[1993] rinon - the rhetoric of jacques derrida ii - plato's pharmacy

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The Rhetoric of Jacques Derrida II: PhaedrusAuthor(s): Yoav RinonSource: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Mar., 1993), pp. 537-558Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20129374 .

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538 THE RHETORIC OF DERRIDA

ovalav re kolI \byov\ For any body which is moved by an external

source is soulless, while the body which is moved by an internal

source has a soul, since that is the essence of the soul's nature. . . .

It is thus a rule of necessity that the soul would be without a

genesis (?y?vrjTOp) in as much as it would be immortal.

(245c5-246a2)4

The expression \?/vxys ovaiav re ko? X?yov is usually translated

as "the soul's essence and definition."5 Although the validity of

this interpretation cannot be disputed, in a metaphysical context6

one might prefer to preserve the Greek original, X?yos. Thus,

there is almost an identity between essence and logos,7 and there

fore a reaffirmation of what Derrida calls the "logocentric hier

archy." This logos is the uncreated origin, and as such the be

ginning of everything. It is not, however, identical to the logos

which is contrasted to writing, since it is definitely not what one

might call speech. It is quite similar, though, as can be seen

from the repeated use of the word "logos." What is this logos,

then?The answer is found in the context. The passage preceding the

one cited above makes a distinction between two types of soul: the

human and the divine (245c3). In other words, Plato makes an

internal division within the signifier "soul." The same technique

is apparent here; we have, in fact, two kinds of phenomena under

the heading of logos, and only the logos connected with the divine

appears in the above section. The human logos is something dif

ferent. This difference is marked in myanalysis

in the

followingmanner: "Logos" refers to the divine Logos, and "logos" to the human

logos. The division itself is far from new and the hierarchical as

4The Translations of Plato are based on Plato, Opera, ed. John Burnet,

5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900-1907). All translations from Greek

in this essay, unless otherwise noted, are my own. Citations given in the

text are from the Phaedrus.5

See for example Reginald Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, Translated

with Introduction and Notes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1952).6

See Charles L. Griswold, Jr., "Self Knowledge and the ibea of the

Soul in Plato's Phaedrus" Revue de m?taphysique et de morale 86 (1981):

482.7

See Gerrit Jacob de Vries, A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato

(Amsterdam: Adolf U. Hakert, 1969), 124.



YOAV RI?ON 539

pects have been previously noted.8 I give it emphasis here due to

the fact that the Derridian avoidance of paying attention to suchinternal divisions will be revealed as a crucial element in his rhet

oric.9

Somewhat later in the dialogue, when Socrates deals with the

art of eloquence (Xbyoov r'exvy', 266c3), it becomes evident that an

internal division within the category of the human logos is also

needed. While the Sophists Thrasymachus and Lysias are men

tioned in connection with dialectic, Socrates and his interlocutor

are searching for the definition of a different kind of art: rhetoric.

The latter, says Phaedrus, has "escaped our notice," and Socrates

agrees that it should be discussed (266c8-d4). Here Phaedrus com

ments, "No doubt, what is written in the books about the art of

eloquence [irepl Xoy vr'exvys] is quite long." Socrates answers: "How

elegantly you have mentioned [vire^pyaas] it" (266d5-7).

It is apparent from this that the art of eloquence, Xbywv, is

connected with writing, since the argumentation is in the written

books, and since the verb viroyLLiivyaKu reappears in the king's de

precation of writing as a <p?ppaKov which impairs memory

(viro/jLV7]G?)s (p?piicxKov; 275a5). Yet, in this context, it is not the form

that is to be blamed, but rather the content.10 The Sophistic art of

8See Paul Friedl?nder, Plato, trans. Hans Meyerhoff, 2d ed. (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1954) vol. 2, p. 108; and Robert Zaslavsky, Pla

tonicMyth and Platonic Writing (Washington: University Press of America,

1981), 96.

9The prominence of the Logos inPhaedrus is strengthened at the endof the dialogue in Socrates' prayer to Pan. According to Diskin Clay ("Socrates' Prayer to Pan," inArktouros: Hellenic Studies Presented toBernard

M. Knox on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday, ed. Glen W. Bowersock, Walter

Burkert, and Michael C. J. Putnam [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1979], 347),Pan is a link in a chain of strong associations to the Logos. In the Phaedrus

the Logos is not identified with the gods, who have to climb in order to

have a look at the metaphysical region. They are, however, closer to the

Logos than are human beings, whose only connection with the Logos is a

mediated one. The fact that Hestia does not join the climbing gods is

evidence of the boundary between the metaphysical and the physical (see

Zaslavsky, Platonic Myth and Platonic Writing, 82), and therefore another

proof of the two kinds of logos. On the connection between Hestia's wingsand the importance of the notion of internal division in the Phaedrus see

Kenneth Dorter, "Imagery and Philosophy in Plato's Phaedrus," Journal

of theHistory ofPhilosophy 9 (1971):285.10

Ian Machattie Crombie emphasizes the fact that Socrates finds fault

not in rhetorical techniques qua techniques but in the switch of their usage




eloquence, that of Teisias and Gorgias, is revolting to Socrates not

because it is written?which is, in this context, relatively unimportant?but because the power of the logos (bt? pco/xyp Xbyop; 267a8) is

put into practice in an unseemly manner. The minor role writing

plays in the argument can be deduced from the emphasis given to

the logos in Socrates' condemnation of the Sophists. In Polus's

book, A School for Eloquence (?lovaela Xbyoop) there are three tech

niques of speech containing the word "logos": repetition of words

(bnrXaaoXoy'ia), sententious style (yp ^oXoyta), and figurative

speaking(etKOPoXoyla)

(267bl0-cl). They are condemned by means

of a metaphor which is very well known to Derrida's readers: So

crates says, "But, my blessed of all, have a look for yourself as well,

whether, in truth, it seems to you too that their warp is loose

[?iearrjKos] as it seems to me" (268a5-6).

The Sophistic weave is criticized for its disjointed nature. The

participle btearyKos is taken from the Greek verb b?aryiii, which

means, according to the LSJ dictionary, not only "to loosen" but

also "to set apart," "to be at variance," "to differ." The participle

itself can also be translated as "not homogeneous." One might be

surprised that so many Derridian concepts appear under the same

Platonic signifier. From the deconstructive point of view, however,

this merely serves as another proof of the validity of the Derridian

interpretation. Still, the Platonic applications are fundamentally

different from the Derridian ones; while Platonists find fault with

difference, Derridians find difference laudable. For our discussion,

however, the emphasis lies not in the valuation itself but rather in

its roots. In other words, the significance lies not in regarding a

phenomenon as either good or bad, but in the deeper motives for

the ethical labelling of the phenomena.

