Lauren: These are articles sent to me by Georgian government representatives to prepare me for my meetings with Mr. Yakobashvili and Ms. Tkeshelashvili… so I wanted to pass them along…

1. Mistral helicopter transport ship. ((NOTE: This issue is still evolving, but it appears France has decided to sell an advanced warship to Russia. This would be the largest ever military sale by a NATO country to Russia, and has many members (Germany and most recently the US) questioning the wisdom of the sale. At the same time there is an unofficial arms embargo against NATO ally (and Afghan troop supplier) Georgia, which can’t get resupplies of military hardware since the August 2008 Soviet invasion. And it comes despite the fact that Russia is violating the August 2008 cease fire accord that Sarkozy himself negotiated. Some key issues have not yet been announced/negotiated, including how many Mistral ships France would sell to Russia, and the level of technology they would be outfitted with.))

THE NEW YORK TIMESFebruary 9, 2010

Gates Voices Concern About Warship Sale to RussiaBy THOM SHANKER PARIS — Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told French officials Monday that he was concerned about their plans to sell Mistral-class amphibious assault ships to Russia, although there is little if anything the United States could do to block the deal, officials said.

Russia has been engaged in negotiations for months over what would be the first significant purchase of advanced NATO weaponry since the collapse of communism. Each Mistral warship costs up to $750 million, and the vessels, which can launch helicopters and armored vehicles, would be viewed as a notable addition to the Kremlin’s rusting fleet.

Mr. Gates chose the well-known diplomatic code for disagreement in describing his discussion of the arms sale with his French counterpart, Defense Minister Hervé Morin.

“I think I would just say that we had a good and thorough exchange of views,” Mr. Gates said.

Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary, said later that Mr. Gates’s meetings here were “very amicable and positive” on issues that included the NATO effort in Afghanistan, but that Mr. Gates “made our concerns very clear” on the arms sale.

The weapons deal has raised alarm in capitals across formerly Soviet territory — in particular in the republic of Georgia, which fought a war with Russia and sees the vessels as a threat that could be based in the Black Sea off its shores.

The maritime Baltic states, also former Soviet republics, have sought information from France about what weapons and advanced technology would be included.

But Mr. Morin emphasized that the cold war was long over, and that Russia is a changed nation. He said that if Moscow is to be viewed as a partner in global stability, then there should be no objections to the French sale.

“We can’t have a double discourse of saying they are partners and then talking about relations with Russia as if it were pre-1991,” Mr. Morin said. He acknowledged however, that “scars” of the Soviet era are still present in some nations of eastern and central Europe.

French officials have agreed to sell one of the ships to Russia and are discussing a deal for three others, according to news reports in France.

THE ECONOMIST (Charlemagne Blog)February 9, 2010

Why is France selling amphibious assault ships to Russia?HERE is a story that may get bigger, as the full implications sink in. After much shilly-shallying and contradictory briefing, France has decided to sell Russia at least one, and possibly four, amphibious assault ships. In an unhappy piece of timing, the news broke as Robert Gates, the American defence secretary, was en route to France for an official visit.

The ship involved, the Mistral, is not just any hunk of steel. It is a 200m long warship, whose job is to land soldiers, helicopters and armoured vehicles on foreign shores. It can carry 15 helicopters, 13 tanks or several hundred troops (different reports talk of 750 soldiers, or a 1,000). After one of these hefty ships paid a port visit to St Petersburg, in November 2009, Vladimir Putin said on a visit to Paris: "I can assure you that if we purchase this armament, we will use it wherever deemed necessary."

French reports of the port visit make clear that authorities in Paris were all too aware of the sensitivities of their commercial project. It was, for example, deemed "provocative" when a senior Russian admiral approvingly declared that if such ships had been in the fleet in 2008, Russian forces would have overrun Georgia "within 40 minutes", rather than in 26 hours. After that sally went down badly, the Figaro reported, the Russians were careful to talk about using such ships for peacekeeping operations, and other kindly activities.

Several news outlets have named the French prime minister, François Fillon, as the driving force behind the deal. The Figaro, house journal of the Sarkozy administration, has talked of "doubts" among officials working for the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, which were finally overcome by the "necessity" of finding work for the French naval shipyards of Saint-Nazaire. Various clever-clogs in the French civil service also came up with a nice line repeated by several government members, that "one cannot say we need to build a partnership with Russia and then refuse to sell it arms." French officials have also briefed that the ship would be sold "bare", without advanced weapons systems. Yet last year, Le Monde talked of opposition to the sale from the French foreign ministry.

Hmm. I wonder if all those doubts have been quelled. It is early days, but it is interesting to note that the first French press reports of Mr Gates's visit played down the Mistral sale. Reflecting French official briefing, I would assume, the French reports focus on subjects like Franco-American co-operation in Afghanistan and the Iranian nuclear dossier, which also came up when the defence secretary met Mr Sarkozy and French ministers.

American press reports, in contrast, led off with the Mistral, and made Mr Gates's dismay at the sale announcement plain. Here is how the New York Times opens its first report online:

PARIS — Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told French officials Monday that he was concerned about their plans to sell Mistral-class amphibious assault ships to Russia, although there is little if anything the United States could do to block the deal, officials said.

Members of congress in America, including Senator John McCain, have already expressed their concerns about the deal. I have a hunch this is not the last we will hear of the Mistral.

Washington PostWednesday, February 3, 2010; A06

Critics say proposed sale of French Mistral ship to Russia will harm regionBy Edward Cody

PARIS -- When the French navy's 23,700-ton Mistral-class amphibious assault ship dropped anchor in St. Petersburg's frigid harbor Nov. 23, it was doing more than paying a friendly visit to the Russians.

The boxy 600-foot vessel -- an advanced helicopter carrier, command center and hospital built for power projection and landing operations -- was also advertising its many high-tech virtues with an eye on selling a copy to the Russian navy for about $750 million.

Such a deal, which the French Defense Ministry said is under negotiation, would mark the Russian military's first major arms purchase abroad in modern history. It would also be a seminal moment for France and the West. The sale would be the largest and most sophisticated by a NATO country to Russia and would dramatize the evolving role of an alliance conceived to counter Soviet military power.

The Obama administration has remained silent on the matter, in public at least, as part of an effort to improve relations with Moscow. But six Republican senators, including John McCain (Ariz.), wrote a letter in December to the French ambassador in Washington, Pierre Vimont, complaining that the sale would be inappropriate because it would suggest that France approves of Russia's conduct, which the letter called increasingly aggressive and illegal.

In particular, the letter cited Russia's refusal to adhere to all the terms of a cease-fire negotiated by French President Nicolas Sarkozy in the summer of 2008 to end the brief war with Georgia. Despite promises to the contrary, some Russian troops have remained in territory recognized as Georgian by most nations.

Criticism in Georgia

Georgian officials have been at the forefront of those questioning the proposed sale. Eka Tkeshelashvili, head of Georgia's National Security Council, said Tuesday that her government has campaigned against the sale on grounds that it would signal Western acceptance of a Russian presence in Georgian territory and raise the specter of Russian military pressure on other surrounding nations.

The Russian navy's commander, Vladimir S. Vysotsky, said recently that Mistral ships would be a welcome addition to his aging fleet and that had they been available in 2008, the Russians would have defeated Georgia "within 40 minutes." Vladimir Putin, Russia's prime minister and former president, added to the jitters, telling reporters during a visit to Paris in November: "I can assure you that if we purchase this armament, we will use it wherever deemed necessary."

"They're saying, 'If we have the ship, we will consider ourselves free to use it wherever we need to,' " Tkeshelashvili said in a telephone interview. "They don't see themselves restricted in any way."

She and other critics of the sale pointed to Russia's affirmation of a right to exercise influence in neighboring nations that once were under Moscow's thumb as part of the Soviet Union and now are aspiring NATO members. The Mistral-class ships, which can carry 16 helicopters, several dozen tanks and hundreds of troops, would be ideal for military actions to exert such influence, they contend.

France defends dealSarkozy's government said the proposed sale was a logical extension of NATO's repeated expressions of willingness to work with Russia as a partner, not an enemy. Prime Minister François Fillon has been a particularly vigorous champion of the deal, framing it in a context of broadened economic and political relations with Russia, including participation in strategic oil-pipeline ventures and joint automobile manufacturing projects.

"It would be impossible to call for continental stability in partnership with Russia if we refuse to sell armaments to Russia," Fillon said during Putin's visit to Paris. "A refusal would amount to contradicting our own statements."

Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner was no less eloquent in his defense of the negotiations. "We do not want to be prisoners of the past," he said after a negotiating session with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, in Moscow.

In addition to cultivating friendship with Russia, a big factor for Fillon's zeal has been the prospect of continuing contracts for the STX shipyards at Saint-Nazaire on France's Atlantic coast, where up to 1,000 jobs are at stake at a time of rising unemployment.

The French navy has put two Mistral-class vessels into service and has a third on order, expected to be delivered next year. Some defense officials have predicted that a fourth and final ship may be ordered later. Except for the prospect of sales to Russia, no other orders are on the horizon.

Russian officials suggested that they would like to buy several vessels, pointing out that their navy sails in several seas and noting President Dmitry Medvedev's pledge to modernize the Russian fleet over the next decade. According to reports from Moscow, they proposed buying one Mistral in a deal that would convey the know-how to manufacture more such ships in Russia.

Seeking to calm critics, Sarkozy's government pledged that the Mistral's most advanced electronics will not be part of any deal and that Moscow's dream of manufacturing its own Mistral-class ships will not be fulfilled. Whether the Russians will still want to buy under those terms may become clear only when Medvedev visits Paris next month, officials suggested.

Correspondent Philip P. Pan in Moscow contributed to this report.

2. Eutelsat dust-up. ((NOTE:The French- and Spanish-owned communications company Eutelsat is in a major battle with Georgia Public Broadcasting for pulling the plug on First Caucasian TV, which is a Georgia-produced, Russian-language news channel designed to be beamed into Russia and surrounding areas. Eutelsat aired the channel for free for a short time and was to begin airing it under contract Feb. 1; Eutelsat pulled it off the air in late January and said they never had a legitimate, finalized contract with GPB. Georgia claims they did, saying Eutelsat’s decision to yank First Caucasian came only after Gazprom’s media group finalized a massive satellite deal with Eutelsat on Jan. 15. Georgia says this is all about censorship, and a European company caving in to Russian political and economic pressure to silence free speech. This issue is still evolving; a court hearing in Paris is scheduled for Feb. 22.))

