus encroached into the lane of thejeepney, the driver of the latter could have swerved the

jeepney towards the spacious dirt shoulder on his righwithout danger to himself or his passengers. This isuntenable.

For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it isnecessary to show that the person who allegedly has the lastopportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existenceof the peril, or should, with exercise of due care, have beenaware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident oinjury if he does not know or could not have known theexistence of the peril.

In this case, there is nothing to show that thejeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger

When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus wasencroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve thejeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must haveassumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its ownlane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the oppositedirection.

Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived thedanger a few seconds before the actual collision, he had noopportunity to avoid it. The Court has held that the last cleachance doctrine can never apply where the party charged isrequired to act instantaneously and if the injury cannot beavoided by the application of all means at hand after the peri

is or should have been discovered.

2. On the Defense of the diligence of a good father ofa family in the selection and supervision of employees, thecourt ruled that when injury is caused by the negligence of anemployee, there instantly arises a presumption that theemployer has been negligent either in the selection of theiemployees or in the supervision of their acts. The evidencedadduced by petitioner is far from sufficient to overcome saiddisputable presumption. The professional drivers license ofRamirez was not produced. It was not likewise proven that heis between 25 to 38 years old, or he attended the necessaryseminars. No documents presented or testimonies proving

the foregoing were produced by petitioner. Hence, Pantrancofailed to meet its burden and overcome the presumption ofnegligence in case of death or injury. There is no presumptionthat the usual recruitment procedures and safety standardswere observed. Hence, there is no cogent reason for theCourt to disturb the ruling of both trial court and court ofappeals that the evidence presented by petitioner, consistingmainly of the uncorroborated testimony of its TrainingCoordinator, fell short to overcome the presumption of

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negligence.

G.R. No. 101683

LBC AIR CARGO, INC. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

By: Charlen

FACTS:

A vehicular collision occurred at about 11:30 in the morningof 15 November 1987. Rogelio Monterola, a licensed driver,was traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle towardsMangagoy on the right lane along a dusty national road inBislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van ofthe LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, driven by defendant Jaime

Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite direction on its wayto the Bislig Airport. On board were passengers Fernando Yu,Manager of LBC Air Cargo, and his son who was seated besideTano. When Tano was approaching the vicinity of the airportroad entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing againsteach other from the opposite direction. Tano stopped hisvehicle and waited for the two racing vehicles to pass by. Thestirred cloud of dust made visibility extremely bad. Instead ofwaiting for the dust to settled, Tano started to make a sharpleft turn towards the airport road. When he was about toreach the center of the right lane, the motorcycle driven byMonterola suddenly emerged from the dust and smashedhead-on against the right side of the LBC van. Monterola died

from the severe injuries he sustained.

A criminal case for "homicide thru reckless imprudence" wasfiled against Tano. A civil suit was likewise instituted by theheirs of deceased Monterola against Tano, along withFernando Yu and LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, for the recoveryof damages. The trial court dismissed both cases on theground that the proximate cause of the "accident" was thenegligence of deceased Rogelio Monterola. CA reversed thedecision of the trial court.

ISSUES:

WON the proximate cause of the accident was the victim'snegligence in the driving of his motorcycle in a very fastspeed and thus hitting the petitioner's cargo van.

RULING:

NO.

Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the driver oany vehicle upon a highway, before starting, stopping oturning from a direct line, is called upon to first see that suchmovement can be made in safety, and whenever the

operation of any other vehicle approaching may be affectedby such movement, shall give a signal plainly visible to thedriver of such other vehicles of the intention to make suchmovement (Sec. 44, R.A. 4136, as amended).

That Rogelio Monterola was running fast despite poovisibility as evidenced by the magnitude of the damage to thevehicles is no defense. His negligence would at most becontributory (Article 2179, N.C.C.). Having negligently createdthe condition of danger, defendants may not avoid liability bypointing to the negligence of the former.

