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1 After the White House: The Politics of the Post-Presidency Nicholas F. Jacobs University of Virginia As independent, elder statesmen, former presidents command a unique authority. This essay focuses on the post-presidencies of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Despite their divergent personal backgrounds, both remained active and consequential in the politics of their era and were forced to speak out on issues they might otherwise try to ignore. Furthermore, both Truman and Eisenhower remained active, loyal partisans. They were just as adamant in condemning their presidential successors on policy, and as senior party officials, both helped to “build” their party organizations by mobilizing voters, recruiting candidates, fundraising, and promoting structural reforms after leaving office. Barack Obama’s decision to remain in Washington, D.C. after his presidency ended produced the predictable split in partisan reactions. Supporters greeted the president’s decision as confirmation of Obama’s long-stated plan to remain politically active after he left the White House. 1 Opponents were less than pleased. Suggesting that the former president was setting up an “Obama Embassy” in the former first family’s new neighborhood of

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After the White House: The Politics of the Post-Presidency

Nicholas F. Jacobs

University of Virginia

As independent, elder statesmen, former presidents command a unique authority. This essay focuses on the post-presidencies of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Despite their divergent personal backgrounds, both remained active and consequential in the politics of their era and were forced to speak out on issues they might otherwise try to ignore. Furthermore, both Truman and Eisenhower remained active, loyal partisans. They were just as adamant in condemning their presidential successors on policy, and as senior party officials, both helped to build their party organizations by mobilizing voters, recruiting candidates, fundraising, and promoting structural reforms after leaving office.

Barack Obamas decision to remain in Washington, D.C. after his presidency ended produced the predictable split in partisan reactions. Supporters greeted the presidents decision as confirmation of Obamas long-stated plan to remain politically active after he left the White House.[endnoteRef:1] Opponents were less than pleased. Suggesting that the former president was setting up an Obama Embassy in the former first familys new neighborhood of Kalomara, the journalist Ed Klein adamantly declared that Obama choose the location to be close to other foreign embassies so as to undermine Trumps administration.[endnoteRef:2] Pennsylvania Representative Mike Kelly (R) argued that the Obamas are remaining in D.C. for one purpose onlyto run the shadow government that is going to totally upset the new agenda.[endnoteRef:3] And commentator Ben Stein saw the decision as just more confirmation that Obama is, essentially a super narcissist.[endnoteRef:4] [1: Obama first hinted at remaining in Washington in November, 2013 during an interview with Barbara Walters, almost 2 and a half years before Donald Trump announced his candidacy. The Obama family confirmed their decision in late 2015. Video of the interview is available at: http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/11/obamas-might-stay-in-washington-after-presidency-ends-2/ . Last Accessed, April 7, 2017. ] [2: Fox & Friends, FOX News Chanel, December 28, 2016. URL: http://video.foxnews.com/v/5263549712001/?#sp=show-clips . Last Accessed, April 7, 2017. ] [3: Associated Press, March 10, 2017, GOP rep backs off claim Obama running shadow government, URL: http://bigstory.ap.org/2e1752947b0543169c02b090b2e8bf36?utm_campaign=SocialFlow&utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=AP . Last Accessed, April 7, 2017. ] [4: Your World with Neil Cavuto, FOX News Chanel, May 26, 2016. URL: https://mediamatters.org/video/2016/05/26/ben-stein-calls-obama-super-narcissist-staying-dc-after-presidency/210605 . Last Accessed, April 7, 2017. ]

Political hyperbole aside, Obamas physical residence in D.C. remains a potent symbol of how he is defining his post-presidency, and there remains a legitimate question over what change a former president can effect.[footnoteRef:1] Already, Obamas actions have contributed to President Trumps concern about the deep state or the lingering, entrenched political interests in place that might stifle conservative reform. But is Obamas stated desire to remain active in American politics anything new? In this essay, I argue that ex-presidents have continued to be moral statesmen, party builders, and vocal leaders of the partisan opposition long after they leave the White House. When compared to his previous eight successors, Obama can uniquely claim a significant amount of post-presidential political capital. The last time this was true was after Dwight D. Eisenhower and Harry S. Truman left office. As the most recent historical example of this institution, they place the politics of the post-presidency in greater historical relief and suggest that Obama, as a former president, is likely to behave much like he did as an actual president. [1: And, given that the last president to remain in Washington, D.C. after his presidency was the conservative anathema Woodrow Wilson, the condemnation of Obamas decision was greater proof of the former presidents decision to fundamentally disrupt American politics as we know it. Wilson remained in the capital city to recuperate from a stroke that left him incapacitated during the final months of his administration. See: John Milton Cooper, Jr. 2011. Woodrow Wilson: A Biography. New York, NY: Vintage Books. ]

Historical Precedent or Unique Ambition?

Consulting the historical record cannot, on its own, tell us whether former President Obama should remain active after he leaves the White House. In American political history, there is plenty of recourse to tradition and myth, which would suggest that the country benefits from the presidents gracious departure. George Washingtons decision to leave after two terms remained a deeply cherished norm for subsequent presidents. Coupled with the first presidents decision to leave the Continental Army after the Revolution, his retirement as Commander-in-Chief further solidified the romanticization of him as the American Cincinnatus.[endnoteRef:5] The ratification of the 22nd Amendment in 1951 was further confirmation of this impulse - that no single person should remain an active force in American politics for too long. [5: Philip Freneaus ode and comparison to the great Roman general who saved the Republic is perhaps the most famous; Verses, Occasioned by General Washingtons arrival in Philadelphia, on how way to his seat in Virginia, December, 1783. The Poems of Philip Freneau: Poet of the American Revolution, vol. II. Fred Lewis Pattee, ed. 1903. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 228.]

The idea of a post-presidency, however, is not a modern convention, and despite Washingtons virtuous return to Mount Vernon, his precedent of political retirement is apocryphal, even by pre-modern standards. Washington himself accepted a commission in the U.S. army from John Adams to help plan for war with France. His former aide-de-camp, Alexander Hamilton, took over the lions share of the planning, but the former president, however, soon died 33 months after retiring. Thomas Jefferson spent most of his post-presidency engaged with his University of Virginia, but having groomed his two immediate successors, Madison and Monroe, he continued to provide advice on how to deal with foreign policy (Meacham 2012). Madison, in addition to straightening out many parts of the historical record to more favorably portray his legacy in the American experiment, re-entered his practice of Constitution-making at age 78 to settle a disruptive apportionment problem in the 1829 Virginia Constitutional Convention (Keysaar 2009). Famously, John Quincy Adams is the only president to return to either chamber of Congress. As a member of the House of Representatives, Adams chaired several important committees over his 18-year term; he also ran for Massachusetts Governor, but dropped out after 29% of voters thought the former president had what it took to run the state. John Tyler fathered 7 children after he left office and then served in the Confederate Congress as a representative from Virginia. And, fulfilling his lifelong desire to serve on the Supreme Court, Chief Justice William Howard Taft capitalized on his political experience to fundamentally reshape the court and enhance its institutional capacity (Crowe 2007).

[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

In the modern era, we have come to think of presidential retirement as unexciting and apolitical. Jimmy Carter and his near 30-long dedication to Habitat for Humanity stands out as the modern exemplar of former presidents turned civic missionary. George W. Bush, and his work with the Wounded Warriors Project follows in this vein (Bush 2017). Yet, while Americas most recent presidents have made a conscience decision to remain out of the political limelight appearing briefly for a personal or celebratory cause their collective political situation is a fairly distinct one (Kaufman 2012). As Table 1 shows, President Obama will stand out as one of the few presidents who will have left office with a claim to substantial political capital. Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and George W. Bush all left office with below-majority support in the last presidential approval poll taken while in office; Nixon, of course resigned, and Johnson chose not to seek re-election in 1968. Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and H.W. Bush left the White House because they lost an election, the most important approval poll. Clinton and Reagan stand out as exceptions, but Reagan suffered from Alzheimers disease for at least the last 10 years of his life, and Bill Clinton, while remaining politically active, was most concerned with advancing Hillary Clintons political career; both of these are unusual circumstances, which should not set the pattern for thinking about post-presidential politics.

The post-presidencies of Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower do, however, offer a revealing comparison of what opportunities and constraints befall presidents after they leave the White House. Truman departed with abysmal approval rankings, after a career of working for the Democratic party, and after a repudiating election that put the GOP in its best political position in over three decades. Eisenhower, on the other hand, was admired by both Republicans and Democrats, left the presidency after less than a decade of holding elected office, and narrowly lost his third term in the closest election in modern politics. Yet, despite their dissimilar circumstances, both diligently tried to maintain an active political agenda, which included a host of non-partisan issues (Eisenhower is partially responsible for the preservation of the Gettysburg battlefield, on which his 500-acre farm abutted) and writing their memoirs (Truman wrote three and was working on a history of the U.S. Senate). More significantly for American political development, Truman and Eisenhower remained embroiled in some of the most dramatic and consequential political episodes of their era. As independent, elder statesmen, former presidents command an authority as unique as the office they once served, and they are forced to speak out on issues they might otherwise try to ignore. Truman was thrust into a dramatic confrontation with Senator Joseph McCarthy and helped precipitate his demise; Eisenhower defended the presidency as an institution and remained a non-partisan, stoic leader in the face of global crises. Most remarkably, given their divergent political backgrounds, both Truman and Eisenhower remained loyal partisans. They were adamant in condemning their presidential successors on policy and as senior party officials, helped to build their party organizations by mobilizing voters, recruiting candidates, fundraising, and promoting structural reforms (Galvin 2010). While not exhaustive of their entire post presidencies (a collective 28 years), these moments help show that like any political actor including acting presidents neither Eisenhower nor Truman were always successful in affecting their desired outcome. Their behavior and intentions nevertheless reveal that despite lacking the constitutional office, their post-presidencies were deeply consequential.

