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Public International Law

CASE DIGEST

Secretary of Justice vs. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion, GR. 139465 January 18, 2000

FACTS:

President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the

Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country".

The Decree is based on the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution. Subsequently,

former Secretary of Justice of the Philippines, signed in Manila the Extradition Treaty between

the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of

America. Subsequently, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign

Affairs of the United States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez which was for

various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance with the related municipal law,

specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069 and the established “Extradition Treaty Between the

Government of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America”, the

department proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical

evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and the treaty.

The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the

documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner on the other hand, denied the request as

it alleges that such information is confidential in nature and that it is premature to provide such

document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation.

Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are not yet available. The private

respondent contends that he is entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the

proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is conflict between international law and municipal law?

RULING:

The provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree

No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation

stage of extradition proceedings. The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential

decree already pose an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as the

evaluation stage. It is not an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. On the other

hand, granting due process to the extradition case causes delay in the process.The rule of pacta

sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the

parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted

with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the

provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize

them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made

between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law

should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of

international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative

enactments.

In this case, there is no conflict between international law and municipal law. The

Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition request

and its supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period of time within which to file his

comment with supporting evidence

In Re: Arturo Garcia, 2 SCRA 984

FACTS:

Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines

without having taken the required bar examinations. His petition contained that among others, he

is a Filipino citizen born, of Filipino parentage; and that he had taken and finished in Spain, the

course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto

de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished

the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter he was allowed to

practice the law profession in Spain.

He alleges that under the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise

of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is entitled to

practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar

examinations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Treaty entered into between the Spain and the Philippines is valid and takes

primacy over subsisting municipal laws?

RULING:

After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the petition for Garcia to practice law

in the Philippines.

Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides:

“The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degree or diplomas to practice

the liberal professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by competent national

authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the Other,

subject to the laws and regulations of the latter.”

The privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly

subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to

exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2.9, and 16

thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession

in the Philippine he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations.

Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh 75 Phil 113 Nov. 16, 1945

FACTS:

During the Japanese occupation, Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case with the Court of

First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge

Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by

General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments

of the courts of the Philippines.

He contends that without an enabling law, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to

continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the former Republic of the Philippines

which is the Philippine government under the Japanese occupation.

ISSUES:

Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were

valid and remained valid even after the American occupation?

RULING:

Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto

government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the

Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported

by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.

Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or

changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a

state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil

government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would

not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.

Lawyer’s League for Better Philippines vs. Pres. Cory Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986

FACTS:

President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. Then subsequently issued, proclamation No.3 was issued

providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted

by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines." ISSUE:

Whether or not the government established by Corazon Aquino is legitimate?

RULING:

Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to

the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court held that: The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country; It is not

merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

Tanada vs. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997

FACTS:

Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as

Senators via signing the said agreement. Their petition seeks the nullification of the Philippine

ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. The WTO opens access to

foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its

exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for

the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the

country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the

signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO. Petitioners on the other hand viewed the

WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and

legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it

gives foreign trading intervention.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement?

RULING:

In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally

accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy

of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of

incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which

are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda – international

agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a

legally binding obligation on the parties. Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in

fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations

among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict

its sovereignty right under the “concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation.” What Senate did was

a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable

is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a

legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political

desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO

remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the

development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic

self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free

choice.

The Holy See vs. Rosario, 238 SCRA 524, Dec. 1, 1994

FACTS:

Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under

the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was given by donation by the

Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises

sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence. Said lots were sold through an

agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both

were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent

Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See

says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this,

Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money. The same lots were

then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. Starbright Sales Enterprises,

Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages against Msgr.

Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and

Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity

from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign

immunity by entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was

also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Holy See can invoke its sovereign immunity and thus cannot be sued?

RULING:

The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-

suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of

International Law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a

condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

that diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the

receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property. The Department of

Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic

missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is

entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court.

Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and

sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be

categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and

subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for

the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-

propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not

for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence

of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise

clothed with a governmental (non-proprietary) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or

gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property.

People vs. Perfecto, 43 PHIL 887

FACTS:

Fernando M. Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate discovered that certain

documents, which contained the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of

oil companies, had disappeared from his office. The day following the convening of the Senate,

the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article regarding what

happened. Perfecto was prosecuted for writing an editorial against the Philippine Senate. The

editorial in question was alleged to have violated Art. 256 of the Penal Code, punishing insults to

Ministers of the Crown.

ISSUE:

Whether Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is still in force?

RULING:

The Supreme Court acquitted him, holding that the particular article of the said Code had

been automatically abrogated, being political in nature, upon the advent of American

sovereignty. Furthermore, Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and

fundamental principles of the American character and system of government. The gulf which

separates this article from this spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as

wide as that which separates a monarchy from a democratic republic like that of the Unite States.

Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon

American principles. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and

obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual

who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which

calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks.

Vilas vs. City of Manila,229 PHIL 345

FACTS:

Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183,

petitioner Vilas is the creditor of the City. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to

recover the sum of money owed to him by the city. The City of Manila that incurred the debts

has changed its sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris

and its contention now is founded on the theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has

been extinguished.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability of the City of

Manila to its creditor?

RULING:

No. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the

municipal corporation organized under the former sovereign. The new City of Manila is in a

legal sense the successor of the old city. Thus the new city is entitled to all property and property

rights of the predecessor corporation including its liabilities. The court held that only the

governmental functions that are not compatible with the present sovereignty are suspended.

Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the oldcity it is still

liable to the creditors of the old City of Manila.

Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 PHIL 155

FACTS:

The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippine from having a stranglehold upon

the people’s economic life.

Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the for the reason that it

denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process; the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title; the Act violates

international and treaty obligations; and the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession

ISSUE:

Whether the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws?

RULING:

The law does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws and is a valid exercise

of police power. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.

US vs. Look Chaw 18 PHIL 573

FACTS:

Several persons went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo. Note

that steamship Erroll is of English nationality and it came from HongKong bound for Mexico via the call ports of Manila and Cebu. These persons found sacks of opium. The complaint was then

filed against defendant and stated that defendant “carried, kept, possessed, and had in his possession and control 96 kg of opium” and that he “he had been surprised in the act of selling P1,000 worth prepared opium.” However, since there was more than 1 crime charged, the fiscal

just filed for “unlawful possession of opium”

Defense admitted that Exhibits A, B, and C, contained opium and were found on board Erroll and that it was true that the defendant stated that these sacks of opium were his and that he

had them in his possession. According to the testimony of the internal-revenue, the opium seized in the vessel had been bought by the defendant in Hong Kong, at P3.00 for each round can and

P5.00 for each of the others, for the purpose of selling it, as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera Cruz; that the vessel arrived at Cebu and on the same day he sold opium.

ISSUE:

Whether the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime? RULING:

Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction. The mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in

the Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Philippines. However, in the case at bar, a can of opium is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open

violation of the Philippine laws.

People vs. Wong-Chen, 18 PHIL 573

FACTS:

In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First

Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that

initiated this case and inwhich the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium,

aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in

Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.

ISSUE:

Whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein involved,

committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters?

RULING:

There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law;

to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels

should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they

were committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the

English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to

which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the

country within territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in

this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States

on this matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.

De Perio-Santos vs. Macaraig, G.R. No. 94070, April 10, 1942

FACTS:

Petitioner was appointed on July 24, 1986, President Cory to the position of Permanent

Representative of the Philippines to the Philippine Mission to the United Nations and other

International Organizations with station in Geneva, Switzerland. On April 6, 1987, petitioner

sought a leave of absence from the home office to spend the Easter Holidays in New York,

U.S.A., with her mother, brothers and sisters at no expense to the Government. She bought two

(2) non-transferable, non-refundable discounted tickets costing SFr. 1,597 for herself and her

adopted daughter Pia.

Before they could take the trip however, petitioner was instructed to proceed to Havana,

Cuba to attend a UNCTAD conference as Philippine delegate. Petitioner is entitled for official

trip outside her station (Geneva) for the cost of airplane ticket costing to SFr. 2,996 for Geneva-

New York-Geneva portion of her Geneva-New York-Havana-New York-Geneva trip. Instead of

buying an economy roundtrip ticket, petitioner used for the Geneva-New York-Geneva portion

of her trip the two (2) discounted tickets costing only SFr. 1,597 for herself and her daughter Pia.

They left Geneva for New York en route to Havana on April 15, 1987. On the same day, the

DFA approved her application for a leave of absence with pay from April 27 to May 1, 1987.

After the Havana Conference, she and her daughter spent her vacation leave in New York before

returning to Geneva (Ibid.). Instead of claiming reimbursement for SFr. 2,996, she requested, and

received, reimbursement of only SFr. 1,597 which she spent for the Geneva to New York, and

New York to Geneva portion of her trip, thereby effecting savings of SFr.1,399 for the

Government.

On September 16, 1987, the DFA ask her to explain why the Mission paid for plane ticket

of infant Pia de Perio-Santos (petitioner's daughter) Geneva-New York-Geneva when petitioner

was not authorized to accompany her adopting mother at government expense. Petitioner replied

that the air fare tickets were for her only and did not include her daughter whose trip was paid

from her personal funds.

The DFA required her to refund the amount representing her daughter's round-trip ticket

since DFA received a copy of the "facture" from the travel agency showing that the amount of

SFr.1,597 was in payment her trip and that the sum of SFr. 673 represented the cost of her

daughter's portion of the ticket. Her co-workers led by Deputy Armando Maglaque, and some

MISUNPHIL employees filed administrative charges against her for "incompetence; inefficient;

corrupt and dishonest activities; rude and uncouth manners; abusive and high-handed behavior;

irregular and highly illegal transactions involving funds of the mission.

The Board of Foreign Service Administration (BFSA) constituted a new 5-man

investigating committee to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties. The committee found

her liable for misconduct only, and recommended dismissal of the other charges. They also

recommended that she be reprimanded and recalled to Manila. In a letter-decision dated April 27,

1988, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs affirmed the BFSA's recommendation declaring Petitioner

guilty of the lesser offense of misconduct, instead of dishonesty, meted to her the penalty of

reprimand, and recalled her to the home office. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on

the ground that she was denied due process when she was declared guilty of misconduct

although it was not one of the charges against her.