The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence oTano who, despite extremely poor visibility, hastily executed

a left turn (towards the Bislig airport road entrance) withoutfirst waiting for the dust to settle. It was this negligent act ofTano, which had placed his vehicle (LBC van) directly on thepath of the motorcycle coming from the opposite directionthat almost instantaneously caused the collision to occurSimple prudence required him not to attempt to cross theother lane until after it would have been safe from and cleaof any oncoming vehicle.

Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance"(also referred to, at times, as "supervening negligence" or as"discovered peril"). The doctrine, in essence, is to the effectthat where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of

one isappreciablylater in time than that of the other, owhen it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligenceshould be attributed to the incident, the one who had the lastclear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed todo so is chargeable with the consequences thereof (seePicartvs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809). Stated differently, the rule would alsomean that an antecedent negligence of a person does notpreclude the recovery of damages for supervening negligenceof, or bar a defense against the liability sought by, another ifthe latter, who had the lastfair chance, could have avoidedthe impending harm by the exercise of due diligence(Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384; Glan

People's Lumber and Hardware vs. Intermediate AppellateCourt, 173 SCRA 464).

In the case at bench, the victim was traveling along the lanewhere he was rightly supposed to be. The incident occurredin an instant. No appreciable time had elapsed, from themoment Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact; thatcould have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity toavoid thecollision.

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It is true however, that the deceased was not all that freefrom negligence in evidently speeding too closely behind thevehicle he was following. We, therefore, agree with theappellate court that there indeed was contributorynegligence on the victim's part that could warrant amitigation of petitioners liability for damages.

Callejo, Sr., J:-- 2nddivision G.R. No. 138060 Sept. 1, 2004

WILLIAM TIU, doing business under the name and style of "DRough Riders," and VIRGILIO TE LAS PIAS vs. PEDRO A.ARRIESGADO, BENJAMIN CONDOR, SERGIO PEDRANO andPHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY AND INSURANCE, INC.,

Nature: review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court from the Decisionof the CA

By: Dux

FACTS:

At about 10:00 p.m. of March 15, 1987, the cargo truckmarked "Condor Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise"bearing plate number GBP-675 was loaded with firewood inBogo, Cebu and left for Cebu City. Upon reaching SitioAggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu, just as the truck

passed over a bridge, one of its rear tires exploded. Thedriver, Sergio Pedrano, then parked along the right side ofthe national highway and removed the damaged tire to haveit vulcanized at a nearby shop, about 700 meters away.Pedrano left his helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch overthe stalled vehicle, and instructed the latter to place a sparetire six fathoms away behind the stalled truck to serve as awarning for oncoming vehicles. The trucks tail lights werealso left on. It was about 12:00 a.m., March 16, 1987.

At about 4:45 a.m., D Rough Riders passenger bus driven byVirgilio Te Laspias cruised same route from Maya bound forCebu City. Among its passengers were the Spouses Pedro A.

Arriesgado and Felisa Pepito Arriesgado, who were seated atthe right side of the bus, about three (3) or four (4) placesfrom the front seat.

As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspias saw thestalled truck, which was then about 25 meters away. Heapplied the breaks and tried to swerve to the left to avoidhitting the truck. But it was too late; the bus rammed into thetrucks left rear. The impact damaged the right side of the busand left several passengers injured. Pedro Arriesgado lost

consciousness and suffered a fracture in his right colles. Hiswife, Felisa, was brought to the Danao City Hospital. She waslater transferred to the Southern Island Medical Center whereshe died shortly thereafter.

Respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado then filed a complaint for

breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorneys feebefore the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 20, against thepetitioners, D Rough Riders bus operator William Tiu and hisdriver, Virgilio Te Laspias on May 27, 1987. The respondentalleged that the passenger bus in question was cruising at afast and high speed along the national road, and thatpetitioner Laspias did not take precautionary measures toavoid the accident.

The petitioners, for their part, filed a Third-Party Complainon August 21, 1987 against the following: respondenPhilippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. (PPSII)respondent Benjamin Condor, the registered owner of the

cargo truck; and respondent Sergio Pedrano, the driver of thetruck.

