14-556 wyoming legislators

8/9/2019 14-556 Wyoming Legislators

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NOS. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

J AMES OBERGEFELL, ET AL.,

Petitioners ,

v.

RICHARD HODGES,

Respondent .

BRITTANI HENRY , ET AL.,

Petitioners ,

v.

RICHARD HODGES,

Respondent .

Consolidated Case Captions Listed on Inside Front Cover

On Writs of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF OF MICI CURI E WYOMING

LEGISL TORS ND SCHOL RS OF FULL F ITH

ND CREDIT IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

HERBERT K. DOBY N ATHANIEL S. HIBBEN

Counsel of Record Nathaniel S. Hibben, P.C.

215 East 21st Avenue 215 East 21st Avenue

PO Box 130 Torrington, WY 82240

Torrington, WY 82240 (307)532-2700

(307) 532-2700 [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for Amici Curiae

mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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A PRIL DEBOER, ET AL.,

Petitioners ,

v.

RICHARD SNYDER, ET AL.,

Respondents .

V ALERIA T ANCO, ET AL.,

Petitioners ,

v.

WILLIAM EDWARD “BILL” H ASLAM, ET AL.,

Respondents .

TIMOTHY LOVE, ET AL. AND GREGORY BOURKE, ET AL.,

Petitioners ,

v.

STEVE BESHEAR,

Respondents .


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i

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1. DoestheFourteenth Amendmentrequireastateto license a marriage between two peopleof thesamesex?

2. DoestheFourteenth Amendmentrequireastateto recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfullylicensedandperformedout-of-state?


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ii

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QUESTIONSPRESENTED.......................................i

TABLEOF AUTHORITIES.....................................iv

INTERESTOF AMICICURIAE...............................1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT....................................2

ARGUMENT..............................................................4

I. States are Not Required to RecognizeMarriages That Conflict With Their OwnMaritalDefinitionorPublicPolicy.....................4

A. States Have Long Asserted andExercised the Power to DenyRecognitiontoMarriagesPerformedinOther Jurisdictions that are ContrarytotheirOwnPublicPolicy............................4

B.

The

Full

Faith

and

Credit

Clause

Does

Not Compel States to RecognizeMarriages that are Contrary to TheirPublicPolicy................................................10

C. On Matters of Choice of Law, Statesare Free to Apply Their Own LawUnder the Due Process Clause if MinimallyConnectedtothePartiesof theTransaction...........................................17

D.

States

Must

Be

Permitted

to

Avoid

Applying Laws of Other States ThatOffendForumPolicies.................................19


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iii

E. Declining to Recognize MarriageRights Does Not Destroy theUnderlyingMarriage..................................26

II. The Marriage Recognition LawsChallengedinTheseCasesareUnliketheFederal Law that the Court Struck DowninWindsor (Section3of FederalDOMA).........26

III. A Ruling for the States on the First

Question

Presented

Necessarily

Requires

a Ruling for the States on the SecondQuestion.............................................................29

CONCLUSION.........................................................31


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iv

TTTTA AA ABBBBLLLLEEEEOOOOFFFF A AA AUUUUTTTTHHHHOOOORRRRIIIITTTTIIIIEEEESSSS

Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Acc. Comm’n ., 294 U.S.532(1935).....................................................23

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague ,449U.S.302(1981)......21 Baker v. General Motors Corp ., 522U.S.222 (1998)

...............................................................................12 Baker v. Nelson ,409U.S.810(1972)......................32

Bradford

Elec.

Light

Co.

v.

Clapper ,

286

U.S.

145

(1932)......................................................................7 Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper , 286 U.S. 145

(1932)....................................................................30 Bucca v. State , 128 A.2d 506 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div.

1957)..................................................................9,17 Catalano v. Catalano ,170 A.2d726(Conn.1961)....9 Christiansen v. Christiansen , 253 P.2d 153 (Wyo.

2011)........................................................................5 Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla (D.P.R.) (D.P.R. Oct.

21,2014)(No.14-1253),2014WL5361987.........32 De

Sylva

v.

Ballentine ,

351

U.S.

570,

76

S.Ct.

974

(1956)....................................................................28 Ex parte Bowen ,247S.W.2d379(Ky.1952)..........10 Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt ,538U.S.

488(2003)..............................................................13 Huntington v. Attrill ,146U.S.657(1892)..............26 In re Est. of Toutant , 633 N.W.2d 692 (Wis. App.

2001)........................................................................8 Lanham v. Lanham ,117N.W.787(Wis.1908)........8 Nehring v. Nehring , 164 Ill. App. 527 (Ill. App. 2d

Dist.

1911)...............................................................

8 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 59

L.Ed.2d416(1979)................................................13


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v

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann ,285U.S.262 (1932) ...............................................................................35

New York Life Insurance Co. v. Head , 234 U.S.149 (1914)....................................................................27

Oregon v. Ice ,555U.S.160(2009)..........................35 Osoinach v. Watkins ,180So.577(Ala.1938)..........9 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n ,306U.S.493,59S.Ct.629(1939).........12

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts ,472U.S.797(1985) ...............................................................................20

Phillips

Petroleum

Co.

v.

Shutts ,

472

U.S.

797,

105

S.Ct.2965(1985)..................................................13 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell ,538U.S.408(2003).............................26

Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp ., 4 S.E.2d 364(Va.1939).........................................................9

True v. Ranney ,21N.H.52(1850)..........................10 United States v. Windsor , 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013)

........................................................................passimWilliams v. North Carolina ,317U.S.287(1942)...16

28U.S.C.§1738C....................................................16

Audioof Oral Argumentat29:23-30:13,Obergefell v. Himes ,No.14-3057(6thCir. Aug.6,2014).........30

Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Full Faith and Credit Clause , in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION(2DED.)..........................................10

Jeffrey

L.

Rensberger,

Interstate

Pluralism:

The

Role of Federalism in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate ,2008B.Y.U.L.REV.1703........................13


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vi

Jeffrey L. Rensberger,Same-Sex Marriages and the Defense of Marriage Act: A Deviant View of an Experiment in Full Faith and Credit ,32CreightonL.Rev.409(1998).................................................12

Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What Are theNational Implications of the MassachusettsGoodridge Decision and the Judicial Invalidationof TraditionalMarriageLaws?:HearingBeforetheUnitedStatesSenateCommitteeontheJudiciary,108thCong.63,68-67(2004)...............................15

Lynn

D.

Wardle,

From

Slavery

to

Same-Sex

Marriage: Comity Versus Public Policy in Inter- Jurisdictional Recognition of Controversial Domestic Relations , 2008 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1855(2008)......................................................................9

MarkD.Rosen,Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors That Determine What the Constitution Requires , 90MINN.L.REV.915(2006).....................................5

Patrick

J.

Borchers,

Baker

v.

General

Motors: Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of

Non-Traditional Marriages , 32 Creighton L. Rev.147(1998...............................................................12

Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act ,32CreightonL.Rev.255(1998)16

RESTATEMENT(FIRST)OFCONFLICTOFLAWS(1934).................................................................5,6,

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OFLAWS(1971).......................................................6,7

Richard

S.