On March 30, 1989, President Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 122 finding petitioner

guilty of dishonesty (instead of misconduct) and imposed upon her the penalty of reprimand,

with recall to the home office.

Hence this petition for certiorari alleging that the President's "reprimand and recall orders are not

supported by substantial evidence and were issued with gross abuse of discretion and serious

error of law".

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was unjustly found guilty and whether her recall to Manila was a

valid exercise of power by the Secretary?

RULING:

The general rule is that the factual findings of administrative agencies are binding on this

Court and controlling on the reviewing authorities if supported by substantial evidence. A review

of the records fails to yield any evidence of dishonesty on the part of the petitioner, or intent to

cheat and defraud the government.

Nevertheless, the Court is not disposed to disturb the order of the DFA and the Office of

the President recalling the petitioner to the home office. There is no merit in the petitioner's

contention that her tour of duty in Geneva was for four (4) years. The Court held that under a

secret Executive Order No. 168, provides that a person who has completed a minimum of one

year of service, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs can transfer that person to Manila for

reassignment and did not have to be explained and justified. The Secretary, as an alter ego of the

President, act with the implied imprimatur of the President herself, unless the act is reprobated

by her.

In consonance with the principle of separation of powers, and considering that the

conduct of foreign relations is primarily an executive prerogative, courts may not inquire into the

wisdom or unwisdom in the exercise thereof. The President is the 'sole organ of the nation in its

external relations and its sole representative with foreign nations.' The assignment to and recall

from posts of ambassadors are prerogatives of the President, for her to exercise as the exigencies

of the foreign service and the interests of the nation may from time to time dictate.

The President is the 'sole organ of the nation in its external relations and its sole

representative with foreign nations.' The assignment to and recall from posts of ambassadors are

prerogatives of the President, for her to exercise as the exigencies of the foreign service and the

interests of the nation may from time to time dictate.

Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553

FACTS:

Petitioner, retired Justice Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit

from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to

5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States

Embassy, hardly two blocks away. It was stated that after the delivery of two brief speeches, a

petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the International Conference for

General Disbarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in

Manila, would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may

be there so that it may be delivered to the United States Ambassador. There was likewise an

assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and

assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally.”

The request for permit was denied because of reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal

elements to infiltrate and/or distrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of

people are expected to attend. Respondent suggested that “a permit may be issued for the rally if

it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the

participants themselves and the general public may be ensured." The denial is also anchored on

the provision of Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic relations which was adopted

in our laws as accepted thru the Ordinance No. 7295 prohibiting the holdings or staging of rallies

or demonstration within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or

chancery.

On October 25, 1983, a minute resolution was issued by the Court granting the mandatory

injunction prayed for on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and

present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition may be granted as an exercise of the constitutional rights and hold

rally despite the express provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic relations?

RULING:

The petition is granted. The Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on

Diplomatic Relations which ratified and signed by the President on October 11, 1965 and was

thereafter deposited with the Secretary general of the United Nations on November 15.

As of that date then, it was binding on the Philippines. The second paragraph of the

Article 22 reads: "2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to

protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any

disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. The Constitution "adopts

the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. To the extent

that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international

law, it should be a part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there were a clear and

present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or

impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the

terminal point would be the Embassy. There was no showing, however, that the distance

between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet and that there exist a clear and

present danger.

Minucher vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97765, Sept. 24, 1992

FACTS:

Minucher is an Iranian national who came to the Philippines to study in the University of

the Philippines in 1974. Scalzo is as a special agent of the US Drugs Enforcement Agency. He

conducts surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the source of

prohibited drugs shipped to the US and makes the actual arrest.

Minucher and one Abbas Torabian was charged for a violation of Act. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972)

before the PasigRTC, such criminal charge was followed by a buy-bust operation conducted by the

Philippine police narcotic agents to which Scalzowas a witness for the prosecution. They were acquitted.

Minucher filed a complaint for damages against Scalzo. He said that some of his properties were

missing like Persian carpets, a painting together withhis TV and betamax sets. There was nothing left in his

house. He averred that his arrest as a heroine trafficker was well publicized and that when we got arrested, he

was not given any food or water for 3 days. In his defense, Scalzo asserted his diplomatic immunity as

evidenced by a Diplomatic Note. He contended that it wasrecognized by the US Government pursuant to the

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Philippine government itself thru its Executive

Department and DFA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity?

RULING:

Yes, Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity. The Convention lists the classes of heads of

diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys,

ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs accredited to the

ministers of foreign affairs. Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the

administrative staff and thetechnical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the

diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are

accorded diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for

immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an understanding that the

same be restrictively applied.

The main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the

determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature.

Scalzo was an Assistant Attaché of the US diplomatic mission. An attaché belongs to a category of officers in the diplomatic establishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press, administrative or financial affairs. There could also be a class of attaches belonging to certain ministries or departments of the

government, other than the foreign ministry or department, who are detailed bytheir respective ministries or departments with the embassies such as the military, naval, air, commercial, agricultural, labor, science, and

customs attaches, or the like.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but

only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the

two sovereigns. While evidence is wanting to show any similar agreement between the governments of the Philippines and of the United States (for the latter to send its agents and to conduct surveillance and related activities of suspected drug dealers in the Philippines), the

consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts heretofore elsewhere

mentioned. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign

Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation” conducted at the residence of Minucher at the

behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the

activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.

Chauf vs. CA, 191 SCRA 713

FACTS:

The Petitioner, Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a

member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base

Education Office at Clark Air Base. She boasts of related working experience and being a

qualified dependent locally available.

By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal

employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler, a civilian

personnel officer and Anthony Persi, Education Director, for alleged discrimination by reason of

her sex being female, color being brown and nationality as Filipino by birth. Shauf was offered a

temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the

condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But if no

vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if

she’s available. Shauf accepted the offer. Mrs. Mary Abalateo’s was about to vacate her position

during that time. But Mrs. Abalateo’s appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never

appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to deny

her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this

allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with

the applicable regulation.

Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service

Commission, Appeals Review Board, and the Regional Trial Court. RTC ruled in favor of Shauf.

Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be

collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they

are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official

governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that

the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive

jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all

administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According to

the CA, defendants are immune from suit.

Shauf then claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is

not a suit against the US government w/c would require consent. On the other hand, respondents

still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing suits against

public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the

Philippines & is not part of international law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents are immune from suit?

RULING:

No. While the doctrine of immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against state officials,

it only contemplates acts done in their official capacity. This does not cover acts contrary to law

& injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. When an official acts in a manner that invades or

violates the personal & property rights of another, the aggrieved party may sue the official &

such suit will not be a suit against the state. The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply

where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.

The Holy See vs. Rosario, 238 SCRA 524

FACTS:

Petitioner, Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and

is represented by the Papal Nuncio. Private Respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., us a

domestic corporation engaged in the real Estate business. The petition arose over a parcel of land

consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila and

registered in the name of the Petitioner Holy See-Papal Nuncio. The said lot Lot 5-A is

contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 271108

and 265388 respectively and registered in the name of the Realty Corporation (PRC). The three

lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., Acting agent to the sellers.

Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises. In view if

the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to the private respondent, a dispute arose as to

who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner may invoke non-suability?

RULING:

This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private

parties as acts jure imperii. The operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to the

general public is undoubtedly for profit as a commercial land not a governmental activity. By

entering into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function,

the United States government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. In

the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered

"commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come out with our own

guidelines, tentative they may be. Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state

with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry.

The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the

Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 PHIL 312

FACTS:

Plaintiffs, Pedro Syquia and Leopoldo Syquia are the undivided joint owners of three

apartment buildings situated in Manila. They executed three lease contracts, one for each of the

three apartments. The period for the three leases was to be for the duration of the war and six

months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the US. The apartment buildings were used for

billeting and quartering officers of the US Armed Forces stationed in Manila. Six months after

Japan surrendered, plaintiffs approached the defendants George Moore and Erland Tillman and

requested the return of the apartment buildings. Moore and Tillman expressed to plaintiffs that

the US Army wanted to continue occupying the premises. Plaintiffs requested to renegotiate said

leases, to execute a lease contract for a period of three years and to pay a reasonable rental higher

than those payable under the old contracts. Respondents refused to execute new and not being

in conformity with the old lease agreements, plaintiffs formally requested Tillman to cancel said

leases and to release the apartments. Tillman refused to comply with the request. On February

17, 1947, plaintiffs served a formal notice to the occupants however thirty-day period lapsed

without any of the respondents complying with their demands. Plaintiffs commenced an action in

the Municipal Court of Manila in the form of an action for Unlawful Detainer against

respondents. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court had

no jurisdiction over the defendants and over the subject matter of the action because the real

party in interest was the US Government and not the individual defendants. Furthermore, the

respondent argued that the war between the US and her allies on one side and Germany and

Japan on the other had not yet been terminated and consequently the period of the three leases

has not yet expired. Also, a foreign government like the US cannot be sued in the courts of

another state without its consent. That even though the US Government was not named as the

defendant in the complaint, it is nevertheless the real defendant as the parties named are officers

of the US Government. The Municipal Court dismissed the action. The CFI of Manila affirmed

the order of the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and try the case.

RULING:

It is clear that the courts of the Philippines have no jurisdiction over the present case for

Unlawful Detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very

beginning of the action. The US Government has not given its consent to the filing of the

suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a

citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter’s consent but it is of a citizen

filing an action against a foreign government without said government’s consent, which renders

more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of this country.

Sanders vs Veridano, 162 SCRA 88

FACTS:

Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner

Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Respondent Rossi is an American

citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines.

Respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game room attendants in the special

services department of the NAVSTA. They were advised that their employment had been

converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protest this

conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and

regulations of the US Department of Defense. Moreau sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel

explaining the change of employment status of the two from which Rossi and Wyer filed in the

Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for damages against the herein petitioners

claiming that the letters contained libellous imputations against the two. Due to the failure to

appear in the court, Moreau and Sanders were declared in default.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?

RULING:

Yes. It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being

called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as

director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its

personnel and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other

related matters. The same can be said for Moreau. Given the official character of the above-

described letters, it can be concluded that the petitioners were being sued as officers of the

United States government. There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot

prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be

sued.