New York TimesFebruary 2, 2010Georgian TV Channel Says Russian Company Elbowed It Off the Air By ANDREW E. KRAMER <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/k/andrew_kramer/index.html?inline=nyt-per> and SCOTT SAYAREMOSCOW — In an echo of the cat-and-mouse game of signal jamming in the Soviet Union, a Russian-language television station in Georgia <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/georgia/index.html?inline=nyt-geo>  is accusing a Russian company of blocking its broadcasts into Russia <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/russiaandtheformersovietunion/index.html?inline=nyt-geo> by buying out the spectrum on a French-operated television satellite.

The Georgian station, Georgian Public Broadcasting <http://www.gpb.ge/?LanguageID=2> , had signed a contract with the satellite operator Eutelsat, <http://www.eutelsat.com/home/index.html>  based in Paris, to broadcast news in Russian to Russia and other former Soviet states, apparently trying to crack the Kremlin’s near monopoly of television news.

The Georgian channel, which is publicly financed, broadcast on a trial basis for 11 days in January and was to formally begin its broadcasts on Monday. But it is off the air for now, and the Georgians are accusing Eutelsat of caving to Russian pressure.

At a news conference in Paris on Monday, Georgian television executives said that as late as Jan. 14 they had a binding offer from Eutelsat to broadcast the new channel for one year.

But according to the Georgian executives, the French company backed out the next day, after announcing that it had received a more lucrative offer from Gazprom Media <http://www.gazprom-media.com/en/index.xml> , an arm of Gazprom <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/gazprom/index.html?inline=nyt-org> , the Russian natural gas <http://www.nytimes.com/info/natural-gas/?inline=nyt-classifier>  giant, for the same spectrum the Georgians had contracted for.

“It would be easy to interpret the series of bizarre excuses from Eutelsat to GPBS as the result of pressure from Gazprom Media Group on Eutelsat to preserve Gazprom Media’s monopoly in Russian broadcast areas,” the Georgian station said in a statement in Paris.

Eutelsat, in a statement, said it had offered an alternative satellite for Georgia. “We are not refusing to broadcast the channel,” Vanessa O’Connor, a spokeswoman for Eutelsat, said in a telephone interview. “If that were the case, surely we wouldn’t be proposing anything else.”

The Gazprom contract was signed in 2008 or 2009 and was not made public until January because Eutelsat wished to first ensure the proper functioning of the W7 satellite, which was launched in November, Ms. O’Connor said. The satellite carries broadcasts for Eastern Europe and Africa, she said, and most of the Eastern European capacity is now owned by Gazprom.

A spokeswoman for Gazprom Media, Irina A. Zemkova, called the satellite booking purely commercial and said Gazprom Media had concluded the contract “without any political ideas at all.”

Gazprom Media, the largest satellite television company in Russia, will not use all of the new spectrum at first, she said, but will roll out new, data-intensive products like video on demand or satellite Internet. A spokesman for the Russian government did not return calls on Monday.

The Georgian government conceived of the idea of a Russian-language news channel after the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 as a counterweight to the anti-Georgian propaganda in Russia’s state-owned news media, which are widely viewed throughout the former Soviet Union.

Eutelsat has offered to shift the programming to another satellite, called W2. But this satellite would require a type of antenna that few people have in the former Soviet Union, Georgian television officials said. Not only were Russians unlikely to buy the specialized antennas, the Georgians said, but owning one would also immediately identify customers of the Georgian station to law enforcement.

Signals from the satellite would also reach less of Russia’s territory, according to a map on Eutelsat’s Web site <http://www.eutelsat.com/satellites/satellite-fleet.html> .

“They said they have no capacity, everything was sold out,” Maya Bichikashvili, deputy director of Georgian Public Broadcasting, said in a telephone interview.

Eutelsat first told the Georgian station that it ended the 11-day trial transmission over concerns about the content of the Russian-language programming, Ms. Bichikashvili said. Only later did it assert that transmission was terminated because the satellite’s capacity was fully booked. Ms. O’Connor, the spokeswoman for Eutelsat, denied that content had played any role in the decision to stop the trial transmission.

Henri d’Armagnac, a lawyer for the Georgian station, said that the contract for the W7 satellite became binding once the Georgian side signed it, and that Eutelsat had no right to retract the offer. Georgian Public Broadcasting filed an urgent complaint on Monday in the Commercial Court of Paris; a hearing is scheduled for Thursday.

Ms. O’Connor said that Eutelsat had never entered into a contract with Georgian Public Broadcasting, but that the company hoped to sign one in the coming days.

Andrew E. Kramer reported from Moscow, and Scott Sayare from Paris.

THE WALL STREET JOURNALFebruary 4, 2010

Editorial–A Clear Signal From EutelsatThe Parisian satellite firm has no capacity to broadcast opposition.Today, a French court will hear Georgian Public Broadcasting's breach-of-contract complaint against Paris-based satellite operator Eutelsat, which GPB says has caved to pressure from Moscow by dumping GPB's Russian-language First Caucasus channel in favor of Russia's state-controlled Gazprom Media Group. More to the point is GPB's censorship complaint against Eutelsat, though no word yet on whether a French court will hear that case. Eutelsat's move in favor of Moscow transmits as clear a signal as the TV-watchers of Eurasia could ever need: No room for opposition here.

GPB's First Caucasus was meant to broadcast throughout Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and to crack the Kremlin's de-facto monopoly over Russian-language television. No question, First Caucasus is itself state-funded, and can arguably be dubbed a mouthpiece for Tbilisi. It comes as little surprise that the government of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili has invested taxpayer laris in an effort to win the propaganda war with Moscow, after it was trounced in physical battle a year and a half ago. Even less shocking is that Moscow would put up a fight against another voice entering its airwaves. What is puzzling though is why Eutelsat feels the need to referee this jostling.

Eutelsat spokeswoman Vanessa O'Connor insists that the company had no contract with GPB, and that bumping GPB's broadcasts from its W7 satellite wasn't a political decision. "We have more clients than we have capacity, and choices have to be made," Ms. O'Connor said, stressing that "in Eutelsat's view," the alternative W2a satellite it offered to GPB would allow the First Caucasus channel to reach a "comparable" audience.

Sure, if you disregard GPS's complaint that the W2a satellite wouldn't transmit to existing antennas in Russia. This means that not only would Russian audiences have to buy a new satellite dish to receive First Caucasus, but—with a second satellite dish sitting outside their dwellings—would broadcast to Russian authorities that Here Live Ears Tuned to Tbilisi. We're sure uptake would be swift. GPB adds the W2a satellite would force it to use a more powerful, and therefore more expensive, broadcast signal, and also would yield a lesser quality of reception in some areas. Eutelsat disputes all this, saying there would be no effective difference between the W7 and W2a satellites

Eutelsat's apparent favoritism toward autocracies is not new. In 2004 Eutelsat needed a court order to remove Hezbollah's Al Manar television channel from the air, and in 2008 it yanked from the airwaves independent Chinese-language New Tang Dynasty Television's broadcasts into China.

As with New Tang, Eutelsat insists its reasons are purely technical, and that it has "no political agenda," in the words of Ms. O'Connor. Then again, having no political agenda of their own isn't quite the same as not pandering to giants with agendas of repression.

If the Parisian satellite firm is so eager to dispel suspicions that it makes business decisions based on how best to please strongmen, a good start might be honoring its contracts—even when that means handing a victory to the bottom dog.

3. “The Afghan Package.” ((This is Georgia’s shorthand for three initiatives: A. The 750 soldiers the country will send to Afghanistan in March (they will go to Helmand province in the south, it is the most dangerous province in the country -- a Taliban stronghold and major drug producing region); B. The hoped-for development of Georgia as a transport hub for NATO supplies being shipped to Afghanistan (if the iddea it gains momentum, Georgian officials hope their country also could become a destination for US troops on R&R); and C. Georgia’s offer to help train Afghan police (This plays off the huge success Georgia has had reforming its own police forces, which just a few years ago were considered irredeemably venal and corrupt, and now are uniformly trusted and respected.))

Associated PressJan. 28, 2010

Interview–Georgian President proposing supply route for US arms to AfghanistanBy Desmond Butler

WASHINGTON — Georgia's President Mikhail Saakashvili says he has proposed to the United States that his country become a logistics hub for the expanding U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. That might be a difficult offer for the Obama administration to accept. In a telephone interview with The Associated Press, Saakashvili outlined a Georgian proposal to develop a corridor for armaments across Georgia and Central Asia to Afghanistan. Georgia is offering its Black Sea ports to Western military supply ships and its airports as refuelling points for cargo planes.

U.S. Navy Capt. Kevin Aandahl, a spokesman for the Defence Department's Transportation Command, said the department is aware of Georgia's willingness, but has not substantially explored the proposal. The White House would not comment.

Saakashvili has long sought to steer Georgia toward the West and eventual NATO and EU membership. That course has been in doubt since Georgia's war with Russia in 2008 that ended in a cease-fire with Russian troops just miles (kilometres) from Tbilisi, the Georgian capital. Georgia also has been unnerved by U.S. President Barack Obama's move to reset relations with Russia and the ambivalence in Washington and many European capitals about Georgia's Western integration.

The idea of an influx of Western military supply ships sailing the Black Sea would be likely to rile Moscow. But Saakashvili points out that Russia has said that U.S. success in Afghanistan is in Russia's interests.

"I don't think that Russia can openly object to this," he said.

Georgia is interested in having a greater U.S. military presence in the region, Saakashvili said, but not as a deterrent.

"The best containment of Russia's adventures in this region is political," he said. "I don't think the

Americans have the resources to do it militarily, and I don't think this route can in any way even indirectly serve as military containment or deterrence."

Saakashvili said the idea was first presented to Vice-President Joe Biden when he visited Georgia in July. He says that he has discussed the idea with the head of U.S. Central Command, Gen. David Petraeus.

The offer follows extensive Georgian contributions to U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan that include a commitment of 900 combat troops, a high number for a small, relatively poor country. It comes as the United States is ramping up its operations in Afghanistan and looking for ways to boost supply.

"Part of our business model is options," said Aandahl of TRANSCOM. "We need to have options into Afghanistan."

