10.11.2012 - saumitra jha
DESCRIPTION
Trade, Institutions and Ethnic Tolerance: Evidence from South AsiaTRANSCRIPT
Trade, Institutions and Ethnic Tolerance:Evidence from South Asia
Saumitra JhaStanford Graduate School of Business
Fellow, CSDP and Niehaus CGG, Princeton
IFPRI, October 2012
February 27th, 2002: Godhra, Gujarat
Feb-Apr 2002: Ahmadabad massacres, Surat peace
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Ahmadabad
Surat
Godhra
0 60 12030 Miles
I Ahmadabad: 13 percentMuslim: 24+ days rioting,324+ dead (including old city).
I Surat: 12.3 percent Muslim: 6days of rioting, 9+ dead (innew suburbs)
I Over the course of 20thcentury- Ahmadabadriot-prone;Surat, “an oasis of peace”.
The research agenda
I How do we encourage cooperation and peacefulco-existence between members of different ethnic,religious and social groups?
I What strategies have achieved these aims historically?I What lessons can such strategies provide for
contemporary policy?I Financial innovations (“Swords into Bank Shares”)(Jha 08,
Jha and Mitchener, in prog.)I Organizational capacity acquired through war (among
vulnerable minorities)(Jha and Wilkinson 12)I Exogenous ∆ inter-ethnic complementarities
This paper
Can exogenous changes that generate robust inter-ethniccomplementarities have a lasting effect on peacefulco-existence in ethnically- diverse societies?
In South Asia- yes.
This paper finds...
200 yrs after decline of exogenous, non-replicable minoritycomplementarities in overseas trade, medieval ports that werethe geographical focuses of the resulting Hindu-Muslimexchange:I 5x ↓ Hindu-Muslim riots (S. Asia, 1850-1950), (Gujarat, 2002).
I 25 pp ↓ any Hindu-Muslim riot
I 10x ↑ survival probability of tolerance each year (thoughdiminishing over time).
Despite: ↑ ethnic mix, ↓ income. In fact, effects bigger in larger,more ethnically diverse towns. Further, household andtown-level evidence for:I ∆ voting consistent with minority safe havens (Gujarat 2002)I ∆ in between group inequality, membership in inter-ethnic
organizations, sustained ethnic specialization in trade, behaviouralmeasures of minority trust, 2005
Mechanisms: what it might be and what it ain’t
Evidence that highlights role of exogenous non-replicableminority complementarity. Not just:I . . . Historic wealth in towns which lacked complementarities (mint
towns).I . . . Or medieval trade (inland trade routes) or modern trade (modern
ports) where complementarities could be replicatedI . . . Or survivorship (medieval towns)I . . . Or historic human capital by itself (artisanal towns) - in fact human
capital and institutions are complements
I . . . Or selection of ports due to continued congenial geography
I Silted medieval ports show similar effects to other ports.I Medieval natural harbour driver of medieval port location
was medieval period-specific (does not predict colonialports).
Trade and polarisation: Somnath temple, sacked 1026
Medieval ports and religious violence in India
Riots, 1850-1950 Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD# of Hindu-Muslim Riots 476 1.116 3.416 53 0.925 5.487 59 0.136 0.472Any H-M Riot 476 0.418 0.494 53 0.170 0.379 59 0.102 0.305# Killed in H-M Riots 476 23.277 242.361 53 88.906 639.995 59 0.136 0.571Total Days of H-M Riots 476 1.630 11.301 53 3.000 20.598 59 0.051 0.289
Colonial Era Outcomes and Covariates% Muslims 1901 244 29.879 17.732 20 18.596 14.884 22 32.449 22.101Mun. Income per Capita 316 1.805 3.092 28 2.155 2.6382 28 1.580 1.103Colonial Overseas Port (1907) 476 0.038 0.191 53 0.170 0.379 59 0.356 0.483Log. Population 1901 476 9.672 1.129 53 9.420 1.209 59 9.170 1.315
Natural Harbours, Not Medieval Ports
Towns, Not Medieval Ports
Medieval Ports
A paradox?
I Montesquieu (18C): commerce encourages “civility”between individuals due to mutual self-interest.
I However: Chua (21C): commercially-oriented ethnicminorities are often the focuses of ethnic violence.
I Examples:I Chinese in IndonesiaI Indians in East AfricaI Many others.
A framework
Focus: environments with “non-local” ethnic minorities: betteroutside options.
Our example: “non-local” Muslim traders had externalresources (information and ties to the Middle East): madeleaving town less costly than for “local” Hindus.
Conditions that favour “peaceful co-existence”
(SPNE with mixed populations, full production, no leaving)1. Non-locals provide complementary goods
I If not: “strong” locals have incentive to target non-locals toseize goods and induce non-locals to leave, reducing futurecompetition
I If so: reduced incentive for ethnic violence: if non-localsleave, non-local- supplied goods become more costly infuture.
2. High cost to seize or replicate source of other group’scomplementarity.
I If not: incentive to violently seize or (over time) replicate.
3. Mechanism to redistribute gains from exchangeI If not: complementarity + limited supply⇒ higher returns
for non-local goods⇒ incentive for strong locals to seizenon-local profits.