Harry S. Truman (1953-1972)

While the Democratic partys misfortunes in 1952 are not all attributable to Truman, certainly no president seeking to capitalize on his partisan or personal leadership could have found themselves in a worse position. Returning to his beloved Missouri and his pre-presidency home in Independence, the ex-president set up a small office in the Kansas City Federal Reserve building. Some former White House assistants joined him to assist in organizing the building of the Truman library, and in helping the president write his memoirs (his personal goal was 10,000 words per day). As Truman would later quip, two years after moving in, he put his name on the door only after so many people were getting lost looking for the restroom.[endnoteRef:6] [6: Drew Pearson, Truman Pays Tribute to Hoover, 8 January, 1954, The Washington Post; Clarence A. Johnson, Being Ex-President is Wearing. The Washington Post, 30 January, 1955.. ]

Party Builder Truman soon returned to Washington less than six months after leaving, but went to great lengths to avoid taking any political stand on the new Eisenhower administration. In the first interview of his post-presidency, he was surprised that anyone cared to read about an old has been, and when asked if he was surprised that Eisenhower had not invited him to the White House, again Truman joked that, Hes too busy to see every Tom, Dick, and Harry that comes to town.[endnoteRef:7] Such careful presentation, however, belied Trumans post-presidential ambitions. [7: Happy Harry Trumans Back, Washington Post, 22 June, 1953. ]

The former president was in D.C. to lunch with Democratic Senators, a meeting, which inflamed rumors that the former-president was gearing up for a Congressional campaign. Even though Truman would only flirt with running for office, he grew increasingly active as the Democrats set their eyes on retaking seats in the midterm elections. Truman headlined a 2,000-person conference in Chicago as the distinguished leader of the party according to Democratic National Committee (DNC) Chair Stephen Mitchell. Now a part of the Big Four, as Mitchell described it, Truman spearhead the partys strategy over their ill-fated loyalty oath a policy in response to Strum Thurmonds run as a Dixiecrat in 1948, but which nearly split the party again when instituted in 1952. Truman, undeterred by threats of another party schism, nevertheless had harsh words for his partisan brethren, telling reporters that, if the governors of the south are worried about [the loyalty oath], thats their problem. Working with the rest of the Democratic Congressional leadership and Virginia Governor John Battle, Truman brokered a deal that would sideline the issue for at least another three years. But, with his party in disarray, Give em Hell Truman continued to publicly rally Democrats. Speaking at the first major fundraising dinner since the 1952 election, the former president lambasted the current administration without remorse. Under Eisenhowers leadership Truman avowed, the wrecking crew is at work, undermining and tearing downif a Democratic Congress is not elected next year, the country and the world will go down to ruin![endnoteRef:8] [8: Truman Does Not Choose to Run for Congress, Washington Post, 9 July 9, 1954; Old Campaigners Meet as Democrats Rally in Chicago, New York Times, 13 September, 1953; Truman Comes Here for 2 Day Party Meeting, Chicago Daily Tribune, 13 September, 1953; Democratic Chiefs Meet for 3 Hours, The Washington Post, 14 September, 1953; Democrats Borrow Eisenhower Tactic, Wall Street Journal, 15 September, 1953, . ]

An emergency gall bladder and appendix operation in June kept Truman largely off the 1954 campaign trail (a year in which Senate Democrats eked out a majority 49-47). Yet, Trumans Chicago debut as the Democrats chief cheerleader comprised just one part of the ex-presidents goal of building up a weakened Democratic party. The hustle and bustle of campaign season behind them, Truman and his fellow Democrats focused their energies on the reorganizing the DNC and the nomination process for the next presidential nominee. At DNC planning meetings in April, 1955, Democrats retooled their campaign strategy, and decided to make an all-out effort to focus their message on President Eisenhower. Joining the DNC executive meeting was the former president, who at their Jackson-Jefferson Dinner fundraiser, kicked off the partys new strategy with full vigor. In the most anti-Eisenhower remarks of the evening, Truman lambasted the administrations China policy as a bare-faced political fraud; continued on to say that Ikes own behavior was scaring the daylights out of Americas allies abroad; and to the audiences chant to pour it on, the former president gleamed that, They may have struck the clock, but they cant turn it back! Several weeks later, the attacks on Eisenhower continued, as Truman tried to hammer home a story about the administrations inept, bungled management of the newly released polio vaccine.[endnoteRef:9] The next month, the target of Trumans give em hell talks was the current presidents domination by business interests the extent to which was largely unknown because of the protective curtain which most of the press throws around its Republican protgs.[endnoteRef:10] [9: Trumans attempt to connect rumors of a polio vaccine shortage to decisions made up high in the Eisenhower administration never panned out. On his remarks, see: Los Angeles Times, 25 May, 1955; Washington Post, 26 May, 1955. ] [10: Democrats Plan to Pin GOP Confusion on Ike, Washington Post, 16 April, 1955; Rayburn Hits GOP Right Wing As Disloyal Opposition, Washington Post, 17 April, 1955; Few Listen to Truman, Hagerty Declares, Washington Post, 30 August, 1955. ]

Trumans independent voice on the speaking circuit became disruptive within the Democratic party itself. In 1952, Truman had helped secure Adlai Stevensons nomination for the presidency, but increasingly, reports leaked that the former president had begun to change his mind (the first indication being his opposition to Paul Butlers election as DNC chair in 1952). Finally, Trumans impromptu, post-presidency confidant, Drew Pearson, reported in October that the former president thought Stevenson jinxed because of his previous loss to Eisenhower. Having just recently met with his unwavering ally, New York Governor Averell Harriman, at the Governors Mansion in Albany, Truman wanted to push an open nominating contest, with Harriman having his full support.[endnoteRef:11] The next day, sitting alongside Harriman in the Governors office, Truman extolled his executive skills, saying that Harriman has all the qualifications to make a good President, and slyly adding that if he were allowed to vote in New York, I know who Id be for. At the end of 1955, Truman began to solidify the basic contours of a campaign strategy for Harriman. Criticizing Eisenhowers foreign policy, he praised Harrimans diplomatic experience labeling it the most important qualification to consider in the next campaign.[endnoteRef:12] Truman even declined several offers from national newspapers and television studios to report on the convention because it would impede his ability to do what I hope to do and at the same time write about it.[endnoteRef:13] [11: Drew Pearson, Truman, Harriman to Hold Conference, The Washington Post, 8 October, 1955. ] [12: GOP Policy, Nixon Stir Truman Scorn, Washington Post, 27 November, 1955,. ] [13: Truman Praises Gov. Harriman, Washington Post, 9 October, 1955; Washington Post, February 14, 1956, 3 Groups Putting Pressure on Ike, 51. ]

Truman traveled to Chicago at the beginning of August, 1954 to set up his private office for the national convention. As Harriman himself acknowledged, the big question was whether the former president would take his coat all the way off, or only half way off, to push his nomination. Harriman, grew nervous as Truman privately confessed that he did not think it appropriate for an ex-President to openly endorse candidates prior to the convention.[endnoteRef:14] The next day, however, Truman joined Harriman at a press-conference on the eve of the convention, and proudly pinning his lapel with an Honest Ave for President button, threw his support entirely for his former Secretary of Commerce.[endnoteRef:15] The formidable anti-Stevenson contingent of multiple varieties was elated with this opening night bomb, none more so than the Tammany Hall New Yorkers. As their leader Carmine G. De Sapio told reporters, Trumans endorsement was inspiring, heartening news. President Truman is, in every sense, the leader of our party...[endnoteRef:16] [14: Joseph Aslop and Stewart Aslop, Matter of FactHarry Trumans Role, Washington Post, 10 August, 1956. ] [15: Trumans full remarks are re-printed in, Text of Statement by Ex-President, Washington Post, 12 August, 1956. ] [16: Harriman Elated By Endorsement, New York Times, 12 August, 1956. ]

Truman not only threw his public endorsement behind Harriman, he commanded his operatives in Chicago to direct their all out blitz to nominate the New York Governor. Old allies from the White House including former DNC chairs William Boyle, Jr. and Frank McKinney, worked on uncommitted state chairman to flip delegate pledges. Ironically, it was the same set of political wranglers that Truman relied on to nominate Stevenson in 1952. The eleventh-hour excitement quickly gave way to more realistic assessments of Harrimans support, however, as the mad rush of delegates never materialized. Rather than converting delegates to Harriman, most Stevenson-leaning groups announced their second or third choice in case Stevenson couldnt pick up the first ballot; Harriman was not their choice.[endnoteRef:17] As a last-ditch effort, Truman worked to drive the wedge on the race issue, hoping that the push for a stronger civil rights platform would convince Northeastern liberals to switch their support to Harriman, or drive enough Southerners from the convention. In pushing the civil rights issue (endorsing the Supreme Courts recent Brown decision, for example), Truman was willing to sacrifice the unity of the party in order to get his man at the top of the ticket.[footnoteRef:2] Stevenson, had star power to match, however. Eleanor Roosevelt arrived in Chicago with her full support already thrown to Stevenson. When Truman accused the presumptive nominee of betraying the New Deal and Fair Deal backbone of the party, Roosevelt responded forcefully. Implying that Stevenson would have more experience than Truman did when he unexpectedly took office, the former First Lady continued to push against the ex-presidents continued influence in the party. We cannot meet the problems of today, or of the future with traditions of the past alone, she concluded.[endnoteRef:18] [17: The first and second day delegate counts are most robustly reported in Harriman Drive is Stopped, Wall Street Journal, 14 August, 1956. ] [2: After Harrimans chances all but ended, Truman ultimately endorsed the moderate civil rights plank, saying that it would be something that would contribute harmony to the party enable Democrats to go out and give the Republicans the licking theyre entitled to. See, Floor Fight on Rights Fizzles, Chicago Defender, 16 August, 1956. On the 1956 Democratic National Convention and the fight for a moderating civil rights plank, see: John Martin. 1979. Civil Rights and the Crisis of Liberalism: The Democratic Party, 1945-1976. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. ] [18: FDR Widow Takes Issue with Truman, Washington Post, 13 August, 1956. ]