Myers,

The

Public

Policy

Doctrine

and

Interjurisdictional Recognition of Civil Unions and


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vii

Domestic Partnerships , 3 Ave Maria L. Rev. 531 (2005)....................................................................12

Stanley E. Cox, DOMA and Conflicts Law: Congressional Rules and Domestic Relations Conflicts Law , 32 CREIGHTON L.REV. 1063 (1999) ...............................................................................22

U.S.Const.art.IV,§1.............................................10


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Amici Curiae include legislators of the State of Wyoming who support their state law definingmarriageastheunionof amanandawoman. Theyare concerned that if this Court agrees with thearguments Petitioners raise, their state’s autonomyover the definition of marriage within their borderswillbesubvertedbythevaryingmarriagepoliciesof their sister states. These legislators are Cheri

Steinmetz,

Curt

Meier,

Nathan

Winters,

Scott

Clem,

MarkJennings, GeraldGay,Garry Piiparinen, TomReeder, Allen Jaggi, Marti Halverson, RobertMcKim, Kendell Kroeker, Roy Edwards, HarlanEdmonds, Bunky Loucks, and Theodore J. (Jim)Blackburn.

Amici Curiae also include scholars who havestudied and written on the Full Faith and CreditClause, conflicts of laws, and marriage recognition.They are concerned that Petitioners’ “marriagerecognition”

arguments

mischaracterize

the

relevant

legal principles and risk compromising well-established conflicts-of-law principles. Thesescholarsarelistedasfollows:

Jeffrey L. Rensberger is a Professor of Law and Vice-President for Strategic Planning andInstitutional Research at South Texas College of

1 Parties

to

these

cases

have

consented

to

the

filing

of

this

brief

and

letters

indicating

their

consent

are

on

file

with

the

Clerk. Amici state that no counsel for a party authored this brief in

wholeorinpart,andnopersonotherthantheamici andtheircounsel made any monetary contribution intended to fund thepreparationorsubmissionof thisbrief.


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2

Law. He has written scholarly works on conflict of lawsissuesraisedbysame-sexmarriages.

Richard S. Myers is a Professor of Law at AveMariaSchoolof Law.Heteachescoursesonconflictsof lawsandhaswrittenmultiplescholarlyarticlesonthe inter-jurisdictional recognition of same-sexmarriages.

Lloyd Cohen is a Professor of Law at George

Mason

University.

He

has

published

writings

on

numerous legal issues including marriage anddivorce.

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The overarching question before the Court inthese fourcases isnotwhetheranexclusivelymale-femalemarriagepolicy isthebest,butonlywhetherit is allowed by the U.S. Constitution. In otherwords, the question is not whether government-

recognized

same-sex

marriage

is

good

or

bad

policy,

but only whether it is required by the U.S.Constitution. Andthespecificquestionaddressedinthis brief is whether the Constitution requires aState that defines marriage as a union between amanandawomantorecognizeasame-sexmarriagevalidlyperformedinanotherState. Itdoesnot.

States have never been constitutionallymandated to recognize marriages that conflict withtheir marriagedefinitionor their public policy. See Part

I.A.,

infra .

The

Full

Faith

and

Credit

Clause

does not compel states to recognize marriages thatarecontrarytotheirpublicpolicy,sowhetherornot


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3

torecognizeasister-statemarriageisachoiceof lawmatter. See Part I.B, infra . The constitutionallimitations on choice of law, as opposed toenforcement of judgments, are minimal. See PartI.C., infra . In addition, the constitution should notbe interpreted to require each state to enforce itssister-state’s policies. See Part I.D., infra .Furthermore,arefusal torecognizeamarriagedoesnotendthemarriage;itsimplydeclinestoenforceorrecognize themarriage in that state. See Part I.E.,infra .

Petitioners and their amici mistakenly assertthat individual states, much like the federalgovernment, are constitutionally bound to recognizeas valid same-sex marriages entered into in otherstates. Suchclaimspersistently ignorebothhistoryand the decisions of this Court, including United States v. Windsor ,2 whichprovide thatstatesretainthe traditional right to define marriage, each for

themselves.

See

Part

II,

infra .

Finally, a ruling for the states on the firstquestion presented necessarily requires a ruling forthe states on the second question presented. For if this Court finds a sufficient rational or compellingbasis for defining marriage as the union of a manand a woman, such a basis will suffice for a state’sdecision not to recognize out-of-state unions thatconflict with its marriage definition. See Part III,infra .

2 133S.Ct.2675(2013).


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InWindsor ,theCourtappliedahigher—“carefulconsideration”—level of scrutiny to Section 3 of thefederalDefenseof Marriage Act(“DOMA”)becauseitwas an untraditional intrusion of federal law into

the

marriage

relation.

That

section,

according

to

the

Court, “rejects a long-established precept.”3 It“departs from [the] history and tradition of relianceon state law to define marriage.”4 Because of this,Section 3 of DOMA merited “careful consideration”as a “discrimination of an unusual character.”5 Incontrast to that provision, there is nothing novel or“unusual” about state laws that define marriage astheunionof amanandawoman.

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ttttoooo

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The long tradition in American law is thatalthough a marriage is generally to be regarded asvalid if valid at the place of celebration, it need notbe recognized if it is contrary to the forum’s publicpolicy. The “‘place of celebration rule’ is a statecommon-law rule rather than a constitutional

3Windsor ,133S.Ct.at2697. 4 Id.at2692. 5 Id.


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mandate.”6 Thatis,eachstatehasgenerallydecidedon its own to adopt this rule, with whateverexceptions it may decide to engraft upon it as amatterof itsownchoiceof lawapparatusandwhollyapart fromanyconstitutionalcompulsion.7 NothingintheConstitutionrequirestheStatestodothis.

TheFirstRestatementof Conflictof Lawsstatedthe place of celebrations as a general rule.8 But theRestatement also excepted from this general rule of

recognition

marriages

contrary

to

the

public

policy

of

the domicile of either party.9 Moreover, one of theexceptions under the First Restatement is preciselydescriptive of cases involving state laws definingmarriageastheunionof amanandawoman. TheFirst Restatement provided for non-recognition of a“marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at thedomicile makes void even though celebrated in

6 SeeMarkD.Rosen,Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors That Determine What the Constitution Requires ,90MINN.L.REV.915,933(2006).7 See,

e.g.,

Christiansen

v.

Christiansen ,

253

P.2d

153,

156-7

(Wyo.2011).8 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §121(1934)(“amarriageisvalideverywhereif therequirementsof themarriagelawof thestatewherethecontractof marriagetakesplacearecompliedwith.”).9

See

id.

§

132

(marriage

void

if

“against

the

law

of

the

state

of domicile

of

either

party,

though

the

requirements

of

the

law

of

thestateof celebrationhavebeencompliedwith”—forexample,in cases of polygamy, incest, miscegenation, or marriagescontrarytoastatuteof thedomicile).


