10.11.2012 - saumitra jha

51
Trade, Institutions and Ethnic Tolerance: Evidence from South Asia Saumitra Jha Stanford Graduate School of Business Fellow, CSDP and Niehaus CGG, Princeton IFPRI, October 2012

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Trade, Institutions and Ethnic Tolerance: Evidence from South Asia

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Page 1: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Trade, Institutions and Ethnic Tolerance:Evidence from South Asia

Saumitra JhaStanford Graduate School of Business

Fellow, CSDP and Niehaus CGG, Princeton

IFPRI, October 2012

Page 2: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

February 27th, 2002: Godhra, Gujarat

Page 3: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Feb-Apr 2002: Ahmadabad massacres, Surat peace

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Ahmadabad

Surat

Godhra

0 60 12030 Miles

I Ahmadabad: 13 percentMuslim: 24+ days rioting,324+ dead (including old city).

I Surat: 12.3 percent Muslim: 6days of rioting, 9+ dead (innew suburbs)

I Over the course of 20thcentury- Ahmadabadriot-prone;Surat, “an oasis of peace”.

Page 4: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

The research agenda

I How do we encourage cooperation and peacefulco-existence between members of different ethnic,religious and social groups?

I What strategies have achieved these aims historically?I What lessons can such strategies provide for

contemporary policy?I Financial innovations (“Swords into Bank Shares”)(Jha 08,

Jha and Mitchener, in prog.)I Organizational capacity acquired through war (among

vulnerable minorities)(Jha and Wilkinson 12)I Exogenous ∆ inter-ethnic complementarities

Page 5: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

This paper

Can exogenous changes that generate robust inter-ethniccomplementarities have a lasting effect on peacefulco-existence in ethnically- diverse societies?

In South Asia- yes.

Page 6: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

This paper finds...

200 yrs after decline of exogenous, non-replicable minoritycomplementarities in overseas trade, medieval ports that werethe geographical focuses of the resulting Hindu-Muslimexchange:I 5x ↓ Hindu-Muslim riots (S. Asia, 1850-1950), (Gujarat, 2002).

I 25 pp ↓ any Hindu-Muslim riot

I 10x ↑ survival probability of tolerance each year (thoughdiminishing over time).

Despite: ↑ ethnic mix, ↓ income. In fact, effects bigger in larger,more ethnically diverse towns. Further, household andtown-level evidence for:I ∆ voting consistent with minority safe havens (Gujarat 2002)I ∆ in between group inequality, membership in inter-ethnic

organizations, sustained ethnic specialization in trade, behaviouralmeasures of minority trust, 2005

Page 7: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Mechanisms: what it might be and what it ain’t

Evidence that highlights role of exogenous non-replicableminority complementarity. Not just:I . . . Historic wealth in towns which lacked complementarities (mint

towns).I . . . Or medieval trade (inland trade routes) or modern trade (modern

ports) where complementarities could be replicatedI . . . Or survivorship (medieval towns)I . . . Or historic human capital by itself (artisanal towns) - in fact human

capital and institutions are complements

I . . . Or selection of ports due to continued congenial geography

I Silted medieval ports show similar effects to other ports.I Medieval natural harbour driver of medieval port location

was medieval period-specific (does not predict colonialports).

Page 8: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Trade and polarisation: Somnath temple, sacked 1026

Page 9: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Medieval ports and religious violence in India

Riots, 1850-1950 Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD# of Hindu-Muslim Riots 476 1.116 3.416 53 0.925 5.487 59 0.136 0.472Any H-M Riot 476 0.418 0.494 53 0.170 0.379 59 0.102 0.305# Killed in H-M Riots 476 23.277 242.361 53 88.906 639.995 59 0.136 0.571Total Days of H-M Riots 476 1.630 11.301 53 3.000 20.598 59 0.051 0.289

Colonial Era Outcomes and Covariates% Muslims 1901 244 29.879 17.732 20 18.596 14.884 22 32.449 22.101Mun. Income per Capita 316 1.805 3.092 28 2.155 2.6382 28 1.580 1.103Colonial Overseas Port (1907) 476 0.038 0.191 53 0.170 0.379 59 0.356 0.483Log. Population 1901 476 9.672 1.129 53 9.420 1.209 59 9.170 1.315

Natural Harbours, Not Medieval Ports

Towns, Not Medieval Ports

Medieval Ports

Page 10: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

A paradox?

I Montesquieu (18C): commerce encourages “civility”between individuals due to mutual self-interest.

I However: Chua (21C): commercially-oriented ethnicminorities are often the focuses of ethnic violence.

I Examples:I Chinese in IndonesiaI Indians in East AfricaI Many others.

Page 11: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

A framework

Focus: environments with “non-local” ethnic minorities: betteroutside options.

Our example: “non-local” Muslim traders had externalresources (information and ties to the Middle East): madeleaving town less costly than for “local” Hindus.

Page 12: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Conditions that favour “peaceful co-existence”

(SPNE with mixed populations, full production, no leaving)1. Non-locals provide complementary goods

I If not: “strong” locals have incentive to target non-locals toseize goods and induce non-locals to leave, reducing futurecompetition

I If so: reduced incentive for ethnic violence: if non-localsleave, non-local- supplied goods become more costly infuture.