Derrida tries to claim that Phaedrus is focused on the deval

uation of writing as writing. The above, however, indicates that

Plato's emphasis is not on the textual angle, on the written nature

of Sophistic argumentation, but on the logos, on the meaning, in

which writing is no more than a formal aspect. Of course, it is

always possible

to

overemphasize

the formal aspects, and,by making

them predominant, to lead the reader to a deconstructive variety of

meanings. This procedure, however, creates a weave which is both

from a means to an end in themselves; see his An Examination of Plato's

Doctrines (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962) vol. 1, p. 198.



YOAV RI?ON 541

different from the Platonic one and alien to it. Although legitimate

in itself, this different weave is the definition of failure accordingto the Derridian rules of the game.11

In accordance with the Platonic context, the art of eloquence is

bad as much because it lacks "speaking in a plausible way" (X'eyeup

iTL?ap s) as because it lacks harmonious composition (269c2-3). So

crates states explicitly that it is impossible to reach dialectic, the

summit of the art of speech,12 while following the Sophists Lysias

and Thrasymachus, since they cannot be regarded as experts in this

field. At this stage, I shall postpone the examination of the role of

the expert in order to go back to the Platonic distinction between

logos and writing.

Originally, both speech and writing are equally moral. Writing

as such is not a shameful thing.13 Socrates repeats it three times:

Well, this is a well known fact, that writing arguments [to yp?upeiv

Xopovs] in itself is not a shameful thing. . . .But I believe that the

shameful thing is the following: both [re nal] speaking and writing in

a way which is not good [ko:Xoos]but shameful, i.e. [re k i] bad. . . .

So, what is the way of writing either [re] in a good way or [icai] in its

opposite? (258dl-7)14

Writing is not, as Derrida claims, always an already disgraced ver

sion of speech; and when mortality is introduced into the discussion,

it is applied to both writing and speech in the same manner. The

distinction between the good and the bad15 is not between writing

and speech but rather within writing and within speech. To put it

differently,Socrates defines two

opposingkinds of

speechand two

opposing kinds of writing, and not one kind of speech which stands

11See Derrida's Introduction to La diss?mination, which considers the

problems of adding something to the "object" of reading.12

Careful attention should be paid to the fact that dialectic is not the

opposite of eloquence. On the contrary, dialectic is both eloquence and

plausibility of argumentation, and therefore it is harmonious.13

See George Grote, Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates (Lon

don: John Murray, 1888) vol. 3, p. 27; and W. H. Thompson, The Phaedrus

of Plato (New York: New York Times, 1973), 86.14

The emphasis in this passage is signified in the Greek original bymeans of ye.

15This is an aesthetic definition as much as a moral one since the

good, KOiX'os,s also the beautiful; see Terence Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory:The Early Dialogues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 239.



542 THE RHETORICOF DERRIDA

in opposition to one kind of writing.16 This notion is stressed in the

Socratic rejection of writing using the myth of Theuth.

When the king refuses to accept the new invention that might

serve as a (pap\iaKop for memory, he does so on the basis of its neg

ative features: marginality, externality, supplementarity, and pr?

tention. Socrates' words following the story seem to reaffirm both

the rejection and its motives:

Certainly, the one who believes that he left an art in a written form

[evypa\xp,ao~i\ and also the one who accepts that reliability and firmness

stem fromwriting [en ypa?iii?LTuv]

ispossibly very naive, and, in fact,it is probable that he does not know the prophecy of Ammon, if he

believes that the written arguments [Xbyovs yeypa?xp,evovs\ are some

thing different from a means of memory [viro?pfjo-al] for the one who

knows the matters to which the written thing [r? yeypa?ip,eva\ refers.

(275c5-d2)

Subsequently, Socrates compares writing to a painting:

For writing [ypa<prj], Phaedrus, has this peculiar characteristic, which

makes it more like a painting. For, although the products stand as

if they were living, yet if you ask them something, they will respond

16The basic equality of writing and speech, which is prior to moral

definitions, is a recurring theme in the dialogue, not only in 258d4-5 and

259el-2, but also in the following passages: XeX?rjaerai 17ypa^aerai

(271b8), X'ey ai re koll ypa<p <n (271c4), Xey v\ypoapuv (272bl). In 273a7

Teisias speaks (X'eyei), and in 273b4 he writes (eypa\pev). These may serve

as examples of the limited importance of binaric oppositions within the

Platonic text, which stands in contrast to the predominance given them

by deconstructionists. See also the relationship between mythos and logos

in Griswold, "Self Knowledge and the ib'ea," 48; and in Charles L. Griswold,

Jr., Self Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus, (New Haven: Yale University Press,

1986), 140. See also Kent F. Moors, Platonic Myth: An Introductory Study

(Washington: University Press of America, 1982), 23. Clearly, equality is

not an accidental attributive in the passages mentioned above; it is, on the

contrary, a sign of the basic ethical neutrality of both speech and writing,as is claimed by Luc Brisson, Platon: Les mots et lesmythes (Paris: Maspero,

1982), 110. This moral neutrality is thoroughly discussed by Friedl?nder,

Plato, 118; J. J. Muhlern, "Socrates on Knowledge and Information (Phaedrus 274b6-275a9)," Classica et Mediaevalia 30 (1969): 180; Victor Gold

schmidt, Les dialogues de Platon (Paris: Presses Universit? de France, 1971),

329; Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies, 2d ed. (Princeton: Princeton Uni

versity Press, 1981), 395; Brisson, Platon: Les mots et les mythes, 120; and

Daniel Babut, "Aelv . . . iravraXbyov cocnrep ??ov avveajavac. Sur quelques

?nigmes du Ph?dre" Bulletin de l'Association Guillame Bud? 46 (1987): 272

3. The moral responsibility lies with the one who puts either the one or

the other into practice, an aspect which is dealt with in a later stage of

the dialogue.



