20121116 mortimer jerome adler 1902 2001 eua wikipedia

7/28/2019 20121116 Mortimer Jerome Adler 1902 2001 EUA Wikipedia

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Mortimer J. Adler

Born December 28, 1902

New York, New York, United

States

Died June 28, 2001 (aged 98)

Palo Alto, California, United States

Era 20th-century philosophy

Region Western Philosophy

School Aristotelian, Thomist, philosophy

Main interests Philosophical Theology,

Metaphysics, Ethics

Mortimer J. Adler

Mortimer J. AdlerFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Mortimer Jerome Adler (December 28,1902 June 28, 2001) was an Americanphilosopher, educator, and popular author.As a philosopher he worked within theAristotelian and Thomistic traditions. Helived for the longest stretches in New YorkCity, Chicago, San Francisco, and SanMateo, California. He worked for ColumbiaUniversity, the University of Chicago,Encyclopdia Britannica, and Adler's ownInstitute for Philosophical Research.

Contents

1 Biography1.1 New York City1.2 Chicago1.3 "Great Books" and beyond1.4 Popular appeal

1.5 Controversy2 Religion and theology3 Philosophy

3.1 Moral philosophy3.2 The intellect3.3 Free will3.4 God3.5 Religion in modern times

4 Personal5 Books by Adler

5.1 Collections edited by Adler6 See also7 References8 Further reading9 External links

Biography

New York City

Adler was born in New York City on December 28, 1902, to Jewish immigrants. He dropped

Influenced by

Influenced

timer J. Adler - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mortimer_J._Adler

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out of school at age 14 to become a copy boy for theNew York Sun, with the ultimate

aspiration to become a journalist.[1] Adler soon returned to school to take writing classes atnight where he discovered the works of men he would come to call heroes: Aristotle, Thomas

Aquinas, John Locke, John Stuart Mill and others.[2] He went on to study at ColumbiaUniversity and contributed to the student literary magazine, The Morningside, (a poem

"Choice" in 1922 when Charles A. Wagner[3] was editor-in-chief and Whittaker Chambers an

associate editor).[4] Though he refused to take the required swimming test for a bachelor'sdegree (a matter that was rectified when Columbia gave him an honorary degree in 1983), hestayed at the university and eventually received an instructorship and finally a doctorate in

psychology.[5] While at Columbia University, Adler wrote his first book:Dialectic, published

in 1927.[6]

Chicago

In 1930 Robert Hutchins, the newly appointed president of the University of Chicago, whomAdler had befriended some years earlier, arranged for Chicagos law school to hire him as aprofessor of the philosophy of law; the philosophers at Chicago (who included James H. Tufts,E.A. Burtt, and George H. Mead) had "entertained grave doubts as to Dr. Adler's competence inthe field [of philosophy]" and resisted Adler's appointment to the University's Department of

Philosophy.[7] Adler was the first "non-lawyer" to join the law school faculty.[8] Adler also

taught philosophy to business executives at the Aspen Institute.[6]

"Great Books" and beyond

Adler and Hutchins went on to found the Great Books of the Western World program and theGreat Books Foundation. He founded and served as director of the Institute for PhilosophicalResearch in 1952. He also served on the Board of Editors of Encyclopdia Britannica from itsinception in 1949, and succeeded Hutchins as its chairman from 1974. As the director ofeditorial planning for the fifteenth edition ofBritannica from 1965, he was instrumental in the

major reorganization of knowledge embodied in that edition.[9] He introduced the PaideiaProposal which resulted in his founding the Paideia Program, a grade-school curriculumcentered around guided reading and discussion of difficult works (as judged for each grade).

With Max Weismann, he founded the Center for the Study of The Great Ideas in 1990 inChicago.

Popular appeal

Adler long strove to bring philosophy to the masses, and some of his works (such asHow toRead a Book) became popular bestsellers. He was also an advocate of economic democracy and

wrote an influential preface to Louis O. Kelso's The Capitalist Manifesto.[10] Adler was oftenaided in his thinking and writing by Arthur Rubin, an old friend from his Columbia

undergraduate days. In his own words:

Unlike many of my contemporaries, I never write books for my fellow professors toread. I have no interest in the academic audience at all. I'm interested in Joe Doakes.


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A general audience can read any book I write and they do.

Dwight MacDonald once criticized Adler's popular style by saying "Mr. Adler once wrote abook calledHow to Read a Book. He should now read a book calledHow to Write a

Book."[11]

Controversy

Adler was a controversial figure in some circles that saw his Great Books of the Western Worldproject as Eurocentric and racially exclusive. Asked in a 1990 interview why his Great Books ofthe Western World list did not include any black authors, he simply said, "They didn't write any

good books."[12]

Religion and theology

Adler was born into a nonobservant Jewish family. In his early twenties, he discovered St.Thomas Aquinas, and in particular the Summa Theologica.[13] Many years later, he wrote thatits "intellectual austerity, integrity, precision and brilliance...put the study of theology highest

among all of my philosophical interests".[14] An enthusiastic Thomist, he was a frequentcontributor to Catholic philosophical and educational journals, as well as a frequent speaker atCatholic institutions, so much so that some assumed he was a convert to Catholicism. But that

was reserved for later.[13]

In 1940, James T. Farrell called Adler "the leading American fellow-traveller of the RomanCatholic Church". What was true for Adler, Farrell said, was what was "postulated in thedogma of the Roman Catholic Church", and he "sang the same tune" as avowed Catholicphilosophers like tienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain and Martin D'Arcy. Farrell attributedAdler's delay in joining the Church to his being among those Christians who "wanted their cakeand...wanted to eat it too", and compared him to the Emperor Constantine, who waited until he

was on his deathbed to formally become a Catholic.[15]