The United States already uses a supply corridor through Russia and Central Asia, besides its primary route via Pakistan. On Wednesday, NATO said that Russia had expressed interest in developing more routes. Those routes as well as one already operating through Georgia are not sanctioned for arms shipments.

It is unclear whether the other countries along the route Georgia has proposed would consent to allowing arms. Georgia has proposed a possible route by boat, rail and road from Romania over the Black Sea, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Saakashvili says that Georgia has been talking to the other countries and believes that opening the corridor is possible. He says that the route would be more direct and cheaper than the more Northern route traversing Russia.

But Andrew Kuchins, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who has researched the Afghan supply routes, said the Russian route currently is less expensive.

In the AP interview, Saakashvili also commented on the presidential election in nearby Ukraine. He said he feared that the country, which also once seemed on a path into NATO, could face turmoil after the runoff on Feb. 7. Analysts are predicting a close race between Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych.

"The worst outcome of the election would be if we get weak government and continued turmoil," Saakashvili said. "No matter who wins, there will be very strong opposition that will be capable of paralyzing the government. The worst case scenario is that Ukraine continues to be a mess."

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTYJanuary 29, 2010

Georgian Offer Of Afghan Transit Unlikely to Tempt NATOBy Ahto LobjakasBRUSSELS -- The United States generally welcomes all assistance in Afghanistan, where Washington is leading NATO efforts in a high-stakes struggle to stabilize the country.

Georgia, however, may prove the exception. It has twice offered its territory as a potential transit corridor for Western military shipments to Afghanistan -- first in February 2009, and again this week, when President Mikheil Saakashvili revived the proposal in an interview with the Associated Press.

Neither the Pentagon nor the White House has commented substantially on the proposal, which is likely to remain just that, with NATO officials suggesting privately the plan is unfeasible both politically and logistically.

Daniel Korski, a senior analyst at the European Council for Foreign Relations (ECFR) in London, says that NATO does not appear to be convinced the Georgian route is either viable or cheaper than the alternatives.

Korski says the question is whether Georgia is "logistically prepared" and "the infrastructure is actually in place. And so far, despite this offer having been on the table for almost a year, NATO has clearly felt that the Pakistani route and also the more northerly route, the one that goes through Russia and some of the Central Asian states, is more viable."

Transit Options

The Georgian plan involves NATO ships crossing the Black Sea to its ports, where their cargo would be loaded onto trains, taken to Azerbaijan, ferried across the Caspian Sea, then driven across Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in freight trucks. Tbilisi is also offering to refuel NATO cargo planes at its airports.

Saakashvili told the AP he believes the other countries involved would give their assent to the plan.

Pakistan remains NATO's primary transit route to Afghanistan. Although vulnerable to insurgent attacks, it's by far the most convenient overland transit corridor to Afghanistan's restless southern provinces, which form the focal point of the new U.S. military strategy.

The rail route via the Baltic states, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan is lengthy, but functional. Its main weakness is that it does not allow NATO allies to transit lethal military goods. Thus far, Germany is the only NATO member state to have been able to negotiate an exception.

The United States and Russia have also negotiated an agreement on the air transit of lethal military shipment. But the deal, which envisioned more than 4,000 overflights a year, has so far amounted to only a handful of flights, with sources on both sides suggesting discord remains over the terms.

NATO Back Door

Under such circumstances, Saakashvili might have reason to hope Washington would welcome a transit

alternative. The Georgian leader, who is eager to bring his country closer to the NATO fold, is also contributing 900 troops to NATO-led troops in Afghanistan, as part of the envisioned U.S. "surge."

But NATO is wary of the Georgian proposal. An increased NATO presence on the Black Sea is certain to irritate Russia, which went to war with Georgia in August 2008. The United States and NATO are still gingerly trying to patch up valuable strategic ties with Moscow following that conflict.

Although Saakashvili in his interview denied any political motivation behind his offer, NATO capitals suspect Tbilisi is trying to find a back door into the alliance. Its membership bid was frozen in April 2008 -- largely on the account of resistance from Germany and France, which have close ties with Russia. Moscow fiercely opposes the NATO bid by both Georgia and fellow former Soviet republic Ukraine.

The current leadership of Ukraine, like Georgia, has attempted to keep itself close to the NATO fold. It this week became the first non-NATO member to contribute forces to the alliance's flagship NATO Response Force.

The ECFR's Korski doesn't think the attempts by Ukraine and Georgia to curry NATO's favor by offering it troops or transit will have any effect on the two countries' membership prospects.

"I think the truth is that it is immaterial at this stage," Korski says. "The question of NATO membership for both Ukraine and Georgia is not going to be decided on whether they support the [NATO] campaign or whether they allow transit across their countries."

However, Saakashvili's calculation may be even simpler. Any NATO or U.S. presence is reckoned across all of Eastern Europe to be better than none -- and security, however slender, against future Russian aggression.

ASSOCIATED PRESSFebruary 5, 2010

US noncommittal on Georgia's supply route offerA senior U.S. diplomat says an offer by Georgia's president of a new supply route for the war in Afghanistan needs to be discussed with the Pentagon.

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg said Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili mentioned the proposal during their talks Friday.

U.S. acceptance of Saakasvili's offer would likely anger Russia, which fought a war with Georgia in August 2008.

It also is unclear whether other countries on the long proposed route would consent to allowing arms. The route _ by boat, rail and road _ would go from Romania over the Black Sea, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Steinberg thanked Georgia for sending troops to Afghanistan, and its plans to send more this spring. THE WEEKLY STANDARD (BLOG)January 25, 2010

Another Reset FailureJuly 2009 deal with Moscow falls short of expectations.BY JOHN NOONAN

One of the big payoffs from the much touted (yet deeply underwhelming) "reset" of relations with Moscow was sustainment of the northern distribution network, a logistical lifeline to Afghanistan which cuts a hot path through several former Soviet republics. This was to be step one in a larger warming trend with Russia, successfully clearing the air between Moscow and Washington after the Georgian War of 2008.

Unfortunately, Obama's grand diplomatic coup has proven long on rhetoric, short on action. An agreement that was intended to spin the relief valve on the principle Afghanistan-Pakistan supply route --by supporting 12 military airlift flights a day through Russian airspace--has fallen flat: Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told RFE/RL today that Russia has allowed only one flight of lethal U.S. military equipment to transit its airspace en route to Afghanistan, despite a July agreement envisioning as many as 12 flights a day.

Though the U.S. ambassador to Moscow claims that there were actually five flights, with 11 planned, the pact clearly hasn't lived up to expectations. And with troops currently surging into the Hindu Kush, there's still no sign that the operational tempo through the NDN has quickened.

So with logistical strains in Afghanistan swiftly increasing, and Obama's new Silk Road quiet, where are the supplies coming from? Georgian officials quickly expressed their full support for coalition forces in Afghanistan and reiterated their desire to assist in the diversification of supply routes through the Caucasus. Georgian deputy defense minister Giorgi Muchaidze underlined his government's commitment to the success of NATO operations, stating in July 2009 that Georgian officials are "fully aware of our strategic responsibility, we stand ready to provide the full access to our infrastructure and the facilities needed for this purpose."

As of September 2009, a full 30 percent of the NDN's supplies were routed through Georgia. So Obama cuts missile defense, sacrifices U.S. and Allied interests in eastern Europe on the altar of "reset," shows every intention to craft our strategic nuclear forces into a posture agreeable to Moscow, and gets an insignificant 5 overflights of Russian airspace as a thank you. Meanwhile, Georgia increases troop presence in Afghanistan (while Russian forces continue to occupy their country), commits its full logistical capabilities to supporting NATO supply efforts, announces its intention to work with other Central Asian states to help expand the NDN -- and this valuable ally gets what, exactly, in return?

Foreign Policy “The Cable” Blog

Feb. 5, 2010

Georgia prepares to deploy "Holbrooke Brigade"By Josh Rogin Richard Holbrooke, the special representative for the issue formerly known as Af-Pak will visit Georgia "shortly," with plans to finalize the deployment of Georgian troops to Afghanistan.

Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg revealed that Holbrooke will go to Georgia while traveling in Tbilisi Friday. Sources said the current thinking is that the visit will occur toward the end of February.

So what will Holbrooke be doing there? Well, in addition to possibly discussing Georgia President Mikheil Saakashvili's offer to allow his country to become a supply route to Afghanistan, which Steinberg reportedly said was a Pentagon matter, Georgian sources tell The Cable that Holbrooke will be putting the final touches on the plan to deploy Georgian troops to Afghanistan in March.

In Georgia, they are calling it the "Holbrooke Brigade," according to a source close to the Georgian government. The plan is for 750 Georgian troops to be deployed in Helmand province at the personal request of Gen. David Petraeus, the source said, who was impressed with their effectiveness along the Iranian border during operations in Iraq. According to the current plan, they will be under U.S. command and supplementing 350 Georgian troops already in country as part of the International Security Assistance Force.

It will be the largest per-capita contribution of any country in Afghanistan other than the U.S. One lingering question that the Georgians plan to raise with Holbrooke is whether the U.S. will offer them any military aid for the mission. The U.S. has not provided any lethal military aid to Georgia since their war with Russian in 2008, but the Georgians may need some items, such as parts for the U.S.-made M4 rifles they will be using in the Afghanistan mission.

In a December report, Senate Foreign Relations ranking Republican Richard Lugar, R-IN, argued for an end to the unofficial ban of U.S. lethal military aid to Georgia, arguing that the increase of Russian arms near there was dangerously tipping the balance.

"The United States, under substantial Russian diplomatic pressure, has paused the transfer of lethal military articles to Georgia, and no U.S. assistance since the war has been directly provided to the Georgian Ministry of Defense," the report stated. "Consequently, Georgia lacks basic capacity for territorial defense."

4. Georgia’s May 30 Local Elections. ((The elections will be closely watched as a barometer of Georgia’s transition to democracy; they also might be seen as a precursor to the next poresdiential eleciotns, since the Mayor of Tbilisi is often considered the presidential frontrunner. Polls shows that few opposition candidates have deep support; President Saakashvili is still very popular and his United National Movement Party are expected to win most local races. Analysts say this gives opposition extremists an incentive to try to disrupt the elections to damage Saakashvili and his party because they have nothing to lose. What many of the stories below miss is this context: Polls show that few opposition candidates have deep support; Saakashvili remains very popular; and Georgians remain overwhelmingly supportive of their country’s tilt to the west and NATO aspirations.))