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6

another state.”10 This shows how far state non-recognitionlawsarefrombeingnovelorunusual.

The First Restatement also excepted from theplaceof celebrationrulethegivingof anyeffecttoamarriage which was “offensive to the policy” of theforum,whetherornotapartytothemarriagewasadomiciliary.11 This rule of non-recognition of marriages against public policy was a part of abroaderprincipleunderwhichastategenerallyneed

not

recognize

foreign

law

if

it

was

contrary

to

public

policy.12 Andnotably,thisCourtlongagorecognizedthatastatemaydeclinetoapplysister-state lawonthe grounds of public policy.13 To do otherwisewould allow one State to dictate policy in a sisterState—something entirely contrary to oursystem of federalisminwhicheachStateissovereign.

The Second Restatement carries these rulesforward.14 Like the First Restatement, the Second

10Id.

§

132(d).

11 Seeid.,§134(“If anyeffectof amarriagecreatedbythelawof onestateisdeemedbythecourtsof anotherstatesufficientlyoffensive to the policy of the latter state, the latter state willrefusetogivethateffecttothemarriage.”).12 See

id.,

§

612

(“No

action

can

be

maintained

upon

a

cause

of

action created in another state the enforcement of which iscontrarytothestrongpublicpolicyof theforum.”).13 SeeBradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper , 286 U.S. 145, 160(1932) (a state might deny a right under sister-state law“because the enforcement of the right conferred would be

obnoxious

to

the

public

policy

of

the

forum”).14 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONFLICT OFLAWS

§ 283 (1971) (“A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhereberecognizedasvalidunlessitviolatesthestrongpublicpolicy

http:///reader/full/domiciliary.11http:///reader/full/domiciliary.11http:///reader/full/policy.12http:///reader/full/policy.12http:///reader/full/policy.13http:///reader/full/policy.13http:///reader/full/forward.14http:///reader/full/forward.14http:///reader/full/domiciliary.11http:///reader/full/policy.12http:///reader/full/policy.13http:///reader/full/forward.14


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Restatement has a broad and general exception tonormal choice of law results for any type of lawcontrarytopublicpolicy.15

That there are relatively few cases in recenttimesapplyingtheauthoritytorefuserecognitiontoa marriage on the ground of public policy is due tothe largely homogenous array of state marriagelaws. Until same-sex marriage became possible insome states, there were few occasions for a state to

decline

to

recognize

another

state’s

marriage

as

against public policy; most states had all butidenticalmarriagepolicies.

Notwithstanding this general homogeneityamong the states’ marriage laws throughout ourNation’s history, there havebeen many examplesof states asserting this authority and declining torecognize another state’s marriage. For example,theWisconsinSupremeCourtrefusedtorecognizeasister-state marriage that was in violation of theforum’s

temporary

prohibition

on

remarriage

followingadivorce.16 Thecourtthereexplainedthata “state undoubtedly . . . has the power to declarethat marriages between its own citizens contrary toitsestablishedpublicpolicyshallhavenovalidityinits courts, even though they be celebrated in otherstates, under whose laws they would ordinarily be

of anotherstatewhichhadthemostsignificantrelationshipto

the

spouses

and

the

marriage

at

the

time

of

the

marriage.”).

15 Seeid.§90(“Noactionwillbeentertainedonaforeigncause

of action the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong publicpolicyof theforum.”). 16Lanham v. Lanham ,117N.W.787,788(Wis.1908).

http:///reader/full/policy.15http:///reader/full/policy.15http:///reader/full/divorce.16http:///reader/full/divorce.16http:///reader/full/policy.15http:///reader/full/divorce.16


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valid.”17 Illinois courts have reached the sameoutcomeonsimilarfacts,statingthat“courtswillnotunder the guise of comity between states enforce orcarry into effect or recognize a foreign contract,which isvoidunderthestatutesof thisstate,wherethestatuteisadeclarationof publicpolicy.”18

The Alabama Supreme Court employed similarreasoning when declining to recognize a marriagebetween an uncle and niece even though the

marriage

was

valid

at

the

place

of

celebration.19 It

held that the “Legislature is fully competent todeclare what marriages shall be void in its ownstate, notwithstanding their validity in the statewhere celebrated, whether contracted betweenpartieswhowereingoodfaithdomiciledinthestatewhere the ceremony was performed, or betweenpartieswholeftthestateof domicileforthepurposeof avoiding its statute, when theycome orreturn tothe state.”20 And when faced with the same

question,

Connecticut

and

New

Jersey

courts

have

likewise declined to recognize out-of-statemarriages.21

17 Id.;seealsoIn re Est. of Toutant ,633N.W.2d692,697(Wis. App.2001)(similarremarriageprohibitionandresult). 18Nehring v. Nehring ,164Ill. App.527,532(Ill. App.2dDist. 1911). 19Osoinach

v.

Watkins ,

180

So.

577,

581

(Ala.

1938).

20

Id. 21 See, e.g., Catalano v. Catalano , 170 A.2d 726, 728 (Conn.

1961) (declining to recognize Italian marriage between uncle andniece);Bucca v. State ,128 A.2d506, 510 (N.J.Super.Ch. Div.1957)(similarfacts).

http:///reader/full/celebration.19http:///reader/full/celebration.19http:///reader/full/marriages.21http:///reader/full/marriages.21http:///reader/full/celebration.19http:///reader/full/marriages.21


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The VirginiaSupremeCourthasalsorefused torecognize a foreign marriage that conflicts with itsstate’s public policy.22 New Hampshire courts too,have declined to recognize out-of-state marriages,explaining that the place of celebration “rule holdsonlywhereitdoesnotstandopposedtothereligion,morality, or . . . institutions of the [jurisdiction] inwhich it is sought to be applied.”23 Finally,Kentucky’shighestcourthasdeclaredvoidanout-of-statemarriagebetweenfirstcousinseventhoughtheparties

at

the

time

of

their

marriage

were

domiciled

in the place of celebration and the marriage wasvalidthere.24

Theforegoingdiscussionthusdemonstrates,andour country’s history further attests, that there isnothing novel or unusual about a state declining torecognizeamarriagefromanother jurisdictionwhenextending that recognition would conflict with thestate’sownpublicpolicy.25

22Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp .,4S.E.2d364,368-69(Va.1939) (refusing torecognizesister-statemarriagebecauseitwas“bigamousandcontrarytoourlawsandpublicpolicy”).23 True

v.

Ranney ,

21

N.H.

52,

55

(1850)

(in

refusing

to

recognize a sister-state marriage because one party lackedmentalcapacity).24Ex parte Bowen ,247S.W.2d379,379(Ky.1952).25 See also Lynn D. Wardle, From Slavery to Same-Sex Marriage: Comity Versus Public Policy in Inter-Jurisdictional

Recognition

of

Controversial

Domestic

Relations ,

2008

B.Y.U.L.