Adler took a long time to make up his mind about theological issues. When he wroteHow toThink About God: A Guide for the Twentieth-Century Pagan in 1980, he claimed to considerhimself the pagan of the book's subtitle. In volume 51 of the Mars Hill Audio Journal (2001),Ken Myers includes his 1980 interview with Adler, conducted after How to Think About Godwas published. Myers reminisces, "During that interview, I asked him why he had neverembraced the Christian faith himself. He explained that while he had been profoundlyinfluenced by a number of Christian thinkers during his life,... there were moral not

intellectual obstacles to his conversion. He didn't explain any further."[16]

Myers notes that Adler finally "surrendered to the Hound of Heaven" and "made a confession offaith and was baptized" as an Episcopalian in 1984, only a few years after that interview.Offering insight into Adler's conversion, Myers quotes him from a subsequent 1990 article inChristianity magazine: "My chief reason for choosing Christianity was because the mysterieswere incomprehensible. What's the point of revelation if we could figure it out ourselves? If it


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were wholly comprehensible, then it would just be another philosophy."[16]

According to his friend Deal Hudson, Adler "had been attracted to Catholicism for many years"and "wanted to be a Roman Catholic, but issues like abortion and the resistance of his familyand friends" kept him away. Many thought he was baptized as an Episcopalian rather than aCatholic solely because of his "wonderful and ardently Episcopal wife" Caroline. Hudson

suggests it is no coincidence that it was only after her death in 1998 that he took the finalstep.[17] In December 1999, in San Mateo, where he had moved to spend his last years, Adlerwas formally received into the Catholic Church by a long-time friend and admirer, Bishop

Pierre DuMaine.[13] "Finally," wrote another friend, Ralph McInerny, "he became the Roman

Catholic he had been training to be all his life".[1]

Despite not being a Catholic for most of his life, Mortimer can be considered a Catholic

philosopher on account of his lifelong participation in the Neo-Thomist movement[16] and his

almost equally long membership of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.[1]

Philosophy

Moral philosophy

Adler referred to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics as the "ethics of common sense" and also as"the only moral philosophy that is sound, practical, and undogmatic". Thus, it is the onlyethical doctrine that answers all the questions that moral philosophy should and can attempt to

answer, neither more nor less, and that has answers that are true by the standard of truth that isappropriate and applicable to normative judgments. In contrast, he believed that other theoriesor doctrines try to answer more questions than they can or fewer than they should, and theiranswers are mixtures of truth and error, particularly the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant.

Adler believed we are as enlightened by Aristotles Ethics today as were those who listened toAristotle's lectures when they were first delivered because the ethical problems that humanbeings confront in their lives have not changed over the centuries. Moral virtue and theblessings of good fortune are today, as they have always been in the past, the keys to livingwell, unaffected by all the technological changes in the environment, as well as those in oursocial, political, and economic institutions. He believed that the moral problems to be solved bythe individual are the same in every century, though they appear to us in different guises.

According to Adler, six indispensable conditions must be met in the effort to develop a soundmoral philosophy that corrects all the errors made in modern times.

First and foremost is the definition of prescriptive truth, which sharply distinguishes it from thedefinition of descriptive truth. Descriptive truth consists in the agreement or conformity of themind with reality. When we think that that which is, is, and that which is not, is not, we think

truly. To be true, what we think must conform to the way things are. In sharp contrast,prescriptive truth consists in the conformity of our appetites with right desire. The practical orprescriptive judgments we make are true if they conform to right desire; or, in other words, ifthey prescribe what we ought to desire. It is clear that prescriptive truth cannot be the same as


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descriptive truth; and if the only truth that human beings can know is descriptive truth thetruth of propositions concerning what is and is not then there can be no truth in ethics.Propositions containing the word "ought" cannot conform to reality. As a result, we have thetwentieth-century mistake of dismissing all ethical or value judgments as noncognitive. Thesemust be regarded only as wishes or demands we make on others. They are personal opinionsand subjective prejudices, not objective knowledge. In short, the very phrase "noncognitiveethics" declares that ethics is not a body of knowledge.

Second, in order to avoid the naturalistic fallacy, we must formulate at least one self-evidentprescriptive truth, so that, with it as a premise, we can reason to the truth of other prescriptives.David Hume said that if we had perfect or complete descriptive knowledge of reality, we couldnot, by reasoning, derive a single valid ought.

Third, the distinction between real and apparent goods must be understood, as well as the factthat only real goods are the objects of right desire. In the realm of appetite or desire, somedesires are natural and some are acquired. Those that are natural are the same for all human

beings as individual members of the human species. They are as much a part of our naturalendowment as our sensitive faculties and our skeletal structure. Other desires we acquire in thecourse of experience, under the influence of our upbringing or nurturing, or of environmentalfactors that differ from individual to individual. Individuals differ in their acquired desires, asthey do not in their natural desires. This is essentially the difference between "needs" and"wants." What is really good for us is not really good because we desire it, but the veryopposite. We desire it because it is really good. By contrast, that which only appears good to us(and may or may not be really good for us) appears good to us simply because we want it at themoment. Its appearing good is the result of our wanting it, and as our wants change, as they do

from day to day, so do the things that appear good to us. In light of the definition of prescriptivetruth as conformity with right desire, we can see that prescriptions are true only when theyenjoin us to want what we need, since every need is for something that is really good for us. Ifright desire is desiring what we ought to desire, and if we ought to desire only that which isreally good for us and nothing else, then we have found the one controlling self evidentprinciple of all ethical reasoning the one indispensable categorical imperative. Thatself-evident principle can be stated as follows: we ought to desire everything that is really goodfor us.The principle is self evident because its opposite is unthinkable. It is unthinkable that weought to desire anything that is really bad for us; and it is equally unthinkable that we ought

not to desire everything that is really good for us. The meanings of the crucial words "ought"and "really good" co-implicate each other, as do the words "part" and "whole" when we say thatthe whole is greater than any of its parts is a self-evident truth. Given this self-evidentprescriptive principle, and given the facts of human nature that tell us what we naturally need,we can reason our way to a whole series of prescriptive truths, all categorical.