Formal model
Muslims in medieval Indian ports
Diogo Homem 1558)
I Complementarity:Pilgrimage↔ Trade
I Non-expropriable,replicable (intangible,network externalities)
I Non-violent transfers:Ease of entry
I Complementary“institutional”mechanisms: culturalnorms, organizations,beliefs.
(source: Diogo Homem 1558)
A 1000 years of religious tolerance?
HogenburgandBraun(1572)
Now in all these (Malabari ports) thepopulation became much increased and thenumber of buildings enlarged, by means of thetrade carried on by the Mahomedans, towardswhom the chieftains of those places abstainedfrom all oppression; and, notwithstanding thatthese rulers and their troops were all pagans,they paid much regard to their prejudices andcustoms, and avoided any act of aggression onthe Mahomedans, except on someextraordinary provocation; this amicablefooting being the more remarkable, from thecircumstance of the Mahomedans not forminga tenth part of the population . . .- Shaikh Zaynnudin al Ma’abari,Tuhfat-ul-Mujahideen, 1528.
Definitions
RiotsI a violent confrontation between 2 communally-identified
groupsI newspaper reports, official records
Medieval trading ports:I Evidence of direct overseas trade, prior to 18th C &
independent of Europeans.I Periplus Maris Erythraei (ca. 1st-3rd C) Traveller’s
narratives (eg Ibn Battuta 1355, di Verthema 1503, Zayn alDin 1528) Imperial gazetteers (1907)
New GIS:(Ain-i-Akbari, ca 1590s-1707)
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Surat
Cochin
Calicut
VeravalBalasore
Mangalore
Porbandar
Agra
Delhi
Patna
Lahore
Bijapur
Lucknow
Ahmadabad
Hyderabad
Legend! Internal Trade Route
Navigable Rivers
$+ Mughal Mints
# Medieval PortsMuslim Rule to 1707 (Years)
0 - 100
102 - 2
00
202 - 3
00
327 - 4
00
410 - 5
00
501 - 6
00
625 - 7
00
712 - 8
00 900
903 - 1
000
0 150 300 450 60075 Kilometers
GIS allows a rich set of controls and correlates
1. Initial geographic factors: Latitude/ Longitude2, Prox. tocoast, coastal town, Prop. natural disasters, Prox.navigable rivers
2. Historical factors: Prox. Ganges (caste), CenturiesMuslim Rule, Mint Town, Skilled Crafts, Historical Shi’a rule
3. Contemporaneous factors: Province / Native Stateintercepts, Modern overseas port
4. Correlates: Prop. Muslim 2 in town, district, Municipalincome per capita
Medieval S. Asia(Ain-i-Akbari, ca 1590s-1707)
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Surat
Cochin
Calicut
VeravalBalasore
Mangalore
Porbandar
Agra
Delhi
Patna
Lahore
Bijapur
Lucknow
Ahmadabad
Hyderabad
Legend! Internal Trade Route
Navigable Rivers
$+ Mughal Mints
# Medieval PortsMuslim Rule to 1707 (Years)
0 - 100
102 - 2
00
202 - 3
00
327 - 4
00
410 - 5
00
501 - 6
00
625 - 7
00
712 - 8
00 900
903 - 1
000
0 150 300 450 60075 Kilometers
Legacies: Religious Demography
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LegendMedieval Ports (% Muslim 1931)#*
61 - 80#*#*#* 0 - 20
Mughal Mints (% Muslim 1931)
$+61 - 80
$+$+$+ 0 - 20Towns (% Muslim 1931)
(61 - 80
((( 0 - 20Prop. Muslim 1942 (Deciles)
0.000
0.001 - 0
.018
0.019 - 0
.037
0.038 - 0
.060
0.061 - 0
.083
0.084 - 0
.128
0.129 - 0
.179
0.180 - 0
.494
0.495 - 0
.759
0.760 - 1
.000
0 150 300 450 60075 Kilometers
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Legend# Riots, 1850-1950 (Quintiles)
D
1D
2D
3D4 -
5D6 -
40
Medieval Ports (% Muslim 1931)
#*61 - 80
#*#*#* 0 - 20Mughal Mints (% Muslim 1931)
$+61 - 80
$+$+$+ 0 - 20Towns (% Muslim 1931)
(61 - 80
((( 0 - 20Prop. Muslim 1942 (Deciles)
0.000
0.001 - 0
.018
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.037
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.060
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.083
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.128
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.179
0.180 - 0
.494