Stevenson got the nomination. Truman, however, stuck with Harriman all the way to the balloting, seconding his nomination on the convention floor, and citing his experience in this line.[endnoteRef:19] Although very, very surprised that Stevenson won on the first ballot, Truman left Chicago gracefully, telling the delegates on the final night that, it is reliably reported that some fellow whom I will not name has said that Adlai Stevenson will have trouble winning in November. Now I want to tell you something. Dont let that worry you. And, in a line that brought down the House, the ex-president reminded them, Thats what they said about me in 1948.[endnoteRef:20] [19: Truman Gives Seconding Talk for Harriman, Los Angeles Times, 17 August, 1956,. ] [20: Not only did Stevenson win, he secured he nomination on the first ballot with 905 votes; 219 more than need, which also happened to be 9 more votes than what Harriman eventually secured. Truman Rallies to Stevenson as a Real Fighter, Los Angeles Times, 18 August, 1956; Text of Address by Truman, Kefauver, and Stevenson Before Democratic Convention, New York Times, 18 August, 1956. ]

Truman returned to Independence and continued his attacks on the Eisenhower racketeers. Despite his convention chaos, the DNC requested that give em hell Truman stay on to give two to three speeches a week on behalf of Stevenson and other Democratic candidates. However, Trumans presence on the campaign trail was hardly felt. Few of his remarks garnered any press coverage, and, given the Missourians penchant for news-making remarks, it is clear that Truman confined himself to the sidelines.[endnoteRef:21] Eisenhower won by even larger margins than he did in 1952; ironically, he picked up only one state, Trumans own Missouri. In a very real way, Stevensons dismal showing vindicated Trumans claims made at the DNC, although, Republicans capitalized on Trumans DNC remarks more than Democrats chose to use the former president as a campaigner. While Stevensons poor showing was not just attributable to Truman, the former president, dismissed so readily for his actions, quickly found himself in the center of the party action. This time, Democrats were willing to embrace his fierce oppositional style a strategy that deeply wounded the GOPs margins in 1958, and finally in 1960 with Kennedys election. [21: Truman Returns to Independence, New York Times, 19 August, 1956; Truman Plans Trip to Australia, Washington Post, August 25, 1956. ]

Opposition Leader The bulk of Harry Trumans post-presidency is best seen through his actions as an opposition leader. Truman quickly recovered from his lost gamble at the 1956 Democratic National Convention. By December, with Democrats reeling from their historic electoral loss, DNC Chair Paul Butler was making progress towards fulfilling a long-awaited promise to party liberals the establishment of a Party Advisory Council.[footnoteRef:3] Spearheading this new committee, which would attempt to wrest agenda control from more moderate leaders in the House and Senate Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson was Harry Truman and his co-leader Adlai Stevenson.[endnoteRef:22] [3: For a discussion of the Democratic Advisory Councils origins, see: Daniel DiSalvo. 2010. The Politics of a Party Faction: The Liberal Labor Alliance in the Democratic Party, 1948-1972, Journal of Policy History 22 (3): 269-299; Eric Schickler. 2016. Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 1932-1965. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.] [22: Butler Says Hell Form Committee as Ordered, Washington Post, 14 December, 1956. By 1959 the councils membership would grow to about 30-members and include such prominent members of the party as Sen. John F. Kennedy and Eleanor Roosevelt (as a consultant). The council was partially responsible for pushing a more liberal civil rights agenda, and criticizing Eisenhower on these grounds. See also, Open Shop Bid Hit by Council of Democrats, Washington Post, 6 May, 1957. ]

Truman did not just confine his partisan role to the policy-making function of this new advisory council. Without a doubt, the former president had already proved to be a vocal, persistent critic of the Eisenhower administration. When speaking in the western plains, Truman railed against the administrations natural resources and land-use policy; talking to organized labor leaders he implied that Ike opposed full employment because it helps keep labor in its place; and, despite the platitude, Trumans critique did not stop at the waters edge - he routinely upbraided Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, for a foreign policy that allowed the unity of the free nations to disintegrate. Speaking at Yale as a guest lecturer during an economic contraction, Truman remarked that if he were still President, Id do something! I wouldnt be sitting still and playing golf. Ill tell you that![endnoteRef:23] [23: GOP Answers Truman Falsehood, Washington Post, 23 September, 1958; Truman Hits Eisenhower Policies, Washington Post, 11 September, 1956; Truman Starts Lectures at Yale, Takes Dig at Ike, Washington Post, 9 April, 1958,. ]

The former presidents most substantive role as opposition leader related to the pitched budgetary battles that engulfed the Democratic Congress and the Eisenhower administration. As president, Truman had suffered severe criticism from fiscal conservatives on both sides of the aisle over the size of his budget proposals. Now, Truman led the charge against Eisenhower as the administration struggled to cut desirable programs, maintain a low tax rate, and keep the budget balanced. Calling Eisenhowers FY 1959 budget a political trap that was intended to make Democrats look either as wasteful spenders or heartless reactionaries, Truman publicly urged Democratic members of Congress to hold firm against the administrations proposed budget.[endnoteRef:24] [24: Parties Switch Roles on Cutting the Budget, Washington Post, 19 May, 1957,. ]

Trumans public advice to the Democrats in response the 1957 recession was coupled with a political first the sworn testimony of a former U.S. President before the Congress to advise on a legislation. With the Eisenhower administration adamant that the federal government should maintain a balanced budget, even as unemployment rose, Congressional Democrats sponsored their own series of public works packages to revitalize areas of chronic unemployment. Representative Brent Spence announced that the House Committee on Banking and Currency would hold 27 days of hearings from state-governors, economists, and labor union heads on the causes of the unemployment crisis the first major economic shock since the end of WWII. Kicking off the hearings was former president Truman.[endnoteRef:25] [25: As the Republican House Whip told the press, Spences high-profile push for public works was nothing more nor less than political dramatics for Democrat propaganda purposes. Partisan Battle on the Economy Seen, New York Times, 10 April, 1958.]

Truman not only critiqued the current President for underestimating the underlying problems of the nations economy, but suggested that Eisenhower had somehow brought it upon the country for his refusal to spend money to overcome structural impediments to economic growth. The needs of the American people have increased, Truman argued, but the present government of the United States is not aware of these things and has not advanced with the times. And in spite of the Republican recession, the Republicans manage to keep prices going upward. This is quite a feat, to have price inflation and recession at the same time. We had a hard time getting a satellite off the ground but it was not trick at all for them to shoot the cost of living into outer space! [endnoteRef:26] Sitting before the Congressional committee, Trumans speech was broadcasted live across the country and helped to solidify the Democratic alternative to Eisenhowers balanced budget fiscal policy.[footnoteRef:4] Eisenhower ultimately vetoed the public works bill, but it would reemerge as a potent symbol of the Democrats Neo-Keynesian commitment when Kennedy came into office two years later. [26: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Banking and Currency, Legislation to Relieve Unemployment: Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong, 2nd sess. 25-77. ] [4: On how the two parties defined their fiscal policy alternatives during this period, see: James Savage. 1988. Balanced Budget and American Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, chapters 5-6.]

Elder Statesman Around the same time that Truman was solidifying his role as one of the Democrats Big Four, the former president emerged center stage in battle over McCarthyism. While Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) directed the Senates permanent investigations subcommittee on communist infiltration, Rep. Harold H. Velde (R-IL) competed for publicity while chairing the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). After months of investigating the communist ties of academias prestigious Rhodes scholarship trust, Velde pounced on reports that Truman, when president, appointed a suspected communist to head the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1946. Inflaming matters more, the news came from Eisenhowers own Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, who in mid-November announced that Truman appointed Harry Dexter White to lead the IMF, despite holding a widely-circulated FBI dossier on Whites spying activities for communist organizations.