Fourth, in all practical matters or matters of conduct, the end precedes the means in ourthinking about them, while in action we move from means to ends. But we cannot think aboutour ends until, among them, we have discovered our final or ultimate end the end that leavesnothing else to be rightly desired. The only word that names such a final or ultimate end is"happiness." No one can ever say why he or she wants happiness because happiness is not anend that is also a means to something beyond itself. This truth cannot be understood withoutcomprehending the distinction between terminal and normative ends. A terminal end, as in


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travel, is one that a person can reach at some moment and come to rest in. Terminal ends, suchas psychological contentment, can be reached and then rested in on some days, but not others.Happiness, not conceived as psychologically experienced contentment, but rather as a wholelife well lived, is not a terminal end because it is never attained at any time in the course ofone's whole life. If all ends were terminal ends, there could not be any one of them that is thefinal or ultimate end in the course of living from moment to moment. Only a normative end canbe final and ultimate. Happiness functions as the end that ought to control all the right choiceswe make in the course of living. Though we never have happiness ethically understood at anymoment of our lives, we are always on the way to happiness if we freely make the choices thatwe ought to make in order to achieve our ultimate normative end of having lived well. But wesuffer many accidents in the course of our lives, things beyond our control outrageousmisfortunes or the blessings of good fortunes. Moral virtue alone or the habits of choosing aswe ought is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of living well. The other necessary, butalso not sufficient condition is good fortune.

The fifth condition is that there is not a plurality of moral virtues (which are named in so many

ethical treatises), but only one integral moral virtue. There may be a plurality of aspects tomoral virtue, but moral virtue is like a cube with many faces. The unity of moral virtue isunderstood when it is realized that the many faces it has may be analytically but notexistentially distinct. In other words, considering the four so-called cardinal virtues temperance, courage, justice, and prudence the unity of virtue declares that no one can haveany one of these four without also having the other three. Since justice names an aspect ofvirtue that is other regarding, while temperance and courage name aspects of virtue that areself-regarding, and both the self- and other regarding aspects of virtue involve prudence in themaking of moral choices, no one can be selfish in his right desires without also being altruistic,

and conversely. This explains why a morally virtuous person ought to be just even though his orher being just may appear only to serve the good of others. According to the unity of virtue, theindividual cannot have the self-regarding aspects of virtue temperance and courage withoutalso having the other regarding aspect of virtue, which is justice.

The sixth and final condition in Adlers teleological ethics is acknowledging the primacy of thegood and deriving the right therefrom. Those who assert the primacy of the right make themistake of thinking that they can know what is right, what is morally obligatory in our treatmentof others, without first knowing what is really good for ourselves in the course of trying to live a

morally good life. Only when we know what is really good for ourselves can we know what areour duties or moral obligations toward others. The primacy of the good with respect to the rightcorrects the mistake of thinking that we are acting morally if we do nothing that injures others.Our first moral obligation is to ourselves to seek all the things that are really good for us, thethings all of us need, and only those apparent goods that are innocuous rather than noxious.

The intellect

Adler was a self proclaimed moderate dualist, and viewed the positions of psychophysical

dualism and materialistic monism to be opposite sides of two extremes. Regarding dualism, hedismissed the extreme form of dualism that stemmed from such philosophers as Plato (body andsoul) and Descartes (mind and matter):


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Strictly speaking, a human being (as defined by the dualistic theory) is not whatcommon sense supposes that person to be: one indivisible thing. That person isactually divided into two individual things, as different and distinct as the rower andthe rowboat in which he sits. If this dualistic theory were true, it would confront uswith the most embarrassing, insoluble difficulties should we try to explain how thesetwo utterly different substances could interact with one another, as they appear to doin human behavior. Brain injuries or defects produce mental disabilities or disorders.We also have the reports from neurological surgery that tell of electrical stimulationof the brain producing conscious experiences. How can this be so if mind and brainare as separate as the rower and the rowboat, a separation so complete that it permits

the rowboat to be sunk while the rower swims away unharmed?[18]

Adler also disagreed with the theory of extreme monism. He believed that while mind and brainmay be existentially inseparable, and so regarded as one and the same thing, the mental and thephysical may still be analytically distinct aspects of it. He put this theory to the test in thefollowing manner:

Let a surgeon open up an individual's brain for inspection while the patient remainsconscious. Let the surgeon dictate to a secretary his detailed observation of thevisible area of the brain under scrutiny, and let that area of the brain be its center forvision. Let the patient dictate to another secretary a detailed description of thevisible walls of the room in which the surgery is occurring. The language used by thesurgeon and the language used by the patient will be irreducibly different: the onewill contain words referring to physical phenomena occurring in the brain; the other,words referring to conscious experiences of the room. The extreme monism that

asserts not only the existential unity of brain and mind, but also that there is noanalytical distinction between them, thus becomes untenable.[18]

Adler was also a harsh critic of the Mind-Brain Identity Theory:

One extremist theory about mind and brain asserts their identity. Used literally, theword "identity" must here mean that there is no distinction whatsoever between mindand brain. That, in turn, means that the two words "mind" and "brain" are strictsynonyms. If that is the case, we cannot meaningfully ask about the relation of

psychology to neurology because psychology is identical with neurology.[18]

After eliminating the extremes, Adler subscribed to a more moderate form of dualism. Hebelieved that the brain is only a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for conceptualthought; that an immaterial intellect is also requisite as a condition; and that the differencebetween human and animal behavior is a radical difference in kind. His reason for this is thattheir cognitive sensory powers do not and cannot apprehend universals. Their cognitive reachdoes not go beyond particulars. Hence, we would not be able to apprehend universals if we didnot have another and quite distinct cognitive power the power of intellect. Our concepts areuniversal in their signification of objects that are kinds or classes of things rather thanindividuals that are particular instances of these classes or kinds. Since they have universality,they cannot exist physically or be embodied in matter. But concepts do exist in our minds. Theyare there as acts of our intellectual power. Hence that power must be an immaterial power, notone embodied in a material organ such as the brain.


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Adler argued that if such an immaterial power did not exist in human beings, our use ofcommon nouns would not be possible. Particular instances are designated by proper names ordefinite descriptions. When we use the word "dog," we are referring to any dog, regardless ofbreed, size, shape, or color. To refer to a particular instance, we would use a canine name, suchas "Fido," or a definite description, such as "that white poodle over there lying in front of thefire." Our concepts of dog and poodle not only enable us to think about two classes of animals,they also enable us to understand what it is like to be a dog or a poodle.

According to Adler, The action of the brain, therefore, cannot be the sufficient condition ofconceptual thought, though it may still be a necessary condition thereof, insofar as the exerciseof our power of conceptual thought depends on the exercise of our powers of perception,memory, and imagination, which are corporeal powers embodied in our sense-organs and brain.

Only if the brain is not the sufficient condition for intellectual activity and conceptual thought(only if the intellect that is part of the human mind and is not found in other animals is theimmaterial factor that must be added to the brain in order to provide conditions both necessary

and sufficient) are we justified in concluding that the manifest difference in kind betweenhuman and animal minds, and between human and animal behavior, is radical, not superficial. Itcannot be explained away by any difference in the physical constitution of human beings andother animals that is a difference in degree.

Adler defended this position against many challenges to dualistic theories. For example, DavidHume believed that man is equipped with sensitive faculties only, and has no intellect. As anominalist, Hume then faced the problem of how to explain the meaning of the general wordsin our everyday language; for example, the common nouns that signify classes or kinds. Hume

attempted to solve this problem by arguing that when we use words that appear to have generalsignificance, we are applying them to a number of perceived individuals indifferently; that is,without any difference in the meaning of the word thus applied.

Adler found this explanation to be a complete contradiction. To say that we can apply words toa number of individuals indifferently amounts to saying that there is a certain sameness in theindividual thing that the speaker or writer recognizes. He argued that if human beings enjoy thepowers of conceptual, as opposed to perceptual thought, there would be no difficulty inexplaining how words signify universals or generalities. They would derive their significancefrom concepts that give us our understanding of classes or kinds.

As for the challenge that mans understanding is derived only from sense, and to the denial of"abstract" or "general ideas, Adler cites the following quote:

Let any man try to conceive of a triangle in general, which is neither Isosceles,Saclenum, nor has any particular length or proportion of sides; and he will soonperceive the absurdity of all the scholastic notions with regard to abstraction andgeneral ideas.

Adler responded to this challenge in his book "Ten Philosophical Mistakes":There we have it in a nut shell. If all we have are sense-perceptions and imagesderived from sense, then we can never be aware of anything but a particular triangle,


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one that is either isosceles, scalene, or equilateral, one that has a certain size or area,one the lines of which are either black or some other color, and so on. What is heresaid of triangles can be said of everything else. We are never aware of anythingexcept particular individuals-whether by perception or imagination-this cow or that,this tree or that, this chair or that, each with this one particular instance of a certainkind of thing. We may have a name for that certain kind, as we do when we use suchwords as triangle, cow, tree, and "chair", but we have no idea of that kind assuch. We have no idea or understanding of triangularity as such, or of what anyindividual must be like to be a particular triangle, cow, tree, or chair. Only our wordsare general. Nothing in reality is general; everything there is particular. So, too,nothing in the mind is general; everything is particular. Generality exists only in thewords of our language, the words that are common, not proper, names. Those whoregard the human mind as having intellectual as well as sensitive powers have nodifficulty in meeting Humes challenge head on. By means of an abstract concept, weunderstand what is common to all the particular cows, trees, and chairs that we canperceive or imagine.

Mortimer J. Adler, Ten Philosophical Mistakes, p. 41-42

Free will

In Adler's two-volume survey on freedom The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical Examinationof the Conceptions of Freedom (1958) and its sequel The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical

Examination of the Controversies about Freedom (1961) he produced an exhaustive studyof the concepts involved in debates about free will and the positions of hundreds ofphilosophers.

In volume I, Adler classified all freedoms into three categories:

The Circumstantial Freedom of Self-RealizationThe Acquired Freedom of Self-PerfectionThe Natural Freedom of Self-Determination

Self-realization Adler defined as freedom from external coercion, political and economicfreedom, etc. This is the kind of freedom that Thomas Hobbes and David Hume thought wascompatible with determinism.