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.759
0.760 - 1
.000
0 150 300 450 60075 Kilometers
Exogenous Driver: medieval natural harbours
Exogenous Driver: medieval natural harbours
Determinants of medieval port location
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
OutcomeTown at Medieval Natural Harbour 0.187*** 0.176*** 0.180*** 0.210** 0.263*** 0.299*** 0.368*** -0.040 -0.033
[0.054] [0.051] [0.060] [0.072] [0.064] [0.059] [0.086] [0.091] [0.116]Town <10km from Modern Coast 0.457*** 0.434*** 0.427*** 0.399*** 0.453*** 0.414*** 0.356** 0.524*** 0.501*** 0.564*** 0.593***
[0.083] [0.093] [0.087] [0.094] [0.114] [0.111] [0.126] [0.091] [0.106] [0.134] [0.153]Log. Distance to Modern Coast -0.014 -0.016 -0.010 -0.008 -0.012 -0.008 -0.004 -0.024 -0.030 -0.005 -0.002
[0.015] [0.014] [0.038] [0.045] [0.029] [0.033] [0.038] [0.015] [0.028] [0.021] [0.031]Log. Distance to Navigable River 0.013 0.008 0.014 0.173*** -0.004 -0.060 0.253*** 0.004 -0.018 -0.002 0.016
[0.008] [0.008] [0.046] [0.052] [0.023] [0.089] [0.072] [0.007] [0.021] [0.009] [0.013]Natural Disasters, 1850-1900 0.014 0.012 0.034 0.037 0.011 0.026 0.028 0.014 0.014 -0.002 -0.002
[0.012] [0.012] [0.026] [0.030] [0.017] [0.041] [0.045] [0.012] [0.018] [0.002] [0.005]Log. Distance to Ganges -0.001 -0.001 -0.037 -0.196*** -0.001 0.083 -0.248*** -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.010
[0.006] [0.008] [0.031] [0.038] [0.005] [0.079] [0.080] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007]Medieval Town 0.051 0.118 0.197* 0.024 0.111 0.203* 0.034 0.020
[0.033] [0.070] [0.092] [0.031] [0.097] [0.111] [0.029] [0.023]Mughal Mint in Town -0.039 -0.046 -0.029 -0.026 -0.004 0.069 -0.062 -0.046
[0.033] [0.073] [0.097] [0.035] [0.089] [0.114] [0.048] [0.030]Other Medieval Patronage Center 0.026 0.053 0.029 0.028 -0.006 -0.055 0.039 0.067**
[0.035] [0.074] [0.069] [0.053] [0.114] [0.117] [0.052] [0.030]Medieval Inland Trade Route -0.010 -0.075 -0.138 -0.001 -0.046 -0.137 -0.028 0.004
[0.036] [0.093] [0.115] [0.042] [0.119] [0.149] [0.037] [0.025]Medieval Skilled Crafts in Town 0.045 0.058 0.046 0.020 -0.037 -0.091 0.072* -0.104*
[0.035] [0.105] [0.128] [0.039] [0.059] [0.078] [0.040] [0.054]Major Shi'a state before 1857 0.007 0.018 0.003 -0.026 0.116 0.111 -0.010 0.044
[0.038] [0.094] [0.106] [0.059] [0.096] [0.091] [0.094] [0.089]Centuries Muslim Rule -0.014 -0.050 -0.071*** -0.028 -0.026 -0.101 -0.025 0.019
[0.015] [0.031] [0.021] [0.039] [0.107] [0.075] [0.038] [0.023]F-test (Natural Harbour) 12.17 12.03 8.97 8.61 17.1 25.49 18.32 0.19 0.08Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.78Sample Full Full Coastal,
<200kmCoastal, <100km
Full Coastal, <200km
Coastal, <100km
Full Full Full Full
Province / NS x Annexation FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No YesObservations 248 248 110 89 248 110 89 248 248 248 248R-squared 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.59 0.64 0.55 0.63
__Overseas Ports 1907_ Medieval Overseas Ports (7th- 17th Century)
Medieval ports and religious violence in India
Riots, 1850-1950 Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD# of Hindu-Muslim Riots 476 1.116 3.416 53 0.925 5.487 59 0.136 0.472Any H-M Riot 476 0.418 0.494 53 0.170 0.379 59 0.102 0.305# Killed in H-M Riots 476 23.277 242.361 53 88.906 639.995 59 0.136 0.571Total Days of H-M Riots 476 1.630 11.301 53 3.000 20.598 59 0.051 0.289
Colonial Era Outcomes and Covariates% Muslims 1901 244 29.879 17.732 20 18.596 14.884 22 32.449 22.101Mun. Income per Capita 316 1.805 3.092 28 2.155 2.6382 28 1.580 1.103Colonial Overseas Port (1907) 476 0.038 0.191 53 0.170 0.379 59 0.356 0.483Log. Population 1901 476 9.672 1.129 53 9.420 1.209 59 9.170 1.315
Natural Harbours, Not Medieval Ports
Towns, Not Medieval Ports
Medieval Ports