YOAV RI?ON 543

in a great solemn silence. And in the same way the logoi also [do not

answer]. Although you might think that they are talking intelligently,

the minute you question them, wishing to learn something of the logoi,

they are always signifying the same one thing. And whenever it is

written even once, every logos iswandering indifferently among both

the experts and among those who have nothing to do with it at all;

moreover, it does not know whom to address and whom to avoid. And

that is not all, since when it is treated without justice, it always needs

its father's defense, for it is not capable of either helping or defendingitself. (275d4-e5)

One of the most important aspects of the above discussion is

that in it writing is revealed as a kind of speech. The expression

"written arguments," Xbyovs yeypapLfiepovs, which appears in the

former of the two passages, hints at this kind of connection. In the

second passage, the process is illustrated explicitly: "every logos,

whenever it is written." The origin of writing is in the logos. True,

the former is a derivative of the latter, as Derrida repeatedly

stresses; but, in contrast with the claims of deconstruction, writing

cannot abandon speech. Tpouprj is always a Xbyos yeypaixfxepos, that

is,a

speciesof

speech;it is a written

speech,at least as far as Plato

is concerned.17 Writing is not a sign of a discontinuity between the

gramma and the logos, as Derrida tries to claim, but rather a sign

of the gap between the logos and the speaker.18 The Derridian

17Friedl?nder, Plato, HO.

18Derrida does not overlook the importance of the speaker in the dia

logue. On the contrary, he pays careful attention to the problem of the

father-son relationship and its correlation with the speech-writing con

nection. The father is afraid of his own, not his logos's castration andmurder. The difficulty in the deconstructive interpretation is elsewhere;

it lies in the father-logos identity. For Derrida, the father and the logosare one, and thus they stand together in opposition to writing. Writing,

he claims, is disconnected from the father, from the logos, and as such it

begins to act independently. Actually, the disconnection of the logos from

the father happens at a much earlier stage, when the logos comes into

being. The moment the logos is pronounced, the moment it is uttered, it

is disconnected from the living and speaking subject-father. Death,

therefore, is already on the stage, and its immediate bond with being is

not surprising. Thus, the difference between speech and writing is not

between the internal and the external (with all the consequent Derridian

meanings), but between the near and the distant. It is this difference that

finds its expression in the ability to give aid. The logos, which is near its

father, can have the benefit of the father's help, while writing, which is

distant, has to wander around. Thus, the text again creates a hierarchy

(of distances) and not an opposition between inside and outside. The merit

of the logos in comparison with writing is, therefore, in the former's close




"writing in general," that which is defined as being disconnected

from any logos, is impossible in the Platonic context, where writingis always dependent on and connected with speech.19

It is not surprising, therefore, that the distinction between the

two kinds of writing is based on the assumption that writing is

always derived from speech. Socrates says, "So, let us have a look

at a different speech [aXXop Xbyop], the legitimate brother of the

former, in what way is it born, on the one hand, and how much it

is better and more capable by nature than the former, on the other

hand" (276al-3). The second kind of writing, "writing in the soul,"

is also a logos like the first one. The internal difference, that within

writing, is on two levels. One level is that of the contribution to

learning; the first type of writing, the illegitimate son of the logos,

cannot contribute to learning (275d7-9), while the second, legitimate

son can do so. The other level is that of the capability of self

defense. Unlike the weakness of the wandering orphan, the Xbyos

yeypafiiiepos, the logos written in the pupil's soul, is "written with

knowledge Sjier eTnarrj/iys]. On the one hand, it is capable of de

fending itself, and, on the other hand, it has the knowledge

[eiriarri?uup] of both speaking and keeping in silence as the situation

demands" (276a5-7). The Derridian fascination with the status of

the orphan (87; 77) thus needs to be reconsidered. This independence

of the orphan, this freedom and liberty, this breaking of the limits

is, more than anything else, a painful state of loneliness. Without

a father, helpless, scorned, and humiliated, the illegitimate logos is

pushed and pulled by those who pass by. Deprived forever of its

origin, it is neither understood nor wanted, and, almost forgotten by everyone, it keeps repeating its unintelligible words. It is a

sorry sight.

relationship with the father. On this same aspect in Plato's Seventh Letter,see Thomas Alexander Szlezak, "The Acquiring of Philosophical Knowledge

According to Plato's Seventh Letter," in Arktouros: Hellenic Studies, 358.19

Even in the passage where writing seems to be explicitly condemned,the connection between the speaker and the written arguments is stressed:

"If, however, the one who knows the truth composes these things, and he

is able to defend them directing himself towards a thorough investigationof what he wrote, and while he speaks, he himself is able to prove that the

written arguments [r? yeypaiiiieva] do not deserve serious consideration,there is no need that he will be called after the latter, but rather after his

serious occupations" (278c4-dl). Dealing with nonserious occupations is

thus legitimate so long as the writer is able to limit them to the region of

unimportant phenomena. This limitation is done by means of speech.



YOAV RI?ON 545

Let us go back to the dialogue. According to Socrates, the

speech which is written in the soul has knowledge, ?xer eTnaryiiys,an epithet echoed in the participle eTnarytioop which appears some

what later. Thus eiuaryiiy, which is connected with the good writ

ing, contrasts with bbâ, mere opinion, which is a characteristic of

the written speech described in the king's answer to Theuth: "For

it will cause forgetfulness in the souls of the learners . . . , that

which has the effigy of wisdom . . . , and they will believe that they

know alot without learning. . . , and they will be seemingly wise

(bo?'oGo<poi) instead of being really wise" (275a2-b2). The opposition

of bb?a and eirioryîy is a recurring theme in the Platonic dialogues.

In the Phaedrus it characterizes the separation of physics from

metaphysics. The region above the sky, the virepovpaPLOP, is por

trayed as the location of the essence of being (ovala optws ovaa; 247c7),

in accordance with which every kind of real knowledge is defined

(irepl yp to rys aXy?ovs eTnaTrjiirjs; 247c8). There, the soul's governor

inspects knowledge (na?op? be eiriaryiiyp), while the soul itself is

nourished by knowledge (247e3). By contrast, the broken-winged

souls that will be incarnated in human bodies are those which are

nourished by mere opinion (boâarij xP^ptolc, 248b5).

Still, although the writing in the soul is able to act indepen

dently, can defend itself, has eirtarij^rj, and is installed in the learn

er's soul, it is always a kind of a logos; thus, writing in the soul is

a kind of logos written in the soul. For Plato, this internal dis

tinction (good and bad) within writing is analogous to the internal

distinction (good and bad) within speech.20 In other words, both

logos and writing are ethically split.21 As a consequence, the central

20This distinction between the two kinds of writing being kinds of

speech reappears in 277e5-278b4: "And there is no doubt that the one who

deems that, on the one hand, in the written speech [ev ?lev r? yeypa/iixevco

Xby ] great frivolity is a rule of necessity, and that no written speech

[Xbyov ypaiprjvat]. . . deserves great seriousness, and that on the other

hand . . .only in the arguments which are really written in the soul [ko?

r<? bvTLypoupopevois evypvXrj] bout the things which are just and beautiful

and good exists that which deserves . . .seriousness; and, moreover, who

thinks that these kinds of speech should be called the legitimate sons oftheir speaker

. . . , [this man,] it seems to me, Phaedrus, both you and I

should aspire to be like." Again, writing is not of itself illegitimate.