Velde quickly scheduled two-days worth of hearings that would expose the Democrats coddling of Communists. No sooner had Harry Truman denied ever seeing such a report than a subpoena for him to testify before Velde arrived at his hotel in New York.[endnoteRef:27] Veldes release of several documents, reportedly in Whites own handwriting from Whitaker Chambers pumpkin-dossier, further entangled Truman. The former president, remained silent and stuck to his 7 a.m. walking constitutional. The press hounded him the morning after he received the subpoena. Truman, however, demurred, remarking instead on the good simple rule of obeying traffic lights, and openly contemplating why so many pigeons were able to survive in New York City.[endnoteRef:28] [27: Velde also issued summons for Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark, who was attorney general at the time of Whites appointment, and South Carolina Governor James Byrnes, who was then serving as secretary of state. Byrnes who had broken with Truman and the Democrats in 1952 had by that time added support to the allegations by confirming that Truman knew of Whites spying activities. Truman, Clark Subpoenaed! Chicago Daily Tribune, 11 November 11, 1953; Truman, Byrnes Subpoenaed with Clark in White Case, New York Times, 11 November, 1953. ] [28: A Smiling Truman Accepts Subpoena, New York Times, November 11, 1953. ]

Trumans nonchalance rare given the former presidents known tendency to swear and berate political opponents was a calculated maneuver to undermine Velde and McCarthyism more generally. Within days of receiving his subpoena, Truman had composed a letter with the help of his former White House aides.[footnoteRef:5] Addressed to Velde, Truman schooled the committee chairman in the finer points of constitutional law. Citing a long line of precedents, commencing with George Washington himself in 1796 Truman argued that presidents and former presidents should not submit to Congressional investigations of the executive: If the doctrine of separation of powers and the independence of the Presidency is to have any validity at all, it must be equally applicable to a President after his term of office has expiredThe doctrine would be shattered and the President, contrary to our fundamental theory of constitutional government, would become a mere arm of the legislative branch of the government if he would feeling during his term of office that his every act might be subject to official inquiry and possible distortion for political purposes.[endnoteRef:29] [5: Samuel I. Rosenman and Charles S. Murphy both visited Truman at his Waldorf-Astoria suite over the two days between receiving the subpoena and releasing his letter. Their involvement indicates what a sensitive situation the Velde subpoena really was for Truman, politically. Rosenman was a close confident and speech writer to both Franklin D. Roosevelt and Truman; most agree that Rosenman helped write Trumans 1948 acceptance speech before the DNC. Murphy took over from Rosenman as special counsel to the president, A Smiling Truman Accepts Subpoena, New York Times, 11 November, 1953. ] [29: Full text of Trumans response is re-printed in several newspapers, including the Chicago Daily Tribune, 13 November, 1953; New York Times,13 November, 1953. ]

In handling the Velde subpoena with a contradictory style of levity and astute constitutional reasoning, Truman destabilized the attack on his character and the conduct of his administration.[footnoteRef:6] Veldes enthusiasm and Trumans coy response embarrassed GOP leaders, who pressed hard on the HUAC chairman to temper his investigation.[endnoteRef:30] But McCarthyism transcended the political posturing of any single committee chairman. The response to Velde was enough to placate constitutional lawyers, but most would agree that the public still had a right to know what Truman then knew about White. The day before Brownells testimony before HUAC, Truman announced through his spokesman that he would respond to the charges in an all-out broadcast.[endnoteRef:31] [6: Truman was careful to limit his critique of the Congressional investigation in two important ways, according to contemporaneous editorials by lawyers and presidential historians. First, he did not deny Congress the authority to investigate other branches, as did Jackson and Buchannan. Second, he did not deny that the president or a former president was immune from judicial proceedings that might require personal testimony of the executive. See: In the Nation, New York Times, 13 November, 1953. ] [30: Truman Subpoena Upsets GOP Chiefs, Los Angeles Times, 14 November, 1953; GOP Leaders Bar Citing of Truman, New York Times, 13 November, 1953. ] [31: Truman will Give White Case Facts On Air Tomorrow, New York Times, 15 November, 1953. ]

On Monday, November 17 - less than 10 months after his presidency ended, Truman sat behind a large wooden desk and spoke to an estimated 50 million Americans (1/3rd of the population) during the three-major networks prime-time broadcast.[endnoteRef:32] Truman began his speech by relaying what he understood to be the major issue a personal attack made by the former chairman of Republican National Committee, which was without parallel, I believe, in the history of our country. He then repeated his argument from his published letter to Velde about the constitutional principle threatened by his subpoena. Truman then turned to the facts of the case and acknowledged that he was well aware of the FBIs secret investigation; he then further conceded the basic facts of Brownells accusation that he allowed Whites appointment to the IMF to proceed, even though he knew about the accusations. According to Truman, however, he ordered the investigation to continue, fearful that any other course of action would stifle the FBIs investigation of White. [32: Ex-President Blasts Cheap Political Trickery, Washington Post, 17 November, 1953; Truman Accuses Brownell of Lying, New York Times, 17 November, 1953. ]

The matter-of-fact presentation of events then turned into something grander. Doubling down on his interpretation of the facts that were before him, Truman argued that the accusation was shameful demagoguery [and] cheap political trickery. The former president continued, describing the political motivations for Brownells accusation: It is now evident that the present Administration has fully embraced, for political advantage, McCarthyismthe corruption of truth, the abandonment of our historical devotion to fairplaythe abandonment of due process of lawthe use of the big lie and the unfounded accusation against any citizen in the name of Americanism and securitythe rise to power of the demagogue who lives on untruththe spread of fear and destruction of faith in every level of our society. In invoking Eisenhowers administration, Truman likely knew that he could (and would) fall victim to the same critique he himself was leveling. But in closing, the former president told the country that McCarthyism, is not a partisan matter. This horrible cancer is eating at the vitals of America and it can destroy the great edifice of freedom. If this sordid, deliberate, and unprecedented attack on the loyalty of a former President of the United States will serve to alert the people to the terrible danger that our nation and each citizen faces, then it will have been a blessing in disguise. I hope this will arouse you to fight this evil at every level in our national life. I hope that this may serve to stir the conscience of the present Administration itself.[endnoteRef:33] [33: Full remarks of Harry Trumans speech re-printed in, Washington Post, 17 November, 1953. ]

The former presidents condemnation of McCarthyism was framed in partisan terms and contemporaneous reactions to his speech fell along the partisan divide. On the facts of the case, Truman appeared to overplay his hand as the next day FBI head J. Edgar Hoover told Congress that the presidents decision made it more difficult to investigate White. Yet, those looking beyond Trumans presentation of the facts and into the heart of the case lauded the former Presidents denouncement of McCarthyism. Responding to the Washington Posts own critical posture to Trumans speech, Michael Straight, the editor of the New Republic, argued that the editorial board has collapsed. It has concentrated on details, failing to see the broad sweep of dangerous precedents and tragic events tragic to those who wonder how many nations may fall under Communist enslavement while Americans, at Mr. Brownells instigation, are fighting among themselves.[endnoteRef:34] [34: Straights response to the Washington Post is re-printed in, Interpreting Truman, Washington Post, 27 November, 1953. For a review of positive and negative reactions to Trumans speech, see: Press Commentary on Truman Speech Varies, Los Angeles Times, November 18, 1953. ]

Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI), who had until this point only be implicated in all of this, recognized how advantageous a moment it was. In his own prime-time address one week after Trumans speech, McCarthy took aim at the former president. Almost immediately, the Senator lashed out and claimed that Trumans use of the word McCarthyism was definitive proof that the former president sympathized with communists. For, as McCarthy told his audience, the definition Truman used was, identical word for word, comma for comma, with the definition used by the Communist Daily Worker. Not only was Trumans definition tainted red, but the real issue, according to the Senator, was not about McCarthyism, but the more dangerous and debilitating, Trumanism. Trumanism, the Senator defined is, the placing of your political party above the interest of the country. Trumanism, he added, is the theory that no matter how great the wrong, it is right if it helps your political party. Trumanism, the Senator continued, in effect says to the head of a household if you catch a criminal looting your safe, kidnapping your children, and attacking your wife, do not dare turn the spotlight on him, do not get rough with him, do not call the police...[endnoteRef:35] McCarthy did what Brownell, Eisenhower, and the rest of the GOP leadership had actively sought to avoid in raising the White issue claim that the former President of the United States actively and willingly sympathized with communists working inside the government. [35: Joseph R. McCarty, A Speech Against Harry S. Truman, WNYC archives id:151018; Municipal archives id:LT2634. Contemporaneous reports of the nationally televised address can be found in Washington Post, 25 November, 1953. ]

Since his own speech, Truman had issued no comment on Brownells testimony and J. Edgar Hoovers explication of events.[endnoteRef:36] Following McCarthys tirade against Trumanism, however, the ex-president headlined a 22-thousand-person rally at Chicago stadium and denounced those who advocated thought-control and book-burning, and the irresponsible smearing of personal reputations. Joined by film stars Cary Grant, Charlton Heston, and Gladys Swarthought, Truman never mentioned McCarthy by name. Nevertheless, the message was clear. If we do not take a stand against these things, Truman told the crowd, then, no matter how great our military strength, we shall surely lose the battle for world peace and justice in which we are now joined. Continuing, he added, [36: Truman did give a small speech before a 500-person meeting of Young Democrats in Kansas City, but he primarily focused on the anti-Democratic bias in the media. Truman Urges Party to Turn From Past, New York Times, 20 November, 1953. ]

The struggle for truth and decency is first of all the struggle for freedom. By freedom I mean, of course, responsible freedom freedom in obedience to the laws of human reason and the moral codeI will not say we are losing the struggle for freedom in America. But I will say that our freedoms are under attack and that these attacks are all the more serious because they are often indiscreet, indirect, and dishonest.[endnoteRef:37] [37: Excerpts of Trumans address, printed nearly in full, are from Truman Assails Fear Tactics of Politicians, Chicago Daily Tribune, 29 November, 1953; See also, Truman Says Freedoms are Now Under Attack, Los Angeles Times, 29 November, 1953; Truman Hits Vigilantes of Intellect, Washington Post, 29 November, 1953. ]