Frequency of Religious Riots (1850-1950) # of Hindu-Muslim Riots in Town, 1850-1950
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Neg. Bin. (I. Ratios)
Neg. Bin. (I. Ratios)
Neg. Bin. (I. Ratios)
Neg. Bin. (I. Ratios)
Neg. Bin. (I. Ratios)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Medieval Overseas Port 0.209*** 0.291*** 0.074*** 0.019*** 0.013** -0.958* -1.330* -1.468** -1.176*[0.101] [0.125] [0.050] [0.023] [0.028] [0.483] [0.679] [0.640] [0.555]
Town >10km from Modern Coast 6.768* 3.670 3.571 3.705 5.228 1.527 0.589 0.305 0.295[6.999] [3.313] [4.384] [3.270] [5.428] [1.002] [0.701] [0.180] [0.424]
Log. Distance to Modern Coast 1.167 1.147 0.948 0.937 0.954 0.123 0.005 -0.029 -0.028[0.256] [0.246] [0.278] [0.151] [0.373] [0.165] [0.153] [0.112] [0.185]
Log. Distance to Navigable River 1.200*** 1.272*** 1.409*** 8.736* 1.017 0.399** 0.523 0.079 -0.118[0.083] [0.067] [0.156] [11.115] [1.005] [0.171] [0.367] [0.130] [0.144]
Natural disasters, 1850-1900 1.093 1.054 1.043 0.778 0.759 0.044 0.037 0.036 0.036[0.066] [0.043] [0.073] [0.173] [0.227] [0.073] [0.069] [0.058] [0.026]
Log. Distance to Ganges 0.838*** 0.891 0.952 0.220 1.811 -0.666** -0.393 0.290* 0.708***[0.050] [0.065] [0.086] [0.231] [1.735] [0.260] [0.358] [0.149] [0.210]
Medieval Town 1.196 1.414* 4.113* 1.685 0.211 0.448 0.128[0.270] [0.260] [3.162] [1.780] [0.239] [0.343] [0.297]
Mughal Mint in Town 2.167*** 1.553 1.628 1.561 0.678 1.265** 1.726**[0.610] [0.417] [0.941] [1.717] [0.715] [0.492] [0.576]
Other Medieval Patronage Center 0.846 1.254 1.089 2.380 0.659 -0.197 0.063[0.244] [0.434] [0.186] [1.928] [0.647] [0.199] [0.185]
Medieval Inland Trade Route 1.420* 1.198 0.837 1.665 0.400 0.833 1.339**[0.283] [0.221] [0.658] [1.706] [0.419] [0.517] [0.532]
Medieval Skilled Crafts in Town 1.891* 2.322** 5.934*** 6.164* 1.613 1.303 1.134[0.616] [0.812] [3.214] [6.710] [1.002] [0.951] [0.916]
Major Shi'a state before 1857 1.540 0.391 0.463 0.165 -1.843** -0.630 -1.022*[0.667] [0.432] [0.688] [0.239] [0.874] [1.046] [0.509]
Centuries Muslim Rule 1.196 1.023 0.506 1.819 -0.056 -0.301 -0.248[0.130] [0.130] [0.236] [1.063] [0.237] [0.546] [0.409]
Sample Full Full Full Coastal, <200km
Coastal, <100km
Full Full Coastal, <200km
Coastal, <100km
Province / NS x Annexation FE No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes YesObservations 248 248 248 110 89 248 248 110 89R-Squared 0.17 0.44 0.51 0.59
Probability of any H-M Riot, 1850-1950Any H-M Riot, 1850-1950? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit, dF/dX
Probit, dF/dX
Probit, dF/dX
Probit, dF/dX
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Medieval Overseas Port -0.237*** -0.223*** -0.227*** -0.194*** -0.227*** -0.202*** -0.266*** -0.264** -0.161[0.071] [0.060] [0.042] [0.046] [0.070] [0.063] [0.071] [0.098] [0.099]
Town <10km from Modern Coast 0.467*** 0.456** 0.319 0.116 0.405** 0.139 0.278* 0.145 0.034[0.159] [0.184] [0.195] [0.132] [0.167] [0.118] [0.143] [0.098] [0.145]
Log. Distance to Modern Coast 0.042 0.039 0.034 -0.002 0.041 0.003 0.006 -0.003 -0.034[0.048] [0.048] [0.043] [0.041] [0.035] [0.042] [0.038] [0.047] [0.048]
Log. Distance to Navigable River 0.028 0.062 0.205** 0.133 0.036 0.193** 0.108*** 0.194* 0.134[0.034] [0.039] [0.096] [0.117] [0.023] [0.074] [0.031] [0.107] [0.160]
Natural disasters, 1850-1900 0.024* 0.024 0.015 0.008 0.021 -0.002 0.029 0.013 0.003[0.014] [0.015] [0.018] [0.017] [0.013] [0.017] [0.023] [0.030] [0.009]
Log. Distance to Ganges -0.054* -0.044 -0.215** -0.095 -0.053** -0.127 -0.017 -0.131 -0.003[0.032] [0.035] [0.104] [0.150] [0.019] [0.077] [0.020] [0.117] [0.155]
Medieval Town -0.024 0.000 -0.049 -0.025 -0.061 0.001 -0.060[0.067] [0.073] [0.100] [0.081] [0.058] [0.092] [0.067]
Mughal Mint in Town 0.138 0.087 0.195 0.179 0.038 0.027 0.074[0.133] [0.185] [0.242] [0.216] [0.108] [0.184] [0.259]