Moreover, the possession of the legitimate writing is one of the character

istics of the man whose personality is an object of desire for Socrates.21

This criterion has different reflections in the dialogue. Thus, the

difference between Plato, who creates a speech imitating Lysias's style,




opposition of the dialogue is not that of writing and speech, as Der

rida tries to claim, but that of the shameful (alaxpbp) and the beau

tiful (kolXop) regarding both writing and speech.22 Socrates: "And

what about both the speaking and the writing of arguments [Xbyovs

Xeyetp re kcxi ypoupetp], is it beautiful or shameful [ko?Xop rjalaxP?pV. . . ; isn't it clear from what we've just said?" (277dl-3). To

sharpen the above argument, I shall now proceed to the position of

the writer of speeches, the logographer.

The logographer's first appearance on the dialogue's stage comes

after the end of Socrates' second

speech:For, my dear friend, only recently one of the politicians railed at him

[Lysias], and reproached him calling him through his whole speech

logographer. And he, fearing for his reputation, might very soon

stop writing speeches at all. (257c4-7)

For Derrida, this passage has a clear interpretation:

The logographer, in the strict sense, composes speeches for litigants;

speeches which he himself does not pronounce, which he does not

attend, so to speak, in person, and which produce their effects in his

absence. In writing what he does not speak, what he would never

say and would never think in truth, the author of the written speechis already entrenched in the posture of the sophist; the man of non

presence and non-truth (76; 68).

The explicit boundary separating the writer from the written speech

seems obvious at first sight. The logographer is the symbol of the

gap between the man who writes and the man who speaks,23 yet an

and Lysias, who creates a speech imitating his client's style, is the monetarymotivation of Lysias versus the educational motivation of Plato; see Ronna

Burger, Plato's Phaedrus: A Defence of a Philosophic Art of Writing (Tuscaloosa: Alabama University Press, 1980), 21. Lysias's speech is disap

proved of because it presents an attitude which is ethically defective; see

Alfred Edward Taylor, Plato: The Man and his Work, 4th ed. (London:

Methuen, 1937), 302. Cf. Giovanni, R. F. Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas:

A Study of Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1987), 91. Ferrari's arguments are not convincing. On myth as a medium

of an ethical message see Paul Shorey, The Unity of Plato's Thought

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), 7; and Leon Robin, Platon

(Paris: Alean, 1935), 192, 196. On the ethical context of the dialogue as a

whole see Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, 30.

22Zaslavsky, Platonic Myth and Platonic Writing, 59.23

Already in the scholia: "for Xoyoypoupoi was the name given by the

ancients to those who wrote speeches [Xbyovs] for money, and sold them to

those who needed them in the law-courts, and the rhetoricians were those

who spoke [Xeyovai]." The translation is based on Scholia Plat?nica, ed.

Gviliem Chase Greene, (Haverford: American Philological Association,

1938).



YOAV RI?ON 547

inspection of Demosthenes' speech dealing with the activity of the

logographer Ktesikles reveals a different picture: "There is also afourth law according to which Theocrines, the one who is now pros

ecuted, must pay 500 drachmae . . . , yet he arranged the things

with Ktesikles the logographer, who acted in the matter for his

opponents, so that he would not have to pay and would not be brought

to the Acropolis."24 The whole affair, therefore, was arranged by

the logographer.25 True, he did not pronounce it with his own mouth

(il ne pronon?ait pas lui-m?me), but one cannot therefore deduce

that he was either absent or did not assist (il n'assistait pas) (76;

68).26 On the contrary, in this case the presence and the help of the

logographer were so great that the logos was not transformed into

a Xbyos yeypa^ixepos. The problem was solved outside the law court,

not with awritten speech learned by heart, but with the help of the

man who is considered by Derrida to be the one who prevents his

help from the logos. It is therefore impossible to treat the logo

grapher as one who formulates his client's opinion (r?digeait des

discours) (76; 68); he is, rather, a counselor in matters of law.27

These facts would not have received so much attention if the

logographer were not such an important link in Derrida's decon

structive chain. The lack of connection between the written speech

and the writing subject represents for Derrida all the following phe

nomena: the sophist's position, (Vhomme de la non-pr?sence et la

24The translation is based on Demosthenes, Orationes, ed. William

Rennie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), vol. 3,1327.19

25See Demosthenes: Selected Private Speeches, ed. C. Carey and R. A.

Reid, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 15.26

The expression il n'assistait pas is a very interesting example of the

absent a. Like the a of the diff?rance which is present in writing thoughabsent from speech, here the a of the expression assister ?, which means

"to be present," is absent from writing, although present inmeaning. The

strong connection between presence and help is not new in either the Pla

tonic or the Derridian contexts. On the wide range of assistance the lo

gographer gives to his client see Stephen Usher, "Lysias and his Client,"

Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 17 (1976): 36. Regarding Usher's

criticism, Kenneth D. Dover's suggestion (in his Lysias and the Corpus

Lysiacum [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968], 151) that the

logographer did not write his speech at all seems to me an exaggeration.27

"L'auteur [Demosthenes] imput insi au logographe le r?le de man

dataire de son client et s'il croit devoir critiquer ses agissements, il parait

cependant trouver naturel que l'avocat, le conseiller, agisse bien au de la

r?daction du discours"; M. Lavency, Aspects de la logographie judicaire

Attique (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1964), 103.




non-v?rit?), the presence of the absence, and, later, the disconnection

from the father. This associative chain not only originates in a

highly problematic linkage (as can be understood from the above

discussion of the logographer), but is also very difficult to verify,

considering the position of both the written speech and Lysias in

the dialogue. The written speech is not always presented as

hopeless, disconnected, and wandering around. Thus, Lysias's

speech (named "logos") can do without Socrates' help because of the

author's presence: "Although I do love you alot, yet, since Lysias is

actually here [wapopros be koll

Avglov]

I do not have even the slightest

intention of offering my help to you" (228d8-e2).28 The stress on

the fact that Lysias is actually present signifies the impossibility of

choosing the solution of simple irony.29 Lysias's presence is not

that of the Derridian absolute absence. Despite the fact that Lysias

is not able to aid the written speech by his own living one, he is

present enough to hinder Socrates from speaking against it. The

weakness of the speech (logos) will be revealed as an internal one,

stemming from its ethical character and not from its formal aspect

as a Xbyos yeypaptiiepos. In this context, writing is irrelevant to the

discussion, and not inferior to speech. Even if Lysias had pro

nounced his speech with his own mouth it would have been impos

sible to help the argumentation, as Socrates later states explicitly:

No doubt, then, he would not seriously write these things with ink

upon the water and would not sow them by means of his pen with

arguments (?ier? Xby v)which are not capable of defending themselves

by means of speech (Xbyco) on the one hand, and are not capable of

teachingthe truth

adequatelyon the other hand.