On March 9, 1954 three months after Trumans prime-time address, Edward R. Murrow took to the airwaves. It spelled the end for McCarthy and the worst excesses of McCarthyism in that generation, but it was just one line in a chorus of denouncement (Fried 1990). McCarthyism receded throughout the previous year, sapped of energy and support, in part, because it took on the former President of the United States. While McCarthy and Velde both won re-election a year after, fellow Republicans had had enough. By the end of 1953, leaks from the senior GOP leadership spread throughout the major dailies that the Republican Policy Committee was actively considering a proposal to change committee hearing procedures that allow for one-man investigations. Even the Vice President Richard Nixon, who had emerged as a national star because of his work on HUAC as a fearsome red hunter took to the podium to take down McCarthy; Nixons denouncement, while never defending Truman, spelled the end of McCarthy, his reckless talk and questionable methods.[endnoteRef:38] [38: GOP Leaders in Congress Discuss Plans to End One-Man Probes by Subpoena and Hearing Curbs, Washington Post, 29 December, 1953; Nixon Says Questionable Methods and Reckless Talk of Red Hunters are Diversion from GOP Program, New York Times, 14 March, 1954. ]

Dwight D. Eisenhower (1961-1969)

Like his own predecessor, Harry Truman, President Eisenhower left Washington in January, 1960 with every hope of a quiet retirement of writing memoirs. Now 70 years old, the former General of the Army and president was newsworthy not for his military exploits or as leader of the free world, but for learning how to drive again. Promising to wait at least five to six months before saying anything noteworthy, the former president emphasized how much he was looking forward to finally becoming just another private citizen.[endnoteRef:39] And golf; plenty and plenty of golf. [39: Eisenhower Calls Soviet Insincere, New York Times, 25 January, 1961; Georgia Quail Hunter, Washington Post, 25 January, 1961; Eisenhower Finds New Life Great, New York Times, 21 January, 1961. ]

Party Builder Despite begrudgingly entering into political life a year before he was elected president, Eisenhower remained an active leader in the Republican party after leaving the White House. While much of his political energy was spent helping his former administration officials run for office often unsuccessfully Eisenhower also dedicated himself to reshaping and expanding the entire GOP.

Just one week after meeting with Kennedy at Camp David to discuss the Bay of Pigs, Everett Dirksen and Charles Halleck (R-IN) traveled up to Eisenhowers Gettysburg office to chart out a strategy for the 1962 midterms.[endnoteRef:40] Eisenhower, who suffered tremendous Congressional losses while president, wanted the party to focus on the midterms before opening up old foreseeable divisions that would come in nominating a presidential candidate. In Washington that June, less than five months out of office, Eisenhower spoke to over 6,000 Republicans at a fundraising dinner. I come as a recent graduate of as tough a political cram course as anyone could devise six years with an opposition Congress, Eisenhower cautioned them, and those who run too fast into the future sometimes trip over the present. As a potential message for the midterms, Eisenhower then introduced his stock critiques, which would define the GOP line for the next eight years; the Democrats were the party of big brother; immoral deficit spending; consolidation and federal overreach; and rampant public power.[endnoteRef:41] [40: Ike and GOP Leaders Chart Course Today, Washington Post, 1 May, 1961; Witch-Hunt Opposed by Ike, Washington Post, 2 May, 1961. ] [41: Ike Urges GOP Fight Now for 62, Not 64, Washington Post, 2 June, 1961. ]

Throughout the year, as states and major cities held elections, Eisenhower crisscrossed the country campaigning in James Mitchells New Jersey gubernatorial race, consulting Nelson Rockefeller in New York, and actively promoting Louis J. Lefkowitzs mayoral race against Democratic incumbent Robert F. Wagner.[endnoteRef:42] Nixon flew into Gettysburg to meet with his former boss who, as Roscoe Drummond wrote, had been writing to him, telephoning him, and talking to him in Gettysburg, that it was Nixons duty to run and that no other decision was tolerable.[endnoteRef:43] In September, the 38 freshman GOP members of the House of Representatives all traveled to Eisenhowers farm to get briefed on the history of the Berlin and Cuba crisis, as well as a simple message to carry with them into the midterms: stop spending so blamed much money.[endnoteRef:44] [42: Ike to Campaign at Mitchell Rally, Washington Post, 5 August, 1961; Ike Urges Firm Stand on Berlin, Washington Post, 12 July, 1961; NY GOP Leaders Map Strategy with Ike, Washington Post, 13 August, 1961. ] [43: Roscoe Drummond, The Nixon Decision, Washington Post, 30 September, 1961. ] [44: 38 Republican Freshmen in House Tour Gettysburg Battlefield with Ike, Washington Post, 12 September, 1961. ]

All of this was a part of Eisenhowers eager attempt to reconstruct the Republican partys image. The former president often stepped behind younger, less experienced candidates for local and state races, with the hope of making the GOP a party no longer dominated by, in his words, gray-haired old men. In addition to encouraging Richard Nixon to run for Californias governorship, Eisenhower also took credit for motivating his former Interior Secretary, Fred Seaton, to run for Governor of Nebraska, and for persuading George Romney, president of American motors, to run for Governor in Michigan.[endnoteRef:45] Helping to recruit and promote candidates was just one component of Eisenhowers attempt to bring more young, sensitive people into the GOP. Once again inviting young Republicans to his farm in September, 1962, the former president told them that it was up to them to provide the enthusiasm, vitality, and vigor to keep the federal government in its own place. Speaking as a refined tactician, and often referring to the force of the Republican party, Eisenhower told Republicans at fundraisers that the surest way to revitalize the GOP was to reach out to the youth. The Republican welcome mat, he said, should be always out for potential allies all kinds of citizens who want to help promote sound and progressive governmentThis kind of organization, political but not blatantly and publicly partisan, is especially appealing to younger citizens, particularly when they are not yet fully committed to membership in either party. Indeed, youth, with its vitality, energy, and idealism, seems often skeptical of the value and virtue of established party systems[endnoteRef:46] In a lengthy cover story for the Saturday Evening Post, the former president declared that the Republican Party is now in something of an emergency situation and that, consequently, we should give far less emphasis to seniority. It is more important than formerly to select new candidates for office from the able and relatively youngwe should seize the opportunity to focus attention on the abilities and personalities of these vital leaders[endnoteRef:47] [45: Ike, 71, Said to Bar his Aid to Old Men, Washington Post, 10 February, 1962,. ] [46: Transcript of the address reprinted in New York Times, 2 February, 1962.] [47: Dwight Eisenhower, Ike Takes a Look at the GOP, Saturday Evening Post, 21 April, 1962, 15-19; Dwight Eisenhower, Danger from Within, Saturday Evening Post, 26 January, 1963, 14-19. ]

Dominated by Congressional leaders in Washington, D.C., Eisenhower also believed that the party would be more effective if it brought more stakeholders into the party leadership. Working with William Miller, chairman of the RNC, the two built a corollary organization to the Democratic Advisory Council, known as the All Republican Conference or Citizens Council. The first meeting, held in a large tent on Eisenhowers Gettysburg farm, brought together governors, state legislators, Eisenhowers former Cabinet, and a small number of Congressional Republicans to talk policy and strategy for the 1964 election. Tagged as a base-broadening move, the new organization drew the ire of nationally elected officials, none more so than Barry Goldwater: These are the same people who caused most of our present Party troublesIt is unthinkable that they should be given another opportunity to lead us down the path to political destruction.[endnoteRef:48] Yet, Eisenhower defended the new organization, writing to Miller that it would help attract that new breed, the mobile American who are crucial to the Republican Partys resurgence. Our new national citizens organization, he added, which will devote much attention to organizational activities in the big cities and metropolitan areas, could well be the secret of Republican success...[endnoteRef:49] [48: Goldwater Blasts GOP Plan to Use Old Guard Chiefs, Washington Post, 3 July, 1962,. ] [49: Ike Joins Party Fight, Lines Up with Liberals, Washington Post, 5 July, 1962. ]

As the 1964 Convention approached, the schism between the amateurs in the Republican Citizens Committee and elected officials in Washington took on greater significance. Eisenhower often couched his dislike of Goldwater, even though he, in principle, remained open to any eventual GOP nominee.[endnoteRef:50] But, the Citizens Council took the lead in drafting the 1964 GOP platform by enacting another one of the former presidents proposals - a series of party to people forums. Most prominently, it was to be from the Citizens Council where the party would take its messaging cues and a subcommittee led by the former presidents brother, Milton Eisenhower, was tasked with gauging public opinion on prominent GOP issues.[endnoteRef:51] The policy positions that emerged mirrored the former presidents positions and openly diverged from most of Goldwaters most provocative statements privatizing the TVA, building up Americas nuclear arsenal, weakening federal civil rights protection, and a general isolationist stance. [50: In the Fall of 1963, Eisenhower remarked that he was unclear on Goldwaters message. Less about the ideologically consistent position of the Arizona Senator, contemporaneous accounts understood Eisenhowers message to be a veiled condemnation of the prospective presidential candidate. Love and Marriage Complicate GOP Candidate Hunt, Washington Post, 15 June, 1963; Ike Said to Narrow GOP Choices to 4, Washington Post, 7 July, 1963.] [51: Eisenhower GOP Council to Study Key Issues, Washington Post, 5 August, 1963. ]