Other Medieval Patronage Center 0.128 0.210** 0.141 0.158 0.156 0.157 0.141[0.114] [0.084] [0.139] [0.126] [0.112] [0.107] [0.179]
Medieval Inland Trade Route 0.214*** 0.194 0.287 0.268* 0.148** 0.247* 0.371*[0.072] [0.143] [0.182] [0.142] [0.056] [0.140] [0.182]
Medieval Skilled Crafts in Town -0.044 0.215 0.246 0.182 0.104 0.255 0.295[0.125] [0.230] [0.307] [0.234] [0.111] [0.174] [0.240]
Major Shi'a state before 1857 -0.163 -0.202*** -0.176*** -0.348 -0.320** -0.393 -0.338**[0.112] [0.047] [0.052] [0.197] [0.140] [0.224] [0.154]
Centuries Muslim Rule 0.061* 0.072 0.106 0.097** 0.028 -0.006 0.047[0.034] [0.048] [0.081] [0.041] [0.058] [0.195] [0.072]
Smith-Blundell Exogeneity Test: c2(1) 0.012 0.053 0.027 0.216
Prob> c2(1) 0.914 0.818 0.869 0.642Sample Full Full Coastal,
<200kmCoastal, <100km
Full Coastal, <100km
Full Coastal, <200km
Coastal, <100km
Controls Initial Medieval Medieval Medieval Initial Medieval Medieval Medieval MedievalProvince / NS x Annexation FE No No No No No No Yes Yes YesObservations 248 248 110 89 248 89 248 110 89R-squared 0.21 0.40 0.42 0.45 0.58
Complementarities, Human Capital and PoliticsOLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)(A) # of Hindu- Muslim Riots in Town (1850-1950)Medieval Overseas Port -0.532 -0.902* -0.899** -1.330** -1.478
[0.454] [0.529] [0.356] [0.518] [0.894]Medieval Skilled Crafts in Town 2.015* 1.927* 2.380*
[1.165] [1.108] [1.248]Medieval Port x Skilled Town -2.734*** -2.201* -3.678**
[0.978] [1.263] [1.492]Centuries Muslim Rule (to 1707) 0.169 0.166
[0.123] [0.126]Town under Muslim Ruler (1850-1947) -1.095* -1.098
[0.628] [0.629]Town under Hindu/Sikh Ruler (1850-1947) -0.848** -0.850**
[0.403] [0.407]Medieval Port x Centuries Muslim Rule -0.063
[0.250]R-squared 0.27 0.44 0.60 0.27 0.27(B) Probability of Any Hindu-Muslim Riot in Town (1850-1950)Medieval Overseas Port -0.206** -0.250*** -0.237** -0.235*** -0.053
[0.077] [0.084] [0.107] [0.058] [0.097]Medieval Skilled Crafts in Town -0.017 0.115 0.306*
[0.113] [0.127] [0.169]Medieval Port x Skilled Town 0.002 -0.081 -0.173
[0.269] [0.292] [0.275]Centuries Muslim Rule (to 1707) 0.041 0.044
[0.033] [0.032]Town under Muslim Ruler (1858-1947) -0.130 -0.127
[0.145] [0.147]Town under Hindu/ Sikh Ruler (1858-1947) -0.097 -0.096
[0.081] [0.077]Medieval Port x Centuries Muslim Rule 0.078**
[0.031]R-squared 0.27 0.42 0.45 0.27 0.28Sample Full Full Coastal,
<200kmFull Full
Controls Medieval Medieval Medieval Medieval MedievalProvince/NS x Annexation FE No Yes Yes No NoObservations 248 248 110 248 248
Placebos and Robustness(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A) Coefficient on Overseas Port in 1907 (OLS)# H-M Riots, 1850-1950 -0.346 0.326 0.085 0.201 0.306 0.591 0.690
[0.542] [0.549] [0.616] [0.573] [0.919] [0.807] [0.770]R-squared 0.16 0.26 0.36 0.48 0.43 0.46 0.57
Any H-M Riot, 1850-1950 0.066 0.084 0.034 0.057 0.148 0.082 0.095[0.133] [0.117] [0.119] [0.116] [0.142] [0.120] [0.101]
R-squared 0.21 0.26 0.30 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.57B) Coefficient on Medieval Port Silted by 1901 (OLS)# H-M Riots, 1850-1950 -0.410 -1.308*** -1.245** -1.298** -1.187* -1.439** -1.375*
[0.371] [0.417] [0.533] [0.564] [0.635] [0.671] [0.716]R-squared 0.16 0.26 0.39 0.51 0.44 0.49 0.59
Any H-M Riot, 1850-1950 -0.217** -0.272** -0.233* -0.198** -0.203 -0.201 -0.096[0.106] [0.111] [0.111] [0.086] [0.126] [0.144] [0.150]
R-squared 0.21 0.27 0.31 0.40 0.41 0.44 0.57C) Coefficient on Medieval Port (2SLS)# H-M Riots, 1850-1950 -3.734 -3.938 -3.550* -2.056 -3.363* -2.374** -2.118**
[2.323] [2.531] [2.005] [1.421] [1.979] [1.034] [0.966]Any H-M Riot, 1850-1950 -0.472 -0.253 -0.657 -0.359 -0.240 -0.637 -0.648*
[0.553] [0.543] [0.526] [0.298] [0.370] [0.415] [0.333]Sample Full Full Coastal,
<200kmCoastal, <100km
Full Coastal, <200km