(276c7-9).

28On the problematics of Kai in this passage see de Vries, A Commen

tary on the Phaedrus, 43. On translating nal as "actually," see William

Jacob Verdenius, "Notes on Plato's Phaedrus," Mnemosyne 8 (1955): 266;

and Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, 12.29

It is, rather, a case of complex irony. Gregory Vlastos defines com

plex irony as an expression in which "what is said both is and isn't what

is meant"; Gregory Vlastos, "Platonic Irony," The Classical Quarterly 37

(1987): 86. That is, on one level of meaning there is a gap between what

is said and what is meant, while on a different level such a gap does notexist. Thus, on the literal level regarding Lysias's physical presence, there

is a gap between words and meaning, while on the level regarding the

relationship between the logos and his father this gap is cancelled. The

notion of complex irony is further developed in Gregory Vlastos, Socrates:

Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1991), 32, 236-42.



YOAV RI?ON 549

The impossibility of teaching adequately is not an inevitable

outcome of the use of writing instead of speech, although writing ismore conducive to inadequate teaching. It is, rather, a reflection

of the defective nature of the logos before it was ever written.30 If

the logoi have knowledge (tier' eTnarrj/iys Xbyovs) and are able to

defend both themselves and the one who has planted them in the

pupil's soul, if they are not barren but fertile and signify continuity

and immortality (276e7-277a3), then writing, which is a derivative

of these logoi, also preserves the same qualities. Thus, again, the

logoi are revealed in this passage as either ontologically good or bad

independent of their written or spoken form. From an ethical point

of view, both forms are predisposed to the shameful and the beautiful

to the same degree (258dl-5). This leads us to the question of the

(p?p/JLCXKOP.

In my previous discussion of the (p?ppaKOP, I tried to reveal the

hidden contradiction between the Derridian (pappaKOP and the Pla

tonic one so as to explain the strategy of deconstructive reading.

The concealment of this contradiction has another purpose, however,

which is to cut the Platonic thread connecting the ip?p?xaKop and the

physician. The central position of the (papfiaKop in the deconstruc

tive interpretation is nourished by its independence; the <p?piiaicop,

as a dominant link in the Derridian chain, cannot have an origin.

The role of the yappLcxKOP is to pose a dangerous question about the

legitimacy of the origin while being immune from that same ques

tion. Moreover, its power stems exactly from that immunity.

According to the rules of the deconstructive game, each link must

be free, since subordination to something, or even worse, to some

body, means the immediate loss of the ability to ask, that is, the

ability to play the central role in the game. Since the latter notion

is a necessary condition in the deconstructive strategy, the exposition

of the <papp,aKOp's dependence due to its connection to the physician

30This opinion contrasts with the opinions of most of the critics, who

regard the deprecation of writing in the Phaedrus, itself a written text, as

a paradox. See de Vries, A Commentary on the Phaedrus, 145; Burger,Plato's Phaedrus, 2; Mary Margaret Mackenzie, "Paradox in Plato's

Phaedrus," Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 28 (1982): 65;Kenneth M. Sayre, "Plato's Dialogues in the Light of the Seventh Letter,"in Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings, ed. Charles L. Griswold, Jr., (New

York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1988), 97; and Rosemary Desjardins,

"Why Dialogues? Plato's Serious Play," in Platonic Writings, HOff.




would show the existence of an aspect within the Platonic text alien

to Derrida'sregulations.31

This attitude does notdispute

the

legitimacy of the deconstructive assumptions in the case of the

<p?piioLKOp,but merely focuses on the impossibility that they may be

realized within the Platonic weave.

Let us go back, then, to the dialogue, to illuminate somewhat

the ipap?aKOPS hidden dependence. The conversation begins with

the questions, "Wherefrom and whereto?" the answers being, "From

Lysias. . .and I intend to walk outside the walls." This declaration

is followed by its motivation: "Because Iwas persuaded by our mu

tual friend, Acumenus." It is only the fifth line of the text?the

(pap/iaKop will not appear for a considerable time?and yet the im

31Jasper P. Neel, who devotes an entire book to Derrida's reading of

Plato, has completely missed the deconstructive concept of textuality; see

Jasper P. Neel, Plato, Derrida, and Writing (Carbondale: Southern Illinois

University Press, 1988). The starting point does seem to be deconstructive:

"The way to neutralize an old, strong text ... is to attack it directly on

its own grounds, then show the most obvious way to rehabilitate it, and

finally expose the deceptiveness of that rehabilitation" (p. xi). The fol

lowing page, however, reveals a basic misunderstanding: "Derrida repeat

edly argues that writing is the truth of the West" (p. xii). The unequivocaluse of the word "truth" in a Derridian context completely ignores Derrida's

main aim: the exposure of the fictive nature of that "truth." Moreover,such argumentation hints at the existence of an original, deconstructive

binaric opposition within the truthful poles of which lies writing. This

implicit notion stands in contrast to the conception that Derrida regardsthe text as an ahierarchical weave. Neel's statement that "Plato iswrong

and Derrida is right" (p. xii) is an explicit manifestation of his binaric

attitude. The Derridian reading aims at unravelling the hidden threads

of the textual net and not at presenting a dialectical position toward them.The whole strategy is planned so as to make impossible the placing of any

deconstructive reading in opposition with its object of reference. Thus,

the innocent binaric opposition of right and wrong is alien to Derrida's

intentions.

Although I have focused on Neel's Introduction, the same criticisms

hold for the book as a whole. One example will suffice to make the point.Neel says he thinks that "we'd rather be ill than suffer Plato's cure" (p.

65). In his discussion of the Phaedrus Derrida continuously plays with

the ambivalence of the (pap^aKov as both remedy and poison, avoiding ref

erence to the (papiioLKovas merely "medicine," because it is also a poison.