RTC ruled in favor of Arriesgado finding Tiu as liable as theemployer of Laspinas who had been negligent in his drivingwhich CA affirmed.

Issues and Ruling:

1.Petit ioner Laspias was negligent in dr iving he Ill-f ated

bus

Since he saw the stalled truck he had more than enough timeto swerve to his left to avoid hitting it; that is, if the speed ofthe bus was only 40 to 50 kph as he claimed. As found by CA

it is easier to believe that petitioner Laspias was driving at avery fast speed, since at 4:45 a.m., the hour of the accidentthere were no oncoming vehicles at the opposite directionLaspias could have swerved to the left lane with properclearance, and, thus, could have avoided the truck. Instinct, atthe very least, would have prompted him to apply the breaksto avert the impending disaster which he must have foreseenwhen he caught sight of the stalled truck.

A man must use common sense, and exercise duereflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautiouscareful and prudent, if not from instinct, thenthrough fear of recurring punishment. He is

responsible for such results as anyone might foreseeand for acts which no one would have performedexcept through culpable abandon. Otherwise, hisown person, rights and property, and those of hisfellow beings, would ever be exposed to all manneof danger and injury.

Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a

vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap,

he was violating any traffic regulation. Laspias also violated

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Section 35 of RA No. 4136:1avvphil.net

Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed. (a) Any persondriving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive thesame at a careful and prudent speed, not greater norless than is reasonable and proper, having due regard

for the traffic, the width of the highway, and or anyother condition then and there existing; and noperson shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highwayat such speed as to endanger the life, limb andproperty of any person, nor at a speed greater thanwill permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop withinthe assured clear distance ahead.

2. Petitioner Tiu failed to overcome the presumption of

negligence against him as one engaged in t he business of

common carriage

Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption ofnegligence at once arises, and it becomes the duty of a

common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinarydiligence in the care of his passengers. It must be stressedthat in requiring the highest possible degree of diligence fromcommon carriers and in creating a presumption of negligenceagainst them, the law compels them to curb the recklessnessof their drivers. The negligence of petitioner Laspias asdriver of the passenger bus is, thus, binding against petitionerTiu, as the owner of the passenger bus engaged as a commoncarrier when it failed to rebut the presumption.

3.The Doctr ine of Last Clear Chance is Inapplicable

It only applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of

two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passengerdemands responsibility from the carrier to enforce itscontractual obligations, for it would be inequitable toexempt the negligent driver and its owner on the groundthat the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. Thecommon law notion of last clear chance permitted courts togrant recovery to a plaintiff who has also been negligentprovided that the defendant had the last clear chance toavoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it isdifficult to see what role, if any, the common law of lastclear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where thecommon law concept of contributory negligence as anabsolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been

rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code.

4.Respondents Pedrano andCondor w ere likew ise Negligent

In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts failed toconsider that respondent Pedrano was also negligent inleaving the truck parked askew without any warning lights orreflector devices to alert oncoming vehicles, and that suchfailure created the presumption of negligence on the part of

his employer, respondent Condor, in supervising hisemployees properly and adequately.

The manner in which the truck was parked clearlyendangered oncoming traffic on both sides, considering thatthe tire blowout which stalled the truck in the first place

occurred in the wee hours of the morning. The Court can onlynow surmise that the unfortunate incident could have beenaverted had respondent Condor, the owner of the truckequipped the said vehicle with lights, flares, or, at the veryleast, an early warning device.