WHO vs. Aquin, 48 SCRA 242

FACTS:

Respondents COSAC officers filed their answer joining issue against petitioners and

seeking to justify their act of applying for and securing from respondent judge the warrant for the search and seizure of ten crates consigned to petitioner Verstuyft and stored at the Eternit

Corporation warehouse on the ground that they "contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods" beyond the official needs of said petitioner "and the only lawful way to reach these articles and effects for purposes of taxation is through a search warrant."

It is undisputed in the record that petitioner Dr. Leonce Verstuyft, who was assigned on

December 6, 1971 by the WHO from his last station in Taipei to the Regional Office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of Health Services, is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to

the Host Agreement executed on July 22, 1951 between the Philippine Government and the World Health Organization. Such diplomatic immunity carries with it, among other diplomatic privileges and immunities, personal inviolability, inviolability of the official's properties,

exemption from local jurisdiction, and exemption from taxation and customs duties.

When petitioner Verstuyft's personal effects contained in twelve (12) crates entered the Philippines as unaccompanied baggage on January 10, 1972, they were accordingly allowed free

entry from duties and taxes. The crates were directly stored at the Eternit Corporation's warehouse at Mandaluyong, Rizal, "pending his relocation into permanent quarters upon the

offer of Mr. Berg, Vice President of Eternit who was once a patient of Dr. Verstuyft in the Congo."

Nevertheless, as above stated, respondent judge issued on March 3, 1972 upon application on the same date of respondents COSAC officers search warrant No. 72-138 for

alleged violation of Republic Act 4712 amending section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code 3 directing the search and seizure of the dutiable items in said crates.

Upon protest of March 6, 1972 of Dr. Francisco Dy, WHO Regional Director for the

Western Pacific with station in Manila, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, personally wired on the same date respondent Judge advising that "Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to

immunity from search in respect of his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions" pursuant to the Host Agreement and requesting suspension of the search warrant order "pending clarification of the matter from the ASAC."

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search and seizure?

RULING:

Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement as expressly recognized by the executive branch of the Philippine Government.

The Department of Foreign Affairs formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position that accordingly "Dr. Verstuyft cannot be the subject of a

Philippine court summons without violating an obligation in international law of the Philippine Government" and asked for the quashal of the search warrant, since his personal effects and

baggages after having been allowed free entry from all customs duties and taxes, may not be baselessly claimed to have been "unlawfully imported" in violation of the tariff and customs code as claimed by respondents COSAC officers. The Solicitor-General, as principal law officer

of the Government, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of

powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in

the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or

other officer acting under his direction.

Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the

government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that "in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass

the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.

As already stated above, and brought to respondent court's attention, the Philippine Government is bound by the procedure laid down in Article VII of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 14 for consultations

between the Host State and the United Nations agency concerned to determine, in the first instance the fact of occurrence of the abuse alleged, and if so, to ensure that no repetition occurs

and for other recourses. This is a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government and as such, has the force and effect of law.

Callado vs. International Rice Research Institute, 244 SCRA 211

FACTS:

Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI from April 11, 1983 to

December 14, 1990. On February 11, 1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.

Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the

IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager in a Memorandum dated March 5, 1990.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint on December 19, 1990 before the Labor Arbiter

for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

On January 2, 1991, private respondent IRRI, through counsel, wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of

Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same.

While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an

Order issued by the Institute on August 13, 1991 to the effect that "in all cases of termination,

respondent IRRI waives its immunity," 8 and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity

no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.

Hence, this petition where it is contended that the immunity of the IRRI as an

international organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be

invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on

"Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620

It is also petitioner's position that a dismissal of his complaint before the Labor Arbiter leaves him no other remedy through which he can seek redress. He further states that since the

investigation of his case was not referred to the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM), he was denied his constitutional right to due process. It is also petitioner's position that

a dismissal of his complaint before the Labor Arbiter leaves him no other remedy through which he can seek redress. He further states that since the investigation of his case was not referred to the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM), he was denied his constitutional right

to due process.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) waived its immunity from suit in

this dispute which arose from an employer-employee relationship?

RULING:

The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its position

clear. Through counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter categorically informing him that the

Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity. In the second place, petitioner's reliance on the

Memorandum with "Guidelines in handling cases of dismissal of employees in relation to P.D.

1620" dated July 26, 1983, is misplaced.

Lasco vs. UN Revolving Fund for National Resources Exploration, 241 SCRA 681

FACTS:

Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special

fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island.

In its Motion to Dismiss, private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity pursuant to the 1946

Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In support thereof, private respondent attached a letter from the Department of Foreign Affairs dated August 26, 1991,

which acknowledged its immunity from suit. The letter confirmed that private respondent, being a special fund administered by the United Nations, was covered by the 1946 Convention on the

Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of which the Philippine Government was an original signatory.

Respondent Labor Arbiter issued an order dismissing the complaints on the ground that

private respondent was protected by diplomatic immunity. The dismissal was based on the letter of the Foreign Office.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, an appeal was filed with the

NLRC, which affirmed the dismissal of the complaints in its Resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, respondent is entitled to immunity as a Specialized Agency of the United

Nations?

RULING:

Yes. As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution, the Philippine

Government adopts the generally accepted principles of international law (1987 Constitution,

Art. II, Sec. 2). Being a member of the United Nations and a party to the Convention on the

Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine

Government adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations and its

specialized agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law. The diplomatic immunity of

private respondent was sufficiently established by the letter of the Department of Foreign

Affairs, recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946

Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations where the Philippine

Government was a party. The issue whether an international organization is entitled to

diplomatic immunity is a "political question" and such determination by the executive branch is

conclusive on the courts and quasi-judicial agencies (The Holy See v. Hon. Eriberto U. Rosario,

Jr., G.R. No. 101949, Dec. 1, 1994; International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja.

Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence

here is by virtue of a joint project entered into by the Philippine Government and the United

Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its mission is not to exploit our natural

resources and gain pecuniarily thereby but to help improve the quality of life of the people,

including that of petitioners.

International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Pura Calleja, 190 SCRA 130

FACTS:

After the Vietnam War, the plight of Vietnamese refugees fleeing from South Vietnam's

communist rule confronted the international community. An Agreement was forged between the Philippine Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an

operating center for processing Indo-Chinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in Bataan.

ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of

the Holy See, as a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II. As an international organization rendering voluntary and

humanitarian services in the Philippines. Med-Arbiter sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal by TUPAS, Director Pura Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), reversed the Med-Arbiter's Decision and ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election. At that time, ICMC's request for recognition as a specialized agency was still pending with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEFORAF).

Subsequently, however, on 15 July 1988, the Philippine Government, through the DEFORAF, granted ICMC the status of a specialized agency with corresponding diplomatic privileges and immunities, as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement between the

Government and ICMC.

ICMC then sought the immediate dismissal of the TUPAS Petition for Certification Election invoking the immunity expressly granted but the same was denied by respondent BLR

Director who, again, ordered the immediate conduct of a pre-election conference. ICMC's two Motions for Reconsideration were denied despite an opinion rendered by DEFORAF on 17 October 1988 that said BLR Order violated ICMC's diplomatic immunity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunity to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws?

RULING:

The foregoing issue constitutes a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that ICMC enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations, which

determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of

powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of

diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate

suggestion by the principal law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign

relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic

jurisdiction.

The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC is clearly necessitated by its international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality

and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to

shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.

ICMC's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights, which are guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, Article III, Section 8, and Article XIII, Section 3 (supra), of the 1987 Constitution.

The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process except in so far as in any

particular case they have expressly waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification election is beyond the scope of that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit

against ICMC. A certification election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated process.

Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Center vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 206

SCRA 283

FACTS:

The private respondent herein was an employee, who was later on terminated due to

financial problem by SEAFDEC-AQD. The latter was a department of herein petitioner which is

an international organization. The separation pay and other benefits was not given to the private

respondent which gave birth to the case at bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent NLRC has a jurisdiction in the case at bar?

RULING:

Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department is an

international agency beyond the jurisdiction of respondent NLRC. Being an intergovernmental

organization, petitioner enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in

whose territory its office is located.

The subjection of such am organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a

convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in there operations or even

influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to

local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities

impartially on behalf of its member-states.

Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 283

FACTS:

Eastern Sea Trading was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of

onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure

and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank

Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the

importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and Financial Agreement

b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the

said EO was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax

Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate?

RULING:

No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at

least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short

of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our

scheme of government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They

sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents

denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The point where ordinary correspondence between this

and other governments ends and agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or

exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It

would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such,

concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into

under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments.

Agustin vs. Edu, 83 SCRA 195

FACTS:

This is a petition questioning the validity of a Letter of Instruction providing for an early

warning device mandatory for motor vehicles. It is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as

being violative to the constitutional guarantee of due process in as far as the rules and regulations

for its implementation are concerned.

The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Ferdinand Marcos aimed to

prevent road accidents and in the interest of safety on all streets, highways including

expressways. All motorist and motor vehicle owners shall have at all times one pair of early

warning device. These hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by

international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Roads and

Signs and the United Nations Organization (UN). Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207

ratified the said Vienna convention requiring the installation of road signs and devices.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the assailed Letter of Instruction is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees

of due process.

RULING:

The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no

unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police

power is a state authority to enact legislation that may interfere on personal liberty or property in

order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police power was

clearly intended to promote public safety.

It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses

relevance: The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of

the law of the nation. Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country

to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. Our country’s word was resembled

in our own act of legislative ratification of the said Hague and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No.

207.

Tanada vs. Angara, 272 SCRA 18

FACTS:

Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the international Agreement establishing

the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote

the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.” Further, they contended that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement

“place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

ISSUES:

Whether or not the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade

liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

RULING:

The 1987 Constitution does not prohibit our country from participating in worldwide

trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that

is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of

the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the

Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goofs, and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the

Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not

necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:

Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly

aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national

economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.

The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without

discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality

and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in

both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino

enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino

capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 208 SCRA 87

Facts:

S.C. JOHNSON AND SON, INC., a domestic corporation organized and operating under the Philippine laws, entered into a license agreement with SC Johnson and Son, United States of

America (USA), a non-resident foreign corporation based in the U.S.A. pursuant to which the [respondent] was granted the right to use the trademark, patents and technology owned by the latter including the right to manufacture, package and distribute the products covered by the

Agreement and secure assistance in management, marketing and production from SC Johnson and Son, U. S. A.