The freedom we have identified as circumstantial is variously called "economicfreedom," "political freedom," "civil liberty," "individual freedom," "the freedom ofman in society," "freedom in relation to the state," and "external freedom." It issometimes referred to negatively as "freedom from coercion or restraint," "freedomfrom restrictions," or "freedom from law," and sometimes positively as "freedom ofaction," "freedom of spontaneity," or "freedom under law."

Mortimer J. Adler, The Idea of Freedom, vol.I, p.127

Self-perfection is the idea from Plato to Kant that we are only free when our decisions are forreasons and we are not slaves to our passions (making moral choices rather than satisfyingdesires).


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This is the acquired or learned knowledge to distinguish right from wrong, good from evil, truefrom false, etc. Adler also includes many theologically minded philosophers who argue thatman is only free when following a divine moral law. Sinners, they say, do not have free will,which is odd because sinners are presumably responsible for evil in the world despite anomniscient and omnipotent God.

As signifying one of the three ways in which writers think that men possess freedom,the word "acquired" refers to that the possession of which depends upon a change ordevelopment in human beings whereby they have a state of mind, or character, orpersonality which differentiates them from other men.

Whatever word is used to designate this difference (whether it be "good," "wise,""virtuous," "righteous," "holy," "healthy," "sound," "flexible," etc.), the differencerepresents an improvement, or the attainment of a superior condition, as measuredon whatever scale of values is posited by the particular writer.

Freedom, in other words, is thought to be possessed only in conjunction with acertain state of mind, character, or personality that marks one man as somehow"better" than another.

ibid., p.135

Self-determination covers the classic problem of free will. Are our actions "up to us," could wehave done otherwise, are there alternative possibilities, or is everything simply part of a greatcausal chain leading to a single possible future?

Adler defines the natural freedom of self-determination as that which is not either

circumstantial or acquired.

A freedom that is natural is one which is (i) inherent in all men, (ii) regardless of thecircumstances under which they live and (iii) without regard to any state of mind orcharacter which they may or may not acquire in the course of their lives.

ibid., p.149

A few years later, Adler revisits in Volume II the idea of a natural freedom ofself-determination, which explicitly includes alternative possibilities and the uncaused self as acause so our actions are "up to us." The uncaused self decides by choosing from prioralternative possibilities.

We have employed the following descriptive formula to summarize theunderstanding of self-determination that is shared by authors who affirm man'spossession of such freedom. They regard it, we have said, as "a freedom which ispossessed by all men, in virtue of a power inherent in human nature, whereby a manis able to change his own character creatively by deciding for himself what he shalldo or shall become.

We have further explained that "being able to change one's own character creativelyby deciding for one's self what one shall do or shall become" expresses the topicalagreement about self-determination only when at least two of the three followingpoints are affirmed:


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(i) that the decision is intrinsically unpredictable, i.e., given perfect knowledgeof all relevant causes, the decision cannot be foreseen or predicted withcertitude;

(ii) that the decision is not necessitated, i.e., the decision is always one of anumber of alternative possible decisions any one of which it wassimultaneously within the power of the self to cause, no matter what other

antecedent or concurrent factors exercise a causal influence on the making ofthe decision;

(iii) that the decision flows from the causal initiative of the self, i.e., on theplane of natural or finite causes, the self is the uncaused cause of the decisionit makes.

These three points, as we shall see, generate three distinct existential issues aboutman's natural freedom of self-determination. Writers who deny (iii) that, on the plane

of natural or finite causes, there are any uncaused causes deny, in consequence, theexistence of a freedom the conception of which posits such causes. Writers who deny(ii) that an effect can be caused in a manner which does not necessitate it deny, inconsequence, the existence of a freedom the conception of which attributes to theself the power of causing but not necessitating the decisions it makes. The existenceof self-determination is also denied by writers who claim (i) that God's omniscienceexcludes a freedom the conception of which involves the intrinsic unpredictability ofdecisions that are the product of man's power of self-determination.

Mortimer J. Adler, The Idea of Freedom, vol.II, p.225

In points (i) and (ii) Adler has defined a two-stage model of free will like that of William Jamesand a dozen other philosophers and scientists.[19]

God

In his 1981 bookHow to Think About God, Adler attempts to demonstrate God as the

exnihilator [the creator of something from nothing][2] of the cosmos. The steps taken todemonstrate this are as follows:

The existence of an effect requiring the concurrent existence and action of an efficientcause implies the existence and action of that cause

1.

The cosmos as a whole exists2.The existence of the cosmos as a whole is radically contingent (meaning that it needs anefficient cause of its continuing existence to preserve it in being, and prevent it from beingannihilated, or reduced to nothing)

3.

If the cosmos needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence, then that cause must bea supernatural being, supernatural in its action, and one the existence of which isuncaused, in other words, the Supreme Being, or God

4.

Two of the four premises, the first and the last, appear to be true with certitude. The second istrue beyond a reasonable doubt. If the one remaining premise, the third, is also true beyond areasonable doubt, then we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that God exists and acts to


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sustain the cosmos in existence.

The reason we can conceive the cosmos as being radically rather than superficially contingent isdue to the fact that the cosmos which now exists is only one of many possible universes thatmight have in fact existed in the past, and might still exist in the future. This is not to say thatany cosmos other than this one ever did exist in the past, or ever will exist in the future. It is notnecessary to go that far in order to say that other universes might have existed in the past andmight exist in the future. If other universes are possible, than this one also is merely possible,not necessary.

In other words, the universe as we know it today is not the only universe that can ever exist intime. How do we know that the present cosmos is only a possible universe (one of manypossibilities that might exist), and not a necessary universe (the only one that can ever exist)?We can infer it from the fact that the order and disorder, the arrangement and disarray, of thepresent cosmos might have been otherwise. That it might have been different from what it is.There is no compelling reason to think that the natural laws which govern the present cosmos

are the only possible natural laws. The cosmos as we know it manifests chance and randomhappenings, as well as lawful behavior. Even the electrons and protons, which are thought to beimperishable once they exist as the building blocks of the present cosmos, might not be thebuilding blocks for a different cosmos.