Georgia’s Saakashvili Expected to Complete Term, Poll Shows By Helena BedwellJan. 16 (Bloomberg) -- Georgia’s economic downturn and the defeat in a war with Russia in 2008 are not likely to affect President Mikheil Saakashvili’s chances of serving out his second term, a poll shows. As many as 78 percent expect Saakashvili to serve out the term through 2013, according to the survey conducted by Washington-based research firm Greenberg Quinlan Rosner. The nationwide poll of 1,200 people was conducted between Dec. 2-9, 2009, Jeremy Rosner, executive vice president principal, said by phone today. It had a margin of error of 2.8 percentage points. Georgian opposition has repeatedly called on Saakashvili to resign, accusing him of causing the economic downturn after the war that caused about $1 billion in damage to the economy. They also say he has clamped down on democracy and freedom of speech. Saakashvili resigned in 2007, following mass street protests. He was re-elected in January 2008 with 53 percent of the vote, and his ruling party won the parliamentary elections in May 2008 with 59 percent. “To say that 78 percent expect Saakashvili to stay is simply unbelievable, as tens of thousands have rallied against him for years now,”, Kakha Kukava <http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Kakha+Kukava&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1> , head of the opposition Conservative Party, said on the phone today.

EURASIA DAILY MONITORJanuary 12, 2010

Moscow Showcases Nogaideli as Opposition Leader in GeorgiaBy Vladimir Socor

Municipal elections in Tbilisi and other Georgian cities in the spring will undoubtedly see another round of opposition demonstrations, with Russia ready for some overt involvement for the first time. Moscow is openly advertising its support for former Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli, leader of the upstart Fair Georgia party, as favorite opposition leader in Georgia. This marks the first-ever overt endorsement of a Georgian opposition politician by Moscow.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin received Nogaideli in Moscow on December 23. This was Nogaideli’s third known visit to Moscow in the last three months. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and State Secretary Grigory Karasin had received Nogaideli on October 27 and November 24 to “start a [political] dialogue,” discuss the “difficult situation in Russian-Georgian relations,” and “facilitate contacts between citizens” (Interfax, Civil Georgia, October 27, November 24).

Putin brought Duma Chairman Boris Gryzlov (who also chairs the United Russia party’s Supreme Council) and Moscow’s Mayor Yury Luzhkov into the December 23 meeting with Nogaideli. Ostensibly, the meeting focused on the recent demolition of a Soviet Army monument in Georgia’s second-largest city, Kutaisi. Undoubtedly, however, political action in Georgia in the coming spring was discussed.

According to a Russian government-released transcript (also an unprecedented signal of support), Nogaideli displayed confidence that he would come to power in Georgia. Yet he overbid for Russian support toward that goal: “Our priority is to rebuild the monument in Kutaisi. We pledge to do so as soon as we come to power.” He also denounced President Mikheil Saakashvili to Putin: “Saakashvili intends to sever the remaining ties between Russia and Georgia” (Jamestown blog, January 7). By this logic it was Georgia, not Russia’s three-year transport blockade and trade embargos, that “severed the ties” even before the 2008 war. Further by this logic, the Georgian leadership “severed the ties” by orienting the country westward (albeit with Nogaideli’s contribution while prime minister).

In Putin’s presence, Nogaideli agreed with Gryzlov to draw up a cooperation agreement between the United Russia and Fair Georgia parties (Interfax, December 23). Nogaideli’s regular handler Karasin commented that Moscow has given preference to this opposition politician because “he is sensible, he looks to the future, he differs favorably from other Georgian politicians” (Interfax, ITAR-TASS, December 24).

The meeting’s roster suggests that Moscow is grooming Nogaideli as a favored interlocutor on multiple levels: with the Russian government, the party of power, the foreign ministry, and the Moscow city government.

Nogaideli is positioning himself and his party as promoting reconciliation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia through Russia. The unstated implication is that such a dialogue could eventually lead to some form of reintegration under Russian auspices, albeit at some cost to Georgia’s independence. Moscow has encouraged such inferences at Georgian diaspora conferences, organized in Russia by wealthy Georgian expatriates. Russian officials do not discourage such inferences when Nogaideli proposes to open dialogue with the South Ossetian and Abkhaz authorities. Sukhumi seems uneasy about Moscow’s possible intentions in this regard. On January 8, Abkhaz “foreign minister” Sergei Shamba publicly ruled out a meeting between Nogaideli and Abkhaz “president” Sergei Bagapsh, which Nogaideli had

apparently discussed in Moscow (Interfax, January 8).

Moscow could boost Nogaideli’s political rating by nudging Sukhumi and Tskhinvali into dialogue with him, if only symbolically and limited to resolving individual humanitarian cases. In that case, Moscow would have to help Nogaideli show at least some minimal results from such dialogue.

Nogaideli served as finance minister (2003-2005) and prime minister (2005-2007), successfully advancing Georgia’s economic reforms. He resigned after undergoing open-heart surgery and went on to increase his already considerable personal wealth in investment banking. Nogaideli founded his Fair Georgia party in December 2008 and supported the radical opposition’s 2009 regime-change campaign. He threatened a “revolutionary scenario” that would overthrow Saakashvili, whether peacefully or through civil war, unless the president were “forced” to call snap elections by fall 2009 –one year after the preceding elections (Civil Georgia, June 8, 2009).

According to some close acquaintances, Nogaideli predicts that Russia will play a growing role in Georgia’s internal politics and he seeks to position himself accordingly, as the Russian-backed alternative to Saakashvili.

For more than 20 years Moscow has failed to enlist respectable or effective political allies in Georgia. It could only work through former KGB figures such as Igor Giorgadze, shadowy businessmen, political eccentrics in Tbilisi, or Aslan Abashidze’s clan in Batumi. Russia had no known allies or sympathizers in the 20-odd small groups that have been pressing since 2007 for regime change outside the constitutional framework. These groups have proven inept and remain marginal, although they will probably take to the streets again in the spring.

With Nogaideli, however, Moscow has picked a mainstream politician and establishment figure, independently wealthy, with organizational abilities, and apparently ready to cast his lot with the Kremlin. Through this example, Moscow probably hopes to peel off some other establishment figures and business circles, if civil strife is again ignited this year.

January 26, 2010

Georgian Opposition Seeks Deal With Putin’s Party

By Helena Bedwell

Jan. 26 (Bloomberg) -- Georgian opposition leader Zurab Noghaideli, a former prime minister, said he wants to partner with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s political party 17 months after a war between the two countries.

“Previous experience has shown that this kind of cooperation works,” Noghaideli said in an interview in the capital Tbilisi today.

“After my recent visits to Moscow, Georgian teenagers detained in South Ossetia were released and charter flights were resumed.”

Noghaideli said the text of the agreement between his Movement for a Fair Georgia and Putin’s United Russia party will be published before he travels to Moscow next month. He declined to elaborate on the substance of the agreement.

No one could be reached for comment in the United Russia press office.

Noghaideli became Georgia’s prime minister in 2005 and was removed in November 2007 as President Mikheil Saakashvili lifted a state of emergency declared after violent clashes between police and opposition protesters. He moved into the opposition a year later.

Russia routed Georgia’s U.S.-trained army in an August 2008 war over the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia. In the wake of the conflict, Russia recognized South Ossetia and another rebel region, Abkhazia, as sovereign countries.

South Ossetian authorities said they arrested four Georgian boys, aged 14 to 17, in November for illegally crossing the border and storing explosives and weapons.

Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe’s commissioner for human rights, secured the release of two boys early last month.

Noghaideli later arranged for the remaining two to return home, he said.

Russia allowed limited Georgian direct charter flights between Tbilisi and Moscow earlier this month.

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTYJanuary 27, 2010

Smear And Loathing In Tbilisi–Mudslinging Targets Rising Georgian Political StarBy Brian WhitmorePerched on a sidewalk along Tbilisi's central Rustaveli Avenue, a large makeshift billboard features a photograph of a beaming Irakli Alasania standing with his wife, Natia. The city pictured in the background? Not Tbilisi, but the glittering skyline of Manhattan.

As passersby look on curiously, they are approached by a television journalist and asked a single question: "Should the family of a candidate for mayor of Tbilisi live in New York?"

A woman comments that he shouldn't because "his attentions will be diverted" and "his heart and mind should be focused here." A man chimes in that "it would be better if his spouse stood by his side and took part in things together with him."

The segment, aired by Real TV, a private channel with close ties to President Mikheil Saakashvili’s government, was part of a broadcast that aired shortly before Christmas attacking Alasania, the main opposition candidate in Tbilisi’s May mayoral race. The program depicted Alasania, Georgia’s former ambassador to the United Nations, as a cosmopolitan elitist who prefers to keep his family safely ensconced in New York, and is out of touch with ordinary Georgian voters.

"The global metropolis [of New York] is now preparing for Christmas celebrations, and presumably, Alasania's family is not an exception," the voiceover says over footage of a New York apartment building with Alasania's name on the doorbell.

"Alasania's wife and children have been living the American dream for 11 months already -- and it seems like the United States remains their most desirable place to live."

The program, one of several broadcasts that Alasania's supporters describe as an overt mudslinging campaign, sidestepped an important bit of context. When Alasania resigned as UN ambassador after nearly three years in the post and returned to Tbilisi in late 2008 to enter politics, he was reluctant to uproot his two young children, who were attending public school in New York. So for now, Alasania’s wife and children remain in the United States.

Tbilisi's mayoral election is four months away, and the battle to shape public perceptions has begun with a vengeance. And the playing field is anything but level. Incumbent mayor Gigi Ugulava, a close ally of Saakashvili and a member of the ruling Georgian National Movement, enjoys wide and positive exposure on Georgia's pro-government broadcast media outlets, which regularly portray him as a competent, hands-on city executive.

By contrast, in the rare instances when Alasania appears on television, he is usually being mocked. In an interview with Echo of the Caucasus, RFE/RL's Russian-language broadcasting to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Alasania says this is a sign that the current authorities see his mayoral bid as a critical challenge.

"I think the government and the Georgian National Movement see us as a very serious competitor," Alasania says. "And what they are doing is motivating us to continue our battle for fair elections, and to win those elections."

Show Us Your Watch!

The reason for the intensity surrounding the Tbilisi mayor's race is that the election is widely viewed as a dress rehearsal for the 2013 presidential vote that will determine Saakashvili's successor. Analysts say Saakashvili's team is pulling out all the stops to make sure the next president will be a handpicked successor -- possibly the incumbent Tbilisi mayor, Ugulava. And that means they need to stop Alasania's mayoral bid in its tracks.