Rev.

1855,

1863

(2008)

(“The

tension

between

comity

and

domestic policy when a foreign-created controversialrelationship is introduced into another jurisdiction is [not]novelintheareaof familylaw....”).

http:///reader/full/policy.22http:///reader/full/policy.22http:///reader/full/there.24http:///reader/full/there.24http:///reader/full/policy.25http:///reader/full/policy.25http:///reader/full/policy.22http:///reader/full/there.24http:///reader/full/policy.25


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BBBB.... TTTThhhheeee FFFFuuuullllllll FFFFaaaaiiiitttthhhh aaaannnndddd CCCCrrrreeeeddddiiiitttt CCCCllllaaaauuuusssseeee DDDDooooeeeessssNNNNooootttt CCCCoooommmmppppeeeellll SSSSttttaaaatttteeeessss ttttoooo RRRReeeeccccooooggggnnnniiiizezezezeMMMMaaaarrrrrrrriiiiaaaaggggeeeessss tttthhhhaaaatttt aaaarrrreeee CCCCoooonnnnttttrrrraaaarrrryyyy ttttoooo TTTThhhheeeeiiiirrrrPPPPuuuubbbblllliiiiccccPPPPoooolllliiiiccccyyyy....

The Full Faith and Credit Clause, Article IV,Section1,of theConstitutionstates,“FullFaithandCreditshallbegiventoeachStatetothepublic Acts,Records, and judicial Proceedings of every otherState. And the Congress may by general Laws

prescribe

the

Manner

in

which

such

Acts,

Records,

and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effectthereof.”26 TheFullFaithandCreditClauseenabledthe sovereign states to come together to form oneunion without requiring that everything citizensestablish in one state must be forfeited when theymove to another state,27 but the Clause does notrequire a state to recognize the policies of anotherstate when doing so would undermine that state’sownpublicpolicy.

In

Baker

v.

General

Motors

Corp .,28 this

Court

explained the differing constitutional obligations of stateswhenassessingsister-state lawasopposedtoasister-state judgment:

Our precedent differentiates the creditowed to laws (legislative measures and

26U.S.Const.art.IV,§1.27 See

Erin

O’Hara

O’Connor,

Full

Faith

and

Credit

Clause ,

in

THEHERITAGE GUIDE TO THECONSTITUTION (2D ED.),

availableat

http://www.heritage.org/constitution#!/articles/4/essays/121/full-faith-and-credit-clause.28522U.S.222(1998).

http://www.heritage.org/constitution#!/articles/4/essays/121/fullhttp://www.heritage.org/constitution#!/articles/4/essays/121/full


20/41

11

common law) and to judgments. “Innumerous cases this Court has heldthat credit must be given to the

judgmentof anotherstatealthoughtheforum would not be required toentertain the suit on which the

judgment was founded.” Milwaukee County , 296 U.S., at 277, 56 S.Ct., at234. The Full Faith and Credit Clausedoes not compel “a state to substitutethe

statutes

of

other

states

for

its

own

statutes dealing with a subject matterconcerning which it is competent tolegislate.”Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n , 306 U.S.493, 501, 59 S.Ct. 629, 632 (1939); seePhillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts , 472U.S. 797, 818–819, 105 S.Ct. 2965,2977–2978 (1985). Regarding

judgments, however, the full faith and

credit

obligation

is

exacting.

A

final judgment inoneState, if renderedbya

court with adjudicatory authority overthe subject matter and personsgoverned by the judgment,qualifies forrecognition throughout the land. Forclaimandissuepreclusion(res judicata)purposes, inotherwords, the judgmentof therenderingStategainsnationwideforce. A court may be guided by theforum State’s “public policy” in

determining

the

law

applicable

to

a

controversy. See Nevada v. Hall, 440U.S.410,421–424,99S.Ct.1182,1188–


21/41

12

1190, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979). But ourdecisions support no roving “publicpolicy exception” to the full faith andcreditdue judgments.29

Since laying out this standard inBaker , this Courtreaffirmed in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt 30 that“fullfaithandcredit ‘islessdemandingwithrespecttochoiceof laws’thanitiswithrespectto judgments.”31 Thus, because a marriage is not a

judgment,32 courts

may

consult

“the

forum

State’s

‘publicpolicy.’”33

29Id.at232-33(emphasisinoriginal).30538U.S.488(2003).31 Richard S. Myers, The Public Policy Doctrine and Interjurisdictional Recognition of Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships ,

3

Ave

Maria

L.

Rev.

531,

536

(2005)

(quoting

Hyatt , 538 U.S. at 494). This Court inHyatt confirmed that“the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel ‘a state tosubstitute the statutes of other states for its own statutesdealing

with

a

subject

matter

concerning

which

it

is

competent

to

legislate.’”

Hyatt ,

538

U.S.

at

494

(quoting

Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486U.S.717,722 (1988)andPacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306U.S.493,501(1939)).32 See Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of Non- Traditional

Marriages ,

32

Creighton

L.

Rev.

147,

167

(1998)

(“Totreatamarriage...asa ‘judgment’wouldmakenonsenseoutof agreatdealof existingfull-faith-and-creditdoctrine. If amarriage license is a ‘judgment,’ then every one of thehundreds of decisions that have refused to recognize out-of-state marriages has been an undetected violation of the

Clause.”)

(footnote

omitted);

Jeffrey

L.

Rensberger,

Same-Sex Marriages and the Defense of Marriage Act: A Deviant View of

an Experiment in Full Faith and Credit ,32Creighton L.Rev.409,421-22(1998)(“A marriageisnota judgmentforfullfaithandcreditpurposes...but(truly)a“ministerial”act. ... [A]ll

http:///reader/full/judgments.29http:///reader/full/judgments.29http:///reader/full/judgments.29


22/41

13

Windsor pointsoutthat“[m]arriagelawsvaryinsome respects from State to State,” such as “therequiredminimumage”and“thepermissibledegreeof consanguinity.”34 Becauseastatehasgoodpolicyreasons for promoting marriage as the union of amanandawoman,itdoesnothavetoacceptout-of-state marriages that undermine its own policypreferences. A state may apply its own marriagelaws in preference to an out-of-state policy that it

judges would undermine its own policy, because “asa

sovereign

[it]

has

a

rightful

and

legitimate

concern

inthemaritalstatusof personsdomiciledwithin itsborders.35

That a state can defer to its own public policymeans that when a state is considering whether torecognizeasister-statemarriage,thestateissimplydeciding whether to apply itsown law or the law of anotherstate. Itisachoiceof lawmatter. Itisnotamatter of recognizing a judgment under full faith

and

credit.

of thehallmarksof a judicialproceedingaremissing. There is neither adversariness nor a neutral decisionmaker with the power to grant or deny relief. Indeed, there is no decisionmaker

empowered

to

decide

what

law

to

apply

.

.

.

.”)