The next step in the argument is the crucial one. It consists in saying that whatever might havebeen otherwise in shape or structure is something that also might not exist at all. That whichcannot be otherwise also cannot not exist; and conversely, what necessarily exists can not beotherwise than it is. Therefore, a cosmos which can be otherwise is one that also can not be;

and conversely, a cosmos that is capable of not existing at all is one that can be otherwise thanit now is.

Applying this insight to the fact that the existing cosmos is merely one of a plurality of possibleuniverses, we come to the conclusion that the cosmos, radically contingent in existence, wouldnot exist at all were its existence not caused. A merely possible cosmos cannot be an uncausedcosmos. A cosmos that is radically contingent in existence, and needs a cause of that existence,needs a supernatural cause, one that exists and acts to exnihilate this merely possible cosmos,thus preventing the realization of what is always possible for merely a possible cosmos, namely,its absolute non-existence or reduction to nothingness.

Adler finishes by pointing out that the conclusion reached conforms to Ockhams rule (the rulewhich states that we are justified in positing or asserting the real existence of unobserved orunobservable entities if-and only-if their real existence is indispensable for the explanation ofobservable phenomena) because we have found it necessary to posit the existence of God, theSupreme Being, in order to explain what needs to be explained-the actual existence here andnow of a merely possible cosmos. The argument also appeals to the principle of sufficientreason.

Adler stressed that even with this conclusion, God's existence cannot be proven ordemonstrated, but only established as true beyond a reasonable doubt. However, in a recentre-review of the argument, John Cramer concluded that recent developments in cosmologyappear to converge with and support Adler's argument, and that in light of such theories as the


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multiverse, the argument is no worse for the wear and may, indeed, now be judged somewhat

more probable than it was originally.[20]

Religion in modern times

Adler believed that, if theology and religion are living things, there is nothing intrinsically

wrong about efforts to modernize them. They must be open to change and growth likeeverything else. Further, there is no reason to be surprised when discussions such as those aboutthe "death of God" a concept drawn from Nietzsche stir popular excitement as they did inthe recent past, and could do so again today. According to Adler, of all the great ideas, the ideaof God has always been and continues to be the one that evokes the greatest concern among thewidest group of men and women. However, he was opposed to the idea of converting atheisminto a new form of religion or theology, and cited many "new theologians" such as WilliamHamilton, Paul Van Buren, Thomas Altizer and Gabriel Vahanian, who promoted this error:

Have any great intellectual events been ushered in by the new and "radical"theologians? Any new truths in theology? None. Any new insights into the nature ofreligion? None. Any new advances for the reform of religion? None. The authorswho gave currency to the notions of the new "radical theology" supported theirassertions with nothing more substantial than the kind of proof that would satisfy thebellman in Lewis Carroll's Hunting of the Snark who cried: "What I tell you threetimes is true!" There was, however, a close accord between the ambiguous languagethey used and their purpose. Their purpose was to transform atheism into a newtheology "the religionless Christianity," "atheistic religion," "secularizedChristianity" to preserve some of Christianity's religious teaching while secularizing

and combining it with atheism. So the question emerges again. What is new aboutthe new theology? Again the answer is nothing. Atheism is not new, nor is irreligion,nor is secularism. These are very old even when they sounded in the work of the

eminent modern predecessors of the new theologians.[21]

Adler saw such movements as obvious and disingenuous attempts to convert atheism andsecularism into new forms of religion, rather than calling them by their right names:

For my part, I respect the honest clear-minded atheist who denies that God exists

and tries to offer thought out reasons for the denial. I respect the honest, criticallyminded agnostic who denies we can ever know whether God exists or not, and treatsreligious belief as a pure act of faith, incapable of being supported or challenged byrational analysis or empirical knowledge of the world. I respect the person who, inhis horror of the superstitions and persecutions that have attended the practices ofreligious institutions, rejects the whole of religion as something from which manshould emancipate himself. But I cannot respect those who corrupt the integrity ofwords in the very act of addressing matters of central importance in theology andreligion. I cannot respect those who instead of calling atheism by its right name,

contrive a peculiar set of excuses for atheism (as in the "death of God movement")and then in spite of laws against false labeling call the result a new theology.[21]

With regard to the apparent increase of secularism or irreligion in our Western society, Adler


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responded:

I suggest that the men and women who have given up religion because of the impacton their minds of modern science and philosophy were never truly religious in thefirst place, but only superstitious. The prevalence and predominance of science inour culture has cured a great many of the superstitious beliefs that constituted theirfalse religiosity. The increase of secularism and irreligion in our society does notreflect a decrease in the number of persons who are truly religious, but a decrease inthe number of those who are falsely religious; that is, merely superstitious. There isno question but that science is the cure for superstition, and, if given half the chancewith education, it will reduce the amount that exists. The truths of religion must becompatible with the truths of science and the truths of philosophy. As scientificknowledge advances, and as philosophical analysis improves, religion isprogressively purified of the superstitions that accidentally attach themselves to it asparasites. That being so, it is easier in fact to be more truly religious today than everbefore, precisely because of the advances that have been made in science and

philosophy. That is to say, it is easier for those who will make the effort to thinkclearly in and about religion, not for those whose addiction to religion is nothingmore than a slavish adherence to inherited superstition. Throughout the whole of thepast, only a small number of men were ever truly religious. The vast majority whogave their epochs and their societies the appearance of being religious were primarily

and essentially superstitious.[22]