"There is no question that the present authorities don't want Mr. Alasania to become mayor because it would automatically make him a leading candidate for president," says Lawrence Sheets, head of the International Crisis Group's Tbilisi office. "The existing authorities want to hang on to power, [and] Alasania would be a formidable opponent if he were the candidate of the united opposition. No question about it."

Real TV is a nominally private television network. But like much of Georgia's private media, it has its links to the state. Real TV’s ownership structure is opaque, but it is widely believed to be under the control of Georgia's powerful interior minister, Vano Merabishvili, one of Saakashvili's closest allies.

The Real TV program about Alasania's family was just one in a series the network has broadcast in recent weeks. Some have been rebroadcast on Imedi, another nominally private but staunchly pro-government television channel. Natia Koberidze, a producer at Imedi, denies there is any political motive behind the station's rebroadcast of the Real TV programs.

Representatives from Real TV could not be reached for comment.

Some of the programs have a mischievous air. When Alasania was greeting voters on a Tbilisi street, a group of Real TV journalists ambushed him and asked on camera to see his watch and mobile phone. A nonplussed Alasania complied, holding up a professional but relatively pedestrian variety of accessories.

Denied a "gotcha" moment, the program nevertheless pushed forward with its preferred narrative.

"Alasania takes a more expensive watch and telephone to his important meetings," a voice over says. "According to our sources, foreign PR consultants advised Alasania to have an inexpensive telephone with him when meeting ordinary people, and made him wear the watch that was given to him by his father as a gift."

'Character Assassination'

Other broadcasts have taken on a decidedly mean-spirited tone. In a recent program, Real TV conducted a mock interview with a life-size mannequin made to resemble Alasania. The interviewer asked a series of accusatory questions, suggesting that Alasania was alternately a Russian agent, a drug dealer, and a former member of a violent and murderous youth gang. The Alasania-like dummy sits silently throughout the mock grilling.

Alasania denied the Real TV allegations outright in an interview with RFE/RL, calling them "character assassination" and an attempt to distract him from his mayoral campaign.

"These allegations have no grounds whatsoever. In due time, when we have faith in the court system in this country, I will address this in court," Alasania says.

"Of course, there is nothing close to these things in my past," he added. "I've been working for the government for 15 years. My background checks have been made and remade. Of course, I have been faithful to my country."

It is unclear what effect the broadcasts are having on Alasania's standing with the Georgian public, as polling in the country is notoriously politicized and often unreliable. Nor is it clear how successful Alasania has been in securing the support of Georgia’s famously fractious opposition.

Alasania has united two opposition parties, the Republicans and the New Rightists, in his Alliance For Georgia movement. But opposition figures like Nino Burjanadze and Levan Gachechiladze, who see Alasania as a threat to their own ambitions, remain wary of him and analysts say he has struggled to expand his base beyond the Tbilisi intelligentsia.

For his part, Alasania says he is preparing to step up his campaign in the coming months.

More Than A Local Election

Meanwhile, many observers say the mudslinging campaign might actually help Alasania.

Giga Zedania, a professor of philosophy at Tbilisi's Ilia Chavchavadze State University, says he is skeptical of Alasania's strengths as a politician but adds that the slew of attacks, which he calls "a clumsy mixture of low moral standards and sheer stupidity," is evoking sympathy for the former UN ambassador.

"I think the owners of Real TV underestimate the intelligence of the Georgian population, and the end effect will be the opposite of what they wanted," Zedania says. "This absolutely biased 'coverage,' or whatever it is called, is making him even more popular, because he comes across as a victim."

Likewise, Sheets of the International Crisis Group says Georgia "is a country where people do not inherently trust authority" and where voters are much more savvy than politicians give them credit for.

"In this country, people know the political allegiances of the various television networks. They are very well aware of it," Sheets says. "This sort of thing is bound to backfire. It is very inept political operating."

The media campaign against Alasania follows the passage by parliament of a controversial amendment to Georgia's election legislation, lowering the threshold to win in the Tbilisi mayoral election in the first round to 30 percent.

Critics called the move a clear attempt to help the incumbent Ugulava avoid a runoff against Alasania. Most observers expect Ugulava to win the most votes in the multiple-candidate first round of the election, scheduled for late May. But analysts also say that due to the strong pro-opposition vote in Tbilisi, Alasania would likely have the upper hand in a head-to-head runoff.

Alasania says he views the mayoral race as the first stage of the post-Saakashvili transition and a crucial test of Georgia's future democratic development.

"This is not a game. Georgia's fate is being decided," Alasania says. "This is more than just a local election. This is a referendum on Georgian democracy."

5. Ukraine Presidential Elections.((NOTE: The recent election of opposition candidate Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine’s presidential election leaves Georgia as the key US/Western/NATO ally in a vital part of the world, and as one of the best models for political and democratic reform among post-Soviet republics.))

AGENCE FRANCE PRESSEJanuary 21, 2010

Bereft of ally Ukraine, Georgia goes it alone against Moscow

By Michael Mainville

Ukraine's expected turn towards Russia under a new president will leave pro-Western Georgia to go it alone in opposing Moscow in the former Soviet Union, analysts said. With Orange Revolution leader Viktor Yushchenko's inglorious ouster from office, Georgia has lost a key ally after nearly five years of joint efforts with Ukraine to transform the post-Soviet political landscape. Hopes that both countries could be at the forefront of Western efforts to diminish Russia's influence in its former empire have dimmed, analysts said, and Georgia is looking increasingly isolated. "Ukraine and Georgia were both playing the same role in terms of expanding Western influence in the former Soviet Union, and that is going to change," said Ana Jelenkovic, a London-based regional expert with the Eurasia Group research firm.

Georgia is probably now going to be standing alone in opposing Moscow," she said. Sunday's Ukrainian election saw Yushchenko trounced by Moscow-leaning candidate Viktor Yanukovich, who will be the favourite in a run-off next month with Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, another veteran of the Orange Revolution who has struck a pragmatic note on Kremlin ties. Yushchenko had been a major ally and close friend of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who came to power in the 2003 Rose Revolution, another peaceful, pro-Western uprising.

Yushchenko, who is godfather to one of Saakashvili's sons, made Ukraine one of Georgia's strongest supporters during its brief 2008 war with Russia over the breakaway South Ossetia region. In comments a day after the vote, Saakashvili insisted ties with Ukraine would remain strong despite Yushchenko's loss. "The absolute majority of Ukrainians and Ukrainian politicians are Georgia's friends regardless of which presidential candidate's camps they represent," Saakashvili said in remarks shown on Rustavi-2 television. "Whatever happens in the second round of these elections, I am sure these relations will not change.

Analysts, however, said there is no way that ties will remain as close, especially if Yanukovich emerges the victor. "Yanukovich's position has been outright hostile to Georgia, especially during the war," said Svante Cornell, the research director of the Stockholm-based Central Asia Caucasus Institute.

The loss of Ukraine as an ally could deal a serious blow to Georgia's efforts to forge closer ties with the West and join the NATO military alliance, analysts said. As a tandem, Georgia and Ukraine had a much higher profile in Western capitals than Georgia alone, said Lawrence Sheets, the Tbilisi-based Caucasus project director for the International Crisis Group.

There's no question that under Yushchenko there was something of a Ukraine-Georgia axis," he said. "Psychologically it made a big difference for Georgia to have this very big and important country as a partner in fighting Moscow." The relationship could even turn confrontational if Yanukovich is elected and follows through on a promise to recognize Georgia's rebel regions as independent states. Moscow recognized South Ossetia and another rebel region, Abkhazia, as independent after the war, a move that has so far been followed by only Nicaragua, Venezuela and the Pacific island state of Nauru.

Shortly after the war, Yanukovich said in a statement that "Ukraine should accept the will of the people of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and recognize their independence." Jelenkovic said Yanukovich could use recognition of their independence as a quick way of cementing ties with Moscow. "It could be a way to start a new presidency off with a symbolic gesture towards Russia of where Yanukovich's presidency stands," she said. That, Sheets said, would deal "a huge psychological and diplomatic blow" to Tbilisi and make it absolutely clear that "Georgia is the last place" in the neighborhood fiercely opposing Kremlin influence.

“Let’s not confuse oranges with roses”

by Thomas Eymond-Laritaz and Orysia Lutsevych 17/01/01 Whereas President Yuschenko got a mere XX% of the votes in the first round of the presidential elections in Ukraine, his color revolution friend and ally, President Saakashvili, reaches the summit of his popularity since 2003 with more than 73% favorable opinion among the Georgian population*. This proves once again that the post-revolutionary paths followed by the two countries and their respective leaders vary dramatically. As a new President will soon come into office, Ukraine should learn from the best practices of its neighbors. Undoubtedly, Yuschenko’s election results reflect the failure of his presidency. The Orange revolution was a real democratic breakthrough, which boosted empowerment of the people and freed the media environment. But none of the promises of Maidan have been delivered. The country made no progress whatsoever in five years and no major reform has been designed nor implemented. The population is highly disillusioned and does not trust anymore its leaders and the institutions. Parliament has the lowest rating ever, with an average approval of less than 2%. Ukraine shares the 146th place in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index with Zimbabwe, Russia and Sierra Leone. The business environment is strained by read tapes, stringent over-regulation and systematic administrative interference. Ukraine ranks 142 out of 183 countries in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rating. It would be unfair to put all the blame on Yushchenko’s shoulders for this poor performance of the country. Although his responsibility cannot be denied, the destructive role of his political opponents, the divisions within the country about its future path of development, and the poor quality of the political and administrative elite should not be underestimated.

The contrast with Georgia is striking. Saakashvili’s ratings illustrate the success of the radical changes he led since 2003. His major steps focused on fighting corruption and bringing economic liberalization. The reform of the police resulted in more than 80% of trust among the population, which is unprecedented in Europe. The petty corruption has been fully eradicated and corrupted officials were held accountable. According to Transparency International, Georgia is the country in the world which progressed the most in the fight against corruption between 2003 and 2009. The once famous and “blooming” Georgian mafia had to fly away. Thanks to drastic economic reforms, Georgia ranks 11th in the World Bank Ease of Doing Business rating, and was nominated as the number one economic reformer in the world in 2008 by the same institution. Taxes have been cut dramatically and red tapes eliminated. Once dark and cold, the country faces now no electricity and heating cuts, has diversified its energy supplies and is exporting electricity to Russia, Armenia and Turkey. The situation is however not fully “rosy”. Reforms have been implemented in a very challenging internal and external environment. In 2007, an attempt of a coup d’etat destabilized the government and the institutions. In 2008, more than 20% of the Georgian territory got fully occupied by Russian forces. In spring 2009, opposition street protests blocked the center of Tbilisi for four months and disrupted the economy. Further structural reforms are needed to unsure a sustainable development, especially in the field of public health, education and judiciary system.

