`

Technology Security &Foreign Disclosure

Export Control

Defense Exportability

2

Introduction

DefenseExportability

Sales & Transfers

Technology Security &

Foreign Disclosure

InternationalCooperative Programs

International Acquisition & Exportability (IA&E)• Introduction

• Technology Security & Foreign Disclosure

• Export Control• Defense Exportability• “Exportability” in IA&E

Planning and Implementation• Key Takeaways

Topics

3

Int’l Acquisition TransactionsStatus Quo -- Macro View

USStrategy & Policy

Foreign Strategy & Policy

Capabilities & Tech

Willing to Transfer

Desired Capabilities

& Tech

Inquiry, Partnership

Discussion or Request for Purchase

?

FMS

DCS

ICP

Other

TSFD Export Control

Int’lAcquisition

Transactions

Defense Acquisition System

4

TSFD Basics

Fundamental Security Considerations

Release Conditions

Type of Authorizations

TSFD Foreign VisitsDisclosureAuthorizations

• Not transfer or use for other purposes without U.S. consent• Provide substantially the same degree of protection as U.S.

Access Protection+

5

USG/DoDTSFD

“Theory”

6

TSFDKey Players & Processes

International Interaction

DoDComponent

Level

CoCOMCountry

Team Level

• ProposedPolicy Changes

• ComponentPolicy

• Implementationguidance &decisions

Military Departments

SAF/IA DASA(DE&C) & G-2 NIPO

• MAJCOMs• PEOs/PMs• Implementation• Technical

Details

AFSAC. AFMC AETC, etc.

USASAC AMC, etc.

NETSAFASYSCOMs, etc.

Labs, Warfare Centers, and Many Others

USG/OSD/Joint Staff

Level

• USG-widePolicy

• DoD-widePolicy

• Top LevelTSFD approvals

USD (Policy)USD (AT&L)USD (Intelligence)ASD(NII)

DoD Agencies: DSCA, DTSA, MDA, DTRA, DISA, etc.

USG/Interagency

Nat’l Sec CouncilIntel CommunityState DeptCommerce DeptHomeland Sec Dept

7

Categories of Information

Classified Military Information (CMI)

Information originated by or for the DoD or its agencies or is under its jurisdiction or control; and that requires protection in the interests of national security

Controlled Unclassified

Information (CUI)

Unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls, pursuant to and consistent with applicable law, regulations and Government-wide policies

Foreign Government

Information (FGI)

Information provided to the USG by a foreign government (s) or international organization or produced jointly with expectation that information, the source, or both are to be held in confidence

DoDM 5200.01 Vol 1-4; DoD Information Security Program

8

USG/DoD TSFD ProcessesMILDEP Processes

DoD Lead: Various

MILDEP-specific various

MILDEP Process

Other DoD Processes

DoD Lead: Various

Org.-specific various

Few documented processes

Interagency process

LO/CLO AT&L Primary

AT AT&L Primary

SAP SAPCO Specialized

DSC AT&L + Policy Specialized

Intel USD(I) Specialized

Data Links/WF DoD CIO Specialized

PNT/GPS DoD CIO Specialized

COMSEC NSA & DoD CIO Primary

GEOINT NGA Specialized

MTCR Policy Specialized

NDP Policy Primary

EW None No single process

NVD/INS DTSA Specialized

9

DoDD 5111.21, “ATTR SSG and TSFDO” (New October 2014)

OSD TSFD Initiative

• Arms Transfer and Technology Release (ATTR) Senior Steering Group (SSG) created in 2008 and formally established in 2012:– Overarching DoD authority to ensure clear senior-level

direction; USD(P) & USD(AT&L) co-chairs – Serves as appeals board and mediation body

• TSFD Office (TSFDO) supports ATTR SSG efforts:– ATTR SSG Executive Secretariat and assesses/recommends

changes to policies– Develops/implements procedures and checklists,

coordinates documentation and policy, conducts outreach

10

OSD Oversight

Secretary of Defense––––––––––––––––––––––––Deputy Secretary of Defense

Secretary of Defense––––––––––––––––––––––––Deputy Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary(Acquisition, Technology

and Logistics)

Under Secretary(Acquisition, Technology

and Logistics)

Under Secretary(Policy)

Under Secretary(Policy)

Director, International Cooperation

(AT&L IC)

Director, International Cooperation

(AT&L IC)

Defense Technology Security Administration

(DTSA)

Defense Technology Security Administration

(DTSA)

Arms Transfer & Technology ReleaseSenior Steering Group (ATTR SSG)

Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure Office (TSFDO)

11

TSFD Basics

Fundamental Security Considerations

Release Conditions

Type of Authorizations

TSFD Foreign VisitsDisclosureAuthorizations

• Not transfer or use for other purposes without U.S. consent• Provide substantially the same degree of protection as U.S.

Access Protection+

12

National Disclosure Policy Overview

• Provides a framework and mechanism for implementing the security requirements of:– Arms Export Control Act (AECA)– Executive Order 13526– NSDM 119

• DoDD 5230.11, “Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations”

13

NDP-1

• Interagency document that implements NSDM 119 within the Executive Branch

• Issued by the Secretary of Defense with concurrence of other Departments and Agencies

• Sets forth specific criteria and conditions that must be satisfied before a decision is made to disclose CMI

• Delegates to the Executive Branch authority to release CMI to eligible governments & international organizations

• Disclosure authority delegated to Heads of Departments and Agencies with jurisdiction over the information

• Disclosure decided on a case-by-case basis and approval of the originator required

14

Disclosure Authorizations

Officials with disclosure authority must consider:• Originator of information • NDP disclosure criteria and conditions

− Supports U.S. foreign policy, military & security objectives− Does not jeopardize U.S. military security− Foreign recipient has the intent and capability to provide the equivalent

degree of protection− Results in clearly defined benefits to the U.S.− Information limited to satisfy authorized purpose

• Delegated Disclosure Authority Levels (from NDP-1 charts)• NDPC Policy Statements

− Countries / Technologies / Weapon Systems

… Avoid making false impressions!