Personal

Adler was married twice and had four children.[23]

Books by Adler

Dialectic (1927)The Nature of Judicial Proof: An Inquiry into the Logical, Legal, and Empirical

Aspects of the Law of Evidence (1931, with Jerome Michael)Diagrammatics (1932, with Maude Phelps Hutchins)Crime, Law and Social Science (1933, with Jerome Michael)

Art and Prudence: A Study in Practical Philosophy (1937)What Man Has Made of Man: A Study of the Consequences of Platonism and Positivism

in Psychology (1937)St. Thomas and the Gentiles (1938)The Philosophy and Science of Man: A Collection of Texts as a Foundation for Ethics

and Politics (1940)How to Read a Book: The Art of Getting a Liberal Education (1940), 1966 editionsubtitledA Guide to Reading the Great Books, 1972 revised edition with Charles Van

Doren, The Classic Guide to Intelligent Reading: ISBN 0-671-21209-5A Dialectic of Morals: Towards the Foundations of Poli tical Philosophy (1941)How to Think About War and Peace (1944)The Revolution in Education (1944, with Milton Mayer)


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The Capitalist Manifesto (1958, with Louis O. Kelso) ISBN 0-8371-8210-7The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical Examination of the Conceptions of Freedom (1958)The New Capitalists: A Proposal to Free Economic Growth from the Slavery of Savings

(1961, with Louis O. Kelso)The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical Examination of the Controversies about Freedom

(1961)Great Ideas from the Great Books (1961)The Conditions of Philosophy: Its Checkered Past, Its Present Disorder, and Its Future

Promise (1965)The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes (1967)The Time of Our Lives: The Ethics of Common Sense (1970)The Common Sense of Politics (1971)The American Testament(1975, with William Gorman)Some Questions About Language: A Theory of Human Discourse and Its Objects (1976)Philosopher at Large: An Intellectual Autobiography (1977)

Reforming Education: The Schooling of a People and Their Education Beyond

Schooling (1977, edited by Geraldine Van Doren)Aristotle for Everybody: Difficult Thought Made Easy (1978) ISBN 0-684-83823-0How to Think About God: A Guide for the 20th-Century Pagan (1980) ISBN0-02-016022-4Six Great Ideas: Truth-Goodness-Beauty-Liberty-Equality-Justice (1981) ISBN0-02-072020-3The Angels and Us (1982)The Paideia Proposal: An Educational Manifesto (1982)

How to Speak / How to Listen (1983) ISBN 0-02-500570-7

Paideia Problems and Possibilities: A Consideration of Questions Raised by ThePaideia Proposal (1983)

A Vision of the Future: Twelve Ideas for a Better Life and a Better Society (1984) ISBN0-02-500280-5The Paideia Program: An Educational Syllabus (1984, with Members of the PaideiaGroup)Ten Philosophical Mistakes (1985) ISBN 0-02-500330-5

A Guidebook to Learning: For a Lifelong Pursuit of Wisdom (1986)We Hold These Truths: Understanding the Ideas and Ideals of the Constitution (1987)

Reforming Education: The Opening of the American Mind(1988, edited by GeraldineVan Doren)Intellect: Mind Over Matter(1990)Truth in Religion: The Plurality of Religions and the Unity of Truth (1990) ISBN0-02-064140-0

Haves Without Have-Nots: Essays for the 21st Century on Democracy and Socialism

(1991) ISBN 0-02-500561-8Desires, Right & Wrong: The Ethics of Enough (1991)A Second Look in the Rearview Mirror: Further Autobiographical Reflections of a

Philosopher At Large (1992)The Great Ideas: A Lexicon of Western Thought(1992)

Natural Theology, Chance, and God(The Great Ideas Today, 1992)The Four Dimensions of Philosophy: Metaphysical-Moral-Objective-Categorical

(1993)


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Art, the Arts, and the Great Ideas (1994)Adler's Philosophical Dictionary: 125 Key Terms for the Philosopher's Lexicon (1995)How to Think About The Great Ideas (2000) ISBN 0-8126-9412-0How to Prove There is a God(2011) ISBN 978-0-8126-9689-9

Collections edited by Adler

Scholasticism and Politics (1940)Great Books of the Western World(1952, 52 volumes), 2nd edition 1990, 60 volumes

A Syntopicon: An Index to The Great Ideas (1952, 2 volumes), 2nd edition 1990The Great Ideas Today (19611977, 17 volumes), with Robert Hutchins, 19781999, 20volumesThe Negro in American History (1969, 3 volumes), with Charles Van Doren

Gateway to the Great Books (1963, 10 volumes), with Robert HutchinsThe Annals of America (1968, 21 volumes)Propdia: Outline of Knowledge and Guide to The New Encyclopdia Britannica 15th

Edition (1974, 30 volumes)Great Treasury of Western Thought(1977, with Charles Van Doren)

See also

List of American philosophersEducational perennialismLiberal Arts, Inc.

Liberal educationGreat BooksWestern canon

References

^ abc Ralph McInerny. "Memento Mortimer"(http://radicalacademy.com

/adlerarticlemcinerny2.htm)

1.

^a

b

Mortimer Adler: 19022001 The DayPhilosophy Died (http://www.word-gems.com

/philos.adler.died.html)

2.

^ Charles A. Wagner Obituary(http://query.nytimes.com

/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0DE2DC1738F933A25751C1A960948260) , The New YorkTimes, December 10, 1986.

3.