The Georgian example proves however that reforms are possible in the post soviet space. The current failure of Ukraine is not irreversible. It takes courage, talent and determination to reform a country. But most of all, it takes a collective effort. Saakashvili’s key to his success was that he brought on board a completely new political generation. Although ministers were without real experience in public administration, they were young (most of then were less than 30), ambitious, educated in the West, passionate and determined to succeed. And they really made a difference. This is exactly where lays Yuschenko’s biggest failure: under his presidency, there has been no renewal of the political elite, which still plays by the old rules. The next Ukrainian President will only succeed in modernizing the country if he/she manages to rejuvenate dramatically the political elite by bringing young, western educated, honest and passionate leaders at all levels of governance. One cannot succeed alone.

Thomas Eymond-Laritaz is advisor to the Georgian President and to the Head of the National Security Council. He lived 5 years in Ukraine where he was the President of the Victor Pinchuk Foundation.Orysia Lutsevych is the Tbilisi Correspondent of the BBC Ukrainian Radio Service and Head of development of the Europe House – Georgia. She previously was Executive Director of the Open Ukraine Foundation in Kyiv.

EURASIANETFebruary 8, 2010

Tbilisi Ponders Implications of Ukrainian Presidential Vote

By Molly Corso

Officials in Georgia are downplaying speculation that the apparent victory of the pro-Russian candidate in Ukraine's presidential run-off will have negative repercussions for Tbilisi. But local analysts are predicting the Ukrainian result could cause a major shift in regional politics.

The outcome of the run-off remains unofficial. With virtually all ballots counted, the pro-Moscow candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, was holding a slim lead over Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, widely seen as Western in her orientation. Monitors of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe noted that the voting was conducted in a largely free-and-fair manner. Tymoshenko, who is widely seen as a geopolitical ally of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, has refused to concede defeat until all votes have been counted and verified, local media outlets reported.

Saakashvili has tried to strike a constructive note over the past several weeks, as it became increasingly likely that Yanukovich, whose tainted electoral victory in 2004 was overturned by the so-called Orange Revolution, was headed to victory in the 2010 race.

"However the election turns out, Georgia will remain Ukraine's friend," Saakashvili told a Ukrainian audience via a live link-up during a February 7 talk show on Ukrainian television, the Interfax news agency reported.

During her weekly February 7 press briefing, Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Nino Kalandadze echoed that line, saying it was too early to guess about potential post-election policy twists. But Kalandadze pointed to the two countries' tight strategic relationship and pledged that Tbilisi would continue to cooperate with any government elected in Ukraine.

Since the 2004 Orange Revolution, Ukraine has played an important role as a strategic partner and regional ally for Georgia. For the past five-plus years both countries have attempted to distance themselves from Moscow's influence, and both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union have often tied the two countries together in reform efforts and expansion plans.

Personal relations also run deep: Outgoing Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko is godfather to Saakashvili's younger son, and Saakashvili graduated from the Kiev University Institute of International Relations.

A recent scandal involving an estimated 2,000 non-registered election observers from Georgia underscored the emotional nature of those ties. Yanukovich supporters accused Georgia of trying to intimidate likely Yanukovich voters and therefore influence the election's outcome. The allegation surfaced after Ukrainian media outlets published alleged recordings of telephone conversations between Saakashvili and Tymoshenko. [For background see the EurasiaNet News Briefs].

The Georgian government and Tymoshenko have denied the allegations, but Georgian observers stayed away from the second round of elections on February 7.

Political scientist Tornike Sharashenidze said that, regardless of the winner, the Ukrainian vote's outcome would not pose an immediate security risk for Georgia. He added that if the new government in Kyiv is pro-Russian, the United States and Europe might refocus attention on the South Caucasus. "If Ukraine becomes pro-Russian, American and Western influence will be much more focused on the Caucasus and Georgia than it was before," he said.

Giorgi Khutsishvili, one of the founders of Tbilisi's International Center for Conflict and Resolution, suggested that the election could serve as a wake-up call for Saakashvili's administration. "Both Yanukovich and Tymoshenko have expressed willingness to compromise with Moscow during their campaigns -- a development that reflects a changed political environment in the region that Georgia cannot afford to ignore," he said.

Aside from the likely victory of a pro-Russian presidential candidate in Ukraine, Tbilisi now faces a US administration that is eager to find a common language with Moscow. Khutsishvili suggested that Tbilisi would have to moderate the stance that it has taken with Russia since the two countries fought a brief and lopsided war in 2008. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Khutsishvili stressed that the Georgian government has two options: start talking with Russia without preconditions, or face an even more insecure future. "As Georgia continues pushing its policy of pretending nothing has changed over the past two years, the election in Ukraine makes Georgia more vulnerable," he said.

Editor's Note: Molly Corso is a freelance reporter based in Tbilisi.

6. The Russian Occupation.((NOTE: The accumulation of events – France’s sale of the Mistral to Russia, the unofficial arms embargo, the US “reset” in relations with Russia, and the general lack of coverage – makes it seem that the world has at best forgotten that Russia is occupying 20 percent of Georgia’s internationally recognized, sovereign territory, and at worse is tacitly – if perhaps unwittingly -- endorsing it. Georgia has adopted a new strategy for reconciling with these occupied territories, as noted below. The upcoming Olympics in Vancouver also shine a spotlight on the occupation as the 2014 games in Sochi are just across the border from occupied Abkhazia.))

BLOOMBERGJanuary 27, 2010

Georgia Seeks Cooperation With Rebel Regions, Forswears War

By Helena Bedwell

Jan. 27 (Bloomberg) -- The Georgian government approved a plan for cooperation with the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and vowed to avoid armed conflict 17 months after a war with Russia.

“We approved this document because we believe in a peaceful resolution,” Temur Iakobashvili, Georgia’s reintegration minister, told reporters in the capital Tbilisi today.

“There won’t be a war with these regions. It’s time to engage people through education as well as social, economic and business projects, instead of isolating them.”

Russia recognized the two regions as sovereign countries after routing Georgia’s army in a five-day war over South Ossetia in August 2008.

The Georgian government maintains that Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain Georgian territories, though Russia has military bases in both regions and defends their borders.

The strategy document, which reiterates Georgia’s claim to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, sets out broad goals for promoting “grassroots-level trade” with the two regions and agriculture as well as job creation. It proposes the creation of “dedicated funds” to support joint business activities.

Iakobashvili said money received from international donors and the Georgian budget will be allocated to implement the strategy.

He declined to say how much Georgia will spend or to give details of specific projects.

The $12.8 billion Georgian economy suffered about $1 billion in damage from the war. Georgia won pledges of $4.55 billion in international aid in the wake of the conflict, including a two-year $1 billion offer from the U.S.

“It’s better late than never; a strategy is always good to have,” Davit Narmania, executive director of the

Caucasian Institute for Economic and Social Research, said by telephone.

“The Georgian government must act as soon as possible and start joint factories, agricultural centers, and help people in the regions to sell their products.”

Iakobashvili said the document will be presented to Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as the United Nations, European Union, Council of Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Wednesday, January 13, 2010The Georgian Dimension of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics <http://jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com/2010/01/georgian-dimension-of-2014-sochi-winter.html> By Giorgi Kvelashvili

In 2014 the Russian Black Sea coastal city of Sochi, located a few kilometers north of the Russian-Georgian border across the Psou River, will host the Winter Olympic Games. The Russian leadership considers the Sochi Olympics as a manifestation of Russia’s pride and growing great power status and attaches “state significance” to the due preparation for the Olympics.

Sochi is a city in the Krasnodar region, which has one of the worst corruption and human rights records across the vast domains of the Russian Federation. Russian human rights organizations have reported facts showing that property rights of individuals in Sochi and in adjacent areas have been constantly violated by the authorities and construction companies they lobby, who strive to make room for the building of Olympic facilities, but in fact are trying to enrich themselves on the already skyrocketing real estate prices (Segodnia.ru, June 8, 2009, http://www.segodnia.ru/index.php?pgid=2&partid=11&newsid=8812). Some Russian sources allege that a lack of transparency and dubious deals characterize tenders organized by the Russian authorities for the needs of future Sochi Olympic sites (Segodnia.ru, June 8, 2009, http://www.segodnia.ru/index.php?pgid=2&partid=11&newsid=8812).

Also, considering the poorly developed infrastructure such as railroads, paved motorways and bridges around the city of Sochi, Russia needs to either transport construction materials from distant parts of the country, which would be both costly and time-consuming, or find “more economical,” albeit illegal, ways of dealing with this arduous task. Moscow hopes that the Russian-occupied Georgian region of Abkhazia can be a “viable alternative.”

Apart from outstanding political aspects, a harmful impact on Georgia’s environment, analysts believe, is yet another dimension of the Sochi Olympics. Georgia’s Abkhazia region bordering on the Sochi area is rich in mineral resources, including construction material such as sand, stone and timber and has infrastructure for transit and transportation, namely roads and railroads. Located very close to the future Olympic city, resources found in the Russian-occupied Georgian region have the potential Moscow deems essential for its construction efforts at Sochi (Online Russian Constructor Magazine, March 11, 2008, http://www.i-stroy.ru/docu/mpp/kozak_podryadchiki_smogut_zakupat_v_abhazii_stro/14887.html).

Ever since Russia was granted permission to hold the 2014 Olympic Games in its Black Sea city, it escalated efforts to make good use of the construction material available on the Georgian side of the border. By recognizing Abkhazia as an independent state, Russia, among other things, freed itself from an immediate obligation to seek Georgia’s consent for the use of resources from Abkhazia. Nonetheless, there is evidence that Moscow started to explore and exploit the “southern option” much earlier, at the beginning of 2008. Thus, months before Russia’s aggression against Georgia and consequent military occupation of the Abkhazia region, representatives of the Russian government had on many occasions expressed readiness to arbitrarily utilize resources in the neighboring country (Online Russian Constructor Magazine, March 11, 2008, http://www.i-stroy.ru/docu/mpp/kozak_podryadchiki_smogut_zakupat_v_abhazii_stro/14887.html).