Coastal, <100km
Province / NS x Annex FE No No No No Yes Yes YesObservations 248 248 110 89 248 110 89
Less Wealth, More Ethnically Mixed(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A) OLS Medieval Overseas Port 0.140** 0.126* 0.103 -0.385** -0.384* -0.424*
[0.058] [0.072] [0.079] [0.168] [0.209] [0.211]Medieval Town 0.058** 0.074** -0.358** -0.218
[0.028] [0.032] [0.143] [0.158]Mughal Mint in Town 0.056** 0.062** 0.056 0.059
[0.025] [0.028] [0.198] [0.158]Other Medieval Patronage Center 0.002 -0.036 -0.050 0.046
[0.027] [0.025] [0.147] [0.141]Medieval Inland Trade Route 0.027 0.021 0.091 -0.016
[0.025] [0.030] [0.135] [0.121]Medieval Skilled Crafts in Town -0.015 0.009 0.636** 0.381
[0.039] [0.043] [0.306] [0.261]R-squared 0.38 0.42 0.55 0.11 0.22 0.5B) IVMedieval Overseas Port 0.299** 0.420** 0.355** -1.899** -2.463** -2.678***
[0.135] [0.187] [0.174] [0.832] [1.166] [0.914]C) Placebo (OLS)Port with foreign trade, 1907 0.042 0.041 0.018 -0.425* -0.142 0.236
[0.066] [0.079] [0.101] [0.235] [0.226] [0.350]R-squared 0.37 0.41 0.54 0.11 0.21 0.49SampleObservations 237 237 237 195 195 195
Controls Initial Medieval Medieval Initial Medieval MedievalProvince / NS x Annexation FE no no yes no no yes
|%Muslims in Town - District| Log Mun. Income Per Capita
British MunicipalitiesSubcontinental
Interactions with Population; Ethnic Mix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)Neg. Bin. (I. Ratios)
Neg. Bin. (I. Ratios)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Medieval Overseas Port 0.479*** 0.534** -1.213** -0.882* -0.472 -0.455 -1.292** -0.893*[0.127] [0.154] [0.544] [0.462] [0.526] [0.617] [0.538] [0.466]
Log Population, 1901 2.884*** 2.793*** 0.487* 0.610 1.652*** 1.443*** 0.432 0.540[0.249] [0.352] [0.273] [0.372] [0.412] [0.427] [0.274] [0.368]
% Muslim in town, 1901 1.398*** 1.334** 0.070 0.021 0.390*** 0.356* 0.097 -0.003[0.158] [0.164] [0.136] [0.177] [0.124] [0.178] [0.168] [0.185]
% Muslim in town2, 1901 0.872** 0.859*** 0.041 0.086 -0.219*** -0.220*** -0.139 -0.126[0.048] [0.046] [0.043] [0.061] [0.077] [0.074] [0.135] [0.125]
Medieval Port x Log Population -1.248** -1.601*** -1.490* -1.712[0.559] [0.543] [0.830] [1.221]
Medieval Port x % Muslim -0.428* -0.111 -0.026 -0.076[0.247] [0.311] [0.299] [0.368]
Medieval Port x % Muslim2 0.282* 0.151 0.060 0.086[0.139] [0.118] [0.104] [0.105]
Observations 248 248 110 89 248 248 110 89R-squared 0.54 0.64 0.38 0.41 0.58 0.69F-test (Medieval Port Variables) 3.95 3.84 1.46 1.39Prob>F 0.01 0.01 0.27 0.29Sample Full Full Coastal,
<200kmCoastal, <100km
Full Full Coastal, <200km
Coastal, <100km
Controls Initial Medieval Medieval Medieval Initial Medieval Medieval MedievalProvince / NS x Annex FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
The survival of religious tolerance in India’s towns:1850-1995
Other Towns
Medieval Ports
Khi
lafa
t Mov
emen
t Fai
ls
Par
titio
n
Oil
Sho
cks
0.2
5.5
.75
1
0 50 100 150
years elapsed since 1850
The survival of religious tolerance in India’s towns:1850-1950
Hazard Ratios (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Medieval Port 0.165*** 0.118*** 0.075*** 0.047*** 0.004***
[0.058] [0.064] [0.020] [0.049] [0.007]Mughal Mint in Town 1.598 6.723* 1.488 3.632
[0.504] [6.932] [0.416] [6.452]Medieval Inland Trade Route 1.706*** 5.645** 1.655*** 5.534
[0.245] [4.291] [0.286] [7.488]Medieval Skilled Crafts in Town 1.910*** 1.292 2.197*** 1.867
[0.468] [0.996] [0.583] [3.061]Centuries Muslim Rule 1.314** 2.490*** 1.148 3.801**
[0.159] [0.639] [0.179] [2.158]Sample Full Full Full,
Coastal (<100km)
Full Full, Coastal
(<100km)Controls Initial Medieval Medieval Medieval MedievalProvince/ NS x Annex FE No No No Yes YesLog-Likelihood -1088.98 -1046.26 -86.13 -1005.69 -81.01Observations 408 408 107 408 107
Continuity and Change, India’s towns: 1850-1995