The said License Agreement was duly registered with the Technology Transfer Board of the Bureau of Patents, Trade Marks and Technology Transfer under Certificate of Registration

No. 8064.For the use of the trademark or technology, [respondent] was obliged to pay SC Johnson and Son, USA royalties based on a percentage of net sales and subjected the same to

25% withholding tax on royalty payments which [respondent] paid for the period covering July 1992 to May 1993 in the total amount of P1,603,443.00

On October 29, 1993, Respondent filed with the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) of the BIR a claim for refund of overpaid withholding tax on royalties arguing that, “the

antecedent facts attending case fall squarely within the same circumstances under which said MacGeorge and Gillete rulings were issued. Since the agreement was approved by the

Technology Transfer Board, the preferential tax rate of 10% should apply. We therefore submit that royalties paid by the respondent to SC Johnson and Son, USA is only subject to 10% withholding tax pursuant to the most-favored nation clause of the RP-US Tax Treaty.

The Commissioner did not act on said claim for refund. Private respondent S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. (S.C. Johnson) then filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).The Court of Tax Appeals rendered its decision in favor of S.C. Johnson and ordered the

Commissioner of Internal Revenue to issue a tax credit certificate in the amount of P963,266.00 representing overpaid withholding tax on royalty payments, beginning July, 1992 to May, 1993.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue thus filed a petition for review with the Court of

Appeals which rendered the decision finding no merit in the petition and affirming in toto the CTA ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that SC Johnson and Son, USA is entitled to the “Most Favored Nation” Tax rate of 10% on Royalties as provide in the RP-US Tax Treaty in

relation to the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty?

RULING:

Under Article 24 of the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty, the Philippine tax paid on income from sources within the Philippines is allowed as a credit against German income and

corporation tax on the same income. In the case of royalties for which the tax is reduced to 10 or 15 percent according to paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty, the

credit shall be 20% of the gross amount of such royalty. To illustrate, the royalty income of a German resident from sources within the Philippines arising from the use of, or the right to use, any patent, trade mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, is taxed at 10% of the

gross amount of said royalty under certain conditions. The rate of 10% is imposed if credit against the German income and corporation tax on said royalty is allowed in favor of the German

resident. That means the rate of 10% is granted to the German taxpayer if he is similarly granted a credit against the income and corporation tax of West Germany. The clear intent of the “matching credit” is to soften the impact of double taxation by different jurisdictions.

The RP-US Tax Treaty contains no similar “matching credit” as that provided under the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty. Hence, the tax on royalties under the RP-US Tax Treaty is not

paid under similar circumstances as those obtaining in the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty. Therefore, the “most favored nation” clause in the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty cannot be

availed of in interpreting the provisions of the RP-US Tax Treaty.5

The rationale for the most favored nation clause, the concessional tax rate of 10 percent provided for in the RP-Germany Tax Treaty should apply only if the taxes imposed upon royalties in the RP-US Tax Treaty and in the RP-Germany Tax Treaty are paid under similar

circumstances. This would mean that private respondent must prove that the RP-US Tax Treaty grants similar tax reliefs to residents of the United States in respect of the taxes imposable upon

royalties earned from sources within the Philippines as those allowed to their German counterparts under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.

The RP-US and the RP-West Germany Tax Treaties do not contain similar provisions on

tax crediting. Article 24 of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty expressly allows crediting against German income and corporation tax of 20% of the gross amount of royalties paid under the law of the Philippines. On the other hand, Article 23 of the RP-US Tax Treaty, which is the

counterpart provision with respect to relief for double taxation, does not provide for similar crediting of 20% of the gross amount of royalties paid.

Since the RP-US Tax Treaty does not give a matching tax credit of 20 percent for the taxes

paid to the Philippines on royalties as allowed under the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty, private respondent cannot be deemed entitled to the 10 percent rate granted under the latter treaty for the reason that there is no payment of taxes on royalties under similar circumstances.

Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245

FACTS:

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time.

The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s

election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been

naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded the special and

affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of

survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictator’s agent abroad.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election?

RULING:

No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement

for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could

not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier

renounced.

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not

only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire

tenure.

Frivaldo is therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.

Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292

FACTS:

On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines

as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a

bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After

repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an

alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunc tion. The Court of

First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen?

RULING:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native

born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen

of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien

who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the

moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the

disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the

naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of

an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go

through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it

should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytime

the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case,

Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such

citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and

again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino

citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a

Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

Bengzon III vs. House Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545

FACTS:

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San

Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. On November 5, 1985, respondent Cruz

enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the United States.

As a consequence, his Filipino citizenship was lost. But he reacquired Filipino citizenship

through repatriation under RA No. 2630.

Subsequently, he was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan.

He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for re-election. Petitioner

filed a case claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the

House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as requiredunder Article VI,

section 6 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American

citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisit ion of Philipp ine citizenship?

RULING:

Filip ino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the

same in the manner provided by law. Commonwea lth Act No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumeratesthe three modes by which Philipp ine citizenship may be reacquired by

a former citizen: (1) by naturalizat ion, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost

their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the

United States at any other time, (4)marriage of a Filip ino woman to an alien; and (5) politica l economic necessity. Repatriation results in the recovery of the

origina l nationality.

This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be

restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filip ino citizen. If he was origina l ly a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philipp ine citizenship, he will

be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filip ino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filip ino citizenship when he rendered

service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philipp ine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the

Civil Registry respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his origina l status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filip ino

father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his origina l status before he lost his Philipp ine citizenship.

Aznar vs. COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703

FACTS:

Private respondent Emilio "Lito " Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January

18, 1988 local elections.

Petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincia l Chairman filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualificat ion of private respondent on the ground that he is alleged ly not a Filip ino citizen, being a

citizen of the United States of America.

On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigra t ion and Deportation Commiss ioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien

Certificate of Registrat ion (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958,

respectively. (Annex "B-1").

During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent, mainta ined that he

is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and

subsisting Philipp ine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for

more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 19 65.

Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Divis ion) dismissed the petition for disqualificat ion for not having been timely filed and for lack of suffic ient proof that private respondent is not a Filip ino citizen. Hence, the

petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is no longer a Filip ino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship?

RULING:

SC dismissed petition for certiorari upholding COMELEC’s decision.

The petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his

Filip ino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. these are:

(1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by

subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitut ion or laws of a foreign

country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose

his Philipp ine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any

other mode of losing Philipp ine citizenship. In the instant case, private respondent

vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a

holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the

electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a

candidate. Thus, private respondent remains a Filip ino and the loss of his

Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed. Considering the fact that admittedly

Labo vs. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1

FACTS:

Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship.

He was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous. According to Australian records, Labo is still an Australian citizen.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines?

RULING:

The petitioner’s contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that

he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization,

he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all other allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has

reacquired Philippine citizenship.

Kookooritchkin vs. Solicitor General, 81 PHIL 435

FACTS:

Eremes Kookooritchkin is a native-born Russia. He grew up as a citizen of the defunct

Imperial Russian Government under the Czars. When the revolution broke out in Russia in 1917, he joined the White Russian Army at Vladivostok and fought against the Bolsheviks until 1922 when the White Russian Army was overwhelmed by the Bolsheviks. As he refused to join the

Bolshevik regime, he fled by sea from Vladivostok to Shanghai and from this Chinese port he found his way to Manila, arriving at this port as a member of a group of White Russians under

Admiral Stark in March, 1923. He stayed in Manila for about seven months, then moved to Olongapo, Zambales, where he resided for about a year, and from this place he went to Iriga, Camarines Sur, where he established his permanent residence since May, 1925. He has remained

a resident of this municipality, except for a brief period from 1942 to July, 1945, when by reason of his underground activities he roamed mountains of Caramoan as a guerrilla officer. After

liberation he returned to Iriga where again he resides up to the present time.

Kookooritchkin is married to a Filipino by the name of Concepcion Segovia, with whom he has one son named Ronald Kookooritchkin. He is shop superintendent of A. L. Ammen

Transportation Company, with about eighty Filipino employees working under him. He receives

an annual salary of P13,200 with free quarters and house allowance. He also owns stocks and bonds of this and other companies.

Kookooritchkin speaks and writes English and the Bicol dialect. Socially he intermingles

with the Filipinos, attending parties, dances and other social functions with his wife. He has a good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. He

has never been accused of any crime. On the other hand, he has always conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire period of residence in Camarines Sur, in his relations with the constituted authorities as well as with the community.

Although a Russian by birth he is not a citizen of Soviet Russia. He disclaims allegiance to the present Communist Government of Russia. He is, therefore, a stateless refugee in this country, belonging to no State, much less to the present Government of the land of his birth to

which he is uncompromisingly opposed. He is not against organized government or affiliated with any association which upholds and teaches doctrine opposing all organized governments.

He does not believe in the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of his ideas. Neither is he a polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy. He is not suffering from any mental alienation or incurable contagious disease.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Kookooritchkin is considered a stateless refugee?

RULING:

Yes. Kookooritchkin’s testimony, besides being uncontradicted, is supported by the well-known fact that the ruthlessness of modern dictatorship has scattered throughout the world a large number of stateless refugees or displaced persons, without country and without flag. The

tyrannical intolerance of said dictatorships toward all opposition induced them to resort to beastly oppression, concentration camps and blood purges, and it is only natural that the not-so-

fortunate ones who were able to escape to foreign countries should feel the loss of all bonds of attachment to the hells which were formerly their fatherland's. Petitioner belongs to that group of stateless refugees. Knowing, as all cultured persons all over the world ought to know, the history,

nature and character of the Soviet dictatorship, presently the greatest menace to humanity and civilization, it would be technically fastidious to require further evidence of petitioner's claim

that he is stateless than his testimony that he owes no allegiance to the Russian Communist Government and, is because he has been at war with it, he fled from Russia to permanently reside in the Philippines. After finding in this country economic security in a remunerative job,

establishing a family by marrying a Filipina with whom he has a son, and enjoying for 25 years the freedoms and blessings of our democratic way of life, and after showing his resolution to

retain the happiness he found in our political system to the extent of refusing to claim Russian citizenship even to secure his release from the Japanese and of casting his lot with that of our people by joining the fortunes and misfortunes of our guerrillas, it would be beyond

comprehension to support that the petitioner could feel any bond of attachment to the Soviet dictatorship.