From March to May 2008 – when Russia still formally acknowledged the Abkhazia region as part of Georgia’s sovereign territory – high-ranking Russian officials had openly stated that Moscow was intending to extract from the deltas of coastal rivers of Georgia’s Abkhazia region some 120 million cubic meters of construction material such as stone and sand and export them to the Russian Federation to meet infrastructure needs of the Sochi Olympics (Segodnia.ru, June 8, 2009, http://www.segodnia.ru/index.php?pgid=2&partid=11&newsid=8812).

Georgia fears that in the course of the illegal extraction of inert materials the unique and fragile environment of the subtropical Black Sea coastal zone immediately south to the Georgian-Russian border will suffer a heavy and irreparable damage. This will include beaches, mountains, rivers, lakes and valleys as well as the picturesque flora and fauna of northwestern Georgia. Erosion of the coastal area and the riverbanks will be one of the many dire consequences. Addressing the Summit on Climate Change at Copenhagen on December 18, 2009, President Saakashvili said: “Olympic Games must serve peace and human aspirations, though it has become the reason for destroying the nature. The process of erosion resulted in climate changes and landslides, the results of which are already felt” (official website of President of Georgia, December 18, 2009, http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=3&st=0&id=3128). It was the first time the Georgian leader brought up the issue of the Sochi Olympics at an international forum.

The only time in history when Russia has had the honor to host Olympic Games was in 1980. Notably, they were held one year after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and thus without the participation of Western democracies. This time, too, Russia has invaded a neighboring sovereign nation in the run-up to the Olympics, but unlike in past experience it did so soon after securing the status of Olympic host in 2007, and a good five years before the event was due in 2014. Apparently, by allowing more time between the invasion and the hosting, Russia’s current leadership wants to avoid the repetition of the 1980 international fiasco. Many analysts believe that the international community should take immediate and decisive steps to make Russia comply with its international obligations, including the obligations under the Olympic Charter. Posted by Jamestown Foundation at 9:17 AM <http://jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com/2010/01/georgian-dimension-of-2014-sochi-winter.html>

7. Unofficial Arms Embargo.((NOTE: A key issue for Georgia is the unofficial arms embargo it has been under since the 2008 invasion by Russia, which has left Russian troops just 25 miles from Tbilisi and underscores the country’s critical need for military support.))

EURASIANETJanuary 5, 2010

Georgia-Senate Staff Report Stokes Unease in the Caucasus

Georgian officials are lauding the recent release of a staff report prepared by a senior US senator's office that urges Washington to consider a resumption of arms sales to Tbilisi. Meanwhile, the separatist entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, together with Russia, have reacted with alarm to the report, claiming that easing Tbilisi's access to arms would increase the chances of a renewed outbreak of fighting in the region.

The US government has not provided weapons to Georgia since that country's disastrous 2008 conflict with Russia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The report, called Striking the Balance: US Policy and Stability in Georgia, was prepared by the staff of Sen. Richard Lugar, the top-ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The carefully worded document does not directly recommend that the United States or NATO rearm Georgia, but it does state that Russian pressure on potential arms suppliers has resulted in a "de facto arms embargo" against Tbilisi.

"The United States Government should ... work with NATO allies in crafting a comprehensive, transparent approach to security assistance and military sales in the region. While Georgia has encountered great difficulty in procuring equipment from NATO countries to provide for its basic territorial defense needs, some allies have pursued significant military deals with Russia that could upset the military balance," the report asserted.

"The United States and NATO allies must reconcile a policy that leaves a dedicated NATO partner unable to provide for its basic defense requirements. These efforts will be most effective if they are undertaken on a multilateral basis. The Alliance must come to grips with the reality that Georgia will require coordinated security support from America and European nations for some years to come," the report said.

Failing to do so, the report added, could result in "an excessive nationalization of Georgian defense policy."

Since the 2008 war, the United States has allocated $1 billion in aid to help Georgia with reconstruction and social needs. But none of that aid has been military-related. Last summer, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili asked Washington to provide his country with "defensive" weapons, including air-defense and anti-tank hardware. At that time, US officials issued a fast and firm denial of the request. Celeste Wallander, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Policy, said; "the United States . . . does not believe Georgia is ready for that kind of defense acquisition."

US Marines are currently training Georgian soldiers for deployment to Afghanistan, but that program is focused on tactics, and does not include the provision of any new equipment.

"It's good to work on training and intellectual capacity, but there is still a means issue," said Col. Jon Chicky, an expert on post-Soviet issues at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. "The NATO alliance isn't that interested in providing the physical means - anti-armor, air defense - to Georgia,

and the alliance members are all over the map. The Baltic states and former Warsaw Pact states are more inclined to support it, and the further West you go you get less support."

The problem, Chicky said, is that US equipment is too expensive and more technologically advanced than Georgia needs. Russian equipment is better suited for the Georgian military, but the countries in a position to provide that equipment, mainly in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, tend to be susceptible to Russian pressure.

"I don't know if the Georgians are under an 'arms embargo' like they claim, but if they try to buy defensive capabilities - air defense, anti-armor, things like that - and countries decide not to provide it to them, then what's the next step? How is Georgia's security going to be ensured if they don't have the means to defend themselves?" Chicky asked.

The Pentagon budget for the next fiscal year is being finalized and will be released soon, but it is not believed to contain any new money for arming Georgia, according to Chicky and Georgian diplomats in Washington.

Representatives of the de facto governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, interviewed via email, complained that the authors of the Senate report never contacted them for their input. They painted a rearmed Georgia as a threat to regional stability.

"We think the result could be more violence, not less," said David Sanakoev, a senior policy adviser to South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity. "President Saakashvili has said he would only use new weapons for defensive purposes, but some of the weapons he is seeking can also be used offensively. Saakashvili has already illegally attacked South Ossetia with weapons he received from NATO countries as was validated by the EU report. His past behavior gives us no reason to trust him."

Security experts in Tbilisi argue that a strong Georgian military offers the best bet for future stability in the region. "Years of experience has shown that any hesitation with regards [to] deepening cooperation on defense and security matters of any sort (for example failure to extend a [NATO Membership Action Plan] to Georgia) has been understood [in Moscow] not as a compromise, but as invitation for 'action,'" said Giorgi Kandelaki, the deputy chairman of the Georgian parliament's Foreign Relations Committee."

"This pattern has been stated many times openly in the mainstream and open Russian political discourse and has been consistently proven with regards to Russian attitudes with any of its neighbors whose sovereignty it resents," Kandelaki continued. [Editor's note: Giorgi Kandelaki is a former EurasiaNet editorial associate]. © Eurasianet

The New York TimesSouth Ossetians Warn Against Rearming Georgia By ELLEN BARRYPublished: February 4, 2010 MOSCOW — Residents of South Ossetia

<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/georgia/south_ossetia/index.html?inline=nyt-geo> , the tiny separatist enclave at the center of the August 2008 war between Georgia <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/georgia/index.html?inline=nyt-geo>  and Russia, on Thursday petitioned Senator Richard G. Lugar <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/l/richard_g_lugar/index.html?inline=nyt-per>  (R-Ind.) to warn against supplying the Georgian government with weapons, saying they could be used against civilians. The petition is a response to a staff report <http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/pdf/Georgia.pdf> released in late December by Mr. Lugar’s office, which calls into question Washington’s decision to stop providing weapons to Georgia after its brief war with Russia. The report, entitled “Striking the Balance: U.S. Policy and Stability in Georgia,” says that the policy has left Georgia “under a de facto arms embargo” that contributes to regional instability. The report stops short of recommending resumption of arms supplies, but highlights the dilemma Washington has faced <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/world/europe/24georgia.html>  for 18 months, as it seeks to improve its relationship with Moscow without abandoning a commitment to help Georgia join NATO <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/north_atlantic_treaty_organization/index.html?inline=nyt-org> , which involves upgrading its military. Under current conditions, the report says, “Georgia will not only have difficulty providing for its own defense needs, but remain susceptible to the internal strife and external manipulation that often accompany such national insecurity.”Some 340 residents of South Ossetia signed the petition, which was forwarded on Thursday by South Ossetia’s American public relations firm. “The citizens of South Ossetia fear that President Saakashvili, in light of his past recklessness and erratic behavior, will again use any military weapons and training against us,” it reads, referring to the Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/mikhail_saakashvili/index.html?inline=nyt-per> . The document goes on to request that Congress hold hearings on how American aid was used in the August 2008 war.Andy Fisher, a spokesman for Senator Lugar, had no comment on the petition, but noted that the Obama administration has made no changes to the policy on military aid to Georgia established under President Bush. South Ossetia, a mountainous area the size of Rhode Island, had been seeking independence from Georgia since the breakup of the Soviet Union. In recent years, Moscow had ratcheted up support for the separatists, and when Mr. Saakashvili ordered an attack on the South Ossetian capital, Russia sent its army to drive out Georgian forces. Moscow went on to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia, another breakaway territory, as sovereign nations.After the war, the United States provided Georgia with $1 billion in aid <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/04/world/europe/04cheney.html> , but cut off all funding to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, stopped providing weapons and training Georgian special forces and deflected Georgian inquiries about antitank and air defense systems, the report from Mr. Lugar’s office said. Military sales, which grew from $10.5 million in 2006 to $25 million in 2007 to $72.3 million in 2008, dropped to zero in 2009. Last August, U.S. forces began training 730 Georgian soldiers to serve in Afghanistan, but all weapons used in the training must then be taken out of Georgia, the report said. Alexander Rondeli, president of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, said he did not expect the United States to change its policy on military aid soon. “Georgia now is in a very difficult situation because Russia has put pressure on everyone, and we can’t even buy cartridges,” he said, adding that the staff report from Mr. Lugar’s office was “a bright spot on a quite dark horizon.”

8. A Little War that Shook the World. NOTE:A recent book by Ron Asmus has received critical acclaim for its deep reporting on the August 2008 Russian invasion. ))

THE ECONOMISTJanuary, 21 2010From The Economist print edition

Georgia and Russia–Ungodly suffering

An American take on a war that fed conspiracies throughout Europe

A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West. By Ronald Asmus. Palgrave Macmillan; 250 pages; $27 and £20.

