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PROACTIVEPROACTIVE “INTELLIGENCE-LED” “INTELLIGENCE-LED”

POLICING : POLICING : Learning from IndonesiaLearning from Indonesia

ADRIANUS MELIALA

University of Indonesia

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““The approach constitutes the The approach constitutes the beginning of the most beginning of the most

significant redefinition of police significant redefinition of police work in the past half century...”work in the past half century...”

(Willson & Kelling, 1989; p. 48)(Willson & Kelling, 1989; p. 48)

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““We should not be fighting the We should not be fighting the crime of the twenty-first crime of the twenty-first

century with the tools of the century with the tools of the nineteenth.”nineteenth.”

((Jack Straw, Home Secretary, United Kingdom, 1997)Jack Straw, Home Secretary, United Kingdom, 1997)

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The truth about The truth about proactive policingproactive policing

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Traditional reactive models of policing have been outdated. Alternatives, either good or relatively good, are then required.

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The truth about The truth about proactive policingproactive policing

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The idea of “new-managerialism” and “good governance”. Policing is basically similar to any other public-related activities taken by public institutions.

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The truth about The truth about proactive policingproactive policing

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Increasing role of technology in policing and awareness toward the benefits given by information system.

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First story:First story:

Riots occurred since 1997,

Armed bank robbery increased since 1999,

Bomb exploded since 2000.

People criticized the role of Intelligence.

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Second story:Second story:

A member of the public reported the police about somebody who have allegedly committed fraud. The responding officer seemed confused to where he should pass the report, whether to

the intelligence office or to the detective office. Surprisingly, both offices claimed as the right

party to process it.

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Third Story:Third Story:The Directorate of Intelligence regularly issued reports on security profile followed

by its analysis. When comparing two reports (the first made during Soeharto’s era and the second made just recently),

what regarded as “threat, enemy or source of instability” are similar

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Before intelligence Before intelligence community has been healed community has been healed

from its organizational from its organizational problems, it is no point problems, it is no point saying intelligence-led saying intelligence-led

policingpolicing

What problems?

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Problem on strict divisionProblem on strict division of assignments of assignments

Criminogenic

Factors

Police

Hazard

Factual

Threat

Intelligence’s Role Detective’s Role

Strategic Level Tactical Level

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Problem on policing style Problem on policing style taken by the INPtaken by the INP

Law

Enforcement

Crime Prevention and

Public OrderPreemptive Efforts in Maintaining Peace and Security

Intelligence & CPO Beat & Paramilitary CID

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Problem on the job overlapProblem on the job overlapbetween Intelligence and CIDbetween Intelligence and CID

INFORMATION

INTELLIGENCE

CID

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Problem of the past times Problem of the past times

State and Government

INTELLIGENCEMILITARY

THE PUBLIC

POLICE

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Problem of controlProblem of control

So far, there’s a few intelligence -related legal infrastructure.

Having no public access to control how intelligence people work

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Problem of ‘militaristic’ habitProblem of ‘militaristic’ habit

Being used to practice the principles of combat intelligence, including all dirty and gross practices

Strong role identification with espionage and undercover activities

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Problem of internal cultureProblem of internal culture

The fearful image is still managed on purposely

No accountability when producing a wrong forecast or analysis

Be implicated with “wet and dry” terrain in relation to the possibility of accepting extra money

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Recent development after the Recent development after the exclusion of the INP from militaryexclusion of the INP from military

Restructuring intelligence directorate at Police HQ by improving its operational capability

Consistently deploying resources in some conflict areas or highlighted crimes

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It’s not enough since:It’s not enough since:11

The ‘activity approach’ is still there. Any elements within the INP would get yearly

allocation based on activity as defined in traditional sense

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It’s not enough since:It’s not enough since:22

There’s no management decision and support to let intelligence playing

significant role. The detective community is still regarded the core

business of the INP

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It’s not enough since:It’s not enough since:33

Intelligence community still uses its outdated approach and

working method. Enhancing capacity is compulsory.

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End of presentationEnd of presentation

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