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VOL.XIX. NO. 4.
For Private Circulation.(Founded in1912.)
Copyrighted under Act of
THE STUDY STRATEGY JUNIOR OFFICERS OF BY - 605 SOME PROBLEMS IMPERIAL OF DEFENCE - 607 READINESS WAR FOR - 628 THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ROYAL NAVYAND THE MER- 641 CHANT NAVY DISARMAMENTSEA AT PEACE ? REFLECTIONS SUGGESTIONS AND INITIATIVE THE URGENT NEED FOR ECONOMY ENGLAND D THE LEAGUE F NATIONS AN O SINCE 1918 AFFECTING THE INTERNATIONAL II. DEVELOPMENTS SITUATION SOME REMARKS THE PRESENT I T U ~ T I O N ON S NAVAL LANDING PARTIES THE FLEETAIR ARM AIRSHIPS THE NEXT STEP : THE REGATTA AND EFFICIENCY FOURREPLIES : DESTROYERS : OR THE TRAINING SCHOOL THE SERVICE OF A BALTIC EXCURSION THE NEW HIGHWAY PAGES AND PAPERS FROM THE LIFE OF ADMIRAL THE FLEET OF SIR FREDERICK RICHARDS HOWE REVIEWS BOOKSOF AND SHIPPING ANNUAL, 1931 BRASSEY'S NAVAL " THE SEA RAIDERS." By E. Keble Chatterton " WITH THE HARWICH NAVAL FORCES, 1914-1918.'' By Commander Claude L. A. Woollard, R.N. " BEFORE JUTLAND." By Captain Hans Pockhammer -
REVIEWS BOOKS-continued OF PAGE " Two LONESHIPS" By Georg Kopp - 783 " GALLANT GENTLEMEN."By E. Keble Chatterton - 789 " THE LOG OF A U-BOAT COMMANDER, U-BOATS OR 1914-rgr8." By Ernest Hashagen - 791 WESTWARD, " THE WAYS OF THE NAVY." By Rear-Admiral D. Arnold Forster - - - 794 "WOLVES OF THE CHANNEL"(1681-1856). Ky W. Branch Johnson - 796 " THE PIRATEWIND." By Owen Rutter - 800 " ENGLISH SEAMEN THE COLONISATIONOF AMERICA." AND By E. Keble Chatterton - 803 " MY GREATEST ADVENTURE." Sir Malcolm Campbell 807 By " MONS, ANZAC KuT." By the Hon. Aubrey Herbert 810 AND " ARMADAS THE SKY." OF By Paul Murphy - 812 " ZEPPELINS OVER ENGLAND." By Freiherr Treusch von - 814 Buttlar Brandenfels " THE FIRST DUTCH WAR." Vo1. VI. Edited by C. T. Atkinson - , - 815 " THEBYNG PAPERS." Vo1. 11. Edited by Brian Tunstall 821 " NELSON." By Clennell Wilkinson - - - - 825 " MUSTAPHA KEMAL." By Dagobert von Mikusch - 827 By Lieut-Col. Sir Arnold " MESOPOTAMIA, 1917-1920.'' T. Wilson - - 829 OF - 833 23. NOTICES BOOKS - 845 24. CORRESPONDENCE The Regatta and Efficiency.
NO. 1931 ERRATUM, AUGUST CONTENTS PAGE Item I for " HISTORY" read "STRATEGY."
HON. EDITOR'S NOTES.
Articles, reviews of books and correspondence intended REVIEW should reach for the February number of THE NAVAL the Hon. Editor not later than the last week in December. Comments will, as always, be welcome on articles and reviews appearing in this number ; and I specially invite remarks on the Study of Strategy (see first article). Many of the articles and reviews are written by officers on active employment, and I wish to avail myself of this occasion to express to the writers our gratitude for undertaking such work-often entailing considerable trouble and research-side by side with their service duties, and so helping to keep THE NAVAL REVIEW close touch with work and thought afloat. in It will be noticed that, in some of the reviews of books, the word " the " is omitted before the names of ships, in others it is inserted. This is done intentionally, and I should welcome opinions from members as to which they consider preferable. There are a few complete sets of the nineteen volumes of THE NAVAL REVIEW (unbound) available for 5. There are also many miscellaneous back-numbers which can be supplied at a reduced price to complete members' sets. Increased membership is badly needed.
RICHARD WEBB, Hon. Editor.rza, Brompton Square, London, S.W.3. November, 1931.