Eisenhowers role in the 1964 Republican National Convention belied the years-long effort to wrest party control away from Goldwater and more conservative factions of the Republican party. While there was rampant speculation that Eisenhower was advising Pennsylvanias favorite-son, and close confidant of the former President, William Scranton, to fight it out in a brokered convention, Eisenhower himself never publicly endorsed any candidate. Milton Eisenhower, however led the convention team that pushed for Scranton in a last-minute effort to block Goldwaters nomination. Despite these deep connections to the anti-Goldwater faction, the former president was adamant in suggesting that it would be inappropriate try to run a political organization or give orders or pull strings in helping to choose the partys next nominee. At the convention, Eisenhower met with both candidates, as Scranton tried to persuade Goldwater to a last minute, publicized debate over the meaning of Goldwaerism. Nevertheless, in the only major public statement the former president gave before the nomination, Eisenhower tried to temper the significance of the Arizona Republicans likely candidacy: I do not believe this convention marks a great historic turning point[endnoteRef:52] [52: Ike and Scranton Talk Creates Stir in Ranks of GOP, Washington Post, 7 June, 1964; Last Thing I Want is to Run Party, Pull Strings, Ike Quoted as Saying, Washington Post, 8 July, 1964; Ike Says Hell Support Barry if He is Nominee, Washington Post, 14 July, 1964. ]

After Goldwaters now-historic speech lauding extremism in the defense of liberty, however, Eisenhower was openly disappointed with the convention result. Despite his careful posture prior to the nomination, the former president quickly distanced himself from the new face of the party. Described as dispirited and increasingly unwilling to support Goldwater after the address, news of Eisenhowers dissatisfaction forced Goldwater to meet with the former president the morning after the speech. After meeting with Goldwater for almost an hour, the former president felt satisfied with the explanation of Goldwaters choice of words, but publicly expressed the Senators need to speak about this during the campaign so as to clarify exactly what he meant. The issue, however, did not go away, as Eisenhower had given a taped TV interview prior to their private meeting. Aired after the day after Eisenhowers initial remarks, the former president authoritatively undermined the Republican nominees rallying cry. Goldwaters phrasing, according to Eisenhower, would seem to say that the end always justifies the means[but] the whole American system refutes that idea and that concept. He then openly questioned his own role, or lack thereof, at the convention. I will say this, the former president concluded, I dont think that my efforts had any great apparent successI did what I thought my conscience dictated and what I thought to be a proper role for a former President in the councils of his party and I think I would probably assume the same role again, but probably I would try to do it better.[endnoteRef:53] [53: Eisenhower Bids Arizonan Explain, New York Times, 18 July, 1964; Clarify Talk, Eisenhower Asks Senator, Los Angeles Times, 19 July, 1964; Eisenhower Hits at Idea End Justifies Means, Los Angeles Times, 20 July, 1964; Extremism Reaction of Ike Shown by Tape, Washington Post, 20 July, 1964. ]

Eisenhowers interview weighed down the post-convention momentum usually enjoyed by the out-party. It also prompted Goldwater to expend significant amounts of energy and time in bringing his party back together through a series of unity sessions that August. Held in Hershey, PA, the summit meeting concluded with a comprehensive, if tepid endorsement from Eisenhower. The former president, reflective of what was most likely discussed at the meeting, emphasized the Senators promise to adopt a more pragmatic foreign policy stance and support federal civil rights legislation. Goldwater, standing next to Eisenhower, responded that he promised not to appoint any Cabinet official in the State Department or Department of Defense without first consulting the former president.[endnoteRef:54] Goldwater even suggested that, if elected, one of his first acts would be to send the former WWII General to Vietnam to assess and advise on the military situation a suggestion that brought quick denial from Eisenhower himself. As the campaign wore on, the former president was noticeably absent from the campaign trail and fundraising dinners that marked his behavior in the 1962 midterm elections. His support extended primarily to filming a set of half-hour sit-down interviews with the GOP candidate to discuss campaign issues titled, A Conversation at Gettysburg.[endnoteRef:55] [54: Roscoe Drummond, Extremists vs. Goldwater, Washington Post, 23 September, 1964.] [55: Goldwater Sets Series of GOP Unity Sessions, Washington Post, July 28, 1964; Statement of Eisenhower is reprinted in full in Washington Post, 13 August, 1964. Statement of Goldwater is reprinted in full in Washington Post, 13 August, 1964; Ike, at 74, Shies from Viet-Nam, Washington Post, 15 October, 1964; Barry Sees LBJ Afraid to Debate, Washington Post, 22 September, 1964. ]

After Goldwaters defeat, though, the president threw himself back into the fight for the soul of the Republican party. Attending planning meetings for the upcoming January RNC meetings that would likely oust party chairman Dean Burch, the former president pushed again to keep the GOPs tent big. As he told Republican leaders, reeling over their historic loss, In later years, we have been more than Republicans. We have been liberal Republicans, moderate Republicans, middle-of-the-road Republicans, and conservative Republicans... Now I want to plead with you, lets become again just Republicans! Beyond rhetoric, the former president took with him a set of sweeping organizational proposals to help revamp the GOP and limit the control of Congressional Republicans, including a plan to dismantle the House and Senate Congressional campaign committees. Fortunately for Eisenhower, the interim meeting of the RNC elected Ray Bliss to revamp the GOP in preparation for the 1966 midterms. Eisenhower deferred to Bliss reform efforts, often encouraging fellow partisans at fundraising dinners to back Bliss as he seeks to fulfil his pledge of reorganizing, of reunifying, of re-energizing the Party from the bottom to the top. The former president also cautioned against splintering organizations that would compete with us in the soliciting of Republican funds.[endnoteRef:56] [56: Last Thing I Want is to Run Party, Pull Strings, Ike Quoted as Saying, Washington Post, July 8, 1964; Leaders Agree with Ike on Poor Image of GOP, Washington Post, 22 January, 1965; Ike, at Ohio Dinner, Asks GOP Unity Behind Bliss, Washington Post, 10 June, 1965; Ike Scores Splintering Amid GOP, Washington Post, 29 June, 1965. ]

Bliss did not push the reorganization plans as full heartedly as he indicated in the aftermath of the 1964 election, but the Republican Party turned towards Eisenhowers strategy nevertheless. A young, Republican-convert in California, Ronald Reagan, won the Governorship on Eisenhowers line of common-sense government, and the former president quickly acknowledged him as a great choice for the party come 1968.[endnoteRef:57] By 1968, Republicans rebuilt at the state level, controlled a majority of the nations governorships, and retained a formidable bloc of moderate partisans as it began to draft its 1968 platform.[footnoteRef:7] Eisenhowers ultimate endorsement of his former Vice-President helped Nixon cement his nomination and secured his vision for the Republican party into the next decade. [57: At the GOP post-mortum meeting in December 1964, Eisenhower closed his speech, remarking that, It doesnt make too much difference what ways we will solve the major problems of the world as long as we popularize the term common sense. We should make it the byword of the party, and, in this way, we can again become the majority party. On Reagan, see: Ike Likes Reagan as 1968 Possibility, Washington Post, 16 June, 1966. ] [7: Robert Novak and Rowland Evans recognized that by 1968, largely due to Eisenhowers political maneuvering, moderate Republican governors like Raymond Shafer and George Romney had successfully coalesced to counter-act the power of national, Congressional leaders. In writing the 1968 platform, Bliss maintained near universal control over selecting convention officers, a compromise position between moderates and conservatives one strikingly different than the outcome four years earlier. See, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Governors Fail to Enlist Eisenhower, Washington Post, 22 February, 1968. ]

Opposition Leader The splintering of the GOP in the early 1960s meant that every policy statement offered by the former president was also an attempt to move the GOP in a particular ideological direction. However, Eisenhower crafted and directed a unifying partisan line of attack, highly critical of Kennedy and Johnsons budgetary politics.

Eisenhower during his presidency was immensely skeptical of Neo-Keynesian, pump-priming fiscal policy, which defined elements of the New Frontier. As Kennedy was attempting to pass a massive public works bill in 1962 (a bill based on the one Truman testified on in 1958), Eisenhower increasingly used his public reputation to denounce the Democratic partys budget philosophy. At a GOP fundraising dinner in 1962, at the height of the administrations efforts to pass the bill, Eisenhowers denouncement was greeted with cheers, whistles, and hurrahs, as he lambasted Kennedys plans. Suggesting that the president had been floundering aimlessly and desperately behind a front of sophistication, he told crows that it is always necessary to examine critically those appropriating and to stop assuming that mere spending means increased strength. Despite their growing animosity, Goldwater followed and capitalized on Eisenhowers critique of the New Economics, calling on Republican voters to send a message to Kennedy to replace his brain trusters with hard-headed business men who actually understood the economy. Dirksen and Halleck in their weekly press conference said that only a GOP Congress could successfully declare a moratorium on Kennedys economic novelties, return to fiscal sanity, and abandon this old scheme to cover up extravagant government spending. And, in providing the alternative, Eisenhower continued to tour the country claiming that Republicans are those who see dedication to balanced budgets as one measure of responsibility in political leadership![endnoteRef:58] [58: Eisenhowers Attack on Kennedys Policies Causes New Problems for Administration, Wall Street Journal, 25 June, 1962. ]