2. High cost to seize or replicate source of other group’scomplementarity.

I If not: incentive to violently seize or (over time) replicate.

3. Mechanism to redistribute gains from exchangeI If not: complementarity + limited supply⇒ higher returns

for non-local goods⇒ incentive for strong locals to seizenon-local profits.

Formal model

Page 13: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Muslims in medieval Indian ports

Diogo Homem 1558)

I Complementarity:Pilgrimage↔ Trade

I Non-expropriable,replicable (intangible,network externalities)

I Non-violent transfers:Ease of entry

I Complementary“institutional”mechanisms: culturalnorms, organizations,beliefs.

(source: Diogo Homem 1558)

Page 14: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

A 1000 years of religious tolerance?

HogenburgandBraun(1572)

Now in all these (Malabari ports) thepopulation became much increased and thenumber of buildings enlarged, by means of thetrade carried on by the Mahomedans, towardswhom the chieftains of those places abstainedfrom all oppression; and, notwithstanding thatthese rulers and their troops were all pagans,they paid much regard to their prejudices andcustoms, and avoided any act of aggression onthe Mahomedans, except on someextraordinary provocation; this amicablefooting being the more remarkable, from thecircumstance of the Mahomedans not forminga tenth part of the population . . .- Shaikh Zaynnudin al Ma’abari,Tuhfat-ul-Mujahideen, 1528.

Page 15: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Definitions

RiotsI a violent confrontation between 2 communally-identified

groupsI newspaper reports, official records

Medieval trading ports:I Evidence of direct overseas trade, prior to 18th C &

independent of Europeans.I Periplus Maris Erythraei (ca. 1st-3rd C) Traveller’s

narratives (eg Ibn Battuta 1355, di Verthema 1503, Zayn alDin 1528) Imperial gazetteers (1907)

Page 16: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

New GIS:(Ain-i-Akbari, ca 1590s-1707)

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Surat

Cochin

Calicut

VeravalBalasore

Mangalore

Porbandar

Agra

Delhi

Patna

Lahore

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Lucknow

Ahmadabad

Hyderabad

Legend! Internal Trade Route

Navigable Rivers

$+ Mughal Mints

# Medieval PortsMuslim Rule to 1707 (Years)

0 - 100

102 - 2

00

202 - 3

00

327 - 4

00

410 - 5

00

501 - 6

00

625 - 7

00

712 - 8

00 900

903 - 1

000

0 150 300 450 60075 Kilometers

Page 17: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

GIS allows a rich set of controls and correlates

1. Initial geographic factors: Latitude/ Longitude2, Prox. tocoast, coastal town, Prop. natural disasters, Prox.navigable rivers

2. Historical factors: Prox. Ganges (caste), CenturiesMuslim Rule, Mint Town, Skilled Crafts, Historical Shi’a rule

3. Contemporaneous factors: Province / Native Stateintercepts, Modern overseas port

4. Correlates: Prop. Muslim 2 in town, district, Municipalincome per capita

Page 18: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Medieval S. Asia(Ain-i-Akbari, ca 1590s-1707)

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Legend! Internal Trade Route

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$+ Mughal Mints

# Medieval PortsMuslim Rule to 1707 (Years)

0 - 100

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00

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00

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00

410 - 5

00

501 - 6

00

625 - 7

00

712 - 8

00 900

903 - 1

000

0 150 300 450 60075 Kilometers

Page 19: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Legacies: Religious Demography

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LegendMedieval Ports (% Muslim 1931)#*

61 - 80#*#*#* 0 - 20

Mughal Mints (% Muslim 1931)

$+61 - 80

$+$+$+ 0 - 20Towns (% Muslim 1931)

(61 - 80

((( 0 - 20Prop. Muslim 1942 (Deciles)

0.000

0.001 - 0

.018

0.019 - 0

.037

0.038 - 0

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0.084 - 0

.128

0.129 - 0

.179

0.180 - 0

.494

0.495 - 0

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0.760 - 1

.000

0 150 300 450 60075 Kilometers

Page 20: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Legacies: Religious Riots

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Legend# Riots, 1850-1950 (Quintiles)

D

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Medieval Ports (% Muslim 1931)

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Page 21: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Exogenous Driver: medieval natural harbours

Page 22: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Exogenous Driver: medieval natural harbours

Page 23: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Determinants of medieval port location

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)

OutcomeTown at Medieval Natural Harbour 0.187*** 0.176*** 0.180*** 0.210** 0.263*** 0.299*** 0.368*** -0.040 -0.033

[0.054] [0.051] [0.060] [0.072] [0.064] [0.059] [0.086] [0.091] [0.116]Town <10km from Modern Coast 0.457*** 0.434*** 0.427*** 0.399*** 0.453*** 0.414*** 0.356** 0.524*** 0.501*** 0.564*** 0.593***

[0.083] [0.093] [0.087] [0.094] [0.114] [0.111] [0.126] [0.091] [0.106] [0.134] [0.153]Log. Distance to Modern Coast -0.014 -0.016 -0.010 -0.008 -0.012 -0.008 -0.004 -0.024 -0.030 -0.005 -0.002