(footnotesomitted). 33Baker ,522U.S.at232-33. 34 Windsor , 133 S.Ct. at 2691-92. See also Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Interstate Pluralism: The Role of Federalism in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate , 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1703,

1743-1795

(assessing

the

empirical

snapshot

of

the

states

to show

how

states

are

fundamentally

different

from

one

another

inculture,conditions,andsocietalvalues). 35 Williams v. North Carolina , 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942) (emphasisadded).

http:///reader/full/borders.35http:///reader/full/borders.35http:///reader/full/borders.35


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14

Notably, there is widespread agreement amonglegalscholarsthattheFullFaithandCreditClausedoes not require states to recognize out-of-statemarriages that conflict with their own domesticrelations policy. Indeed, a recognized expert in theconflictsof lawfield,ProfessorPatrickBorchers,haslong recognized that “the Full Faith and CreditClausecannotbelegitimatelyinvolvedtoremovethe[same-sexmarriage]debatefromthepoliticalarena.Likealargenumberof otherissuesof contemporaryconcern,

same-sex

marriage

will

have

to

be

decided

statebystate.”36

Even supporters of same-sex marriage readilyacknowledge that the Full Faith and Credit Clausedoes not require one state to recognize a same-sexmarriageformedinanotherstate. ProfessorJoannaGrossman, for instance, has stated that “[t]heassumption that recognition of . . . same-sexmarriages by other states would be both compelled

and

automatic

.

.

.

represented

.

.

.

wishful

thinking”

on the part of same-sex marriage proponents.37

Going further, she acknowledged that “[t]he legalpredicate” for the claim that the Full Faith andCredit Clause would require one state to recognizeanother state’s same-sex marriage “was at bestexaggerated” and “at worst a complete fiction.”38

“Historically speaking,” Professor Grossmanobserved,“over the long history of variations among

36

Borchers,

supra ,

at

185. 37 Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the

Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws , 84 Or. L. Rev. 433, 449(2005)(emphasisadded). 38Id.at452.

http:///reader/full/proponents.37http:///reader/full/proponents.37http:///reader/full/proponents.37


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15

and conflicts between state marriage laws, full faith and credit principles have never been understood to compel one state to recognize another’s marriages .”39

YaleLawProfessorLeaBrilmayerhasexpressedsimilarsentiments:

[M]arriages entered into in one state havenever been considered constitutionallyentitled to automatic recognition in other

states.

This

is

in

part

because

marriages

are

not like judicial judgments, which areannounced only after lengthy formal courtproceedings in which both sides arerepresentedbycounsel. It isalsobecauseof the special importance in American law of familyrelationships,which...makesfamilylaw distinctive. Finally, it has always beentooeasy forpeopletoavoidtheirhome-statelaw by traveling to another state to takeadvantage of more lenient marriage laws.For

all

of

these

reasons,

states

have

always

had greater freedom to re-examine thevalidity of marriages entered into elsewherethantheyhavetore-examinethemeritsof a

judicialawardinatortorcontractcase. Thestatehasarighttotakeintoaccountitslocal“publicpolicy.”40

39Id.

40

Myers,

supra ,

at

540

(quoting

Judicial

Activism

vs. Democracy:

What

Are

the

National

Implications

of

the

Massachusetts Goodridge Decision and the Judicial Invalidationof TraditionalMarriageLaws?:HearingBeforethe UnitedStatesSenateCommitteeontheJudiciary,108thCong.


25/41

16

Thus, “most scholars agree, as a matter of constitutional theory and interpretation, that statesare not compelled under the Full Faith and CreditClause to honor a marriage that undermines astrongpublicpolicyof thestate.”41

This is especially true where, as here, Congresshas spoken pursuant to its express authority underthe Clause.42 Although this Court invalidatedSection 3 of DOMA in Windsor —which simply

forbade

the

federal

government

from

recognizing

same-sex marriages performed in a state thatpermitted them—the Court left intact DOMA Section 2, which specifically frees the states fromanyobligation theymightotherwisehaveunder theClause to recognize same-sex marriage performedout of state.43 Section2 of DOMA clearly foreclosesanyopportunityforPetitionerstorelyupontheFull

63,

68-67

(2004)

(prepared

statement

of

R.

Lea

Brilmayer,

Professor,

Yale

University

School

of

Law)).

41Grossman, supra ,at454.42 See Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act ,32 Creighton L. Rev. 255, 391 (1998) (explaining that thehistorical

“evidence

is

compelling

that

Congress

was

intended

tohavebroadpowertocreatestatuteslike[Section2of]DOMA under

the

Effects

Clause”).

43 See28U.S.C.§1738C (“NoState,territory,orpossessionof the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to giveeffect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any

other

State,

territory,

possession,

or

tribe

respecting

arelationship

between

persons

of

the

same

sex

that

is

treated

as

a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from suchrelationship.”).

http:///reader/full/Clause.42http:///reader/full/Clause.42http:///reader/full/state.43http:///reader/full/state.43http:///reader/full/Clause.42http:///reader/full/state.43


26/41

17

Faith and Credit Clause in challenging the man-womanmarriagelawsatissueinthesecases.

To be sure, DOMA Section 2 and the FullFaithand Credit Clause do not by themselves dispose of Petitioners’recognitionclaimsundertheFourteenth

Amendment. But the mere existence of the FullFaith and Credit Clause—combined with theabsence of any language in the Fourteenth

Amendment dealing with recognition issues—

strongly

suggests

that

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

does not require a state to recognize an out-of-statemarriagethatconflictswithitsownpublicpolicy. If the Congress that adopted the Fourteenth Amendmentandsent ittothestates forratificationhad intended to restrain the states in exercisingtheir traditional authority to determine whether torecognize rights afforded under the laws of anotherstate, that Congress would have been expected toinclude such a provision in the Fourteenth

Amendment.

The

absence

of

such

a

provision

strongly suggests that recognition claims should bedealt with exclusively under the Full Faith andCreditClause. Andasexplainedabove,thatClausedoes not require states to recognize same-sexmarriagesformedotherstates.

CCCC.... OOOOnnnn MMMMaaaatttttttteeeerrrrssss oooof ff f CCCChhhhooooiiiicccceeee oooof ff f LLLLaaaawwww,,,, SSSSttttaaaatttteeeessss aaaarrrreeeeFFFFrrrreeeeeeee ttttoooo A AA AppppppppllllyyyyTTTThhhheeeeiiiirrrrOOOOwwwwnnnnLLLLaaaawwwwUUUUnnnnddddeeeerrrr tttthhhheeeeDDDDuuuueeee PPPPrrrroooocccceeeessssssss CCCCllllaaaauuuusssseeee iiiif ff f MMMMiiiinnnniiiimmmmaaaallllllllyyyyCCCCoooonnnnnnnneeeecccctttteeeedddd ttttoooo tttthhhheeee PPPPaaaarrrrttttiiiieeeessss oooof ff f tttthhhheeee

TTTTrrrraaaannnnssssaaaaccccttttiiiioooonnnn....