Tuquero vs. Munoz, G.R. No. 140520

FACTS:

The Hong Kong Magistrate’s Court issued a warrant for the arrest of Munoz for accepting bribes in violation of a HK ordinance and for conspiring to defraud. Later, the

Philippines DOJ was requested by the Mutual Legal Assistance Unit of the Hong Kong DOJ for the provisional arrest of Munoz pursuant to the RP-HK Extradition Agreement.

The request was forwarded to the NBI. Subsequently, a warrant for the arrest of Munoz

was issued by the RTC. Munoz filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus assailing the validity of the Order of Arrest, which the CA granted on the ff. grounds: 1) that the

request was unauthenticated and mere facsimile copies which are insufficient to form a basis for its issuance; 2) that the 20 day period under PD 1069 or the Philippine extradition law was not

amended by the RP-HK extradition agreement which provides for a 45 day period for provisional arrest; 3) the judge issued it without having personally determined the existence of probable cause; and 4) the requirement of dual criminality under the Philippine extradition law has not

been satisfied as the crimes complained of are not punishable by Philippine laws. Munoz filed for release contending that since he has been detained beyond 20 days, the maximum for the

provisional arrest, without a request for extradition being received by the DOJ, he should be released.

ISSUE:

Whether the provisional warrant of arrest issued by the RTC was void?

RULING:

Yes. Sec. 20 of PD 1069 provides that the requesting state may, pursuant to the relevant

treaty or convention and while the same remains in force, request for the provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition. In urgent cases, the person sought may, in accordance with the law of the requested Party, be provisionally arrested on the application of

the requesting Party. There was urgency in the present case as there was a concern of Munoz being a flight risk if he will be informed of the pending request for extradition especially given

the fact that if he will be found guilty of the charges against him, the penalties are of such gravity as to increase the probability of Munoz absconding if allowed provisional liberty.

The request, as well as the accompanying documents, is valid despite lack of authentication. The pertinent extradition law does not provide for a requirement of authentication

for the provisional arrest. Moreover, the authenticated copies of the decision or sentence imposed upon Munoz by HK and the warrant of arrest has already been received by the Phil. Furthermore,

the extradition agreement only requires authentication for the request of extradition and not for the provisional arrest. Provisional arrest is a solution to the impending risk of flight as the process of preparing a formal request for extradition and its accompanying documents is time-

consuming and leakage-prone. Thus, it is an accepted practice for the requesting state to rush its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic cable or facsimile. The temporary hold on private

respondent’s privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his

extradition to HK. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.

Harvey vs. Santiago, 162 SCRA 840

Facts:

Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew Harvey and Jonh Sherman, Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout. All of them reside at Pagsanjan, Laguna.

Respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their

residences. The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his

care and subjects confirmed being live-in.

During petitioner’s apprehension there were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.

Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17

February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation

proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code.

Warrants of Arrest were issued against petitioners for violation of of Immigration Act and the Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the

same date. Petition for bail was filed but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of existence of probable cause?

2. Whether or not there were unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents?

3. Whether or not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners?

RULING:

While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of

the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of

articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).

The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest.

2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest.

The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal.

It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning.

The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the

Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the

Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court

proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a counsel if

desired.

Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of

the sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people.

Cuevas vs. Munoz, 348 SCRA 542

FACTS:

The Hong Kong Magistrate͛s Court at Eastern Magistracy issued a warrant for the arrest of respondent Juan Antonio Muñoz for seven counts of accepting an advantage as an agent and

seven counts of conspiracy to defraud, contrary to the common law of Hong Kong.

The Department of Justice received a request for the provisional arrest of the respondent from the Mutual Legal Assistance Unit, International Law Division of the Hong Kong

Department of Justice pursuant to Article 11(1) of the RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement.

Upon application of the NBI, RTC of Manila issued an Order granting the application for provisional arrest and issuing the corresponding Order of Arrest. Consequently, respondent was

arrested pursuant to the said order, and is currently detained at the NBI detention cell.

Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus

assailing the validity of the Order of Arrest. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring the Order of Arrest null and void on the grounds, among others that the request for provisional arrest and the accompanying warrant of arrest and summary of facts were unauthenticated and

mere facsimile copies which are insufficient to form a basis for the issuance of the Order of Arrest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the request for provisional arrest of respondent and its accompanying documents

must be authenticated?

DECISION:

The request for provisional arrest of respondent and its accompanying documents is valid despite lack of authentication. There is no requirement for the authentication of a request for

provisional arrest and its accompanying documents. The enumeration in the provision of RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement does not specify that these documents must be authenticated

copies. This may be gleaned from the fact that while Article 11(1) does not require the accompanying documents of a request for provisional arrest to be authenticated, Article 9 of the same Extradition Agreement makes authentication a requisite for admission in evidence of any

document accompanying a request for surrender or extradition. In other words, authentication is required for the request for surrender or extradition but not for the request for provisional arrest.

The RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement, as they are worded, serves the purpose

sought to be achieved by treaty stipulations for provisional arrest. The process of preparing a formal request for extradition and its accompanying documents, and transmitting them through diplomatic channels, is not only time-consuming but also leakage-prone. There is naturally a

great likelihood of flight by criminals who get an intimation of the pending request for their extradition. To solve this problem, speedier initial steps in the form of treaty stipulations for

provisional arrest were formulated. Thus, it is an accepted practice for the requesting state to rush its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic cable. Respondent’s reliance on Garvida v. Sales, Jr. is misplaced. The proscription against the admission of a pleading that has been

transmitted by facsimile machine has no application in the case at bar for obvious reasons. First, the instant case does not involve a pleading; and second, unlike the COMELEC Rules of

Procedure which do not sanction the filing of a pleading by means of a facsimile machine, P.D. No. 1069 and the RP Hong Kong Extradition Agreement do not prohibit the transmission of a request for provisional arrest by means of a fax machine.

Wright vs. CA, 235 SCRA 341

FACTS:

Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, entered into

a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the

Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the

extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the extradition treaty may be applied retroactively?

RULING:

Under the Constitution, the Court has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal

legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no

absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the

Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming

into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the

Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a

criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for

prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or

consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.

Sec. of Justice vs. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion, GR NO. 139465

FACTS:

The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for

the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with

the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in

the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it.

The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the

requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing?

RULING:

Yes. Section 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation

directed against him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or

government.” Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the

prospective extradite. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request & the temporary arrest of the

prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Clearly, there’s an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency

conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation

of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation.

Qua Che Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27

FACTS:

The petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board with having purchased US Dollars in the total sum of $130, 000 without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the

Philippines and further having remitted the money to Hong Kong and to themselves.· Warrants were issued but upon filing for a surety and cash bond they were released.·

Trial Court upheld the validity of the delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether the stay of an alien in this

country would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State.· Power to issue warrants and fix bonds were held to be essential to and complement the power to deport aliens under sec 69 of the rRvised Administrative Code

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President has the power to deport aliens and delegate those powers?

RULING:

The President has the power to carry out order of deportation but may not order arrest during investigation. Such power may not be delegated.

It is provided under Sec. 69 of the Revised Administrative Code: Deportation of subject

to foreign power “A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported,

expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent,

of the ground upon which such action is contemplated.In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to

produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.”

While it did not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirable aliens and merely lays down the procedure, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President can deport an alien is a clear indication of the recognition, and inferentially a ratification, by

the legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive. Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable alien maybe effected in two ways: by order of the

President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Commonwealth ActNo.613.SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all

previous laws relating to the entry of aliens into the Philippines, and their exclusion, deportation, and repatriation wherefrom, with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-

seven hundred and eleven which shall continue in force and effect.

Filipinas Compania de Seguros vs. Christen Huenfeld, 89 SCRA 54

FACTS:

Christern Huenefeld & Co, primarily controlled by German subjects, obtained a fire

policy from Filipinas (a Philippine corp under American jurisdiction) in the sum of P1000,000

covering merchandise in a building.

During a Japanese Military occupation, the building and insured merchandise were

burned. Christern submitted to Filipinas its claim under the policy but Filipinas refused to pay

contending the policy ceased to be in force on the date the US declared war against Germany.

Philippine Exec Commission, Filipinas paid Christern. Filipinas filed an action to recover

the sum paid. The CFI dismissed the action and CA affirmed such decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Christern was a “public enemy” and therefore not entitled to the insurance?

RULING:

The Philippine insurance Law in Sec. 8 provides that “anyone except a public enemy may

be insured.” It stands to reason that an insurance policy ceases to be allowable as soon as an

insured becomes public enemy.

The purpose of the war is to cripple the power ad exhaust the resources of the enemy, and

it is inconsistent that one country should destroy its enemy property and repay in insurance the

value of what has been so destroyed, or that it should in such manner increase the resources of

the enemy or render it aid.

The respondent having become an enemy corporation on December 10 1941, the

insurance policy issued in its favor on October 1 1941 by Filipinas had ceased to be valid and

enforceable and since the insured goods were burned after Dec 10 1941, and during the war,

Christern was not entitled to any indemnity under the said policy.

Haw Pia vs. China Banking Corporation,80 PHIL 604

FACTS:

Haw Pia had a loan from China Banking Corporation. This was completely paid

according to Haw Pia, on different occasions from 1942 to 1944 through Bank of Taiwan, Ltd.,

which was appointed by the Japanese Military authorities as liquidator of China Banking Corp.

With this, Haw Pia instituted an action against China Banking Corp. to compel the bank to

execute a deed of cancellation of mortgage on the property used as security for the loan and to

deliver its title. However China Banking Corp. demanded from Haw Pia payment of the sum of

the loan with interests.

RTC decided in favor of China Banking Corp. on the basis that there was no evidence to

show that Bank of Taiwan was authorized by China Banking Corp. to accept Haw Pia's payment

and that Bank of Taiwan, as an agency of the Japanese invading army, was not authorized under

the international law to liquidate the business of China Banking Corp. As such, Haw Pia's

payment to Bank of Taiwan has not extinguished the loan.

ISSUE:

Whether the Japanese Military Administration had the authority to order the liquidation of the

business of China Banking Corp. and to appoint Bank of Taiwan authorized as such to accept

payment?

RULING:

YES, under international law, the Japanese Military authorities had power to order the

liquidation of China Banking Corp. and to appoint and authorize Bank of Taiwan as liquidator to

accept the payment in question, because such liquidation is not confiscation of the properties of

China Banking Corp., but a mere sequestration of its assets which required its liquidation.