[0.015] [0.014] [0.038] [0.045] [0.029] [0.033] [0.038] [0.015] [0.028] [0.021] [0.031]Log. Distance to Navigable River 0.013 0.008 0.014 0.173*** -0.004 -0.060 0.253*** 0.004 -0.018 -0.002 0.016

[0.008] [0.008] [0.046] [0.052] [0.023] [0.089] [0.072] [0.007] [0.021] [0.009] [0.013]Natural Disasters, 1850-1900 0.014 0.012 0.034 0.037 0.011 0.026 0.028 0.014 0.014 -0.002 -0.002

[0.012] [0.012] [0.026] [0.030] [0.017] [0.041] [0.045] [0.012] [0.018] [0.002] [0.005]Log. Distance to Ganges -0.001 -0.001 -0.037 -0.196*** -0.001 0.083 -0.248*** -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.010

[0.006] [0.008] [0.031] [0.038] [0.005] [0.079] [0.080] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007]Medieval Town 0.051 0.118 0.197* 0.024 0.111 0.203* 0.034 0.020

[0.033] [0.070] [0.092] [0.031] [0.097] [0.111] [0.029] [0.023]Mughal Mint in Town -0.039 -0.046 -0.029 -0.026 -0.004 0.069 -0.062 -0.046

[0.033] [0.073] [0.097] [0.035] [0.089] [0.114] [0.048] [0.030]Other Medieval Patronage Center 0.026 0.053 0.029 0.028 -0.006 -0.055 0.039 0.067**

[0.035] [0.074] [0.069] [0.053] [0.114] [0.117] [0.052] [0.030]Medieval Inland Trade Route -0.010 -0.075 -0.138 -0.001 -0.046 -0.137 -0.028 0.004

[0.036] [0.093] [0.115] [0.042] [0.119] [0.149] [0.037] [0.025]Medieval Skilled Crafts in Town 0.045 0.058 0.046 0.020 -0.037 -0.091 0.072* -0.104*

[0.035] [0.105] [0.128] [0.039] [0.059] [0.078] [0.040] [0.054]Major Shi'a state before 1857 0.007 0.018 0.003 -0.026 0.116 0.111 -0.010 0.044

[0.038] [0.094] [0.106] [0.059] [0.096] [0.091] [0.094] [0.089]Centuries Muslim Rule -0.014 -0.050 -0.071*** -0.028 -0.026 -0.101 -0.025 0.019

[0.015] [0.031] [0.021] [0.039] [0.107] [0.075] [0.038] [0.023]F-test (Natural Harbour) 12.17 12.03 8.97 8.61 17.1 25.49 18.32 0.19 0.08Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.78Sample Full Full Coastal,

<200kmCoastal, <100km

Full Coastal, <200km

Coastal, <100km

Full Full Full Full

Province / NS x Annexation FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No YesObservations 248 248 110 89 248 110 89 248 248 248 248R-squared 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.59 0.64 0.55 0.63

__Overseas Ports 1907_ Medieval Overseas Ports (7th- 17th Century)

Page 24: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Medieval ports and religious violence in India

Riots, 1850-1950 Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD# of Hindu-Muslim Riots 476 1.116 3.416 53 0.925 5.487 59 0.136 0.472Any H-M Riot 476 0.418 0.494 53 0.170 0.379 59 0.102 0.305# Killed in H-M Riots 476 23.277 242.361 53 88.906 639.995 59 0.136 0.571Total Days of H-M Riots 476 1.630 11.301 53 3.000 20.598 59 0.051 0.289

Colonial Era Outcomes and Covariates% Muslims 1901 244 29.879 17.732 20 18.596 14.884 22 32.449 22.101Mun. Income per Capita 316 1.805 3.092 28 2.155 2.6382 28 1.580 1.103Colonial Overseas Port (1907) 476 0.038 0.191 53 0.170 0.379 59 0.356 0.483Log. Population 1901 476 9.672 1.129 53 9.420 1.209 59 9.170 1.315

Natural Harbours, Not Medieval Ports

Towns, Not Medieval Ports

Medieval Ports

Page 25: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Frequency of Religious Riots (1850-1950) # of Hindu-Muslim Riots in Town, 1850-1950

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

Neg. Bin. (I. Ratios)

Neg. Bin. (I. Ratios)

Neg. Bin. (I. Ratios)

Neg. Bin. (I. Ratios)

Neg. Bin. (I. Ratios)

OLS OLS OLS OLS

Medieval Overseas Port 0.209*** 0.291*** 0.074*** 0.019*** 0.013** -0.958* -1.330* -1.468** -1.176*[0.101] [0.125] [0.050] [0.023] [0.028] [0.483] [0.679] [0.640] [0.555]

Town >10km from Modern Coast 6.768* 3.670 3.571 3.705 5.228 1.527 0.589 0.305 0.295[6.999] [3.313] [4.384] [3.270] [5.428] [1.002] [0.701] [0.180] [0.424]

Log. Distance to Modern Coast 1.167 1.147 0.948 0.937 0.954 0.123 0.005 -0.029 -0.028[0.256] [0.246] [0.278] [0.151] [0.373] [0.165] [0.153] [0.112] [0.185]