5. The Liabil it y of Respondent PPSII as Insurer

As can be gleaned from the Certificate of Cover, suchinsurance contract was issued pursuant to the CompulsoryMotor Vehicle Liability Insurance Law. It was expresslyprovided therein that the limit of the insurers liability foeach person was P12,000, while the limit per accident waspegged at P50,000. An insurer in an indemnity contract for

third party liability is directly liable to the injured party up tothe extent specified in the agreement but it cannot be heldsolidarily liable beyond that amount. The respondent PPSIcould not then just deny petitioner Tius claim; it should havepaid P12,000 for the death of Felisa Arriesgado, andrespondent Arriesgados hospitalization expenses oP1,113.80, which the trial court found to have been dulysupported by receipts. The total amount of the claims, evenwhen added to that of the other injured passengers which therespondent PPSII claimed to have settled, would not exceedthe P50,000 limit under the insurance agreement.

Indeed, the nature of Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability

Insurance is such that it is primarily intended to providecompensation for the death or bodily injuries suffered byinnocent third parties or passengers as a result of thenegligent operation and use of motor vehicles. The victimsand/or their dependents are assured of immediate financiaassistance, regardless of the financial capacity of motovehicle owners.

6. Damages to be Awarded

The trial court correctly awarded moral damages in theamount of P50,000 in favor of respondent Arriesgado. Theaward of exemplary damages by way of example or correction

of the public good,is likewise in order. As the Courratiocinated in Kapalaran Bus Line v. Coronado:

While the immediate beneficiaries of the standardof extraordinary diligence are, of course, thepassengers and owners of cargo carried by acommon carrier, they are not the only persons thatthe law seeks to benefit. For if common carrierscarefully observed the statutory standard oextraordinary diligence in respect of their own

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passengers, they cannot help but simultaneouslybenefit pedestrians and the passengers of othervehicles who are equally entitled to the safe andconvenient use of our roads and highways. The lawseeks to stop and prevent the slaughter and maimingof people (whether passengers or not) on our

highways and buses, the very size and power ofwhich seem to inflame the minds of their drivers.Article 2231 of the Civil Code explicitly authorizes theimposition of exemplary damages in cases of quasi-delicts "if the defendant acted with grossnegligence."

The respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado, as the surviving spouseand heir of Felisa Arriesgado, is entitled to indemnity in theamount of P50,000.00.

The petitioners, as well as the respondents Benjamin Condorand Sergio Pedrano are jointly and severally liable for said

amount, conformably with the following pronouncement ofthe Court in Fabre, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals:

The same rule of liability was applied in situationswhere the negligence of the driver of the bus onwhich plaintiff was riding concurred with thenegligence of a third party who was the driver ofanother vehicle, thus causing an accident. Its driver,the operator of the other vehicle and the driver ofthe vehicle were jointly and severally held liable tothe injured passenger or the latters heirs. In Viluanv. CA:

"Nor should it make difference that the

liability of petitioner [bus owner] springsfrom contract while that of respondents[owner and driver of other vehicle] arisesfrom quasi-delict. As early as 1913, wealready ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56Phil. 177, that in case of injury to apassenger due to the negligence of thedriver of the bus on which he was riding andof the driver of another vehicle, the driversas well as the owners of the two vehiclesare jointly and severally liable for damages.Some members of the Court, though, are of

the view that under the circumstances theyare liable on quasi-delict."

AFFIRMED withMODIFICATIONS:

(1) PPI and Tiu are ORDERED to pay, jointly andseverally, Arriesgado - P13,113.80;

(2) Condor and Pedrano are ORDERED to pay, jointlyand severally,Arriesgado P50k as indemnity;P26,441.50 as actual damages; P50k as moral

damages; P50k as exemplary damages; and P20k aattorneys fees.

LAPANDAY vs ANGALA (G.R. No. 153076)

By; Sheng

Facts:

On 4 May 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a Datsun crewcab drivenby Apolonio Deocampo (Deocampo) bumped into a Chevypick-up owned by Michael Raymond Angala (respondent) anddriven by Bernulfo Borres (Borres). LapandayAgricultural andDevelopment Corporation (LADECO) owned the crewcab

which was assigned to its manager Manuel Mendez(Mendez). Deocampo was the driver and bodyguard ofMendez. Both vehicles were running along Rafael Castillo St.Agdao, Davao City heading north towards Lanang, Davao CityThe left door, front left fender, and part of the front bumpeof the pick-up were damaged.

