17th performance and operations conference in dubai

Improving Performance with SafetyT/Off – APPRroach - LanDinG

Presented byCaptain HOUDIN Jean Pierre – Flight Operation Support Director

Performance and Operations workshop in Beijing

© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Introduction

• At the 18th Airbus Flight Safety Conference (March 2012), the main messages about ROPS were

Recognized as a global opportunity to improve safety

Extended to include contaminated runway conditions (A350XWB)

Solution available for all Airbus FBW aircraft

Solution possible for all other types of TAWS‐equipped airplanes

• Today’s objectives areTwo significant events replayed with ROPS

ROPS development status

Runway excursions, an industry priority for safety bodies


Content

Why, What and When (WWW.airbusworld.com)1

Cockpit/Operations/Configuration changes2

Operations/Configuration Impacts3

Conclusion4


Take-Off – FMS functions

• Objectives (TOS 1 function):• To provide a safety net within avionics

regarding erroneous take-off parameters.• To reduce risks of tail strike,

• Detect gross inconsistencybetween take-off parameters inserted in FMS.

• Two additional functions (TOS 2)• A/C position check• Take-off distance check

Entry out of range

V1/VR/V2 DISAGREE

T/O SPEED TOO LOW


Check ZFW range:

ZFWMIN ≤ ZFW ≤ ZFWMAX

Check performed as soon as ZFW is entered or modified.

When check fails: « » message and ZFW entry rejected.

Detect erroneous weight initialization in the FMS

Take-Off Securing (TOS 1)


Detect erroneous take-off speeds initialization in the FMS


Check TO speeds consistency:

V1 ≤ VR ≤ V2

Checks performed as soon as all the 3 TO speeds are inserted in the PERF TO page, or each time a TO speed is modified.

When check fails: « V1/VR/V2 DISAGREE » message.


TOS 1 reduces gross error entries in the FMS


Checks performed:- When ZFW, BLOCK and CONF are entered on the MCDU.- When ZFW, BLOCK, CONF or TO thrust setting are modified.- At engine start.

When check fails: «TO SPEED TOO LOW » message.

Check VMC limitation:

V1 ≥ KV1VMCG * VMCG

VR ≥ KVRVMCA * VMCA

V2 ≥ KV2VMCA * VMCA

Check Vs1G/VMU limitation:

VR ≥ KVR * VRMIN

V2 ≥ KV2 * VS1G



•A/C position check:Secure take-off location:

Detection of take-off from taxiway

TOS 2 “A/C position check” prevents take-off from taxiway.

ECAM

A/C not on runway


TOS2 “A/C position check” prevents take-off from wrong runway

FMS departure runway ECAM

A/C on a runway ≠ FMS departure runway.


•A/C position check:Secure take-off location:

Detection of none FMS departure runway


Check that the A/C has a sufficient runway length to perform a safe take-off.Performed in preflight/take-off phases.

At preflight

At take-off config test

At take-off power

1

2

3

1

3

2

TOS 2 “take-off distance check” prevents risk of runway overrun© 2011 Google

TOS 2: take-off distance check



NO ALERT

Lift-off distance < Runway length available

1

Runway length available

Lift-off distance

FMS runway

PREFLIGHT

Pilot entries:- take-off speeds- ZFW- T.O. thrust- T.O. shift- …



New check performed each time

a parameter is modified

Lift-off distance > Runway length available

Runway length available

Lift-off distance

FMS runway



PREFLIGHT© 2011 Google

1


Lift-off distance > Runway length available

FMS runway Runway length available

Lift-off distance

TAKE-OFF CONFIG TEST



MCDU

ECAMAUDIO

© 2011 Google

1

2


ECAM

AUDIO

3

Lift-off distance > Remaining distance on runway

Remaining distance on runway

Lift-off distancecurrent runway

FMS pilot entries

TAKE-OFF THRUST SETTING

+ actual A/C position at TO thrust setting

+

+ actual flap/slat conf setting

+ …


© 2011 Google

1

2


Non Precision Approaches (NPA)

GPS PRIMARY


Non precision approach like an ILS?

FLSFMS Landing

System

Existing ILS look alike

Available on A320 family Very soon on A330/A340Basic on A380 and A350

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/44/Whiteman_localizer.jpg


FLS virtual beam

Published NPA minima apply

• Airport code• Runway Number• Runway Threshold

FLS virtual beam defined by:• Slope• Course • Anchor Point (Runway threshold or Final End Point)

Course

Anchor Point

Beam

http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fichier:Runway_diagram.png


FLS beam

Course

FLS approach

• Slope/Course/Anchor Point (Runway threshold or Final End Point)• Only approaches with a straight final leg

• Temperature correction in cold weather conditions


FLS concept – Key points

• The FLS principle is based on a virtual beam output computed from the FMS database,

• Most of published NPAs can be flown with FLS function,

• Temperature correction in cold weather conditions,

• Current NPA minima apply,

• Not compatible to RNP AR approaches.FLS/FINAL APP capability possible on future FMS standards