Neel's declaration, in addition to its complete incompatibility with a Der

ridian reading, also avoids the importance of that play of meanings. What

is more, the claim that writing for Plato is a "trivial play" (p. xi) stands

in contrast to the serious position of Platonic play in Derrida's argumen

tation. This emphasis, however, follows a long tradition of reading; see

W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1975) vol. 2, pp. 56-65.



YOAV RI?ON 551

portance of the physician is already hinted at.32 Acumenus the

physicianis a friend of Socrates and

Phaedrus;his

son, Eryximachus,himself a physician and a close friend of Phaedrus, "meets" both

Socrates and Phaedrus in another Platonic dialogue, the Sympo

sium.33 As the discussion develops, it is clear that there is another

physician besides Acumenus and Eryximachus and that he is the

physician, Hippocrates,34 according to whose instructions Socrates

32The association between medicine and the physicians creates a cen

tral axis in the dialogue, and exceeds the pharmaceutic links. AccordingtoWerner Jaeger, medicine is the model for Plato's ethics; Werner Jaeger,

Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert Highet, vol. 2 (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1944), 3. The appearance of medical lit

erature symbolizes in ancient Greece the transition to the age of professionalization (p. 11). Plato stresses the difference between the slave-doctor

and the professional doctor inLaws, a difference which is highly connected

with the logos (p. 12). In addition, toward the end of the dialogue, medicine

is associated with Egypt, the land of the myth of Theuth, by means of

Isocrates; see Hans Herter, "The Problematic Mention of Hippocrates in

Plato's Phaedrus," Illinois Classical Studies 1 (1976): 39-40. On the con

nection between medicine and philosophy see also Pierre-Maxime Schuhl,"Platon et la medicine," Revue des ?tudes Grecques 62 (1960): 73-9; and

Michel Frede, "Philosophy and Medicine in Antiquity," Essays in Ancient

Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 225 (on the ethical relationshipof medicine to philosophy see p. 231).

33See de Vries, A Commentary on the Phaedrus, 33; and Hackforth,

Plato's Phaedrus, 25.34

At the beginning of On Airs, Waters, Places, Hippocrates gives the

following advice: "The one who wants to learn well the art of medicine

must do the following. . . .And to test the warm winds and the cold ones. . . one should test the characteristics of the water . . . and the kinds of

water the inhabitants apply . . .and the soil also, whether it is not fertileand dry or whether it is full of trees and water . . . and the inhabitants'

way of life"; translation based on Hippocrates, On Airs, Waters, Places, in

Opera, ed. and trans. W. H. S. Jones (Cambridge: Loeb Classical Library,

1923). The analogy between this and Socrates' actions when he arrives

at Ilisos is quite prominent, as Ferrari shows very clearly: "He [Socrates]examines the soil and finds itwell watered [the spring] and thickly covered

with vegetation [the lush grass, the plane?and agnus?trees]; he checks

the characteristics of the water supply [sweet and cool; and notice here the

pedantically scientific 'as you can confirm with your toes', oxrre ye r? irobl

TeKixrjpaa?aL, 230b7]; he considers the winds [the pleasant breeze]; and he

concerns himself with the inhabitants of the place, detecting the presenceof Achelous and the Nymphs and commenting on the musical activity of

the cicadas?whose habits of spare eating and drinking and fondness for

work he reserves, however, for later scrutiny"; Ferrari, Listening to the

Cicadas, 17. See also Jaap Mansfeld, "Plato and the Method of Hippo

crates," Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 21 (1980): 356; and Martha

C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy




implicitly acts. Thus, it is possible to infer from the context of

activities done according to the instructions of the physicians (goingoutside the walls according to Acumenus,35 checking the place ac

cording to Hippocrates) that there exists a certain bond between

the ipapjxaKOP and the physician, an inference which is affirmed by

the following:

Socrates: No doubt, it seems to me as if it were you who found the

(papiiOLKovf getting me out, like those who hold out and shake a green

twig or some kind of fruit before the cattle and lead them, so you,

carrying in front of me logoi in books, seem to be able to lead me

through Attica and to whatever other place you'd like. (230d5-el)

In the Greek language, the complete dependence of the (pap/xaKop

on its user is overemphasized. The sentence opens with a double

emphasis on the agent of the action, Phaedrus; both the usage of

the personal pronoun "you" (av, which is not necessary in Greek)

and the particle ?xeproi strongly signify a human context.36 The

green twig and the fruit, which are not able to act autonomously,

indicate the same dependence, as their movement is the outcome of

a human decision. Despite what Derrida says (79-80; 71), the com

parison underlined by Socrates is not between the (papixanop and the

logoi in books, but rather between those who lead the cattle and

Phaedrus. In other words, it is not between different objects but

between different men. The (pap/xcxKopwhich leads Socrates out of

the walls is not an inner-directed entity; although potentially pow

erful, a human being must put it into practice.37 Phaedrus takes it

with him, places it under his cloak, makes it peep out, conceals it,

exposes it, and attracts Socrates with it (230e3).

and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 124. On

the connection between Hippocrates and Plato, see Ferrari, Listening to

the Cicadas, 248, n. 19; and Mansfeld, "Plato and the Method of Hippocrates,"354. On the importance of medicine in the dialogue see Annie Lebeck,

"The Central Myth of Plato's Phaedrus," Greek, Roman and ByzantineStudies 13 (1972): 21, n. 21; and Schuhl, "Platon et la medicine," 75, 77.

35The mere act of walking creates a bond between the physicians and

the logos, a bond which is stronger than that of the one between the physicians and the (p?pixaKov. See Lebeck, "The Central Myth of Plato's Phae

drus," 284, n. 32; 285, n. 34.36

All the textual corrections suggested by de Vries (A Commentaryon the Phaedrus, 57) strengthen this accentuation by means of the Greek

ye.37

On the emphasis given to the human factor in the dialogue see Stan

ley Rosen, "The Non-Lover in Plato's Phaedrus," Man and World 2 (1969):425.