The sequestration or liquidation of enemy banks in occupied territories is authorized

expressly, not only by the US Army and Naval Manual of Military Government and Civil

Affairs, but also similar manuals of other countries, without violating Art. 46 or other articles of

the Hague Regulations. They do not amount to an outright confiscation of private property. The

purpose of such sequestration, as expounded in the Annual Report of the Office of the Alien

Custodian, is that enemy-owned property can be used to further the interest of the enemy and to

impede their war efforts. All enemy controlled assets can be used to finance propaganda,

espionage, and sabotage in these countries or in countries friendly to their cause.

Since the Japanese Military Forces had power to sequestrate and impound the assets of

China Banking Corp. and to appoint Bank of Taiwan as liquidator, it follows that payments of

Haw Pia to Bank of Taiwan extinguished his obligations to China Banking Corp.

Brownell vs. Bautista, 95 Phil 853

FACTS:

Antonina Bautista was married to Japanese National named Muneo Teraoka, also known

as Charles M. Teraoka. Muneo Teraoka died and was survived by his wife and six children. Antonina Bautista and four of her children died in different instances; the surviving children are

Carlos Teraoka and Marie Dolores Teraoka, they were taken by the American army and were sent to Japan.

The Enemy Property Custodian of the U.S. Army took into his custody the properties

described in the complaint on suspicion that these properties were tainted with enemy interest. Macario Bautista, father of Antonina Bautista, believing that the entire Teraoka family had already died, and being the nearest surviving or relative of the Teraokas, claimed the said

properties from the Enemy Property Custodian. Macario Bautista, then, by an affidavit of adjudication, succeeded in securing the cancellation of the certificates of title in his own name.

Once he had the certificates of title in his name, free of any lien or encumbrance, Macario Bautista sold one lot to defendant Antonio Baluga.

The office of the Philippine Alien Property Administration was established in the

Philippines; it assumed and took over the functions and duties of the defunct Enemy Property

Custodian of the United States Army. This new office learned that the entire two of the Teraoka

children, Carlos and Marie Dolores, are very much alive and are living in Japan. Then the

Philippine Alien Property Administrator, on the supposition that Carlos Teraoka and Marie

Dolores Teraoka are Japanese nationals, vested and took title to the portion of the said properties

belonging, by right of succession, to said Carlos and Marie Dolores Teraoka, by virtue of

Vesting Order No. P-394, issued on February 2, 1949, which was later supplemented and

amended.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the vesting of the property by Philippine Alien Property Administrator is valid?

RULING:

The complaint prays for partition of the properties and not merely for delivery of their

possession. Apparently, this is an action contemplated in Rule 71 wherein the court, before

proceeding with the partition, has to pass upon the rights or the ownership of the parties

interested in the property (Section 2). In an action for partition the determination of ownership is

indispensable to make proper adjudication. In this particular case, this acquires added force

considering that the titles of the properties appear issued in the name of defendants, and the

plaintiff contends that they belong to enemy aliens. By filing this action of partition in the court a

quo, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator has submitted to its jurisdiction and put in issue

the legality of his vesting order. He cannot therefore now dispute this power. It is true that the

complaint does not specifically allege that the Administrator is invoking the authority of the

court under section 3 of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 and that the failure to make mention

of that fact should no militate against the stand of the Administrator.

The fact remains that the very averments of the complaint show that the real purpose of

the action is not the recovery of possession but the partition of the properties. This makes this

case come, as already said, under Rule 71 of our Rules of Court. The lower court did not err in

passing upon the nationality of Carlos and Marie Dolores Teraoka, or in determining the validity

of the vesting order issued by the Philippine Alien Property Administrator.

Laurel vs. Misa, 77 Phil 856

FACTS.:

The petitioner, Anastacio Laurel, was arrested in Camarines Sur in May, 1945, by the United States Army, and was interned, under a commitment order "for his active collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation," but in September, 1945, he was turned over

to the Commonwealth Government, and since then has been under the custody of the respondent Director of Prisons.He was charged with treason, by adhering to the enemy by giving the latter

aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time and that he cannot be tried since the Court has no jurisdiction. Furthermore, he claimed that he had renounced his Filipino citizenship after joining

the Japanese paramilitary Makapili, and then swearing allegiance to Japan. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the

Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s allegiance and sovereignty were suspended during the change of

government? RULING:

The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his

government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the Philippine government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasn’t suspended; rather, it was

the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of government, there is no such change since the sovereign – the Filipino

people – is still the same. What happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines.

Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 PHIL 113

FACTS.

This case was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines

established during the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, was refused to be

addressed by the respondent judge of the lower court. He argued that the proclamation issued by

Gen. Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings

and judgments of the courts of the said governments. He also argued that the said governments

during the Japanese occupation were not de facto governments. The Imperial Japanese Forces

occupied the City of Manila on January 2, 1942 and on the next day their Commander in Chief

proclaimed "the Military Administration under law over the districts occupied by the Army." It

was also provided in the said proclamation that "so far as the Military Administration permits, all

the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall

continue to be effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in

their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the governments established in the Philippines under the names of Philippines

Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation

or regime were de facto governments?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the Philippine Executive Commission which was organized

by Order No. 1 by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by

the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. The

source of its authority comes from the Japanese military, it is a government imposed by the laws

of war. The same is true with the Republic of the Philippines. Apparently established and

organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people,

was, in truth and reality, a government established by the Japanese forces of occupation.

Kuroda vs Jalandoni, 42 OG 4282

FACTS:

Kuroda argues that the military commission established by EO 68 has no jurisdiction to try the petitioner for acts violated of the conduct of war, and crimes against the citizen of the

Philippines. The petitioner’s basis is that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague convention.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners may be tried by the Military commission or not? RULING:

The Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention are rules and regulations which

forms part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principle of international law as part of the law of the land as promulgated by the constitution.

Yamshita vs. Styer

FACTS:

Yamashita was the Commanding General of the Japanese army in the Philippines during World War 2. He was charged before the American military commission for war crimes. He filed a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Gen. Styer to reinstate his status as prisoner

of war from being accused as a war criminal. Petitioner also questioned the jurisdiction of the military tribunal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the military tribunal has jurisdiction?

RULING:

The military commission was lawfully created in conformity with an act of Congress

sanctioning the creation of such tribunals.The laws of war imposes upon a commander the duty to take any appropriate measures within his powers to control the troops under his command to

prevent acts which constitute violation of the laws of war. Hence, petitioner could be legitimately charged with personal responsibility arising from his failure to take such measure. In this regard the SC invoked Art. 1 of the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, as well as Art. 19 of Hague

Convention No. X, Art. 26 of 1929 Geneva Convention among others.

La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos

FACTS:

Petitioners assails the constitutionality of the RA 792 (Phil. Mining Act of 1995) along

with its Implementing Rules and Regulations, DENR Administrative order 96-40 and the Financial and technical assistance agreement (FTAA) entered into on March 30,1995, by the Republic of the Philippines and Western Mining Corporation Philippines, Inc..

On July 25, 1987, two days before the opening of congress, Pres. Cory Aquino issued EO

279, authorizing the DENR secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale explorations, which upon recommendation of the Sec, the

President may execute with the foreign proponent. Sec.8 of the EO states that the same shall take effect immediately. By such authority the subject WMCP FTAA was executed on March 30,

1995.

On March 3, 1995, Fidel V. Ramos approved RA 7942, to govern the exploration,

development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources. 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila times, or on April 9, 1995, RA 7942 took

effect. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995 the President entered into an FTAA withWMCP.On August 15, 195, DENR Secretary, Victor Ramos issued DAO 95-23, later

repealed by DAO 96-406. Subsequently, WMCP sold all its shares to Sagittarius mines, Inc, a Filipino corporation. By virtue of such, DENR approved the transfer and registration of the

subject FTAA from WMCP to Saguittarius.

ISSUE:

Whether or not EO 279 is valid and took effect in accordance with due process?

RULING:

EO 279 took effect and is valid. Petitioners contentions that based on EO 200, Sec.1, EO

27 could have only taken effect fifteen day after its publication at which time Congress had

already convened and the President’s power to legislate has ceased have no merit. From a

reading of Sec.8 of EO 279, Sec.1 of EO 200 and Tanada v Tuvera, the court holds that EO 279

became effective immediately upon its publication in the OG on August 3, 1987. There is

nothing in EO 200 that prevents a law from taking effect on a date.

What is mandatory under EO 200, and what due process requires as held in Tanada v Tuvera, is the publication of law. The convening of the first congress did not prevent the

effectivity of the laws previously enacted by the president in the exercise of her legislative powers. Art 18, Sec.6 states that “The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative

powers until the First Congress is convened.” Thus, the convening of Congress merely precluded the exercise of the legislative powers of the President. There can be no question that EO 279 is an effective and a validly enacted, statute.

Rep. of the Phil. vs. Sadiganbayan

FACTS:

After the EDSA Revolution, there was a revolutionary government bound by no

constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as

the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law. The Bill of Rights

under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during

the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration,

almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The revolutionary

government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum.

The Presidential Commission on Good Government (the “PCGG”), through the AFP

Anti-Graft Board, investigated reports of unexplained wealth involving Major General Josephus

Ramas, the Commanding General of the Philippine Army during the time of former President

Ferdinand Marcos.

Then, the Constabulary raiding team served a search and seizure warrant on the premises

of Ramas’ alleged mistress Elizabeth Dimaano. Aside from the military equipment stated in the

warrant, items not included in the warrant, particularly, communications equipment, land titles,

jewelry, and several thousands of cash in pesos and US dollars, were also seized

Accordingly, Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez, in behalf of the Republic of the

Philippines (the “Republic” or “Petitioner”) filed a Complaint against Ramas and Dimaano.

On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint on the grounds that

(1) the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate the private respondents and (2) the search and

seizure conducted was illegal.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate Ramas and Dimaano?

2. Whether or not the properties confiscated in Dimaano’s house were illegally seized and

therefore inadmissible in evidence?

DECISION:

The PCGG, through the AFP Board can only investigate the unexplained wealth and

corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the 2 categories mentioned in Section

2 of E.O No. 1, i.e.: AFP personnel who accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the

administration of former President Marcos by being the latter’s immediate family, relative,

subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their

powers, influence; or: AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided

the President assigns their cases to the PCGG. In the case at bar, Petitioner does not claim that

the President assigned Ramas’ case to the PCGG. Therefore, the present controversy should fall

under the first category of AFP personnel before PCGG could have jurisdiction. It was held that

Ramas was not a “subordinate” of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO

No. 1 and its amendments. Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make

him a “subordinate” as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he

enjoyed close association with former President Marcos.

Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to

waive. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it.

Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGG’s sole task is only to recover the ill-

gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. Without these elements, the PCGG

cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.

It has been said that “the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state”

and from there is derived “the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing

form of government without regard to the existing constitution.” Nevertheless, even during the

interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration,

almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed

responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is

a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State “to respect and to ensure

to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the

present Covenant.” Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the

duty to insure that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his

privacy, family, home or correspondence.” The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a

signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his

property.” Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding

document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the

generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. Thus, the

revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the right of

individuals under the Declaration.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during

the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations

under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to

say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that

Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the

Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the

Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the

revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance

with its treaty obligations under international law. It was only upon the adoption of the

Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary

government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such

directives and orders void. Thus, during the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights

existed, directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers

did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and

orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the

revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary

government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application,

specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items

specifically described in the warrant. However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not

included in the warrant – the monies, communications equipment, and jewelry and land titles

confiscated. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these

items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded

its authority when it seized these items. The seizure of these items was therefore void, and

unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person

from whom the raiding seized them.

However, the Court did not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items

merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these

items from the possessor and ordered that these items should be returned immediately to

Dimaano.

Oposa vs. Factoran Jr

FACTS:

This class suit is brought by 44children, through their parents, claiming that they bring

the case in the name of “their generation as well as those generations yet unborn.” Aiming to

stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the

country and to cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements.

The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the

State in its capacity as Parens Patriae

The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop

issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law—and violative of

plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the lower court,

invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the Supreme Court on

certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the children have the legal standing to file the case?

DECISION:

Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal

standing to file the case based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility”. Their right to

a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the

succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future

generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the

exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of public welfare

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. CA

FACTS:

The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin,

Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to

stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,

Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of

pollution of the water content of the surrounding area. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel

found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin

area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the

Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as

required under Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and

Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

The LLDA found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams

could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the

presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during

collection or handling.

The LLDA subsequently issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government

of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely

halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the

Camarin dumpsite. Also, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police,

enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks

into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.

The City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City

an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order. In its complaint, the City

Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the

health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology

within its territorial jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the LLDA has the authority to entertain the complaint authorized by the City

Government of Caloocan?

RULING:

LLDA has authority. As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally

pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law

provides for another forum.. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized

administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory

laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting and

accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding

provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan

21 with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control,

preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue

ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and

authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect

the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating

from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned

declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove

all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the

region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or

projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region.

By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive

Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring

the discontinuance or pollution." 24 (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes

the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction. To be

sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue an ex-parte cease and desist

order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express

grant to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984

which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983.

However, it would be a mistake to draw there from the conclusion that there is a denial of the

power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring

the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive

Order No. 927, series of 1983. The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of

protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the

Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which

provides: The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful

ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. As a constitutionally guaranteed right

of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with

the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instil

health consciousness among them." 28 It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines are party to

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which

recognize health as a fundamental human right.

La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos

FACTS:

On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting the Petition

and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the

subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts, [9] which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty

over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive management and control of

the enterprise, including operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the products discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of

extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts.

Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for

Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over our natural resources?

RULING:

The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to “enter into agreements

with foreign owned corporations.” On the other hand, Congress may review the action of the

President once it is notified of “every contract entered into in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its execution.” In contrast to this express

mandate of the President and Congress in the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard; the courts may

-- in a proper case -- exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power of control over the

EDU of our natural resources.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate

branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our country

and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country. “The judiciary is loath

to interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official functions.” As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George Malcolm, “Just as the Supreme Court,

as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers

expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.” Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches of government. And let not the Court interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the supreme

law of the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all the people.

The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to

enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace. The Court fully sympathizes with the plight

of La Bugal B’laan and other tribal groups, and commends their efforts to uplift their communities. However, the Court cannot justify the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise legal and binding

FTAA contract.

The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and complexity of such agreements, the humongous amounts of capital and financing required for large-scale mining operations, the complicated

technology needed, and the intricacies of international trade, coupled with the State’s need to maintain flexibility in its dealings, in order to preserve and enhance our country’s

competitiveness in world markets. On the basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations - insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements - as well as the subject Financial and

Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).

USA v. Guinto

FACTS:

These are several cases involving the doctrine of state immunity. In GR No. 76607, the

private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in

connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base

which was won by a certain Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award to the bid

winner because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the

invitation to bid, and subsequently, to conduct a rebidding. In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove

filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Lamachia, Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion for his

dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station in

Baguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa, Cartalla

and Orascion, that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables

served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and thereafter referred

the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective bargaining agreement between the

center and its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and recommended his

dismissal. Genove’s reaction was to file his complaint against the individual petitioners. In GR

No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Cano O’ Donnell, an

extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the

individual petitioners who are officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force

Office of Special Investigators. On the basis of the sworn statements made by them, information

for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against

Bautista in the RTC of Tarlac. Said officers testified against him at his trial. Bautista was

dismissed from his employment. He then filed a complaint against the individual petitioners

claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed. In GR No. 80258, a complaint for

damages was filed by the private respondents against the herein petitioners (except the US), for

injuries sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants. There is a conflict of

factual allegations here. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed

them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused

extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this and claim that plaintiffs were arrested for

theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest. In motion to

dismiss the complaint, the US and the individually named defendants argued that the suit was in

effect a suit against the US, which had not given its consent to be sued.

ISSUE:

Whether the defendants were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done

by them in the performance of their official duties?

RULING:

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted

principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even

without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of

international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the

majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state

as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are

sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to

prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed

against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their

duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to

perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state

although it has not been formally impleaded.

PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

On 7 April 1986, in connection with criminal proceedings initiated in the Philippines to

locate, sequester and seek restitution of alleged ill-gotten wealth amassed by the Marcoses and

other accused from the Philippine Government, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) wrote

the Federal Office for Police Matters in Berne, Switzerland, requesting assistance for the latter

office to:(a) ascertain and provide the OSG with information as to where and in which cantons

the ill-gotten fortune of the Marcoses and other accused are located, the names of the depositors

and the banks and the amounts involved; and (b) take necessary precautionary measures, such as

sequestration, to freeze the assets in order to preserve their existing value and prevent any further

transfer thereof (herein referred to as the IMAC request). The Office of the District Attorney in

Zurich, pursuant to the OSG’s request, issued an Order directing the Swiss Banks in Zurich to

freeze the accounts of the accuse

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Swiss officials can invoke state immunity from suit?

RULING:

The act of state doctrine is one of the methods by which States prevent their national

courts from deciding disputes which relate to the internal affairs of another State, the other two

being immunity and non-justiciability. It is an avoidance technique that is directly related o a

State’s obligation to respect the independence and equality of other States by not requiring them

to submit to adjudication in a national court or to settlement of their disputes without their

consent. It requires the forum court to exercise restraint in the adjudication of disputes relating to

legislative

International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja

FACTS:

ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine government to operate the refugee

processing center in Morong, Bataan. That comes from an argument between the Philippine

government and the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees for eventual resettlement to

other countries was to be established in Bataan. ICMC was duly registered with the United

Nations Economic and Social Council and enjoys consultative status. As an international

organization rendering voluntary and humanitarian services in the Philippines, its activities are

parallel to those of the international committee for migration and the international of the Red

Cross. On July 14, 1986, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied for certification with the

then Ministry of Labor and Employment a petition for certification election among the rank and

file members employed by ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is an

international organization registered with the United Nations and hence, enjoys diplomatic

immunity.

The Med-Arbiter sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition for each of jurisdiction. On

appeal by TUPAS, Director Calleja, reversed the Med-arbiter’s decision and ordered the

immediate conduct of a certification election. ICMC then sought the immed iate dismissal of the

TUPAS petition for certification election involving the immunity expressly granted but the same

was denied. With intervention of department of foreign affairs who was legal interest in the

outcome of this case, the second division gave due to the ICMC petition and required the

submittal of memoranda by the parties.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extends to immunity

from the application of Philippine labor laws?

RULING:

The grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extends to immunity from

the application of Philippine labor laws, because it is clearly necessitated by their international

character and respective purposes which is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by

the host country in their internal workings.

Employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled because

each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of disputes out

of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party.

Moreover, pursuant to article IV of memorandum of abuse of privilege by ICMC, the

government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded.

Baer v. Tizon

FACTS:

Respondent Edgardo Gener, as plaintiff, filed a complaint for injunction with the Court of

First Instance of Bataan against petitioner, Donald Baer, Commander of the United States Naval

Base in Olongapo. He alleged that he was engaged in the business of logging in an area situated

in Barrio Mabayo, Municipality of Morong, Bataan and that the American Naval Base

authorities stopped his logging operations.

A restraining order was issued by respondent Judge on November 23, 1964.Counsel for

petitioner, upon instructions of the American Ambassador to the Philippines, entered their

appearance for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of respondent Judge on the ground that

the suit was one against a foreign sovereign without its consent.

Gener opposed petitioner's motion to dismiss relying on the principle that "a private

citizen claiming title and right of possession of certain property may, to recover possession of

said property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the Government, who are said to be

illegally withholding the same from him, though in doing so, said officers and agents claim that

they are acting for the Government." Petitioner, thereafter, on January 12, 1965, made a written

offer of documentary evidence, including certified copies of telegrams of the Forestry Director to

Forestry personnel in Balanga, Bataan dated January 8, and January 11, 1965, directing

immediate investigation of illegal timber cutting in Bataan and calling attention to the fact that

the records of the office show no new renewal of timber license or temporary extension permits.

The respondent Judge, issued an order granting respondent Gener's application for the

issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the

opposition to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of immunity from suit without consent is applicable?

DECISION:

A foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by

permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of

the place. "It is a widely accepted principle of international law, which is made a part of the law

of the land (Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution), that a foreign state may not be brought to

suit before the courts of another state or its own courts without its consent." The doctrine of state

immunity is not limited to cases which would result in a pecuniary charge against the sovereign

or would require the doing of an affirmative act by it. Prevention of a sovereign from doing an

affirmative act pertaining directly and immediately to the most important public function of any

government - the defense of the state — is equally as untenable as requiring it to do an

affirmative act."