Respondent filed an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages, andAttorneys Fees against LADECO, its administrative officeHenry Berenguel4 (Berenguel) and Deocampo. Respondenalleged that his pick-up was slowing down to about five to tenkilometers per hour (kph) and was making a left turn

preparatory to turning south when it was bumped frombehind by the crewcab which was running at around 60 to 70kph. The crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point oimpact. Respondent alleged that he heard a screeching soundbefore the impact. Respondent was seated beside the driverand was looking at the speedometer when the accident tookplace. Respondent testified that Borres made a signabecause he noticed a blinking light while looking at thespeedometer.

Deocampo alleged that the pick-up and the crewcab he was

driving were both running at about 40 kph. The pick-up wasrunning along the outer lane. The pick-up was about 10meters away when it made a U-turn towards the leftDeocampo testified that he did not see any signal from thepick-up.6 Deocampo alleged that he tried to avoid the pick-upbut he was unable to avoid the collision. Deocampo statedthat he did not apply the brakes because he knew thecollision was unavoidable. Deocampo admitted that hestepped on the brakes only after the collision.
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Issue:

Who is liable for negligence?

Held:

We rule that both parties were negligent in this case. Borreswas at the outer lane when he executed a U-turn. FollowingSection 45(b) of RA 4136, which provides that (Sec. 45.Turning at intersections. x x x

(b) The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shallapproach such intersection in the lane for traffic to the rightof and nearest to the center line of the highway, and, inturning, shall pass to the left of the center of the intersection,except that, upon highways laned for traffic and upon one-way highways, a left turn shall be made from the left lane oftraffic in the direction in which the vehicle is proceeding.)Borres should have stayed at the inner lane which is the lane

nearest to the center of the highway. However, Deocampowas equally negligent. Borres slowed down the pick-uppreparatory to executing the U-turn. Deocampo should havealso slowed down when the pick-up slowed down. Deocampoadmitted that he noticed the pick-up when it was still about20 meters away from him.13 Vehicular traffic was light at thetime of the incident. The pick-up and the crewcab were theonly vehicles on the road.14 Deocampo could have avoidedthe crewcab if he was not driving very fast before thecollision. Further, the crewcab stopped 21 meters from thepoint of impact. It would not have happened if Deocampowas not driving very fast.

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Applies

Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of lastclear chance applies. The doctrine of last clear chance statesthat where both parties are negligent but the negligent act ofone is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it isimpossible to determine whose fault or negligence causedthe loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoidthe loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss.16 Inthis case, Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid thecollision. Since Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had

full control of the situation since he was in a position toobserve the vehicle in front of him.17 Deocampo had theresponsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front ofhim.18 A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoidskidding and overturning, compared to running straightahead.19 Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he wasnot driving very fast while following the pick-up. Deocampowas not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did notstep on the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He onlystepped on the brakes after the collision.

Peti t ioners are Solidari ly Liab le

LADECO alleges that it should not be held jointly and severallyliable with Deocampo because it exercised due diligence inthe supervision and selection of its employees. Aside from

this statement, LADECO did not proffer any proof to showhow it exercised due diligence in the supervision andselection of its employees. LADECO did not show its policy inhiring its drivers, or the manner in which it supervised itsdrivers. LADECO failed to substantiate its allegation that itexercised due diligence in the supervision and selection of itsemployees. Hence, we hold LADECO solidarily liable withDeocampo.

G.R. No. 167346 April 2, 2007

SOLIDBANKCORPORATION/ METROPOLITAN BANK AND

TRUST COMPANY, vs. SPOUSES PETER and SUSAN TAN

By; Myrie

FACTS: On December 2, 1991, respondents representativeRemigia Frias, deposited with petitioner ten checks worthP455,962. Grace Neri, petitioners teller no. 8 in its Juan LunaManila Branch, received two deposit slips for the checks, anoriginal and a duplicate. Neri verified the checks and theiamounts in the deposit slips then returned the duplicate copyto Frias and kept the original copy for petitioner.