Common Interface for all Landing Systems

ILS Selection replaced by LS

But no change on:- Audio Control Panel

- Radio Management Panel

Not a new type of approach…But a new way to fly existing

procedures


PFD changes


ND changes

FLS Beam

Modification Operational Impact (MOI) N°35811


Summary – FLS approach

• ILS look alike concept• FLS Approach preparation identical to ILS • Mixed LOC/VNAV capability


ROPS Design Objectives

Transition Point

ROPSRunway Overrun Prevention System

Page 34


RWY Overrun Prevention System (ROPS)

Reduction of avoidable runway overruns is a priority

Page 35


Page 40

Runway Overrun Factors at Landing• WET RLD determination: inaccurate method• Stabilization not achieved at 1000/500 ft• Wind change or shift at low altitude• Approach becoming unstable at low altitude• Long flare, • Long derotation• Late selection of engine thrust reversers• Auto brake setting too low• Late / weak pedal braking including Auto Brake override• Runway friction coefficient lower than expected• Cancellation of reversers at 70 kt• Partial / total failure of braking system• Contaminated runway (snow, ice…)

Solved by:

ROW

Solved by:

ROP


On top of ROPS: Brake To Vacate• Benefits

• Optimisation of the runway occupancy• Integration in the future SESAR ATM concept

• Enhanced safety• Environment

• Lower fuel consumption with thrust reverser usage optimisation• Operational savings: Braking energy reduction (20 -30%) & Turn

Around Time optimisation• Already certified on A380• Certification target for A320 & A330/A340: 2013

Predicted performance Real time monitored performance

Page 42


On top of ROPS: Brake To Vacate (BTV)


Page 44

BTV Selection (reminder): DRY & WET lines

BTV selection in PLAN Mode

1 : Runway selection:DRY and WET lines

2 : Exit selection 3 : BTV arming with Auto-Brake rotary switch

DRY and WET lines computed and displayed for ROW and BTV


Page 45

BTV & ROW A380 Normal ops: DRY & WET lines

BTV armed

Mode ARC – Range 2NMMode ARC – Range 5NM Mode ARC – Range 2NM

BTV ActivationSTOP Bar on ND

Below 500 ft, DRY/WET lines are "alive”

PredictedDRY/WET lines


On ND wet line displayed Amber, if A/BRAKE BTV armed

Runway Overrun Prevention SystemDescription of the function ‐ ROW alarms (1/2)

If ROW WET distance to stop is longer than remaining runway length:

Below 400ft Amber message on PFD (flashing for 9s)And, no audio

Page 46

→ Standard Operating Procedure : Go‐Around if runway is not DRY

WET

DRY

GS 145


Runway Overrun Prevention SystemDescription of the function ‐ ROW alarms (2/2)

If ROW DRY distance to stop is longer than remaining runway length:

Below 400ft :Red message on PFD (flashing for 9s)And, below 200ft :

Audio callout “RWY TOO SHORT”

→ Standard Operating Procedure : Go‐Around (whatever runway condition)Page 47

WET

DRY

GS 145


Runway Overrun Prevention SystemDescription of the function ‐ ROP alarms

If ROP distance to stop is longer than remaining runway length:

Page 48

→ Standard Operating Procedure : Apply Full Pedals and Set/Keep Max Reverse

• Red message on PFD Until max pedal deflection Repetitive audio “BRAKE… MAX BRAKING”

Then, until max reverse selection :Repetitive audio “SET MAX REVERSE”

• At 80kt (if still in overrun situation)One audio “KEEP MAX REVERSE”


Runway Overrun Prevention SystemA Natural Link with in‐flight realistic landing distance assessment based on IFLD

Introduction of In‐flight landing distance assessment and ROPS,A consistent approach

Covering training, procedure and cockpit technology... Airbus is ready and active

Crew proactive one‐shot landing performance assessment

Real‐time automated proactive landing performance assessment

+Crew alerting

Real‐time automated actual stopping distance calculation

+Crew alerting

In‐flight realistic landing distance assessment by

the crew

VFR stabilization gateAs recommended per SOPIn

Flight

On Groun

d

Pilot action based on simple SOP

Page 49


Runway Overrun Prevention SystemTimeline for AIRBUS Fleet

1st PrototypeApril 2004

A380October 2009

A320 FamilyQ3 2013

A330/A340Q4 2014

A350XWBBaseline @ EIS

ResearchOct. 1998 ‐ Feb. 2002

Page 50


ROPS flight deck technology is supplemented by Airbus SOP of in-flight realisticlanding distance assessment based on FAA TALPA Operational Landing Distance(IFLD) recommendations:

– AFM, QRH and FCOM Revisions– Airbus Type Rating Training based on IFLD– Taking into account FSF ALAR and IATA RERR recommendations


Runway Overrun Prevention SystemReplay Of Two Significant Airbus Events – 1st Case

Page 52

Aircraft Conditions

• A320‐214• Aerodynamic configuration : FULL• Landing Weight: 64 Tons• CG location : 28%

Runway Conditions

• Landing Distance Available = 1966m• Average downhill slope: +0.23%• Reported Dry