Theconstitutional limitationsonchoiceof law— as opposed to enforcement of judgments—are


27/41

18

minimal. A statemayapply itsown law if ithas“asignificant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,creatingstateinterests,suchthatchoiceof its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentallyunfair.”44 ThisisthetestunderboththeFullFaithand Credit Clause and under the Due ProcessClause.45 Of course, in the marriage-recognitioncasesbeforethisCourt,thesame-sexcouplesseekingrecognition of their out-of-state unions aredomiciliariesof therespondentstates. Thattheyaredomiciled

in

those

states

provides

more

than

significant contact with those states to justify thestates’ application of their own laws and publicpolicy.

More broadly, sufficient connections will likelyexist in the vast run of same-sex marriagerecognition cases. The factors that influence andlimit forum selection also create an interest in theforum. If,forexample,thesuitisbroughtinastate

because

the

party

opposing

recognition

of

a

same-sex

marriage has connections with that state, the statewill have an interest in not burdening that partywith liability based upon recognition of thatmarriage. On theotherhand, if the suit is broughtin the state because the same-sex couple, or one of the spouses, has some residence, property,employment, or other connections with that statemakingitconvenienttosueinthatforum,theforum

44 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts , 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985)(quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague ,449U.S.302,312-13 (1981)). 45Id.

http:///reader/full/Clause.45http:///reader/full/Clause.45http:///reader/full/Clause.45


28/41

19

state will likewise have an interest due to theconnectionsof oneof thesame-sexspouses.

Indeed, the law of jurisdiction ensures that astate will almost always have a connection to thecase. Andthatsameconnectionwillsatisfythedueprocess and full faith and credit test for sufficientcontactscreatingstate interests. In theeventof anoutlier,sayacase inwhich jurisdiction isnotbaseduponcontactsbutuponserviceof processwithinthe

state,

the

completely

unconnected

forum

would

be

barred from applying its own law under theShutts test.46

Thus, interested states are constitutionallypermitted to apply their own law to same-sexmarriages, and any concern about unconnectedstates applying their law is already handled byexistinglimitations.

DDDD.... SSSSttttaaaatttteeeessss MMMMuuuusssstttt BBBBeeee PPPPeeeerrrrmmmmiiiitttttttteeeedddd ttttoooo A AA Avvvvooooiiiidddd

A AA Appppppppllllyyyyiiiinnnngggg

LLLLaaaawwwwssss

oooof ff f

OOOOtttthhhheeeerrrr

SSSSttttaaaatttteeeessss

TTTThhhhaaaatttt

OOOOf ff ff ff feeeennnnddddFFFFoooorrrruuuummmmPPPPoooolllliiiicccciiiieeeessss....

Should the Court declare that the Constitutionrequires interstate recognition of same-sexmarriages, the traditional autonomy of each statefrom the laws of their sister-states will beundermined. Ournationisapluralone. Statesareallowed,withinconstitutionallimits,tomakechoicesas to how their societies will be structured. Onmanymatters,statesdifferlittle. Suchwasthecaseuntil

recently

on

the

definition

of

marriage.

But

46Shutts ,472U.S.at818.


29/41

20

occasionally spectacular disagreements arise amongthe states. Traditionally, the Constitution has notbeeninterpretedtorequireeachstatetoagreetotheother’s policy. In fact, such a result is logicallyabsurd, as it would appear to require that “thestatute of each statemust be enforced in the courtsof theother,butcannotbeinitsown.”47

Today, in addition to same-sex marriage, statesare divided over legalization of marijuana. Must a

state

that

has

not

legalized

marijuana

recognize

and

enforce a contract for the sale of marijuana inanother state that has legalized use of thatsubstance? State law also differs on the legality of prostitution. Surelyastatecandeclinetorecognizea Nevada contract for prostitution services on theground of public policy. Are states bound to acceptall contracts from other states involving surrogatemothers? Must states enforce gambling contractseventhoughsuchcontractsarevoidundertheirown

law?

If

a

state

has

decided

as

a

matter

of

consumer

protectionthatarbitrationclausesareagainstpublicpolicy, must it nonetheless enforce them if they areenforceable under the law of another state? Muststates enforce contracts formed in other states forthesaleof bodypartsor tissue formedicalresearchortreatment?

Inshort,muchuncertaintywouldbeunloosed if the Court refuses to allow states the autonomy todecline toapplysister-state lawwithwhich ithasa

profound

disagreement.

Unless

the

Court

carves

out

47 Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Acc. Comm’n .,294 U.S.532,547(1935).


30/41

21

one rule for same-sex marriage and another for allother legal relationships—a proposition that seemsindefensible—it is hard to see where the rush toenforcement of sister-state law will end. This willhave the unfortunate effect of impoverishing thediversity of legal and political arrangementsthroughoutourpluralnation.

Moreover,if recognitionistobedemandedinthecontextof same-sexmarriages,itishardlyclearthat

the

state

to

do

the

yielding

should

be

the

state

of

domicile rather than the state of celebration. As amatterof respect for sister-state law, itwould seemthattherealinterloperisthestateof celebrationif itgrantsamarriagetotwopersonsdomiciledinstatesthat disallow same-sex marriages. As ProfessorStan Cox has argued, the place of celebration ruleseems perverse when applied to couples whoknowinglyevadethelawsof theirhomestate:

A more arbitrary and illogical choice of law

rule

is

hard

to

imagine.

Although

the place of celebration can hardly becalled “fortuitous” (after all, the brideandgroomquitedeliberatelyarrangetobethere),theplacewherethemarriageis celebrated is merely the place wherethe marriage is celebrated. It is notnecessarilytheplacewherethemarriedcouple will live out their married life.Surely the state where the marriage is

manifested,

in

the

living

out

of

themarried life together, has the only

legitimate interest in placingprohibitionsuponwhocanmarrywhom


31/41

22

orwhatmustbedonebeforeacoupleisconsideredqualifiedtomarry. Afterall,thepointof aprohibitiononmarriageisnot for purposes of the ceremony, butfor purposes of living togetherthereafter as man and wife. Thus, thelawof thestateof themaritaldomicile,not the law of the place of celebration,should determine the validity of amarriage.48

States have interests in recognizing or notrecognizing marriages wholly apart from tangible,material, consequentialist reasons. Windsor explicitly recognizes this. One reason New Yorkallowedsame-sexmarriageswastogrant“dignity”tosuch relations.49 Now, if a state has a sufficientinterestindignifyingagivenrelationship—if thatisa sufficient basis for state action as Windsor suggests—thenbythesamereasoningastatewould

equally

have

an

interest

in

choosing

to

dignify,

perhaps uniquely, other relationships. States, thatis, have interests in asserting their people’s ownvalues through their laws and in avoiding the

48 Stanley

E.

Cox,

DOMA

and

Conflicts

Law:

Congressional

Rules and Domestic Relations Conflicts Law ,32CREIGHTONL.REV.1063,1069-70(1999).49 SeeWindsor , 133 S. Ct. at 2692. (“By its recognition of thevalidityof same-sexmarriagesperformedinother jurisdictionsand then by authorizing same-sex unions and same-sex

marriages,

New

York

sought

to

give

further

protection

anddignity

to

that

bond

.