Log. Distance to Navigable River 1.200*** 1.272*** 1.409*** 8.736* 1.017 0.399** 0.523 0.079 -0.118[0.083] [0.067] [0.156] [11.115] [1.005] [0.171] [0.367] [0.130] [0.144]

Natural disasters, 1850-1900 1.093 1.054 1.043 0.778 0.759 0.044 0.037 0.036 0.036[0.066] [0.043] [0.073] [0.173] [0.227] [0.073] [0.069] [0.058] [0.026]

Log. Distance to Ganges 0.838*** 0.891 0.952 0.220 1.811 -0.666** -0.393 0.290* 0.708***[0.050] [0.065] [0.086] [0.231] [1.735] [0.260] [0.358] [0.149] [0.210]

Medieval Town 1.196 1.414* 4.113* 1.685 0.211 0.448 0.128[0.270] [0.260] [3.162] [1.780] [0.239] [0.343] [0.297]

Mughal Mint in Town 2.167*** 1.553 1.628 1.561 0.678 1.265** 1.726**[0.610] [0.417] [0.941] [1.717] [0.715] [0.492] [0.576]

Other Medieval Patronage Center 0.846 1.254 1.089 2.380 0.659 -0.197 0.063[0.244] [0.434] [0.186] [1.928] [0.647] [0.199] [0.185]

Medieval Inland Trade Route 1.420* 1.198 0.837 1.665 0.400 0.833 1.339**[0.283] [0.221] [0.658] [1.706] [0.419] [0.517] [0.532]

Medieval Skilled Crafts in Town 1.891* 2.322** 5.934*** 6.164* 1.613 1.303 1.134[0.616] [0.812] [3.214] [6.710] [1.002] [0.951] [0.916]

Major Shi'a state before 1857 1.540 0.391 0.463 0.165 -1.843** -0.630 -1.022*[0.667] [0.432] [0.688] [0.239] [0.874] [1.046] [0.509]

Centuries Muslim Rule 1.196 1.023 0.506 1.819 -0.056 -0.301 -0.248[0.130] [0.130] [0.236] [1.063] [0.237] [0.546] [0.409]

Sample Full Full Full Coastal, <200km

Coastal, <100km

Full Full Coastal, <200km

Coastal, <100km

Province / NS x Annexation FE No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes YesObservations 248 248 248 110 89 248 248 110 89R-Squared 0.17 0.44 0.51 0.59

Page 26: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Probability of any H-M Riot, 1850-1950Any H-M Riot, 1850-1950? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

Probit, dF/dX

Probit, dF/dX

Probit, dF/dX

Probit, dF/dX

OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS

Medieval Overseas Port -0.237*** -0.223*** -0.227*** -0.194*** -0.227*** -0.202*** -0.266*** -0.264** -0.161[0.071] [0.060] [0.042] [0.046] [0.070] [0.063] [0.071] [0.098] [0.099]

Town <10km from Modern Coast 0.467*** 0.456** 0.319 0.116 0.405** 0.139 0.278* 0.145 0.034[0.159] [0.184] [0.195] [0.132] [0.167] [0.118] [0.143] [0.098] [0.145]

Log. Distance to Modern Coast 0.042 0.039 0.034 -0.002 0.041 0.003 0.006 -0.003 -0.034[0.048] [0.048] [0.043] [0.041] [0.035] [0.042] [0.038] [0.047] [0.048]

Log. Distance to Navigable River 0.028 0.062 0.205** 0.133 0.036 0.193** 0.108*** 0.194* 0.134[0.034] [0.039] [0.096] [0.117] [0.023] [0.074] [0.031] [0.107] [0.160]

Natural disasters, 1850-1900 0.024* 0.024 0.015 0.008 0.021 -0.002 0.029 0.013 0.003[0.014] [0.015] [0.018] [0.017] [0.013] [0.017] [0.023] [0.030] [0.009]

Log. Distance to Ganges -0.054* -0.044 -0.215** -0.095 -0.053** -0.127 -0.017 -0.131 -0.003[0.032] [0.035] [0.104] [0.150] [0.019] [0.077] [0.020] [0.117] [0.155]

Medieval Town -0.024 0.000 -0.049 -0.025 -0.061 0.001 -0.060[0.067] [0.073] [0.100] [0.081] [0.058] [0.092] [0.067]

Mughal Mint in Town 0.138 0.087 0.195 0.179 0.038 0.027 0.074[0.133] [0.185] [0.242] [0.216] [0.108] [0.184] [0.259]

Other Medieval Patronage Center 0.128 0.210** 0.141 0.158 0.156 0.157 0.141[0.114] [0.084] [0.139] [0.126] [0.112] [0.107] [0.179]

Medieval Inland Trade Route 0.214*** 0.194 0.287 0.268* 0.148** 0.247* 0.371*[0.072] [0.143] [0.182] [0.142] [0.056] [0.140] [0.182]

Medieval Skilled Crafts in Town -0.044 0.215 0.246 0.182 0.104 0.255 0.295[0.125] [0.230] [0.307] [0.234] [0.111] [0.174] [0.240]