Incidence Ratios in Medieval Ports (1) (2) (3) (4)1850-1950 0.108*** 0.073*** 0.089*** 0.064***
[0.054] [0.074] [0.039] [0.053]1950-1980 0.232* 0.229 0.190* 0.188*
[0.185] [0.255] [0.163] [0.174]1980-1995 3.491 4.261 3.207 4.020
[2.771] [4.832] [3.039] [5.391]Observations 407 180 407 1801931 % Muslim Polynomial No No Yes YesState FE (1991 boundaries) Yes Yes Yes YesGeographic & Historic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample FullCoastal
<200km FullCoastal
<200km
Between Group Inequality, IHDS urban sample,2004-5
0.0
5.1
0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30
Urban Non-Port Sample Urban Sample, Medieval Port is Dist HQ
Muslim Non-Muslim
Ker
nel D
ensi
ty
Composite Household Assets Scale (1-30)
Graphs by District HQ is a Medieval Port
Occupational Specialization, IHDS urban sample,2004-5
Prop. Muslim, Other Urban
Prop. Muslim, Medieval Port HQ
0 .1 .2 .3 .4Muslim Share of Employment Category, 2004-5
Others
Pension/Rent
Profession NEC
Salaried Emp
Organized Business
Small Trade
Artisan
Non-Ag Labor
Ag Labor
Allied Ag
Cultivation
Other Urban Medieval Port HQ
Trust and Organizations, IHDS urban sample, 2004-5
OLS, Observations= 14820 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)Panel A: Assets and Trust
Medieval Port is District HQ 0.007 0.012 -0.008**[0.017] [0.026] [0.004]
Muslim Household -0.075*** -0.053*** 0.004 0.013 0.013 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.010***[0.008] [0.007] [0.017] [0.011] [0.011] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Med. Port x Muslim Household 0.070*** 0.041* -0.068** -0.068** -0.068** -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.010***[0.022] [0.022] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
R-squared 0.12 0.27 0.1 0.35 0.35 0.01 0.03 0.04Panel B: OrganizationsMedieval Port is District HQ 0.085*** 0.062** -0.03
[0.026] [0.027] [0.019]Muslim Household -0.043*** -0.037*** -0.029*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.015*** 0.050*** 0.015 0.022**
[0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.015] [0.010] [0.010]Med. Port x Muslim Household 0.011 -0.007 -0.013 0.072 0.03 0.028 0.102* 0.092** 0.086**
[0.035] [0.029] [0.030] [0.052] [0.051] [0.051] [0.055] [0.039] [0.040]R-squared 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.36 0.36Household Wealth Control No No Yes No No Yes No No YesFixed Effects State District District State District District State District District
`A Lot of Conflict' in Mohalla Refused Polio Vaccine
Business/ Trade Union Credit/ Savings Religious/ Social/ Festival
Household Asset Score (0-1)
Gujarat, Feb 27- April 15, 2002
Gujarat, Feb 27- April 15, 2002
Feb-Apr 2002: Ahmadabad massacres, Surat peace
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Ahmadabad
Surat
Godhra
0 60 12030 Miles
I Ahmadabad: 13 percentMuslim: 24+ days rioting,324+ dead (including old city).
I Surat: 12.3 percent Muslim: 6days of rioting, 9+ dead (innew suburbs)
I Over the course of 20thcentury- Ahmadabadriot-prone;Surat, “an oasis of peace”.
Gujarat assembly elections, 1998 and 2002
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Bhuj
Daman
Morvi
Patan
Surat
Amreli Broach
Godhra
Gondal
Mahuva
Mandvi
Nadiad
RajkotBaroda
NavsariVeraval
Jamnagar
Jaitpore
Junagadh
Palanpur
Ahmadabad
BhavnagarPorbandar
0 60 12030 Miles
LegendWinning Party
BJPINCINDJD(U)
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Bhuj
Daman
Morvi
Patan
Surat
Amreli Broach
Godhra
Gondal
Mahuva
Mandvi
Nadiad
RajkotBaroda
NavsariVeraval
Jamnagar
Jaitpore
Junagadh
Palanpur
Ahmadabad
BhavnagarPorbandar
0 60 12030 Miles
LegendWinning Party
BJPINCINDJD(U)
Polarised voting: In non-port constituencies, six point swing to BJPfollowing violence. In constituencies with medieval trade legacy, a sixpoint swing away from the BJP.
