2006 international symposium on contemporary labor economics (labor2006)

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2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006) Labor Markets Mobilization and Economic Development in a Harmonious Society, With a Focus on Chinese Labor Markets December 16 - 18, 2006 Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE) and Dept. of Economics, School of Economics Xiamen University, China

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2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006) Labor Markets Mobilization and Economic Development in a Harmonious Society, With a Focus on Chinese Labor Markets December 16 - 18, 2006 Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE) - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

Labor Markets Mobilization and Economic Development in a Harmonious Society,

With a Focus on Chinese Labor MarketsDecember 16 - 18, 2006

Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE)

and Dept. of Economics, School of EconomicsXiamen University, China

Page 2: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

Population and Labor Mobility: Some Conceptual Issues with reference to China

人口与劳动力流动一些概念问题及有关中国的情况

Yew-Kwang Ng 黄有光 Economics, Monash University, Australia

澳大利亚蒙纳士大学

Page 3: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

大城市应该限制外来移民吗? • 市场自动调节 资源最优配置,自由选择,

不必限制。像西方国家。• 假定完全竞争、没有交易成本、没有报酬

递增、没有外部作用等。• 城市,方便交易、往来、与公物,减低交

易成本与取得报酬递增。• 为何要限制呢?拥挤、污染、治安危害等

大于报酬递增的利益。

Page 4: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

禁止移民,难是应有的政策 • 忽略人际之间的差异 ,若多一人造成

一万元的净损失,应对每个移民抽一万元的税,也应对本市原有居民每人抽一万元。

• 禁止移民,等于抽无穷大的税。

Page 5: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

• 只要对外部成本抽取适当税收(按对他人所造成的损失),即使不考虑报酬递增,外来移民对本市 ( 国 ) 居民整体利大于弊。( Clarke & Ng, Economic Record 1993 )

• 例如,非技术工人的移入,可能会减低本市(国)非技术工人的工资,但却会更大地增加其他生产要素的报酬。

• 从本市看,可能收入分配恶化,但从全国(全世界)看,收入分配改善。

Page 6: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

Similar results on population• Ng (1986) reviewed grounds for population

control (e.g. resource limitation, reduction in per capita income, congestion, unemployment), found them wanting (ignore ignorance and irrational preference).

• Rather, I found reasons (e.g. external benefits of a larger population through a higher growth rate in knowledge, a public good) in favour of subsidizing population growth.

• Ng (2004): a subsidy on births Pareto-optimal even ignore factors (external benefits) identified in Ng (1986) and economies of specialization discussed in Yang and Ng (1993).

Page 7: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

Sources of sup-optimality • A pecuniary externality: more people

reduces the marginal product of labour and hence the real wage rate.

• No distortion: traditional analysis. At margin, loss of a marginal decrease in wage rate exactly offset by gain to other factors.

• True only with the set of individuals unchanged.

Page 8: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

With the set changing as new people are born (or enter)

• A part of the external pecuniary cost of a reduced wage rate is sustained by the prospective people.

• This makes the gain to existing factor-owners > external pecuniary costs, explaining the ‘problem’.

• A combination of pecuniary externality + change in the set of population that creates the sub-optimality.

• A point no one has noticed and in the direction opposite to the intuition of most people.

Page 9: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

The “problem” is related to: new people enjoy positive welfare

• The “problem” due to: additional people provides existing people with more opportunity to trade.

• Ignore: ignorance and irrational choice, distributional effect, etc.

Page 10: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

忽视报酬递增 • 若报酬递增 偏爱城市生活,而城市有

拥挤与污染等外部成本,则从一个更大的角度,考虑效率、平等、自由与公正等问题,有不同的结论。

• 城乡居民隔离制度 , 有悖于公平和自由 .

Page 11: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

报酬递增 Widespread for

• Buddhism: 十年修得同船渡 ;

百年修得共枕眠 . IR from the 3 kingdoms in China.

• Visit the hut once; returns: nothing.