Major Shi'a state before 1857 -0.163 -0.202*** -0.176*** -0.348 -0.320** -0.393 -0.338**[0.112] [0.047] [0.052] [0.197] [0.140] [0.224] [0.154]

Centuries Muslim Rule 0.061* 0.072 0.106 0.097** 0.028 -0.006 0.047[0.034] [0.048] [0.081] [0.041] [0.058] [0.195] [0.072]

Smith-Blundell Exogeneity Test: c2(1) 0.012 0.053 0.027 0.216

Prob> c2(1) 0.914 0.818 0.869 0.642Sample Full Full Coastal,

<200kmCoastal, <100km

Full Coastal, <100km

Full Coastal, <200km

Coastal, <100km

Controls Initial Medieval Medieval Medieval Initial Medieval Medieval Medieval MedievalProvince / NS x Annexation FE No No No No No No Yes Yes YesObservations 248 248 110 89 248 89 248 110 89R-squared 0.21 0.40 0.42 0.45 0.58

Page 27: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Complementarities, Human Capital and PoliticsOLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)(A) # of Hindu- Muslim Riots in Town (1850-1950)Medieval Overseas Port -0.532 -0.902* -0.899** -1.330** -1.478

[0.454] [0.529] [0.356] [0.518] [0.894]Medieval Skilled Crafts in Town 2.015* 1.927* 2.380*

[1.165] [1.108] [1.248]Medieval Port x Skilled Town -2.734*** -2.201* -3.678**

[0.978] [1.263] [1.492]Centuries Muslim Rule (to 1707) 0.169 0.166

[0.123] [0.126]Town under Muslim Ruler (1850-1947) -1.095* -1.098

[0.628] [0.629]Town under Hindu/Sikh Ruler (1850-1947) -0.848** -0.850**

[0.403] [0.407]Medieval Port x Centuries Muslim Rule -0.063

[0.250]R-squared 0.27 0.44 0.60 0.27 0.27(B) Probability of Any Hindu-Muslim Riot in Town (1850-1950)Medieval Overseas Port -0.206** -0.250*** -0.237** -0.235*** -0.053

[0.077] [0.084] [0.107] [0.058] [0.097]Medieval Skilled Crafts in Town -0.017 0.115 0.306*

[0.113] [0.127] [0.169]Medieval Port x Skilled Town 0.002 -0.081 -0.173

[0.269] [0.292] [0.275]Centuries Muslim Rule (to 1707) 0.041 0.044

[0.033] [0.032]Town under Muslim Ruler (1858-1947) -0.130 -0.127

[0.145] [0.147]Town under Hindu/ Sikh Ruler (1858-1947) -0.097 -0.096

[0.081] [0.077]Medieval Port x Centuries Muslim Rule 0.078**

[0.031]R-squared 0.27 0.42 0.45 0.27 0.28Sample Full Full Coastal,

<200kmFull Full

Controls Medieval Medieval Medieval Medieval MedievalProvince/NS x Annexation FE No Yes Yes No NoObservations 248 248 110 248 248

Page 28: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Placebos and Robustness(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

A) Coefficient on Overseas Port in 1907 (OLS)# H-M Riots, 1850-1950 -0.346 0.326 0.085 0.201 0.306 0.591 0.690

[0.542] [0.549] [0.616] [0.573] [0.919] [0.807] [0.770]R-squared 0.16 0.26 0.36 0.48 0.43 0.46 0.57

Any H-M Riot, 1850-1950 0.066 0.084 0.034 0.057 0.148 0.082 0.095[0.133] [0.117] [0.119] [0.116] [0.142] [0.120] [0.101]

R-squared 0.21 0.26 0.30 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.57B) Coefficient on Medieval Port Silted by 1901 (OLS)# H-M Riots, 1850-1950 -0.410 -1.308*** -1.245** -1.298** -1.187* -1.439** -1.375*

[0.371] [0.417] [0.533] [0.564] [0.635] [0.671] [0.716]R-squared 0.16 0.26 0.39 0.51 0.44 0.49 0.59

Any H-M Riot, 1850-1950 -0.217** -0.272** -0.233* -0.198** -0.203 -0.201 -0.096[0.106] [0.111] [0.111] [0.086] [0.126] [0.144] [0.150]

R-squared 0.21 0.27 0.31 0.40 0.41 0.44 0.57C) Coefficient on Medieval Port (2SLS)# H-M Riots, 1850-1950 -3.734 -3.938 -3.550* -2.056 -3.363* -2.374** -2.118**

[2.323] [2.531] [2.005] [1.421] [1.979] [1.034] [0.966]Any H-M Riot, 1850-1950 -0.472 -0.253 -0.657 -0.359 -0.240 -0.637 -0.648*

[0.553] [0.543] [0.526] [0.298] [0.370] [0.415] [0.333]Sample Full Full Coastal,

<200kmCoastal, <100km

Full Coastal, <200km

Coastal, <100km

Province / NS x Annex FE No No No No Yes Yes YesObservations 248 248 110 89 248 110 89

Page 29: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Less Wealth, More Ethnically Mixed(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