Even on some of the least technocratic elements of the New Frontier, Eisenhower struck a hard line on the Kennedy administrations spending priorities, often earning front-page newspaper attention. On increased money for space exploration, the former president declared that, at the very least we might not defer buying tickets for a trip to the moon until we can pay cash for the ride! Campaigning for Maryland candidates in 1962, the former president told cheering crowds pinning We miss Ike buttons that, In my day we called people who would not pay their way deadbeats. I think they, the Democrats, are asking us to be deadbeats! Speaking in Illinois, Eisenhower declared that Republicans of any stripe were united because they were the kind of people who will eliminate the Alice-in-Wonderland thinking that embodied Democratic Party orthodoxy. In Minneapolis, the former president lambasted the little clique of professors who were advising the president to make an unconscionable grab for power with the Executives budgetary discretion over public works. Speaking to an estimated 25,000 people in Hartford, Connecticut, the ex-president continued his attack on the technocratic underpinnings of the New Frontier They want a Washingtonwhere the executive gets its goals and purposes from a clique of theorists who specialize in experimental tampering and tinkering and talktimidity in everything, except in spending money! Holding a news conference at the Capitol building, Eisenhower treated over 170 reporters to a White-House style press conference on the Kennedy budget. He focused on the growing set of obligations that comprised Kennedys domestic agenda, as well as the young presidents attempt to vest more power in the Executive. Increased federal concentration, he added, was the real threat to liberty in this republic. Eisenhowers press conference followed from a set of day-long meetings with senior GOP officials on Capitol Hill, in which he forewarned the impending danger of the Democratic partys Leviathan State.[endnoteRef:59] [59: Ike Denounces Foreign Policy and Spending, Washington Post, 17 September, 1961; Democrats Make US Nation of Deadbeats, Ike Says at GOP Rally, ; Washington Post, 8 September, 1962; Ike Attacks Power Grab By Kennedy, Washington Post, 11 October, 1962; Ike Sees GOP Administrations Desperately Needed in States, Washington Post, 16 October, 1962; Ike Charges Kennedy Seeks Wider Powers, Washington Post, 11 May, 1962; GOP Chiefs Say Kennedy Tries to Build Up Leviathan State, Washington Post, 14 May 1962. ]

Eisenhower further made headlines when, in in a surprising move of ideological consistency, the former president lambasted the Kennedy administrations budget increases for military spending. I must record by personal belief, Eisenhower remarked at a GOP fundraising dinner, that substantial amounts in our current defense budgets reflect unjustified fears, plus a reluctance in some quarters to relinquish outmoded concepts.[endnoteRef:60] The spat portended a deep division over the direction of the GOP heading into the presidential nomination contests, but few could must the same degree of authority as the former General. He continued this critique in 1963, writing in the Saturday Evening Post about the need to cut down on troops in NATO, primarily because of the financial stress put on the federal budget now the largest peacetime budget in American history. Eisenhowers fiscal conservatism and balanced budget mentality only grew as President Johnsons nutty Great Society took hold. Eisenhower was never alone in his condemnation of big government spending, but as former president, his opinions carried unmatched authority, and never ceased to be newsworthy. [endnoteRef:61] [60: Big Spenders Sway Kennedy, Kike Says, Washington Post, 30 June, 1962. ] [61: Ike, 75 Today, Lets Mind Go to Past, Then to Future of Republican Party, Washington Post, 14 October, 1965. ]

Elder Statesman It was President Kennedy who first drew Eisenhower back into political life as an elder statesman in support of Americas foreign interests and the presidencys role in securing them.

As soon as Kennedy took office, a mammoth international crisis threatened to erupt in Laos. Under Eisenhower, the U.S. government had aided the anti-communist general Nosavan Phoumi. The Eisenhower-established SEATO treaty proved ineffective, and neither of Americas two strong allies in the region Britain and France were unwilling to support the military leader. As this crisis threatened to further destabilize the region, the Kennedy administration reached out directly to former president Eisenhower for consultation. During the transition period, Eisenhower and Kennedy worked closely to keep the transitioning administration apprised of developments.[footnoteRef:8] Kennedy had handled the Laos crisis delicately upon entering the White House, but the minor interventions had made the possibility of a military invasion more likely. By mid-March, Kennedy announced that the U.S. would no longer unconditionally support Phoumi; rather, they would support a concerted effort to broker a cease-fire and make Laos a neutral state. [8: As Arthur Schlesinger recounts, the last conversation among many conversations Kennedy had with Eisenhower during the transition concerned the possibility of military action in Laos. See, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. 1965. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 162-164; 320.]

Eisenhower, who was heavily implicated in the success or failure of the regions stability, announced that he would pause his Palms Spring vacation and speak to reporters about international affairs and Kennedys decision. Eisenhower was adamant the young administration, despite a worsening situation, was conducting itself admirably. Recalling his phone conversation with the president earlier that morning, Eisenhower told reporters that His [Kennedys] idea seemed to conform exactly with what we had tried to do the last few years. He added that, the present Administration seems dedicated to peace and is trying to be fair. Pressed on whether Eisenhower would have pursued a military option, the former president strongly critiqued the question. None of us can help by irresponsible suggestions, he said, I would want exactly the same facts that the President has before I made any statement on that. The man responsible for foreign affairs is the President.[endnoteRef:62] [62: Eisenhower Backs Kennedys Actions in Laos Crisis, New York Times, 25 March, 1961; Ike, Kennedy Express Same Views on Laos, Chicago Daily Tribune, 25 March, 1961; Ike Gets Call From Kennedy, Washington Post, 25 March, 1961.]

Less than a month later, all attention turned from Laos towards Cuba. In late April, news quickly rolled in about some Cuban rebels who were ambushed at the Bay of Pigs. World leaders and press reports quickly implicated the White House and the countrys CIA for the unsuccessful revolt, turning what would have been an isolated uprising into a global crisis. Kennedy moved quickly to quell the unrest and stave off partisan attacks, meeting with Senators Goldwater and Rockefeller, and conferring with Richard Nixon. The President also wanted to meet with Eisenhower, under whose administration a version of the invasion was first conceived. Flying an Air Force helicopter out to the former presidents farm in Pennsylvania, Kennedy and Eisenhower met at Camp David on Saturday, April 22. As Kennedys press secretary, Pierre Salinger, told reporters the day before the meeting, the president felt that Eisenhower, as leader of the Republican party and former President, should know what the situation is.[endnoteRef:63] [63: Ike, Kennedy to Confer on Cuban Crisis, Chicago Daily Tribune, 22 April, 1961. ]

As Eisenhower later recounted in a 1964 oral history, the meeting with Kennedy was more than just a partisan ploy to temper the blowback. Up to that point nobody had fully taken responsibility for the invasion. Eisenhower recalled that, he [Kennedy] was asking what to do now and he wanted to know what I thought would be the Russian reactionhe was afraidHe was more interested in what I thought he should do now, than what the Russians would like to do.[endnoteRef:64] Meeting alone in the Aspen Lodge, the president and former president met for almost two hours. Speaking to reporters shortly after, Kennedy paid respect to his predecessor, saying that he wanted to meet with Eisenhower to get the benefit of his thoughts and experience. Eisenhower then told the press that he was all in favor of the United States supporting the man who is carrying the responsibility for our foreign affairs.[endnoteRef:65] [64: Dwight D. Eisenhower's Post-Presidential Papers, 1965 Signature File, Box 7, PR-3 Public Relations-3 Interview 11-27-64; NAID #12023937, pages 15-16] [65: Eisenhower Urges Nation to Back Kennedy on Cuba, New York Times, 23 April, 1961; And Another in Cuba, Chicago Daily Tribune, 23 April, 1961. Eisenhower Meets with Kennedy, Asks Nation to Back Him, Los Angeles Times, 23 April, 1961,. ]

Eisenhowers solidarity with the new president, coupled with Kennedys own humble acceptance of blame, won praise in the mainstream press. The presidents appeal to Mr. Eisenhower for support, The Washington Post read, was a wise gesture of national unity; and the generous response of the former President, who has known like strains and disappointments was characteristically patriotic. The columnist Roscoe Drummond who Kennedy credited with suggesting the initial pre-inaugural meetings concerning Laos[endnoteRef:66] - recognized the significance of this relationship best, writing That Mr. Eisenhower will not make political capital out of the failure of the Cuban invasion and will strongly support the President in whatever decisive action is needed to remove an unelected Communist state from our doorstep.[endnoteRef:67] [66: Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Special Correspondence. Eisenhower, Dwight D., 1961: January-December; document 5. ] [67: Aftermath of Cuba, Washington Post, 24 April, 1961; Ike and Kennedy, Washington Post, 1 May, 1961. ]

Despite the former presidents admonition, blame still trickled in from the other side of the aisle. The following week, though, Eisenhower made another show of support, inviting 20 of his former Cabinet secretaries and White House aides to his Gettysburg office to discuss the need to further temper GOP critiques of Kennedys foreign policy. Later that summer, while standing in front of 6,000 Republicans at a fundraising dinner at the National Armory, Eisenhower pressed his unifying commitments further saying, As the President attempts to preserve our freedoms, as he seeks to strengthen peace as he confers with foreign leaders, whether friendly or hostile, he has the hopeful and sympathetic good will of all loyal Americans, regardless of party. He added that he had pride in those Republicans who did not attempt to criticize, condemn, or belittle those in authority. Eisenhower continued this massive display of presidential support into the Kennedy administrations next crisis Berlin later that summer. Standing alongside Nelson Rockefeller, at his office at Gettysburg College, Eisenhower again asked that Americans unite around their President and support the administrations foreign aid and defense policies. As the situation worsened, press routinely pushed Eisenhower into expressing his views on the administrations response. Emphasizing that he was not up on things, Eisenhower justified each of the current presidents decisions with a similar line that he must be doing it for a good reason.[endnoteRef:68] [68: Ike Urges Firm Stand on Berlin, Washington Post, 12 July, 1961; Eisenhower Urges Calm in Facing World Crisis, Washington Post, 23 July, 1961. ]