• Visit the hut 3 times ( 三顾茅庐 ); returns: almost everything, as outlined:

Page 12: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

From 0 to 9:• 0. 空城计• 1/3 :三分天下。• 1. 一心为主,鞠躬尽瘁,死而后己。• 2. 前后出师表。• 3. 三气周瑜;锦囊三妙计。• 4. 平四方:东:借东风,和东吴。

» 西:平西蜀。» 南:服南蛮。» 北:北伐中原。

• 5. 安居平五路。• 6. 六出祁山。• 7. 七擒孟获。• 8. 八阵图。• 9. 九伐中原。

Page 13: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

报酬递增与 E-F 冲突 • 给定交易成本与报酬递增使城乡生活有显著差异,

即使在价格、收入、社会服务与经济发展等采取理想政策,包括实现城乡居民收入的边际社会福祉价值相等这一平等条件(即使抽象掉税收对激励的打击而使这条件成为可能),也无法保证城乡人口的自由流动不会造成城市过度密集。

• 通过适当的税收/补贴方案来使城市人口密度保持在可接受水平 ?

• 可能会导致边际城市人口的收入过低,无法满足平等条件。

Page 14: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

• 城市有较多的工作与娱乐机会,吸引人们入城。多一人进城,增加拥挤与污染,减低其他类似人找到工作的或然率 .

• 若根据外部成本课税,以达致效率(城市人口不太多),则可能导致边际城市人口的收入过低,无法满足平等的条件(每人收入的边际社会福祉价值相等),甚至可能会有饥饿。(中国、印度)

Page 15: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

E-F 冲突 • 自由与公平要求 : 城市和农村居住无差异

(两者总效用相等,没有更多人要入城) .

• 平等要求 : 城乡居民收入的边际社会福祉价值相等(使收入的人际无成本重分配不会增加社会福祉) .

• 这两条件会发生冲突 : 即使收入相等 , 绝大多数人选择入城,而且城市居民能从消费中取得更大的效用,除非城市很拥挤,抵消其好处,但这使效率低。

Page 16: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

• 这效率与平等和自由与公平之间的冲突,我简称为 E-F 冲突(从英文的Efficiency and Equality versus Freedom and Fairness ;详论见笔者以此为题,在 Kyklos 1985 的文章,中译:唐翔译的拙作《社会福祉与经济政策》,北京大学出版社)。

Page 17: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

E-F 冲突与强制性兵役• 发达国家,城乡差别小, E-F 冲突可

忽略不计,最优以自由与公平为目标。• E-F 冲突在兵役问题表现尖锐。• 经济学者倾向于雇佣军制度。

Page 18: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

• 也许必须把薪饷定为平民的几十倍,才能吸引足够的志愿者。

• 可能使没有当兵的平民挨饿(收入的边际福祉很高);而士兵的收入很高,却没机会有高效用的消费,因而收入的边际福祉很低,使收入的边际社会福祉价值相等这一平等条件不能实现。

• 义务兵役可能有其他理由,但 E—F 冲突,是一解释。

Page 19: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

E—F 冲突来源于报酬递增 • 若无报酬递增,每人可当几个月兵,赚够钱来维持平民生活。

• 若部队多是临时兵,效率肯定很低。• 训练的成本与经验累计(在做中学)

等原因,士兵有非常大的报酬递增。

Page 20: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

• 如果需要工作人口的百分之五的人当兵,不能由每人每十年当半年的兵,而要少数人每人当十年,甚至几十年的兵。

• 对年青男子的强制性兵役,未必一定是不应该采取的措施。

• 传统经济学由于大致忽视报酬递增,因而也没有考虑到 E—F 冲突的可能性。

Page 21: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

自由与公平的重要• 平等、效率、自由以及公平不能同时实现,

每项牺牲一些,也许最优。• 不是所有偏离这四目标的做法都好。• 除了战争时期的兵役,在所有其他问题上遵守自由与公平,很可能最优。

• 中国的城乡问题,可通过发展基础设施、中小城市、农村经济,逐步开放等办法,长期而言,应该遵守自由与公平。

Page 22: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

分析不足• 发展基础设施、中小城市等应进行到

何程度,根据何原则,政府参入的程度应多少等,牵涉到报酬递增与外部成本等,传统经济学没有充分的分析,认识很不足够。

• 有许多研究课题、博士论文可作。

Page 23: 2006 International Symposium on Contemporary Labor Economics (LABOR2006)

• 敝校蒙纳士(原译莫纳什)大学经济系近年成立的‘报酬递增与经济组织’研究中心 (Centre for Increasing Returns & Economic Organization) ,希望能做出一些贡献。

• 可惜中心的首届主任杨小凯教授于2004 年 7月去世。

• 希望长江的后浪会更加壮丽!