As usual practice between petitioner and respondents, thelatters passbook was left with petitioner for the recording ofthe deposits on the banks ledger. Later, respondentsretrieved the passbook and discovered that one of thechecks, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank

check no. 403954, payable to cash in the sum of P250,000was not posted therein.

Immediately, respondents notified petitioner of the problemPetitioner showed respondent Peter Tan a duplicate copy of adeposit slip indicating the list of checks deposited by FriasBut it did not include the missing check. The deposit slip borethe stamp mark "teller no. 7" instead of "teller no. 8" whopreviously received the checks.
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Respondents demanded that petitioner pay the amount ofthe check but it refused, hence, they filed a case for collectionof a sum of money in the RTC of Manila, Branch 31. In itsanswer, petitioner averred that the deposit slips Frias usedwhen she deposited the checks were spurious. Petitioneraccused respondents of engaging in a scheme to illegally

exact money from it. It added that, contrary to the claim ofrespondents, it was "teller no. 7" who received the depositslips and, although respondents insisted that Frias depositedten checks, only nine checks were actually received by saidteller. It sought payment of P1,000,000 as actual and moraldamages and P500,000 as exemplary damages.

RTC found petitioner liable to respondents. Basis ofjudgment: this Court believes that the loss of MetrobankCheck No. 403954 in the sum of P250,000.00 was due to thefault of [petitioner][It] retained the original copy of the[deposit slip marked by "Teller No. 7"]. There is apresumption in law that evidence willfully suppressed would

be adverse if produced. Art. 1173 of the Civil Code states that"the fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omissionof that diligence which is required by the nature of theobligation and corresponds with the circumstances of theperson of the time and of the place"; and that "if the law orcontract does not state the diligence which is to be observedin the performance, the same as expected of a good father ofa family shall be required."

For failure to comply with its obligation, [petitioner] ispresumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligentlyunless they prove that they observe extraordinary diligenceas prescribed in Arts. 1733 and 1735 of the Civil Code (Art.

1756).

Petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto theRTCs assailed decision.

ISSUES: 1. WON the petitioner is negligent for the loss of thesubject checks.

2. WON the award of damages in favor of respondents wasunjustifiable.

3. WON the application by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, ofthe provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to theinstant case was erroneous.

RULING:The petition must fail.1

stissue: According to petitioner, the fact that the check was

deposited in Premier Bank affirmed its claim that it did notreceive the check.

We meticulously reviewed the records of the case and foundno reason to deviate from the rule. Moreover, since the CAaffirmed these findings on appeal, they are final andconclusive on us. We therefore sustain the RTCs and CAs

findings that petitioner was indeed negligent and responsiblefor respondents lost check.

2nd

issue: Petitioner argues that the moral and exemplarydamages awarded by the lower courts had no legal basis. Fothe award of moral damages to stand, petitioner avers tha

respondents should have proven the existence of bad faith byclear and convincing evidence. According to petitionersimple negligence cannot be a basis for its award. It insiststhat the award of exemplary damages is justified only whenthe act complained of was done in a wanton, fraudulent andoppressive manner.

We disagree.

While petitioner may argue that simple negligence does notwarrant the award of moral damages, it nonetheless cannotinsist that that was all it was guilty of. It refused to producethe original copy of the deposit slip which could have provenits claim that it did not receive respondents missing check

Thus, in suppressing the best evidence that could havebolstered its claim and confirmed its innocence, thepresumption now arises that it withheld the same forfraudulent purposes.

Moreover, in presenting a false deposit slip in its attempt tofeign innocence, petitioners bad faith was apparent andunmistakable. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or somemoral obliquity or conscious doing of a wrong that partakesof thenature of fraud.