The White House recognized Eisenhowers efforts to rally around the flag. Eisenhower, in response to the Berlin crisis, penned a lengthy essay in the Saturday Evening Post. Kennedy wrote to the former president, praising his essay as constructive and helpful. After Eisenhower appeared on CBS to denounce extremism in America, coming most prominently from the John Birch Society, Kennedy again penned his predecessor writing that, I want you to know how much I appreciated and admired your televised remarks about extremists. I dont know of anyone whose opinion on this matter will have greater weight; and your statement is another example of your service and devotion to the country.[endnoteRef:69] [69: Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. Presidents Office Files. Special Correspondence. Eisenhower, Dwight D., 1961: January-December; 47 49. ]

Eisenhower was not 100 percent consistent in his defense of Kennedys foreign policy. As William Ewald, the presidents speechwriter, later recounted,

When Kennedy became the leader, he [Eisenhower] couldnt care who it was, hes going to support him, especially on foreign policy, national security policy... Now he obviously had a great deal of bitterness and resentment at the Kennedy attacks on him, on his record, his performanceIn the 62 campaign, somewhere along the line, something got off the rails. And Kennedy made a speech or part of a speech, talking about how great his record was on foreign policy against Eisenhowers. And this infuriated Eisenhowerand he went up to Harrisburg and he made a blistering attack on the Kennedy record. And then he said, I think we ought to stop this. And I wont say anymore, and I dont think you should say anymore. I tell you neither side said any more...[endnoteRef:70] [70: William B. Ewald, Oral History Interview JFK #1, July 15, 1983. Interviewer Sheldon Stern; and the John F. Kennedy Library, 13-14. ]

Ewalds account mirrors the historical record quite accurately, and even while Eisenhower continued to critique Kennedys domestic spending, he nevertheless urged the country to stand behind the President without regard to their political affiliation as he seeks to lead us to a peaceful and honorable place in world affairs. And throughout 1962 and 1963, Kennedy routinely met with Eisenhower for brief meetings, often lasting longer than planned, including after the death of civil rights activist Medgar Evans and Kennedys landmark civil rights address. In 1963, the Kennedy administration actively sought and secured Eisenhowers support of their controversial nuclear test ban treaty - the biggest battle since the Treaty of Versailles, according to the White House. As president, Eisenhower had tried to negotiate a ban-treaty in 1958, but negotiations fell flat, in large part due to intra-party opposition. Eisenhowers prospective endorsement became all the more imperative in Kennedys fight to pass the treaty when the former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis Strauss, criticized the agreement and Barry Goldwater ramped up his attack. Even the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair, James Fulbright (D-AK), requested Eisenhowers perspective on the matter.[endnoteRef:71] In response, Eisenhower traveled to Washington to meet with Senators to clarify his position, and make clear his support of the administrations goals. As Ewald later explained, Eisenhowers support of Kennedy actually went against the advice of his political advisors. Strauss and Brownell both remained skeptical and encouraged Eisenhower to remain silent on the matter. In the end, however, Eisenhower recognized that it was one of those things where there was no compromising, and it didnt take him long; he did endorse it.[endnoteRef:72] [71: Eisenhower for Test Ban, New York Times, 27 August, 1963; Ike Approves Test Ban, Washington Post, 27 August, 1963. ] [72: William B. Ewald, Oral History Interview, 16. ]

The Politics of the Post-Presidency

The post-presidencies of Truman and Eisenhower show that authority gained as President of the United States does not quickly recede, but that the form it takes is predictable. Truman, remained an active, polemical darling for the Democratic party, helped promote an alternative fiscal policy to counter Eisenhowers balanced budget approach, and, in retrospect, courageously battled the politics of McCarthyism. Surprisingly, Eisenhower remained just as politically active as Truman, and despite having less experience, was arguably more successful in directly imprinting his legacy on his party. While never getting the reputation of Give em Hell Truman, Eisenhower turned out to be just as critical of subsequent administrations as Truman was of his, but, as the elder statesman, he used his position to unify the country during multiple foreign crises. However, this also included conferring with Johnson over the decision to send more troops to Vietnam, and supporting the Vietnam War until his death in 1969.[endnoteRef:73] To this extent, both Eisenhower and Trumans claim to leadership as an elder statesman was never value-neutral, nor was it intended to be. [73: President Tells of Talk with General Eisenhower, Washington Post, 8 October, 1965; Dwight D. Eisenhower, America's Place in the World, Reader's Digest 87:522 (October 1965), 7681]

To be sure, Obamas decision to remain in Washington was an incredibly personal one; the family wants daughter-Sasha to finish her two more years of high school. However, even if he was not living in the nations capital, Obamas presence in Washingtons political scene may be just as domineering, as was Eisenhower and Trumans. In late December, less than a month before he left office, President Obama sat down with his former chief strategist, David Axelrod for a lengthy interview on the presidents retirement plans. Obama responded with an ambitious, open-ended list of priorities to build that next generation of leadership and identify really talented staff and organizers who are already out there and encouraging them to get involved [with the Democratic Party]. [endnoteRef:74] In the closing months of his presidency, more of his priorities came into sharper relief. As an opposition leader, he and his first Attorney General, Eric Holder, have already organized a 527-advocacy group to push redistricting reform, with the implicit goal of helping Democrats recover some semblance of power in state government.[endnoteRef:75] Obamas My Brothers Keeper has a unique private-public partnership design that will allow the president to maintain direction over it, now that is no longer a White House priority; with former Obama-official Broderick Johnson as its newly elected chair, this mentoring initiative will continue to solidify the former presidents place as an elder statesman in national and local conversations on racial equality. [74: David Axelrod, The Axe Files, Ep. 108: President Barack Obama, The University of Chicago Institute of Politics & CNN. Audio and Interview transcript available at CNN.com. URL: http://podcast.cnn.com/the-axe-files-david-axelrod/episode/all/Yg1u54uYTmB7Mb/me1tyh.html . Last Accessed, March 28, 2017. ] [75: Edward-Isaac Dovere, Obama, Holder to lead post-Trump redistricting campaign, Politico, 17 October, 2016. URL: http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/obama-holder-redistricting-gerrymandering-229868 . Last Accessed, April 7, 2017. ]

While Obama will carry with similar levels of media attention and personal loyalties necessary to effect political change, in one important respect, however, he will be distinct from the post-presidencies of Eisenhower or Truman. President Obama entered into office in large part because of his independence from the formal Democratic party, using his personal campaign organization (Obama for America, now titled Organizing for Action) to mobilize voters, solicit campaign funds, and pronounce party doctrine. As Sidney Milkis and John York (2017) write, It remains to be seen, however, whether the presidential partisanship practiced by Obamas information-age, grassroots organization offers a novel and enduring form of party building or marks, instead, a new stage of executive aggrandizement that subordinates collective party responsibility to a cult of personality. By most accounts, President Obama used his organization to prioritize his own personal loyalties over his partys collective position. Interestingly enough, in the modern era, only Dwight Eisenhower suffered greater party-seat losses in the Congress than President Obama (Jacobs and Ceaser 2016). Yet, Eisenhower redoubled his efforts to reshape the Republican party after his term by actively working through its pre-existing institutions. Obama has the option of forgoing the Democratic party and instead using his own impressive institutional capacity to carry forward his post-presidential ambitions.

41

Table 1: Presidential Approval During Last Week in Office

Incumbent President

Date Range

Presidential Approval

Approval by Presidents Party

Approval by Opposing Party

Presidents Party in Two-Party Vote

H. Truman

December 15, 1952

32%

50%

9%

44.55% (1952)

D. Eisenhower

December 12, 1960

59

88

43

49.92 (1960)

J. Kennedy

November 12, 1963

58

80

31

61.34 (1964)

L. Johnson

January 5, 1969

49

63

32

49.96 (1968)

R. Nixon

August 4, 1974

24

50

13

48.95 (1976)

G. Ford

December 12, 1976

53

80

40

48.95 (1976)

J. Carter

December 7, 1980

34

49

14

44.69 (1980)

R. Reagan

December 28, 1988

63

93

38

53.90 (1988)

H.W. Bush

January 10, 1993

56

86

33

46.55 (1992)

W. Clinton

January 13, 2001

66

93

39

50.27 (2000)

W. Bush

January 10, 2009

31

75

6

46.31 (2008)

B. Obama

January 18, 2017

59

95

14

50.51 (2016)

Source: Gallup Polls, Presidential Job Approval Center. URL: http://www.gallup.com/interactives/185273/presidential-job-approval-center.aspx?g_source=PRESIDENTIAL_JOB_APPROVAL&g_medium=topic&g_campaign=tiles . Last Accessed, March 8, 2017. Presidential Vote Share of the Two-Party Vote calculated from data provided by: N. Jacobs and J. Ceaser, The 2016 Presidential Election by the Numbers and in Historical Perspective, The Forum 14 (2016): 361-385.

References

Bush, George W. 2017. Portraits of Courage: A Commander in Chiefs Tribute to Americas Warriors. New York, NY: Crown.

Cooper, Jr., John Milton. 2011. Woodrow Wilson: A Biography. New York, NY: Vintage Books.

Crowe, Justin. 2007, Forging Judicial Auton