Institutional continuity (17-21C)
Coast Muslim trading groups
Strong community organisation
Medieval complementary
services
Medieval institutions 19th century/ contemporary
complementary services
19th century/ contemporary institutions Contemporary residential integration
Additional barriers to replication
Inter-religious organisations
Transfer mechanisms
Additional barriers to replication
Inter-religiousorganisations
Transfer mechanisms
Gujarat Arabs, Daudi Bohras, Memons,
Nizari Ismailis
Yes7 Trans-oceanic shipping
Apprenticeship restrictions5
Merchant Guilds, Political
delegations2
Commercial taxation3, Joint
ventures2
Agate, Carnelians1, Silver thread
weaving5, Yarn and Diamond
cutting, (Gulf / SE Asia
networks)4
Apprenticeship restrictions5,
Administrative sanctions,
Social sanctions
(Kaala-paani)1
Peace committees,
Business associations4,
National political party
``minority wings''7
Political donations,
Joint ventures6,
Local public goods,
Disaster relief7
Yes4,7
Malabar/ Central West
Arabs, Bearys, Koyas, Mappilas,
Nawaiyats
None evident
Trans-oceanic shipping
Social sanctions (Kaala-paani)8
Political delegations8
Commercial taxation, Joint ventures, Ease of conversion, Local public
goods8
(Gulf networks), Commodities
trading4,9
Social sanctions
(Kaala-paani)2
Peace committees, Chambers of commerce,
Clubs4,9
Local public goods9
Yes4,9
Coromandel (East)
Marraikayars, Persians, Labbais
Yes10,11 Trans-oceanic shipping
None evident None evident Commercial taxation, Joint
ventures10, Voluntary
donations to Hindu-specific public goods11
pearl diving, coastal shipping, (Gulf/ SE Asia
networks)10
None evident Regional political parties10
No10,11
Sources: 1: Mehta (1991), 2: Dasgupta (2000) 3: Thapar (2004), 4: Varshney (2002), 5: Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency (1899), Haynes (1991), 6: Concerned Citizens Tribunal (2002), 7: personal interviews, Blank (2001), 8: al Malibari (1528), di Verthema (1503), Bouchon (2000), 9: Osella (2003), 10: More (1997), 11: S. Bayly (1989)
Porbandar: medieval and modern Bohrajamaatkhanas
Surat: Bohra headquarters
Old Ahmadabad: segregated neighbourhoods (pols)
The Sephardim (15-20C)
I Complementarity:connections with Atlanticeconomy
I Non-expropriable,replicable (intangible,network externalities)
I Non-violent transfers(large-scale immigration)
Lessons for peace in fragmented societies
I Complementarity between groups.I Organisations that match by complementary skills in joint
business ventures (eg Ismailis).I Education: complete homogenisation of human capital may
be counter-productive.I Competition within groups (sharing mechanisms)
I Explicit inter-ethnic public goods provision may mitigateshocks.
I Provision of shares in trading ventures to locals may alsoalign incentives, foster organisation (Jha, 2007).
Theoretical extension
I Transfers go to biggest threat (rulers/ mob bosses) inexchange for “protection”: ethnic cronyism (eg Indonesia,Kenya)
I Rulers may face perverse incentives to “polarise”: increaseriot threat to extract greater transfers (intermittent pogromsdemonstrate value of protection)
I A more efficient eqm may exist. Explicit public goodsprovision can reduce majority incentive to expropriate.
Basic model
Timing:1. agents can leave, receiving L if non-locals or 0 if locals.2. If stay, are matched and play a two-sided prisoner’s
dilemma with two modifications:I payoff to cooperate comes from production of two goods
with externality: agents producing same good act assubstitutes, i.e. Πk (Nk ,N−k ) ↓ Nk , k ∈ {A,B} while thoseproducing different goods may be complements(Πk (Nk ,N−k ) ↑ N−k ) or substitutes (Πk (Nk ,N−k ) ↓ N−k ).Assume WLOG, non-locals produce A, locals produce B.
I payoff to “fink” comes from chance to seize other’sproduction.
Bl = F (sl − snl )Π̃nl (·)− D (1)
DefinitionA peaceful co-existence equilibrium is a subgame perfect Nashequilibrium with the following properties:
1. There is at least one member of each identity in theeconomy. iN
t ∩ K N t 6= ∅,∀i ∈ {local, nonlocal}2. ICp: Every agent produces. R = 1,∀k ∈ K N t
3. ICl : No agent has an incentive to leave.Vstay ≥ Vleave,∀k ∈ K N t
.4. ICv : No agent has an incentive to target another with
violence. Vpeace ≥ Vviolence, ∀(k , x) ∈ K × K
Two key constraints
I ICl : Non-locals should want to stay: Π(Nnl ,Nl) ≡ LI ICv : binding constraint is strongest targeting weakest:
D ≥ F (sl−snl)Πnl(Nnl ,Nl)−(1−F (sl−snl))Πl(Nl ,Nnl) ≡ �(2)
Note: if can reduce non-local payoffs through repeated violenceto violate ICL, then ICv becomes:
D ≥ �+ δΠl(Nl ,Nnl)− Πl(Nl ,Nnl − 1)
1− δ(3)
1. If substitutes: as δ ↑, ICv always violated.2. If complements: as δ ↑, ICv never violated.
Remarks:1. Higher patience or political stability leads to more (less)
violence if substitutes (complements). Examples.2. With higher patience, need high cost to replicate others’
production process, or incentive to do so, creatingsubstitutes.
3. Particularly if non-locals poor (Πnl ∼ L) (peace seemsstable), an increase in outside option may lead to suddenviolence if substitutes. e.g. Partition. Back