YOAV RI?ON 553

This complexity of connections which exist between the

(pap/xcxKop, the physician, and the books is also seen when Socrates

explains, using a fictitious dialogue, some of his ideas concerning

the importance of the expert:

Socrates: Well, then, tell me; if someone coming to your friend Eryximachus or to his father, Acumenus, would say "I am an expert

[eir?o~TOiixai] n applying [irpoo-<p'epeiv] he following things to the bodies

so that they would be warmed whenever Iwant. . . ,and many other

things of this kind; and because of my knowledge [eTrio-Tafxevos]of them

I consider myself a physician, and I also believe I am able to make [a

physician] everyother man to whom I would

give the knowledge[eirLGTriixriv] bout these things . . ." (268a8-b4)38

The fictitious speaker claims to be a physician on the basis of

certain knowledge (eTTLarrjixrj),which enables him both to heal and

to transmit the ability to heal to others. The importance of such

a claim cannot be overemphasized, since emery ?xri, hich is depicted

in a different context as the opposite of bb^a, seems to be in this

context identical with bb^a, as there is no doubt that the speaker

cannot have the eiuoTyixy of medicine merely on the basis of knowing

the effects of the (p?p/xana. He can, however, have a plausible as

sumption as to the meaning of medicine, that is, the bb?a of medicine.

Thus, while using the word eiriory^y, the speaker in fact refers to

bb?a. In this light, one might wonder whether this is another hint

at a Derridian thread. If the signifier eiriarypiT] constitutes both

knowledge and opinion, then it is fundamentally similar to the

(p?p/xcxKop,which constitutes both medicine and poison. Such a con

clusion, however, ignoresthe delicate construction of the Platonic

text. The speaker's declaration that he has this certain kind of

knowledge (applying (pap/xaKcx in order to get a certain result) means

that he feels he has also acquired the art of medicine. From his

point of view, this is not bb?a but einerrj/xy. From Socrates' point

of view, however, the mere claim that one has a certain kind of

knowledge is far from being sufficient proof of its possession. Al

though the existence of knowledge can be reflected by such kinds of

utterance, the latter in itself cannot create knowledge. This

contrast is vividly expressed in Socrates' presentation of the

38On the verb irpo<npepeiv, applying drugs to the sick body, see de Vries,

A Commentary cm the Phaedrus, 227. This is the same verb used in con

nection with the (papiAOLKovf the head in Charmides 157c5.




claim. On the one hand, the dialogue form, which gives a different

voice to each opinion, preserves a variety of perspectives. On the

other hand, this same technique restricts the confused ideas concerning

the nature of knowledge (eTnary/xy-^o^to the limited domain of the

speaker, the arrogant layman. By contrast, the vast field of the expert

remains free from that kind of ambiguity.

Still, one might argue that the above is but another example of a

binaric opposition, expert-layman, which can easily be resolved through

deconstruction. Such a movement might have been possible if Plato's

careful choice of words in thephysician's

answer had notalready pre

vented it: "Does he know in addition [irpoGeirioraraL] what kind of

actions one has to do and when and in what manner they should be

done?" (268b6-8). The difference, therefore, is not of quality but of

quantity;both laymen and experts know how to apply certain (pcxp/xaKa

to achieve certain effects, but only the expert has the additional knowl

edge concerning specific actions and timing. It is again clear why

deconstruction is impossible. What seemed at first to be another case

of a binaric opposition is revealed to be a difference on the same level.

In other words, instead of polarity, which is the starting point of any

deconstructive maneuver, one finds a sequence which prevents any

activation of the Derridian strategy.

The layman's position begins to be problematic only when he

tries to deny the existence of the gap which separates him from the

expert. This clearly indicates that Plato's main concern is not with

the presence or absence of knowledge but with the proper use or

abuse of words expressing that knowledge. In itself, the different

amounts of knowledge are neither good nor bad. They are morally

neutral. What is morally wrong is the oral concealment of the real

situation. This brings us back to the (p?p/xanop: "And because he

heard once from a book [e/c ?i?Xlov] or he was acquainted with drugs

[ip?pixaKLOLs], he believes himself to be a physician, while he is not

an expert [eTra? p] at all" (268c2-4).

Again, both books and (p?p/xana appear in a deprecating con

text,39 yet it is not their essence which is condemned, but their action.

Medicineclearly

cannot exist as a

science,

as e-Kiary^y, without a

knowledge, eiriarrnxy, of <pap/xaKa. To be a physician, however, one

39Plato uses here the word <papixaKLovand not the word (p?pi?anov, a

diminutive which hints at humiliation. See de Vries, A Commentary on

the Phaedrus, 228.



YOAV RI?ON 555

must in addition know the right application of each <papixaKOP to

each patient. The distinction is not one between different objects

but between different kinds of users of these objects. The difference

is between the man who is an expert (eira? p) and the man who is

not an expert. It is the nonexpert's lack of knowledge which makes

books and <p?pixcxKa harmful, not their mere existence. It is this

same expert-nonexpert distinction which is the focus of a passage

already cited in connection with the deprecation of written speech:

And whenever it is written even once, every logos iswandering around

in the same manner both among the experts and among those whohave nothing to do with it at all. Moreover, it does not know to whom

it should speak and to whom it should not. (275d9-e3)40

The problem is not, therefore, with the wrong objects but with the

wrong hands. Socrates repeats this notion regarding poetry (268c5

d2) and harmony (268d6-e6, with eirdieiP in 268e5) as well. Again,

knowledge itself is not at fault.41

There is one more point to be discussed, and that is the conse

quences of using the (p?p/xaKOP. The duality of the <papixaKOP, (poison

medicine) becomes more serious when the poison is not merely

metaphorical (as in the king's answer to Theuth), but is a means of

consciously causing harm. The Athenian in the Laws dedicates a

separate section to the laws concerning poisoning where, again, the

difference is between two sorts who use the <papixaKOP, and not be

40On the epistemological deprecation associated with the verb "to

wander around" (nvXivbelrai) see de Vries, A Commentary on the Phaedrus,252.