.

.

a

far-reaching

legal

acknowledgment

of

the intimate relationship between two people, a relationshipdeemedbytheStateworthyof dignity inthecommunityequalwithallothermarriages”).

http:///reader/full/marriage.48http:///reader/full/marriage.48http:///reader/full/relations.49http:///reader/full/relations.49http:///reader/full/marriage.48http:///reader/full/relations.49


32/41

23

imposition of contrary values adopted by otherStates.50

ThisCourthasrecognizedthesame principle inanalogous contexts. For example, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.Campbell ,51 theCourtinvalidatedondueprocessgroundsapunitivedamageawardbased inpartonout-of-stateconductthat was (or might have been) treated differentlyunderthelawsof thesecondstate. Inreachingthat

conclusion,

the

Court

quoted

with

approval

an

earlier decision,Huntington v. Attrill ,52 which heldthatstate“[l]awshavenoforceof themselvesbeyondthe jurisdictionof theStatewhichenactsthem,andcanhaveextra-territorialeffectonlybythecomityof other States.”53 Requiring a State that does notallow same-sex marriage to recognize such amarriage formed in another state would flatlycontravene that bedrock principle—in effectpermittingthesecondstatetosetmarriagepolicyfor

the

first

state.

Similarly, the Court inState Farm quoted withapproval its earlier decision in New York Life Insurance Co. v. Head ,54 whichheldthat”itwouldbe

50 Professor Joseph Singer has argued for an “expansive definition[] of state interests . . . . [He rejects] the usual practice of confining state interests to the pragmatic or expedient, like keeping people off the welfare rolls.” Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts , 70 B.U. L.

REV.

731,

741

(1990). 51538U.S.408,421(2003)(Kennedy,J.).

52146U.S.657(1892). 53Id.at669. 54234U.S.149(1914).

http:///reader/full/States.50http:///reader/full/States.50http:///reader/full/States.50


33/41

24

impossible to permit the statutes of [one state] tooperate beyond the jurisdiction of that State . . .without throwing down the constitutional barriersby which all the States are restricted within theorbits of their lawful authority.”55 That principleapplies here as well: Forcing a state that definesmarriageasaunionbetweenamanandawomantorecognize a same-sex marriage obtained in anotherstatewouldallowthesecondstatetoextend itsownpolicy beyond the “orbit of [its] lawful authority.”Such

a

rule

would

thus

“throw[]

down

the

constitutional barriers” that ensure that each Stateremainssovereignwithinitsown“orbit.”

Thesesettledprinciples—andthefactthatstateshaveinterestsinrecognizingorrefusingtorecognizemarriages—clearlydistinguishWindsor . Thereisnofederal interest in determining whetherpersons aremarried. AstheCourtexplained,

Consistent with this allocation of authority,

the

Federal

Government,

through our history, has deferred tostate-law policy decisions with respectto domestic relations. In De Sylva v. Ballentine , 351 U.S. 570, 76 S.Ct. 974(1956), for example, the Court heldthat, “[t]o decide who is the widow orwidower of a deceased author, or whoarehisexecutorsornextof kin,”undertheCopyright Act “requiresa reference

to

the

law

of

the

State

which

createdthose legal relationships” because

55Id.at161.


34/41


35/41

26

wherever performed, so long as itwas lawful at theplaceof celebration.

EEEE.... DDDDeeeecccclllliiiinnnniiiinnnngggg ttttoooo RRRReeeeccccooooggggnnnniiiizezezeze MMMMaaaarrrrrrrriiiiaaaaggggeeee RRRRiiiigggghhhhttttssssDDDDooooeeeessss NNNNooootttt DDDDeeeessssttttrrrrooooyyyy tttthhhheeee UUUUnnnnddddeeeerrrrllllyyyyiiiinnnnggggMMMMaaaarrrrrrrriiiiaaaaggggeeee....

Denying recognition does not take awaymarriagerights. It justrefusestorecognizethemina particular state. A same-sex couple can still

enforce

their

marriage

rights

in

other

states

that

grantorchoosetorecognizesame-sexmarriages. A refusal to recognize a marriage does not end themarriage,itsimplyrulesthatitmaynotbeenforcedor recognized in a particular state. Indeed, thisCourt has observed that a “state may, on occasion,decline to enforce a foreign cause of action. In sodoing, it merely denies a remedy, leavingunimpaired the plaintiff’s substantive right, so thatheisfreetoenforceitelsewhere.”57

IIIIIIII....

TTTThhhheeee

MMMMaaaarrrrrrrriiiiaaaaggggeeee

RRRReeeeccccooooggggnnnniiiittttiiiioooonnnn

LLLLaaaawwwwssss

CCCChhhhaaaalllllllleeeennnnggggeeeedddd

iiiinnnn

TTTThhhheeeesssseeee CCCCaaaasssseeeessss aaaarrrreeee UUUUnnnnlllliiiikkkkeeee tttthhhheeee FFFFeeeeddddeeeerrrraaaallll LLLLaaaawwww tttthhhhaaaatttttttthhhheeeeCCCCoooouuuurrrrttttSSSSttttrrrruuuucccckkkkDDDDoooowwwwnnnn iiiinnnnW WW Wi ii in nn nd dd ds ss so oo or rr r ((((SSSSeeeeccccttttiiiioooonnnn3333oooof ff f FFFFeeeeddddeeeerrrraaaallllDDDDOOOOMMMMA AA A))))....

Petitioners wrongly assert that as a result of Windsor , individual states, much like the federalgovernment, are now constitutionally bound torecognize as valid same-sex marriages entered intoin other states. (See Bourke App. Br. 52-54).Whether it was right or wrong as to Section 3 of DOMA,

Windsor

strongly

supports

the

authority

of

a

57Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper ,286U.S.145,160(1932).


36/41

27

state to define marriage: Every single time thatWindsor talksabouttheinfirmitiesof DOMA Section3,itmentionsthatthestatehadchosentorecognizea union that the federal government was excluding.Themajorityopinionthusexpresslysaidthat itwasCongress’sdeviationfromthedefaultof deferencetostatemarriagedefinitionsthatdroveitsopinion.

Windsor confirms that there is nothing unusualabout the autonomy of the states to define and

regulate

marriage

for

themselves.

The

Court

stated

inWindsor that “[t]herecognitionof civil marriagesis central to state domestic relations law applicableto its residents and citizens.”58 In addition, “[t]hedefinitionof marriageisthefoundationof theState’sbroaderauthoritytoregulatethesubjectof domesticrelationswithrespect to the ‘protectionof offspring,property interests, and the enforcement of maritalresponsibilities.’”59 Furthermore,theCourtaffirmedthat “[t]he states, at the timeof the adoptionof the

Constitution,

possessed

full

power

over

the

subject

of

marriage and divorce . . . [and] the Constitutiondelegated no authority to the Government of theUnited States on the subject of marriage anddivorce.”60

Most notably, the Windsor Court held that“consistent with this allocation of authority, theFederal Government, through our history, hasdeferredtostate-lawpolicydecisionswithrespectto

58Windsor ,133S.Ct.at2691. 59Id. 60Id.