A) OLS Medieval Overseas Port 0.140** 0.126* 0.103 -0.385** -0.384* -0.424*

[0.058] [0.072] [0.079] [0.168] [0.209] [0.211]Medieval Town 0.058** 0.074** -0.358** -0.218

[0.028] [0.032] [0.143] [0.158]Mughal Mint in Town 0.056** 0.062** 0.056 0.059

[0.025] [0.028] [0.198] [0.158]Other Medieval Patronage Center 0.002 -0.036 -0.050 0.046

[0.027] [0.025] [0.147] [0.141]Medieval Inland Trade Route 0.027 0.021 0.091 -0.016

[0.025] [0.030] [0.135] [0.121]Medieval Skilled Crafts in Town -0.015 0.009 0.636** 0.381

[0.039] [0.043] [0.306] [0.261]R-squared 0.38 0.42 0.55 0.11 0.22 0.5B) IVMedieval Overseas Port 0.299** 0.420** 0.355** -1.899** -2.463** -2.678***

[0.135] [0.187] [0.174] [0.832] [1.166] [0.914]C) Placebo (OLS)Port with foreign trade, 1907 0.042 0.041 0.018 -0.425* -0.142 0.236

[0.066] [0.079] [0.101] [0.235] [0.226] [0.350]R-squared 0.37 0.41 0.54 0.11 0.21 0.49SampleObservations 237 237 237 195 195 195

Controls Initial Medieval Medieval Initial Medieval MedievalProvince / NS x Annexation FE no no yes no no yes

|%Muslims in Town - District| Log Mun. Income Per Capita

British MunicipalitiesSubcontinental

Page 30: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Interactions with Population; Ethnic Mix

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)Neg. Bin. (I. Ratios)

Neg. Bin. (I. Ratios)

OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS

Medieval Overseas Port 0.479*** 0.534** -1.213** -0.882* -0.472 -0.455 -1.292** -0.893*[0.127] [0.154] [0.544] [0.462] [0.526] [0.617] [0.538] [0.466]

Log Population, 1901 2.884*** 2.793*** 0.487* 0.610 1.652*** 1.443*** 0.432 0.540[0.249] [0.352] [0.273] [0.372] [0.412] [0.427] [0.274] [0.368]

% Muslim in town, 1901 1.398*** 1.334** 0.070 0.021 0.390*** 0.356* 0.097 -0.003[0.158] [0.164] [0.136] [0.177] [0.124] [0.178] [0.168] [0.185]

% Muslim in town2, 1901 0.872** 0.859*** 0.041 0.086 -0.219*** -0.220*** -0.139 -0.126[0.048] [0.046] [0.043] [0.061] [0.077] [0.074] [0.135] [0.125]

Medieval Port x Log Population -1.248** -1.601*** -1.490* -1.712[0.559] [0.543] [0.830] [1.221]

Medieval Port x % Muslim -0.428* -0.111 -0.026 -0.076[0.247] [0.311] [0.299] [0.368]

Medieval Port x % Muslim2 0.282* 0.151 0.060 0.086[0.139] [0.118] [0.104] [0.105]

Observations 248 248 110 89 248 248 110 89R-squared 0.54 0.64 0.38 0.41 0.58 0.69F-test (Medieval Port Variables) 3.95 3.84 1.46 1.39Prob>F 0.01 0.01 0.27 0.29Sample Full Full Coastal,

<200kmCoastal, <100km

Full Full Coastal, <200km

Coastal, <100km

Controls Initial Medieval Medieval Medieval Initial Medieval Medieval MedievalProvince / NS x Annex FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes

Page 31: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

The survival of religious tolerance in India’s towns:1850-1995

Other Towns

Medieval Ports

Khi

lafa

t Mov

emen

t Fai

ls

Par

titio

n

Oil

Sho

cks

0.2

5.5

.75

1

0 50 100 150

years elapsed since 1850

Page 32: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

The survival of religious tolerance in India’s towns:1850-1950

Hazard Ratios (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Medieval Port 0.165*** 0.118*** 0.075*** 0.047*** 0.004***

[0.058] [0.064] [0.020] [0.049] [0.007]Mughal Mint in Town 1.598 6.723* 1.488 3.632

[0.504] [6.932] [0.416] [6.452]Medieval Inland Trade Route 1.706*** 5.645** 1.655*** 5.534

[0.245] [4.291] [0.286] [7.488]Medieval Skilled Crafts in Town 1.910*** 1.292 2.197*** 1.867

[0.468] [0.996] [0.583] [3.061]Centuries Muslim Rule 1.314** 2.490*** 1.148 3.801**

[0.159] [0.639] [0.179] [2.158]Sample Full Full Full,

Coastal (<100km)

Full Full, Coastal

(<100km)Controls Initial Medieval Medieval Medieval MedievalProvince/ NS x Annex FE No No No Yes YesLog-Likelihood -1088.98 -1046.26 -86.13 -1005.69 -81.01Observations 408 408 107 408 107

Page 33: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Continuity and Change, India’s towns: 1850-1995

Incidence Ratios in Medieval Ports (1) (2) (3) (4)1850-1950 0.108*** 0.073*** 0.089*** 0.064***