41Moreover, on the subject of harmony, the learning (?xa?^ixara) to

be condemned in the context of a deceitful eino~Triixri is a necessary

(?vaynala) precondition for harmony (268el) as much as the (p?ppaica are

necessary for the physician (270b6). At this point Iwould direct the read

er's attention to Michel Foucault's criticism of Derrida in the afterword

to his Histoire de la folie ? l'?ge classique (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), 583

603. Although his criticism deals with a Derridian reading of Descartes'

notions about madness, Foucault's attitude toward the deconstructive text

is very similar to my own criticism of Derrida. As with the internal

division within writing, Foucault indicates the internal division withinmadness (p. 591); like the claim that the main opposition in the Platonic

text is not speech-writing but ethical-nonethical, Foucault states that Des

cartes' main opposition is not insanity-sanity but demens-dormiens. What

is more, Foucault proves that the Derridian both-and phenomenon is im

possible, while impossibility in general is an important criterion for Der

rida's critical discussion (p. 596).




tween different consequences of its use, that is, between different

responsibilities:

This is the law concerning poisoning [7rep? <pap?xa/celas]; the man who

poisons [<papixaKevr? someone in order to incite damage without a fatal

consequence either to himself or to the other, or in order to have a

fatal consequence for the latter or otherwise to his cattle or bees,

would, if on the one hand [?xev]he is a physician and would be convicted

of poisoning, suffer death; and if, on the other hand [be], he is a layman

[Ibi?rris], the court will decide what he shall suffer or pay. And if

there would be a suspicion that someone is causing harm by means

of spells, charms, or some kind of incantations or other such kinds of

witchcrafts [r v tolovtuv (papfxaKei^v], if, on the one hand [/xev], he isa prophet or a diviner, let him die, and if, on the other hand [be], he

would be convicted of witchcraft [irepl (pap/xaKelas] without any helpof prophetic art, he shall be dealt with as in the former case; the court

will decide about him what he shall suffer or pay.42

The text is unambiguous; the legislator distinguishes between the

expert and the layman, whether in medicine or in witchcraft. The

expert's fate is uniform; the penalty is always death, regardless of

the seriousness of the outcome. With theexception

ofmurder,

where the penalty is humiliation in addition to death,43 all damage

to property and person is considered by the enforcers of the law to

be the same; there is no place for mercy. The reason for the severity

is clear: the abuse of knowledge?an abuse based on the power given

by society to the expert so that he will put it to good use?is con

sidered to be a kind of treason. This twofold aspect of the law,

which allows different penalties for the layman, but only one for

the expert, applies even though in both cases (p?p/xaica were con

sciously used to cause harm. Although the layman's intentions were

no better than those of the expert, it is only in the latter case that

the court has no leeway. Thus, unlike Derrida, who disconnects his

deconstructive agents from any subject and therefore from any re

sponsibility, Plato emphasizes again and again the responsibility of

the human being for his actions and their outcomes.

In conclusion, the above discussion illuminates the problematics

of a deconstructive interpretation in accordance with its own reg

ulations. The hierarchical construction of the Platonic text cannot

be deconstructed unless the textual weave goes through a drastic

42Laws 933dl-e5.

43Ibid., 871d4-5.



YOAV RI?ON 557

change, which is impossible in the context of a subtle Derridian

reading. In addition, the <p?p/xaKOp's autonomy, which is an essentialcharacteristic of Derrida's commentary on Plato, was disputed here,

and as a result the question of the validity of the deconstructive

exegetical process is reopened. As for the last issue to be dealt

with, namely, the notion of responsibility within the Derridian frame

of reference, this must be developed another time.

The HebrewUniversity of Jerusalem

Appendix: \[/vxy ir?aa

The expression "the soul as a whole," which is my translation

for the Greek \pvxy ir?aa, was first suggested by Ulrich von Wila

mowitz-Moellendorff.44 Even Wilamowitz himself, however, found

it problematic and left some of the difficulties unresolved.

Moreover,Wilamowitz is an exception, since the dispute among most inter

preters since Hermias Alexandrinus45 concentrates on the question

whether the meaning of ypvxy ir?acx is "all soul" or "every soul."46

The latter problem cannot be resolved by means of textual criticism,47

and therefore my suggestion is based on the context. In 246b6 and

following, \pvxy Troica appears as a complete being (reXea ?xep ovp

ovp ovaa) having wings, which stands in contrast to the soul which

has lost its wings (irTepoppvrjaaaa). In 246d6 and following, the

wings' power to carry the heavy part of the soul to the gods' place

of habitation is mentioned; Zeus himself, driving a winged chariot

(irrypop ap/xa), directs the gods toward the summit of the sky, from

which it is possible to have a look at the metaphysical region.

Moreover, falling to earth is a direct outcome of the falling off of

the wings (248c7-8). The opposition is quite clear; the divine, the

44Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Piaton (Berlin: Weidmannsche

Buchhandlung, 1920) vol. 2, p. 364.45Hermias Alexandrinus, In Piatonis Phaedrum Scholia, ed. Paul

Couvreur (Paris: Librarie mile Bouillon, 1901), 102.46

Thompson, The Phaedrus of Plato, 44; Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus,63.

47Perceval Frutiger, Les mythes de Platon: ?tude philosophique et lit

t?raire (Paris: Alean, 1930), 34.




origin, and the presence stand in contrast to the human, the deriv

ative, and the absence, while the insurmountable gap between thetwo poles is realized by the actual breaking off of the wings. It is

according to this opposition that the insufficiency of both transla

tions becomes manifest. The use of a collective signifier ("all" or

"every"), which tends to give an impression of identity and closeness,

is a misreading of an expression which appears in the context of

difference and separation. By contrast, the translation "the soul

as a whole" both emphasizes the existence of the difference and

preserves the notion of completeness which is one of the charac

teristics of the Platonic primeval situation.

The above two options raise another problem. At 247b6 the

dialogue presents the souls which are named immortal (at ?xepyap

a?aparoL KaXov/xepat), while at 248al, the other souls are presented

(al be aXXat \?/vxo??). The Greek combination of ?xepand be represents

a binary opposition.48 The souls of the second group, which belong

to those which are not gods, are not named immortal. In the light

of this contrast, both "all soul" and "every soul" are misinterpre

tations of the Greek \?/vxy Traca, since they ignore the difference

between the mortal and the immortal. It is the context again which

hints at the accuracy of my translation. In 246c7-d2, the connection

between the living being (fyop) and the immortal is depicted. The

immortal has both a body and a soul which exist forever as a com

plete phenomenon (av/xire?pvKora).49 By contrast, the living being,

which is an outcome of an arbitrary connection between body and

soul, has only a temporal completeness, which merely serves as a

means for the new growth of the wings. Translating \pvxy iraaa as"the soul as a whole" stresses the difference between the complete

immortal and the incomplete mortal in a dialogue where difference

is a main theme.50

48de Vries, A Commentary on the Phaedrus, 134.

49Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 239.

50See Raphael Demos, "Plato's Doctrine of the Psyche as a Self-Moving

Motion," Journal of the History of Philosophy 6 (1968): 134; Guthrie, A

History of Greek Philosophy, 419, n. 4; and Griswold, Self Knowledge in

Plato's Phaedrus, 259, n. 13.

[1993] rinon - the rhetoric of jacques derrida ii - plato's pharmacy

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