^The Morningside. Columbia UniversityPress. 1922 (Vol x, Nos. 56, AprilMay1922). p. 113. ISBN 0-300-08462-5.

4.

^ "Remarkable Columbians" Columbia U.website on Adler (http://c250.columbia.edu

/c250_celebrates/remarkable_columbians/mortimer_j_adler.html)

5.

^ ab Mortimer Adler (http://www2.selu.edu/Academics/Faculty/nadams/educ692/Adler.html)

6.

^ Charles Van Doren,"Mortimer J. Adler(19022001)", Columbia Forum online,November 2002(http://www.college.columbia.edu/cct/nov02

/nov02_forum_adler.php) ; Peter Temes,"Death of a Great Reader and Philosopher",Chicago Sun-Times, 3 July 2001(http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4155

/is_20010703/ai_n13917760) ; "grave doubts":"A Statement from the Department ofPhilosophy" at Chicago, quoted on p. 186 in

Gary Cook, George Herbert Mead: TheMaking of a Social Pragmatist, U. of IllinoisPress 1993.

7.

^ Centennial Facts of the Day, U Chicago Law8.


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School website (http://www.law.uchicago.edu/centennial/history/archive/index.html)^ Mortimer J. Adler (1986),A Guidebook to

Learning: For the Lifelong Pursuit of

Wisdom, New York: Macmillan, p.88.

9.

^ Louis O. Kelso and Mortimer J. Adler(1958). The Capitalist Manifesto(http://www.kelsoinstitute.org/pdf/cm-entire.pdf)

10.

^ Rosenberg, Bernard. "Assaulting theAmerican Mind."Dissent. Spring 1988.

11.

^ Elizabeth Venant, "A Curmudgeon StandsHis Ground", The Los Angeles Times, 3December 1990, pp. E1E2.

12.

^ abc Peter Redpath. "A Tribute to MortimerJ. Adler"(http://www.salvationisfromthejews.com

/adler.html)

13.

^ Mortimer J. Adler (1992).A Second Look inthe Rearview Mirror: Further

Autobiographical Reflections of a

Philosopher at Large. New York: Macmillan,p. 264.

14.

^ James T. Farrell (1940), "Mortimer T. Adler:A Provincial Torquemada". Reprinted in The

League of Frightened Philistines and Other

Papers. New York: Vanguard Press, 1945, pp.106109.

15.

^a

b

c

Mortimer Adler Biography(http://www.basicfamouspeople.com/index.php?aid=3028) ,BasicFamousPeople.com.

16.

^ Deal Hudson (June 29, 2009). "The GreatPhilosopher Who Became Catholic"(http://www.insidecatholic.com/feature

/the-great-philosopher-who-became-

17.

catholic.html)

^ abc Mortimer J. Adler. "Is IntellectImmaterial?" (http://radicalacademy.com

/adlerintellect1.htm) . The Radical AcademyAdler Archive. http://radicalacademy.com

/adlerintellect1.htm.

18.

^ Two-Stage Models for Free Will

(http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/two-stage_models.html)

19.

^ John Cramer. "Adler's CosmologicalArgument for the Existence of God"(http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF

/1995/PSCF3-95Cramer.html) . Perspectiveson Science and Christian Faith, March 1995,pp. 3242.

20.

^ ab Mortimer J. Adler. "Concerning God,Modern Man, and Religion (Part One)"(http://radicalacademy.com

/adlergodmodernman1.htm) . The RadicalAcademy Adler Archive.http://radicalacademy.com

/adlergodmodernman1.htm.

21.

^ Mortimer J. Adler. "Concerning God,Modern Man, and Religion (Part Two)"(http://radicalacademy.com

/adlergodmodernman2.htm) . The RadicalAcademy Adler Archive.http://radicalacademy.com

/adlergodmodernman2.htm.

22.

^ William Grimes, "Mortimer Adler, 98, Dies;Helped Create Study of Classics," New YorkTimes, June 29, 2001(http://query.nytimes.com

/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C07E6D71739F93AA15755C0A9679C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all)

23.

Further reading

Harry Ashmore, Unseasonable Truths: The Life of Robert Maynard Hutchins (New York:Little Brown, 1989).Alex Beam,A Great Idea at the Time: The Rise, Fall, and Curious Afterlife of the Great

Books (New York: Public Affairs, 2008).Mary Ann Dzuback,Robert M. Hutchins: Portrait of an Educator(Chicago: Universityof Chicago, 1991).Amy A. Kass, "Radical Conservatives for a Liberal Education" (Ph.D. diss., 1973).Tim Lacy, "Making a Democratic Culture: The Great Books Idea, Mortimer J. Adler, and

Twentieth-Century America" (Ph.D. diss., Loyola University Chicago, 2006).William McNeill,Hutchins' University: A Memoir of the University of Chicago192950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).Hugh Moorhead, "The Great Books Movement" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago,


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1964).Joan Shelley Rubin, The Making of Middlebrow Culture (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1992).

External links

Center for the Study of The Great Ideas (http://www.thegreatideas.org/)Mortimer J. Adler Archives (http://www.radicalacademy.com/adlerdirectory.htm)Review of "A Great Idea at the Time: The Rise, Fall, and Curious Afterlife of the GreatBooks," with a lengthy commentary on Adler (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/books/review/Campbell-t.html)Mortimer Adler on Information Philosopher (http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/adler/)Mortimer Adler (http://www.hrc.utexas.edu/multimedia/video/2008/wallace/adler_mortimer.html) on the The Mike Wallace Interview September 7, 1958

Mortimer J. Adler (http://www.imdb.com/name/nm3566289/) at the Internet MovieDatabase

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