[0.054] [0.074] [0.039] [0.053]1950-1980 0.232* 0.229 0.190* 0.188*

[0.185] [0.255] [0.163] [0.174]1980-1995 3.491 4.261 3.207 4.020

[2.771] [4.832] [3.039] [5.391]Observations 407 180 407 1801931 % Muslim Polynomial No No Yes YesState FE (1991 boundaries) Yes Yes Yes YesGeographic & Historic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes

Sample FullCoastal

<200km FullCoastal

<200km

Page 34: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Between Group Inequality, IHDS urban sample,2004-5

0.0

5.1

0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30

Urban Non-Port Sample Urban Sample, Medieval Port is Dist HQ

Muslim Non-Muslim

Ker

nel D

ensi

ty

Composite Household Assets Scale (1-30)

Graphs by District HQ is a Medieval Port

Page 35: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Occupational Specialization, IHDS urban sample,2004-5

Prop. Muslim, Other Urban

Prop. Muslim, Medieval Port HQ

0 .1 .2 .3 .4Muslim Share of Employment Category, 2004-5

Others

Pension/Rent

Profession NEC

Salaried Emp

Organized Business

Small Trade

Artisan

Non-Ag Labor

Ag Labor

Allied Ag

Cultivation

Other Urban Medieval Port HQ

Page 36: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Trust and Organizations, IHDS urban sample, 2004-5

OLS, Observations= 14820 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)Panel A: Assets and Trust

Medieval Port is District HQ 0.007 0.012 -0.008**[0.017] [0.026] [0.004]

Muslim Household -0.075*** -0.053*** 0.004 0.013 0.013 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.010***[0.008] [0.007] [0.017] [0.011] [0.011] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]

Med. Port x Muslim Household 0.070*** 0.041* -0.068** -0.068** -0.068** -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.010***[0.022] [0.022] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]

R-squared 0.12 0.27 0.1 0.35 0.35 0.01 0.03 0.04Panel B: OrganizationsMedieval Port is District HQ 0.085*** 0.062** -0.03

[0.026] [0.027] [0.019]Muslim Household -0.043*** -0.037*** -0.029*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.015*** 0.050*** 0.015 0.022**

[0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.015] [0.010] [0.010]Med. Port x Muslim Household 0.011 -0.007 -0.013 0.072 0.03 0.028 0.102* 0.092** 0.086**

[0.035] [0.029] [0.030] [0.052] [0.051] [0.051] [0.055] [0.039] [0.040]R-squared 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.36 0.36Household Wealth Control No No Yes No No Yes No No YesFixed Effects State District District State District District State District District

`A Lot of Conflict' in Mohalla Refused Polio Vaccine

Business/ Trade Union Credit/ Savings Religious/ Social/ Festival

Household Asset Score (0-1)

Page 37: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Gujarat, Feb 27- April 15, 2002

Page 38: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Gujarat, Feb 27- April 15, 2002

Page 39: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Feb-Apr 2002: Ahmadabad massacres, Surat peace

"

#*

#*#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

$

Ahmadabad

Surat

Godhra

0 60 12030 Miles

I Ahmadabad: 13 percentMuslim: 24+ days rioting,324+ dead (including old city).

I Surat: 12.3 percent Muslim: 6days of rioting, 9+ dead (innew suburbs)

I Over the course of 20thcentury- Ahmadabadriot-prone;Surat, “an oasis of peace”.

Page 40: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Gujarat assembly elections, 1998 and 2002

""

#*

#*#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

Bhuj

Daman

Morvi

Patan

Surat

Amreli Broach

Godhra

Gondal

Mahuva

Mandvi

Nadiad

RajkotBaroda

NavsariVeraval

Jamnagar

Jaitpore

Junagadh

Palanpur

Ahmadabad

BhavnagarPorbandar

0 60 12030 Miles

LegendWinning Party

BJPINCINDJD(U)

""

#*

#*#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

#*

Bhuj

Daman

Morvi

Patan

Surat

Amreli Broach

Godhra

Gondal

Mahuva

Mandvi

Nadiad

RajkotBaroda

NavsariVeraval

Jamnagar

Jaitpore

Junagadh

Palanpur

Ahmadabad

BhavnagarPorbandar

0 60 12030 Miles

LegendWinning Party

BJPINCINDJD(U)

Polarised voting: In non-port constituencies, six point swing to BJPfollowing violence. In constituencies with medieval trade legacy, a sixpoint swing away from the BJP.