TWO points about the war in Georgia in 2008 have stuck in outsiders’ memories. One is that it was quite unexpected. The other is that Georgia started it. Both, in Ronald Asmus’s view, are wrong.

The real cause of the war, he argues, was Russia’s determination to block Georgia’s American-educated and America-loving president, Mikheil Saakashvili. He had embarked on “a crash course to turn Georgia from a semi-failed state into a reform tiger that could become the catalyst for creating a democratic pro-Western corridor in the southern Caucasus…it was a breathtaking vision.”

Mr Asmus’s metaphors may be breathtakingly mixed, but his big point is right. Situated on the most promising east-west route for oil and gas, Georgia was becoming an economic and political success story under Mr Saakashvili, who took power in the “Rose revolution” of 2003. Its pluralism was a profound challenge to the authoritarian crony capitalism taking root in Russia under Vladimir Putin.

Mr Saakashvili’s growing sway in two Russian-backed breakaway regions of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, was also an increasing nuisance for the Kremlin. He had restored Georgian control over a corner of Abkhazia and set up a loyalist administration inside South Ossetia—an untidy place with villages of varying ethnic and political make-up.

For Russia, that was intolerable, Mr Asmus argues. The Kremlin, therefore, deliberately provoked the Georgian leader into starting a war that he was bound to lose. Humiliating Georgia was also a way of paying back NATO for the recognition of Kosovo, a breakaway province of Serbia. And it signalled the limits of America’s role in Russia’s back yard.

Mr Asmus writes with authority. He is a former American official who masterminded the first enlargement of NATO to the ex-communist east. In his office, now at a Brussels think-tank, souvenirs include a commemorative sword given by the “grateful nation of Poland”. He has lobbied hard for new candidates, including the Baltic states, which joined NATO in 2004, and most recently for Georgia.

His book lays bare the dilemma facing Mr Saakashvili in the summer of 2008. Russian provocations against Georgia had been escalating for months, with a mixture of economic pressure, subversion and military attacks, chiefly by air. The West’s response was feeble. It made anodyne pleas to both sides to refrain from using force. It was not prepared to say unequivocally to Russia that destabilising Georgia would have serious inevitable consequences.

On July 29th 2008, Russia’s proxies in South Ossetia started shelling pro-Georgian villages there. What was Mr Saakashvili supposed to do? If he ignored the shelling, leaving his supporters to flee or be killed, the loss of prestige would be catastrophic. His pleas to the outside world to intervene were ignored. Moreover, Mr Saakashvili received intelligence (probably exaggerated) that large numbers of Russian troops were crossing into South Ossetia, perhaps as reinforcements, perhaps as a prelude to a full-scale invasion.

Mr Saakashvili decided to act at once, ordering troops into South Ossetia to stop the shelling but not to

fight the Russian troops there. As Mr Asmus recounts with painful clarity, that decision was a disaster. The Georgian army lacked plans, troops, equipment, training and communications. All it had was hopes of a quick victory, of Russian hesitancy and of Western support. In fact, huge Russian reinforcements poured in, and within a few days were poised to take Tbilisi.

America stood back, though Mr Asmus gives an intriguing hint that at least some officials were arguing, albeit tentatively and unsuccessfully, for a military response to defend Georgia. That could have ended the war quickly—or led to a terrifying escalation. In the end, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, on behalf of the European Union, brokered a messy ceasefire.

The book’s detailed inside accounts of Georgian and Western manoeuvring before, during and after the war are gripping. Mr Asmus is caustic about the outside world’s failure to forestall the conflict. Hundreds of people died and many thousands of people lost their homes because of that. In particular he highlights the weakness of NATO (crippled by feuding over the Iraq war) and of the self-centred and complacent EU.

He is rather kinder—too kind, many might feel—to the Georgians. Many decisions and actions may have been mistaken and deserve scrutiny, he concedes. But the author flinches from condemning even the most lamentable mistakes outright. In particular, the heavy-handed crackdown on opposition demonstrators and media in November 2007 played a big role in tarnishing Georgia’s image abroad. This deserves more than the couple of sentences Mr Asmus devotes to it here. Mr Saakashvili’s exasperating habits were similarly damaging: disorganisation, self-indulgence, verbosity, favouritism and vindictiveness are just a few. Mr Asmus also ignores how far the Georgian leadership’s American cheerleaders, especially in some corners of the Republican Party, may have made it overconfident.

Insights from the Russian side are also missing (because officials in Moscow declined to talk to him, says Mr Asmus). What were the Kremlin’s real war aims? How badly did Russia’s military forces do? What conclusions did Russian leaders draw? The definitive book on that is still to come, but Mr Asmus’s work sets a high standard.

<http://www.politico.com/> U.S. pondered military use in GeorgiaBy: Ben SmithFebruary 3, 2010 04:37 PM EST President George W. Bush and his senior aides considered — and rejected — a military response to Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, according to a new history of the conflict and interviews with former officials in the Bush administration.

With desperate Georgians begging for American help in closing down the key route through which Russian soldiers were pouring into the country, Bush’s national security aides outlined possible responses, including “the bombardment and sealing of the Roki Tunnel” and other “surgical strikes,” according to a new history of the conflict and independent interviews with former senior officials.

“In that moment of desperation these issues came onto the table, and came to the principals committee” consisting of Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and top Cabinet members, said Ron Asmus, a Clinton administration State Department official whose book, out this week, is called “The Little War That Shook the World.” <http://www.amazon.com/Little-War-that-Shook-World/dp/0230617735>  

“There were people on [Vice President Dick] Cheney’s staff and [National Security Adviser Stephen] Hadley’s staff who said, ‘We can’t let Georgia go down like this.'”

Hadley, Asmus writes, thought the action too risky — but he formally raised the question with Bush, Cheney and other top officials in a meeting on Aug. 11 in order to prompt an “open discussion” and put Cheney and others on the record.

“No principal advocated the use of force,” said Asmus, who is now executive director of the Transatlantic Center in Brussels.

Hadley, in an interview, declined to comment directly on the substance of conversations among the principals but confirmed that there had been consideration — and dismissal — of the use of force.

"There was a discussion of, ‘Should we consider military action to achieve our objectives?’ and the view was that that was not an attractive option,” he said. "It was a long way away, and it would be a direct military confrontation with Russia.”

That the question arose at all is a mark of the scale of the crisis that appeared to burst out of nowhere in the summer of 2008 and of the continuing risks posed by a region of the world that draws little American public attention.

U.S. intelligence resources, Asmus reports, had largely been shifted away from the Caucasus, and despite rumblings from Russia, the U.S. was taken by surprise by the timing of what began, in Asmus’s telling, as a series of Russian provocations and escalated when Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili took the proffered bait, engaging separatist forces and then Russian soldiers who were nominally there as “peacekeepers.”

That triggered a massive Russian response, one that Georgians were essentially unable to resist once soldiers began pouring through the tunnel, the easiest pass through the Caucasus mountains.

Senior American aides involved in discussions at the time recall a frantic atmosphere in which — despite pleas from Saakashvili and other top Georgian officials, who seemed at times to expect American military aid, though there’s no evidence they were promised it — the limits of U.S. action became clear.

“As we played out these strands and talked about it, we had to be prepared for direct confrontation with Russian military forces — and was that something we were prepared to recommend to the president?” recalled Damon Wilson, the former senior director for European affairs at the National Security Council. “We came to the right decision, but it was an emotionally difficult decision."Joe Wood, the deputy assistant for national security affairs to the hawkish Cheney, was in Georgia shortly before the war broke out, but in the end he didn’t advocate bombing the tunnel.

He said he’s still unsure “whether or not it should have been more seriously considered.“We will know the answer to that question in 10 to 20 years,” he said. “If Russia continues to assert itself either militarily or through other coercive means to claim a sphere of influence, we will look back at this as a time that they were able to change boundaries in Europe without much reaction,” he said. “And then we’ll say we should have considered harder options.”

“If not, then not using military action in this case will probably turn out to have been good judgment,” he said.

Bush opted for a softer option but one that carried an implicit threat: He chose to send humanitarian supplies to Georgia by military, rather than civilian, aircraft.

“We thought it was a useful signal to use military aircraft to transfer supplies and things into Georgia, and that was not lost on the Russians,” Hadley said.

Asmus’s book opens debate on the meaning of the Georgia conflict, which has left Russia in effective control of the separatist province, even as the Obama administration closes in on a nuclear arms reduction treaty with the Moscow government.

Asmus and some more hawkish former national security staffers believe that the conflict was the product of negligent American diplomacy and that it set a precedent for instability in Europe. Hadley defends the administration’s performance and argues that the blame for the conflict lies wholly with Russia.

Asmus argues that a series of Western mistakes signaled to Russia that it would be able to march into Georgia with impunity. Crucially, the NATO allies failed to agree, at a conference in Bucharest, Romania, on a concrete plan that would put Georgia and Ukraine on a path toward NATO membership. And, he argues, Bush never called Russia’s top leaders to make clear that an invasion of Georgia would bring drastic consequences.

As it was, the Russians seized control of much of the country and seemed poised to drive on to the capital, Tbilisi. A turning point, in Asmus’s telling, came when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Aug. 10 that Saakashvili “had to go.”

By Rice’s account, Asmus reports, she told Lavrov that such a demand was “completely unacceptable” and brushed off his protest that it was a “confidential conversation.”

“The Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Minister of Russia do not have a confidential conversation about the overthrow of a democratically elected government. I am about to get on the phone and tell everyone I can possibly find that Russia’s war aim is the overthrow of the Georgian government,” Asmus quotes her as saying.

Under international pressure, Russia stopped short of accomplishing that goal, though the Georgian leader was badly weakened. And they left the White House arguing that it had done what it could.

The message out of the NATO meeting in Bucharest was "as good a deterrence message as voting them into” a formal path to membership, said Hadley. Vladimir “Putin was under no illusions about our commitment to Georgia and our commitment to Saakashvili. We’d been sending Putin a message about Georgia ever since Saakashvili was elected president."

Hadley places the blame for the incident squarely on the Russians and suggests that the emphasis in President Barack Obama’s attempt to “reset” relations with Russia had been a bit misplaced.

"The reason there had to be a reset is not because of the Bush administration policies,” he said. “The reason there had to be a reset is because Russia invaded Georgia.”

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