As to the award of exemplary damages, the law allows it byway of example for the public good. The business of banking

is impressed with public interest and great reliance is madeon the banks sworn profession of diligence andmeticulousness in giving irreproachable service.13 Fopetitioners failure to carry out its responsibility and toaccount for respondents lost check, we hold that the lowercourts did not err in awarding exemplary damages to thelatter.

3rd

issue: We hold that the trial court did not commit anyerror. In citing the different provisions of the Civil Code oncommon carriers,15 the trial court merely made reference tothe kind of diligence that petitioner should have performedunder the circumstances. In other words, like a common

carrier whose business is also imbued with public interestpetitioner should have exercised extraordinary diligence tonegate its liability to respondents.

In one case,16 the Court did not hesitate to apply the doctrineof last clear chance (commonly used in transportation lawsinvolving common carriers) to a banking transaction where iadjudged the bank responsible for the encashment of aforged check. There, we enunciated that the degree ofdiligence required of banks is more than that of a good fathe
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of a family in keeping with their responsibility to exercise thenecessary care and prudence in handling their clients money.

We find no compelling reason to disallow the application ofthe provisions on common carriers to this case if only toemphasize the fact that banking institutions (like petitioner)

have the duty to exercise the highest degree of diligencewhen transacting with the public. By the nature of theirbusiness, they are required to observe the highest standardsof integrity and performance, and utmost assiduousness aswell.

Myrie

PAULAN vs SARABIA (7-31-58) Unreported Case

As Cited in Corpuz vs Paje

The four-year prescriptive period began to run from the daythe quasi-delict was committed, or from December 23, 1956,and the running of the said period was not interrupted bythe institution of the criminal action for reckless

imprudence. (Paulan vs. Sarabia, G.R. No. L-10542, July 31,1958.)

As Cited in Ferrer vs Ericta

The four-year period begins from the day the quasi-delict iscommitted or the date of the accident (Diocesa Paulan, et al.vs. Zacarias Sarabia, et al., L-10542, July 31, 1958)

As Cited in Capuno vs Pepsi

In the case ofDiocosa Paulan, et al. vs. Zacarias Sarabia, etal., G.R. No. L-10542, promulgated July 31, 1958, this Courtheld that an action based on aquasi-delictis governed byArticle 1150 of the Civil Code as to the question of when theprescriptive period of four years shall begin to run, that is,

"from the day (the action) may be brought," which means

from the day the quasi-delictoccurred or was committed.

The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants'contention that the four-year period of prescription in thiscase was interrupted by the filing of the criminal actionagainst Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived thecivil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately.Such reservation was not then necessary; without havingmade it they could file - as in fact they did - a separate civilaction even during the pendency of the criminal case

(Pacheco v. Tumangday, L-14500, May 25, 1960; Azucena vPotenciano, L-14028, June 30, 1962); and consequently, asheld inPaulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the institution of a criminaaction cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution

of a civil action based on a quasi-delict."

G.R. No. L-13715 December 23, 1959

FELIX V. VALENCIA, vs.CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT CO., ET AL.

By; Adora

Facts: The present case in an offshoot of G.R. NoL-6158 * (March 11, 1954), entitled Cebu Portland CementCompany vs. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) andPhilippine Land Air-Sea Labor union (PLASLU), which that the

separation of plaintiff herein, Felix V. Valencia, from hisposition as general superintendent in the Cebu PortlandCement Company, Cebu, was unjustifiable. Said court orderedthat Felix V. Valencia be reinstated from May 1, 1949 toNovember 16, 1950, with all the privileges and emolumentsattached to said petition. The present complaint was filed onJune 22, 1956, and alleges that in procuring plaintiffsdismissal through malicious, illegal, unjust, oppressive andhigh-handed acts, plaintiff and his family have been terriblyhumiliated and have suffered an irreparable injury to theigood name. So it is prayed that actual or compensatorydamages, exemplary damages, nominal or temperate

damages, attorney's fees and contingent fees, all amountingto P299,509.00, be granted plaintiff-appellant. Plaintiffappellant claims that the Court of Industrial Relations casepresented by him against the

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