Bayan Muna v. Romulo

FACTS:

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the

marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of

Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was

impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.

Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the

International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for

the most serious crimes of international concern X x x and shall be complementary to the national

criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under

international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of

aggression. On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d·Affaires Enrique A. Manalo,

signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by

the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory

countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The

Philippines is not among the 92.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio for contracting obligations

that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of

international law?

RULING:

No. Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral

obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of

international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement , as petitioner

would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply

shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering an American

criminal to the [ICC] x x x. The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner’s earlier

position, which, as already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement,

virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under the

Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles. The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to

state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor-General,

is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x

x . The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the country’s judiciary to

try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.

Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow

Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial

and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized

under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with

the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities

necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the

AKBAYAN v. Aquino

FACTS:

Petitioners seek to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic

Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during

the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. The JPEPA, which

will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another

country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which

includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services,

investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons,

cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement,

improvement of the business environment, and general and final provisions.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to information?

2. Whether the executive privilege claimed by the respondents applies only at certain stages of

the negotiation process?

RULING:

Supreme Court dismissed the petition, on the following reasons:

To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the

threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern.In determining whether or not a

particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. ‘Public

concern’ like ‘public interest’ is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad

spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect

their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In

the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at

issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the

Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are

matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic

negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to

the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.

Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to

information, a specific “showing of need” for such information is not a relevant consideration,

but only whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has

claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the

same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that the

information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively

and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.

Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to information includes official

information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must

constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions

like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national

security and public order.

In the case at hand, Petitioners have failed to present the strong and “sufficient showing of need”.

The arguments they proffer to establish their entitlement to the subject documents fall short of

this standard stated in the decided cases.

There is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a matter of public concern. The

Court has earlier concluded that it is a matter of public concern, not on the basis of any specific

need shown by petitioners, but from the very nature of the JPEPA as an international trade

agreement.

While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to refrain from issuing subpoenas to

executive officials – out of respect for their office – until resort to it becomes necessary, the fact

remains that such requests are not a compulsory process. Being mere requests, they do not

strictly call for an assertion of executive privilege.

Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary

FACTS :

The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which “shall have the

power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international

concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” Its jurisdiction

covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression

as defined in the Statute.

On December 28, 2000, the Philippines signed the Rome Statue. The Rome Statute

however requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject to ratification,

acceptance or approval of the signatory states.

Thus, a petition for mandamus was filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the

Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its

concurrence in accordance with Sec. 21, Art. VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

ISSUE :

Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty

to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine

Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President?

RULING:

In our system of government, the President, being the head of the state, is regarded as the

sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign

nations. As chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with

respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with

foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations,

enter into treaties, and otherwise transact business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-

making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties,

the Constitution provides for a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 votes

of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. The

participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to

provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations.

Petitioners equate signing of the treaty with ratification, which are two different and

distinct steps in the treaty-making process. Signature is primarily intended as a means of

authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of good faith of the parties. Ratification, the other

hand, is a formal act, executive by nature, undertaken by the head of the state or of the

government.

The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is ratification

that binds the state to the provisions thereof. Under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested

in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate is limited only

to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence to the ratification. Such power of the

President cannot be encroached by the courts via mandamus and the courts has no jurisdiction

over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. Therefore,

the Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its

jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of

Rome Statute to Senate.

Lim vs. Exec. Secretary

FACTS:

Personnels from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in

Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in “Balikatan 02-1.” They are

a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) a

bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951.

The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the

international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the

tragic events that occurred on September 11, 2001.The MDT has been described as the “core” of

the defense relationship between the Philippines and its traditional ally, the United States. Its aim

is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint

training with its American counterparts; the “Balikatan” is the largest such training exercise

directly supporting the MDT’s objectives. It is this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the

obligations thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm.

Petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and

prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were joined subsequently

by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-list organizations, who filed

a petition- in- intervention on February 11, 2002

ISSUE:

Whether the Balikatan is covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement?

RULING:

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 32 contains provisos

governing interpretations of international agreements. It clearly provides that the cardinal rule of

interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the

parties’ intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the

meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be

taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. The VFA permits United States personnel to

engage, on an impermanent basis, in “activities,” the exact meaning of which was left undefined.

The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States

personnel must “abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in

particular, from any political activity.

It appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word

‘activities” arose from accident. It was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain

leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for

purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new

techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation’s marine resources, sea search-and-

rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such

as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like.

Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is

only logical to assume that ’Balikatan 02-1,” a “mutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and

training exercise,” falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of

the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support

the conclusion that combat-related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the one subject

of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.

Paul Joseph Wright vs. CA

FACTS:

This is a case of extradition request made in February 19, 1993, by the Australian

government to the Philippine government seeking the arrest and deportation to Australia of

petitioner Paul Joseph Wright, an Australian citizen, for indictable crimes committed under that

country’s Victorian Crimes Act of 1958, specifically, numerous counts of Obtaining Properties

by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the aforementioned law, and perjury. The Philippine

authorities apprehended the petitioner, and extradition proceedings were filed before the

Regional Trial Court of Makati, which rendered a decision ordering the deportation of petitioner.

The trial court, in its decision dated 14 June 1993, concluded that the documents submitted by

the Australian Government meet the requirements of Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and

that the offenses for which the petitioner were sought in his country are extraditable offenses

under Article 2 of the said Treaty.

Petitioner challenged the validity of the extradition order issued by the trial court as

affirmed by the Court of Appeals under the Treaty. Petitioner contending that the trial court order

violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. He avers that for the extradition

order to be valid, the Australian government should show that a formal charge had been initiated

and pending before a competent court in Australia.

ISSUES:

1. Whether it is necessary for a valid extradition request be based on a pending criminal charge

against the extraditee in his home country;

2.Whether the said treaty amount to a ex-post facto law abridging petitioner’s right under Section

21, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution;

RULING:

The court a quo committed no error in granting the extradition request. It was found that

the charges against the petitioner were offenses were undeniably offenses in the Requesting State

at the time they were alleged to have been committed. Under Article 6 of the said Treaty, it only

required the warrant for the arrest of an individual be included in the request, enumerating the

acts and omissions which were alleged against the person in respect of each offense are sufficient

to show that a person is wanted for prosecution under the said article. Furthermore, the 'Charge

and Warrant of Arrest Sheets' attest to the fact that petitioner is not only wanted for prosecution

but has, in fact, absconded to evade arrest and criminal prosecution. Since a charge or

information under the Treaty is required only when appropriate, i.e., in cases where an individual

charged before a competent court in the Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested

State, a charge or a copy thereof is not required if the offender has in fact already absconded

before a criminal complaint could be filed. As our Court of Appeals correctly noted, limiting the

phrase "wanted for prosecution" to person charged with an information or a criminal complaint

renders the Treaty ineffective over individuals who abscond for the purpose of evading arrest and

prosecution. Anent petitioner’s contention that alleged offenses were committed prior to the

effectivity of the Treaty. The Treaty provides that petitioner is extraditable because the offenses

for which petitioner is sought by his government are clearly extraditable under Article 2 of the

Treaty. These were offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were committed, and,

irrespective of the time they were committed, they fall under the panoply of the Extradition

Treaty's provisions. Under the Treaty there is no finding proscribing its enforcement for crimes

committed before its enactment.

Secretary of Justice vs. Hon Lantion and Mark Jimenez

FACTS:

On June 18, 1999, the United States government sent a note verbale to the Philippine

government requesting the extradition of Mark Jimenez, a Filipino citizen, for violation of US

laws on conspiracy, fraud and tax evasion. Attached with request were the Grand Jury Indictment

and the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida. Private

respondent requested that he be furnished with the official extradition request and other

supporting papers and that he be given time to answer the charges. The request of the respondent

was denied. DOJ held that the move of respondent Jimenez was premature because it is only

after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be

furnished by the court with copies of the petition. It also noted that the formal request for

extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents obtained through

grand jury process are covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. Private

respondent filed with the RTC a case against the respective secretaries of DOJ, Foreign Affairs

and the director of NBI for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent

the extradition documents); certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999);

and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request), together with an

application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.

The court a quo held in favor of Jimenez and ordered the DOJ to maintain the status quo by

refraining from committing the acts complained of and from conducting further proceedings in

the extradition request.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner official was unqualifiedly prevented from performing legal duties

under the extradition treaty and the Philippine extradition law?

RULING:

The Court in sustaining the two basic due process rights of private respondent, considered

the evaluation process akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding

the consequences of which, according to the court, are essentially criminal. As such

jurisprudence dictates that the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and

civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Hence, private respondent is entitled

to these indispensable basic rights during the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings.

However, upon motion for reconsideration the court reversed its previous decision.However, in a

motion for reconsideration filed by the government, this Melo decision was reversed and instead

the dissenting opinion of J. Puno was adopted.

The Supreme Court held that extradition is a sui generis proceeding and as such, the

determination as to whether an individual should be extradited is not a criminal proceeding

where a suspect is entitled to all the constitutional rights of an accused. The process of

extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. The Court

held the constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an

accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee, especially by one whose extradition papers are still

undergoing evaluation.

Government of Hongkong v. Olalia Jr.

FACTS:

The P hilipp i nes and Hong K ong s igned an “Agreeme nt fo r the

S urrender o f Accused and Convicted Persons.”Priva te respondent Muñoz was

charged before the Hong Kong Court. Department of Justice (DOJ) received from the

Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent

Muñoz. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation

(NBI)which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional

arrest of private respondent. The NBI agents arrested and detained him.

Muñoz filed a petition for bail which was denied by Judge Bernardo, Jr. holding that

there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high

“flight risk.” After Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhib ited himse lf from further hearing the case,

it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a

motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by

respondent judge.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess

of jurisdiction in allowing private respondent to bail?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind

the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the

potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from

justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the burden of showing that he

or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail. This is because the Philippines, along with

the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights

as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right of a prospective

extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty

obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human

rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines

should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.

Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential

extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in

character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to

secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. It does

not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a

potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are

guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the

Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for

bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that

he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine

whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

The petition was dismissed and the case was remanded to the trial court to determine whether

private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the

trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and

thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.