37/41

28

domestic relations.”61 InWindsor , the public policyof New York reflected its own community’sperspectivebyfirstrecognizingthevalidityof same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions andthen later licensing same-sex marriages in state.Sincethestatesatissuehavenotchosentoredefinemarriage,theyshouldbelefttoautonomouslyretaintheir interest indefiningandregulating themaritalrelationship to reflect their own communities’consideredperspectives.62

Furthermore, Windsor carefully distinguishesthe federal intrusion of DOMA Section 3 from therun-of-the-mill responsibility of the states for theregulation of their own domestic relations. Thisresponsibility is “an important indicator of thesubstantialsocietal impactthestate’sclassificationshave in the daily lives and customs of its people.”63

TheSupremeCourt inWindsor struckdownSection3 of federal DOMA because it created two

contradictory

marriage

regimes

within

a

state

that

had redefined marriage.64 However, the strongthreadof Windsor stillremainsthatthestateshavethe right, without intrusion of the federalgovernment, to reflect their own public policies intheir own laws. United States District Judge JuanPerez-Gimenez recently highlighted this feature of Windsor :

61Id. 62Id.at2692-93. 63Id.at2693. 64Id.at2694.

http:///reader/full/perspectives.62http:///reader/full/perspectives.62http:///reader/full/marriage.64http:///reader/full/marriage.64http:///reader/full/perspectives.62http:///reader/full/marriage.64


38/41

29

The Windsor opinion did not create afundamental right to same gendermarriagenordid itestablish thatstateopposite-gender marriage regulationsare amenable to federal constitutionalchallenges. If anything, Windsor stands for the opposite proposition: itreaffirms the States’ authority overmarriage, buttressing Baker ’sconclusionthatmarriageissimplynotafederal

question.65

This Court too should conclude that Windsor supports the authority of states to define marriagefortheirowncommunitiesandtodeclinetorecognizeout-of-state unions that conflict with their chosenmarriagedefinition.

IIIIIIIIIIII.... A AA A RRRRuuuulllliiiinnnngggg f ff foooorrrr tttthhhheeee SSSSttttaaaatttteeeessss oooonnnn tttthhhheeee FFFFiiiirrrrsssstttt QQQQuuuueeeessssttttiiiioooonnnnPPPPrrrreeeesssseeeennnntttteeeedddd NNNNeeeecccceeeessssssssaaaarrrriiiillllyyyy RRRReeeeqqqquuuuiiiirrrreeeessss aaaa RRRRuuuulllliiiinnnngggg f ff foooorrrr tttthhhheeeeSSSSttttaaaatttteeeessssoooonnnntttthhhheeeeSSSSeeeeccccoooonnnnddddQQQQuuuueeeessssttttiiiioooonnnn....

The outcome of these cases rises or falls on theCourt’s resolution of the first question presented:whethertheFourteenth Amendmentrequiresastatetolicenseamarriagebetweentwopeopleof thesamesex. If Petitioners prevail on that question, theinterstate recognition issue becomes irrelevant

65Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla (D.P.R.)(D.P.R.Oct.21,2014)(No. 14-1253), 2014 WL 5361987. See also Baker v. Nelson ,

409

U.S.

810

(1972).

“It

takes

inexplicable

contortions

of

themind

or

perhaps

even

willful

ignorance—this

Court

does

not

venture an answer here—to interpretWindsor ’s endorsementof thestatecontrolof marriageaseliminatingthestatecontrolof marriage.” Conde-Vidal ,2014WL5361987at*8.

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becausesame-sexmarriageswillpresumablyexistinall50states. Butif Petitionersdonotprevailonthefirst question presented, the Court will necessarilyhave found a sufficient rational or compelling basisfor defining marriage as the union of a man and awoman. And this same basis suffices for a state’sdecision not to recognize out-of-state unions thatconflictwithitsmarriagedefinition.

Judge Sutton observed this very point during

oral

arguments

in

the

proceedings

below,

stating:

Isn’t the first question whether a State candecide for itsownpurposes, itsowncitizens,whetherto[license]same-sexmarriage? Andif itdecidesit’snotgoingtodothat,fornow,andif theU.S.Constitution .. .permitsthatchoice,...itseemsreallyoddtomethat[theState] can be told, “Okay, even though youcanmakethatchoiceforyourowncitizen, if someone comes from another State, thatpublic-policy

choice

doesn’t

bind

you.”

... Andviceversa,...if theState...underthe Fourteenth Amendment must [license]same-sexmarriageswithin itsState, thenof course, it follows, [the plaintiffs] win therecognitionpoint.66

There is thus no logical basis for this Court’sanswer to the first question presented to deviate

66

Audio

of

Oral

Argument

at

29:23-30:13,

Obergefell

v.

Himes ,No.

14-3057

(6th

Cir.

Aug.

6,

2014),

available at http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/court_audio/aud1.php.This citation is to the audio recording downloaded from thereferencedwebsite.

http:///reader/full/point.66http:///reader/full/point.66http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/court_audio/aud1.phphttp:///reader/full/point.66http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/court_audio/aud1.php


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from its answer to the second. Therefore, once theCourtaffirmsthattheConstitutiondoesnotrequirethe states to redefine marriage, it shouldcorrespondingly confirm, for the reasons stated inthisbrief,thatstatesneednotrecognizeout-of-stateunions that conflict with their public policy onmarriage. In both licensing and recognition, thestates’ sovereignty over the definition of marriageremainsinviolate.

CCCCOOOONNNNCCCCLLLLUUUUSSSSIIIIOOOONNNN

The staggering implications of Petitioners’recognition claims starkly illustrate theirfoundational flaws. Their constitutional theory, if credited, would effectively require each state toconform itsmarriagepolicy tothevaryingmarriagepoliciesenactedinotherstates. That,inturn,wouldterminate states’ ability to serve as “laboratories”that independently experiment with domestic-relations (and other social) policy.67 Rather thanfostering

the

states’

freedom

to

experiment

with

different approaches to difficult social questions,Petitioners’theorywouldempowerone laboratorytocommandeertheothers,essentiallynationalizingthemarriagepolicyof themostinventivestate. Becausethat cannot be the law, theCourt should affirm theCourtof Appeals’decision.

67 SeeOregon v. Ice , 555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009);New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann , 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting).

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Respectfully submitted,

HERBERT K. DOBY

Counsel of Record

215 East 21st Avenue

PO Box 130

Torrington, WY 82240

(307) 532-2700

[email protected]

N ATHANIEL S. HIBBENNathaniel S. Hibben, P.C.

215 East 21st Avenue

Torrington, WY 82240

(307) 532-2700

[email protected]
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]

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