T H E STUDY O F STRATEGY BY JUNIOR OFFICERS.THE writer of " Gaps in the Study of Strategy "l strikes at the root of the whole question when he suggests improving the grounding of junior officers in the subject. Admiral Boyle, in a recent lecture, while dealing with the interest produced by the present Junior Officers' War Course, said :-" Except for the haphazard instruction young officers may get on going to sea-and this depends very much where and under whom they serve-there is little to keep this interest a l i ~ e . " ~ Why should this be so ? The average gunroom officer is keen enough, but too often the interest is gone before he even reaches Greenwich. The principal reason for this is the lack of knowledge of the existing facilities for study. As a midshipman the writer and his contemporaries had no idea of the existence of M.I.R.s., the R.U.S.I. Journal, or THE NAVALREVIEW. In some ships perhaps this state of affairs does not exist, but it is the rule in the majority. Many, too, are unaware of the facilities provided by the Port Libraries. Those officers in charge of midshipmen might well remedy this state of affairs. In one ship recently it was the custom for gunroom officers to meet once a month under the guidance of a selected officer to discuss the information given in the latest M.I.R.s., and this period of instruction was very popular. Would it not be possible to send the R.U.S.I. Journal REVIEW not to all gunrooms at any rate to those of if and THE NAVAL big ships ? The expense would not be very high, the value would be inestimable and the applications for membership of both would certainly increase in numbers. The lack of practice in writing English during the period between Dartmouth and Greenwich can surely be dealt with easily enough. The Journal, which should serve this purpose, is in many ships allowed to lose its entire value by becoming a sort of glorified deck log, and yet officers in charge only too often allow it to be kept in that way. In spite of the instructions given in each Journal, descriptions of places visited are seldom given, and critical comments on exercises are often not allowed. Two excellent chances of learning how to write are thus wasted.1
NAVAL REVIEW NO. 3, Val. XIX, August, 19.31. p. 399. R.U.S.I. Journal May, 1931, p. 368.
THE STUDY OF STRATEGY BY JUNIOR
If junior officers were also, from time to time, set to write essays on subjects of service and general interest, the gap between Dartmouth and Greenwich would be bridged. Even if it is considered that sufficient time is not available, a prize might be offered annually for the best essay by a midshipman on a given subject. In the writer's limited experience, when midshipmen were asked on one occasion to criticise the present scheme of instruction afloat and on another occasion to write an account of a combined operation in which they had taken part, they were by no means loath to do so. As far as possible before the commencement of any exercise, its idea should be explained to gunroom officers, and on foreign stations lectures on the political situation should be given from time to time. If all, or any, of the above things were done in all ships, as they are undoubtedly done in some,the interest of the cadet leaving Dartmouthwould be maintained, and officers would obtain that better grounding which the writer of " Gaps in the Study of Strategy " regards as essential.
SOME PROBLEMS OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.]THEsubject of my paper is " Some Problems of Imperial Defence," ancl the qualification implied by the word " some " is an important one : for it is obvious that the whole of the problems of Imperial Defence could not even be sketched, however superficial the sketch, in an hour's talk. What I wish to do is to indicate something of what I would call the " anatomy " of the problem, the skeleton which, in my opinion, forms the framework, or policy, of which armaments are the executors. As far as I can I will avoid technical questions, and limit-again as far as I can-references to those very misleading and untrue things, statistics. We all know what has been said about them. As there is, I think, nothing more important than a clear definition of the expressions we employ, it is right for me to begin by saying what I mean when I use the words " Imperial Defence " in order that we may all be thinking about the same thing and on the same lines. I have tried very hard to make a definition which is accurate. I will not say that the one I have made is the best or that it cannot be improved upon ; I dare say it could ; but what I call " Imperial Defence " is this : " The provision of security for the interests, the persons and the territory of all those people who constitute the populations of the British Empire." In the long run Security is the ultimate end. Of course, I recognise, as everyone must, that there are two schools of thought on the question of security-on the policy by which security is to be attained. There are those who maintain that armaments not only cannot furnish security, but that, worse than that, they tend merely to produce insecurity. That is a doctrine of which I dare say you have heard a good deal lately. And there are people who think otherwise. I t is clearly not my business to discuss those particular problems. They have been before the world for a very long time. When I was reading the life of Sir Henry Lawrence, I found that he had referred to a similar conflict in opinion so long ago as 1844. An officer of the fighting services, however, so long as fighting forces exist at all, can only proceed upon the assumption that security can be provided by force, and that it is his duty to think out how it is to be provided ; for on no other hypothesis can his existence, or the existence of his tools, be justified. I t is not theAn address given by Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond t o the British Empire League on April nznd, I Q Z I .
SOME PROBLEMS OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.
fighting officer's business, qud officer, to discuss whether war can be cured by war; whether the old saying be true that if you want peace you must prepare for war ; or whether the doctrine that armaments generate war, and that lack of armaments generates peace and therefore security, are the more justified by t