Short Final and Touchdown Conditions

• 15kts average tailwind• 162kts ground speed at touchdown• Touchdown at 850m from runway threshold

Pilot Actions

• Ground spoilers not armed• Thrust reversers not selected

Consequences

• Hull loss without fatalities

Two significant events replayed with ROPS


Runway Overrun Prevention SystemReplay Of Two Significant Airbus Events – 1st Case

Page 53

Aircraft Conditions

• A320‐214• Aerodynamic configuration : FULL• Landing Weight: 64 Tons• CG location : 28%

Runway Conditions

• Landing Distance Available = 1966m• Average downhill slope: +0.23%• Reported Dry

Short Final


Pilot Actions

• Ground spoilers not armed• Thrust reversers not selected

Consequences

• Hull loss without fatalities

“IF WET: RWY TOO SHORT” passing 150ft

and “RWY TOO SHORT” at threshold overfly

Therefore, Go Around


Runway Overrun Prevention SystemReplay Of Two Significant Airbus Events – 2nd Case

Page 54

Aircraft Conditions

• A320‐233• Aerodynamic configuration : FULL• Landing Weight: 63.5 Tons• CG location : 33.5%

Runway Conditions

• Landing Distance Available = 1649m• Average downhill slope: ‐0.47%• Reported Wet

Short Final and Touchdown Conditions


Pilot Actions

• Ground spoilers armed• Max Rev selected at touchdown• Max pedals 14s after touchdown• Idle Rev selected at 190m from runway end

Consequences

•54kts runway overrun speed •Hull loss with fatalities


Runway Overrun Prevention SystemReplay Of Two Significant Airbus Events – 2nd Case

Page 55

Aircraft Conditions

• A320‐233• Aerodynamic configuration : FULL• Landing Weight: 63.5 Tons• CG location : 33.5%

Runway Conditions

• Landing Distance Available = 1649m• Average downhill slope: ‐0.47%• Reported Wet

Short Final


Pilot Actions

• Ground spoilers armed• Max Rev selected at touchdown• Max pedals 14s after touchdown• Idle Rev selected at 190m from runway end

Consequences

•54kts runway overrun speed •Hull loss with fatalities

“RWY TOO SHORT” passing 150ft

Therefore, Go Around


Runway Overrun Prevention SystemA350XWB ‐ Step 3 Development Status

RWY condition matrix on WHEEL pageto assist pilots in contaminated

runway conditionsRWY

condition selector

A/BRKPushbutton

Runway condition short feedback on ND

Page 62


Runway Overrun Prevention SystemA350XWB ‐ Step 3 Development Status

• AchievementsDetailed specification deliveredEASA Human Factors evaluations successfully doneEASA and FAA first certification meetings doneFirst integration tests on bench done

• On‐going activitiesPreparation of integration tests on iron birdPreparation of flight tests

• Schedules for Entry‐into‐Service:BTV/ROPS available at A350XWB Entry‐Into‐Service

Page 63


Runway Excursions, A Priority For Safety Agencies

US NTSB (March 2011)“Actively pursue with aircraft and avionics manufacturers the development of technology to reduce or prevent runway

excursions and, once it becomes available, require that the technology be installed.”(A‐11‐28 safety recommendation to FAA)

European Aviation Safety Agency (June 2012)Release of draft Terms of Reference to mandate existing on‐board technologies on airplane

To increase the level of safety by reducing the number of runway excursions

Regional Aviation Safety Group – Pan America (October 2012)Positive Business Case related to the deployment of ROPS‐like technology to mitigate runway excursion risk in Latin America

Recommendation to implement such on‐board technology

European Action Plan for Prevention of Runway Excursions (January 2013)“On‐board real time performance monitoring and alerting systems that will assist the flight crew with the land/go‐around

decision and warn when more deceleration force is needed should be made widely available.”(AM03 safety recommendation to aircraft manufacturers)

Page 66


Page 67

Enhanced Visual Systems (EVS)


EVS-HUD

Page 68

HUD provisions


Page 69

Enhanced Visual Systems (EVS)


Conclusion – T/OFF

Flight PhasePre Flight

T/O CONF CHECKT/O THRUST SET

TOS 1•ZFW•SPEEDS

TOS 2•T/O Distance check

•T/O Distance check•A/C Position check•T/O Distance check

Page 70

Entry out of range

V1/VR/V2 DISAGREE

T/O SPEED TOO LOW


FLS beam

Course

Conclusion - FLS approach

•Most of published NPAs can be flown with FLS function,•Current NPA minima apply, Not compatible to RNP AR approaches.•FLS/FINAL APP capability possible on future FMS standards


Conclusion – FLS APPROACH

Approach technique and procedures :ILS “Look-alike” conceptSimplification of proceduresSame procedures for all kinds of approach (decelerated technique)

FLS is not a new type of approach….

…but a new way to fly existing NPA

Reduce training time and cost due to standardization of procedures

Improvements to increase safety/situation awareness during NPATemperature correction for cold weatherVertical guidance for LOC only/LOC B/C

17th performance and operations conference in dubai

Documents