Page 41: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Institutional continuity (17-21C)

Coast Muslim trading groups

Strong community organisation

Medieval complementary

services

Medieval institutions 19th century/ contemporary

complementary services

19th century/ contemporary institutions Contemporary residential integration

Additional barriers to replication

Inter-religious organisations

Transfer mechanisms

Additional barriers to replication

Inter-religiousorganisations

Transfer mechanisms

Gujarat Arabs, Daudi Bohras, Memons,

Nizari Ismailis

Yes7 Trans-oceanic shipping

Apprenticeship restrictions5

Merchant Guilds, Political

delegations2

Commercial taxation3, Joint

ventures2

Agate, Carnelians1, Silver thread

weaving5, Yarn and Diamond

cutting, (Gulf / SE Asia

networks)4

Apprenticeship restrictions5,

Administrative sanctions,

Social sanctions

(Kaala-paani)1

Peace committees,

Business associations4,

National political party

``minority wings''7

Political donations,

Joint ventures6,

Local public goods,

Disaster relief7

Yes4,7

Malabar/ Central West

Arabs, Bearys, Koyas, Mappilas,

Nawaiyats

None evident

Trans-oceanic shipping

Social sanctions (Kaala-paani)8

Political delegations8

Commercial taxation, Joint ventures, Ease of conversion, Local public

goods8

(Gulf networks), Commodities

trading4,9

Social sanctions

(Kaala-paani)2

Peace committees, Chambers of commerce,

Clubs4,9

Local public goods9

Yes4,9

Coromandel (East)

Marraikayars, Persians, Labbais

Yes10,11 Trans-oceanic shipping

None evident None evident Commercial taxation, Joint

ventures10, Voluntary

donations to Hindu-specific public goods11

pearl diving, coastal shipping, (Gulf/ SE Asia

networks)10

None evident Regional political parties10

No10,11

Sources: 1: Mehta (1991), 2: Dasgupta (2000) 3: Thapar (2004), 4: Varshney (2002), 5: Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency (1899), Haynes (1991), 6: Concerned Citizens Tribunal (2002), 7: personal interviews, Blank (2001), 8: al Malibari (1528), di Verthema (1503), Bouchon (2000), 9: Osella (2003), 10: More (1997), 11: S. Bayly (1989)

Page 42: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Porbandar: medieval and modern Bohrajamaatkhanas

Page 43: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Surat: Bohra headquarters

Page 44: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Old Ahmadabad: segregated neighbourhoods (pols)

Page 45: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

The Sephardim (15-20C)

I Complementarity:connections with Atlanticeconomy

I Non-expropriable,replicable (intangible,network externalities)

I Non-violent transfers(large-scale immigration)

Page 46: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Lessons for peace in fragmented societies

I Complementarity between groups.I Organisations that match by complementary skills in joint

business ventures (eg Ismailis).I Education: complete homogenisation of human capital may

be counter-productive.I Competition within groups (sharing mechanisms)

I Explicit inter-ethnic public goods provision may mitigateshocks.

I Provision of shares in trading ventures to locals may alsoalign incentives, foster organisation (Jha, 2007).

Page 47: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Theoretical extension

I Transfers go to biggest threat (rulers/ mob bosses) inexchange for “protection”: ethnic cronyism (eg Indonesia,Kenya)

I Rulers may face perverse incentives to “polarise”: increaseriot threat to extract greater transfers (intermittent pogromsdemonstrate value of protection)

I A more efficient eqm may exist. Explicit public goodsprovision can reduce majority incentive to expropriate.

Page 48: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Basic model

Timing:1. agents can leave, receiving L if non-locals or 0 if locals.2. If stay, are matched and play a two-sided prisoner’s

dilemma with two modifications:I payoff to cooperate comes from production of two goods

with externality: agents producing same good act assubstitutes, i.e. Πk (Nk ,N−k ) ↓ Nk , k ∈ {A,B} while thoseproducing different goods may be complements(Πk (Nk ,N−k ) ↑ N−k ) or substitutes (Πk (Nk ,N−k ) ↓ N−k ).Assume WLOG, non-locals produce A, locals produce B.

I payoff to “fink” comes from chance to seize other’sproduction.

Bl = F (sl − snl )Π̃nl (·)− D (1)

Page 49: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

DefinitionA peaceful co-existence equilibrium is a subgame perfect Nashequilibrium with the following properties:

1. There is at least one member of each identity in theeconomy. iN

t ∩ K N t 6= ∅,∀i ∈ {local, nonlocal}2. ICp: Every agent produces. R = 1,∀k ∈ K N t

3. ICl : No agent has an incentive to leave.Vstay ≥ Vleave,∀k ∈ K N t

.4. ICv : No agent has an incentive to target another with

violence. Vpeace ≥ Vviolence, ∀(k , x) ∈ K × K

Page 50: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Two key constraints

I ICl : Non-locals should want to stay: Π(Nnl ,Nl) ≡ LI ICv : binding constraint is strongest targeting weakest:

D ≥ F (sl−snl)Πnl(Nnl ,Nl)−(1−F (sl−snl))Πl(Nl ,Nnl) ≡ �(2)

Page 51: 10.11.2012 - Saumitra Jha

Note: if can reduce non-local payoffs through repeated violenceto violate ICL, then ICv becomes:

D ≥ �+ δΠl(Nl ,Nnl)− Πl(Nl ,Nnl − 1)

1− δ(3)

1. If substitutes: as δ ↑, ICv always violated.2. If complements: as δ ↑, ICv never violated.

Remarks:1. Higher patience or political stability leads to more (less)

violence if substitutes (complements). Examples.2. With higher patience, need high cost to replicate others’

production process, or incentive to do so, creatingsubstitutes.

3. Particularly if non-locals poor (Πnl ∼ L) (peace seemsstable), an increase in outside option may lead to suddenviolence if substitutes. e.g. Partition. Back