15

Other Key TSFD Policy Sources

• NSDD 189*– Established principle that USG/DoD fundamental research should

remain unrestricted to the maximum extent possible – If national security requires control, information should be classified

• DoDI 5230.24 and DoDD 5230.25**– Establishes DoD policy for marking and managing technical documents,

including DoD program and technical information, and provides for CUI controls (if appropriate) over their distribution, release, and dissemination

– Helps implement DoDD 5230.25 by providing DoD acquisition community document originators with guidance on what must be controlled as CUI

*NSDD 189, National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information, 21 Sep 1985**DoDI 5230.24, Distribution Statements on Technical Documents, 23 Aug 2012 and DoDD 5230.25, Withholding of Unclassified Technical Data from Public Disclosure, 6 Nov 1984

Protection of CUI

• Addressed in DoDM 5200.01, Volume 4, “DoD Information Security Program: Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)”

• Application of FOUO Markings to CUI

• Access to CUI (within the DoD and disseminated outside the DoD)

• Physical protection of CUI

17

TSFD Basics

Fundamental Security Considerations

Release Conditions

Type of Authorizations

TSFD Foreign VisitsDisclosureAuthorizations

• Not transfer or use for other purposes without U.S. consent• Provide substantially the same degree of protection as U.S.

Access Protection+

18

Foreign Visit Authorizations

• Verifies clearance, need to know, and sponsor• Purposes of Visit Requests:

– Facilitate administration (scheduling/venue)– Vehicle for disclosure/export authorization decisions– Vehicle for security assurance

• Types of Visits:– One-time – single visit, <30 days, specific purpose– Recurring – intermittent visits usually up to 1 year– Extended – single visit for 2-3 years / program

• Types of Assignments:– Foreign Liaison Officer (FLO)– Defense Personnel Exchange Program (DPEP)– Cooperative Program Personnel (CPP)

… Avoid makingfalse impressions!

19

USG/DoDTSFD

“Practice”

20

International ProgramsSecurity Planning

• Effective planning for foreign participation in an international program starts early-on

• Failure to plan for security requirements and accomplish them in a timely fashion can adversely affect cost, schedule, and performance

• In order to achieve effective security planning– Identify information/technology requiring protection– Identify & specify what can be shared & with whom– Document how it is to be protected, to include what cannot be

shared

21

Obtaining TSFD Approvals

• Who has foreign disclosure authority over the CMI and/or CUI to be released?

• Should the TSFDO and ATTR SSG be informed or involved?• Has Classified Military Information (CMI) disclosure

authority been delegated? (NDP Charts, Policy Statements, etc.)

• Is an Exception to National Disclosure Policy (ENDP) required for CMI release?

− Supported by the DoD Component− Approved through the ENDP process

• Are other USG/DoD processes or releases required? (if so, TSFDO consultation is recommended)

22

MILDEP Int’l Program Organizations (IPOs)

SECDEFDEPSECDEF

SECDEFDEPSECDEF

Secretary of the Army Secretary of the Army Secretary of the Air ForceSecretary of the Air ForceSecretary of the NavySecretary of the Navy

Assistant Secretary forAcquisition, Logistics and

Technology

Assistant Secretary forAcquisition, Logistics and

Technology

Deputy Under Secretary forInternational Affairs

Deputy Under Secretary forInternational Affairs

Assistant Secretary forResearch, Development,

and Acquisition

Assistant Secretary forResearch, Development,

and Acquisition

Deputy Assistant Secretaryfor Defense Exports and

Cooperation

Deputy Assistant Secretaryfor Defense Exports and

Cooperation

Director, Navy InternationalPrograms Office

Director, Navy InternationalPrograms Office

There are Similarities and DifferencesAmong Them!

23

Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO)

• Military or civilian personnel authorized by the DoD Component DDA to make foreign disclosure decisions

• Based on delegated authority, FDOs make program-level disclosure decisions on release of CMI and CUI

• FDOs must ensure:− Proposed disclosure is in support of a lawful and authorized USG

purpose− Parent Component is the originator of the information− Proposed release decision is within their delegated authority − Other DoD Components having joint or shared interest have been

consulted − Decision is consistent with false impressions policy

Make the FDO part of the program team!

24

Delegation of Disclosure Authority Letter (DDL)

• Issued by DoD Component Designated Disclosure Authority (DDA) in consultation with PM and TSFD stakeholders

• Documents classification levels, categories, scope, and limitations on information that DoD personnel can disclose to foreign entities on a program

• Delegates disclosure authority to lower level organizations within the Component

• Should be prepared as soon as foreign participation is planned in a program

• U.S.-only document not to be shared or discussed with foreign personnel

25

Defense Security Service

• Defense Security Service (DSS) Mission– Administer the National Industrial Security Program– Support national security and the warfighter– Oversee the protection of U.S. and foreign classified

information in the hands of industry

• DSS Operational Directorates– Industrial Security Field Operations (Field Agents)– Programs and Policy – Foreign Ownership, Control or

Influence (FOCI); National Interest Determination (NID); and International Division

– Education and Training (Courses and webinars)– Counterintelligence (Awareness and Elicitation issues)

26

Export Control Basics

Fundamental Considerations

Key Principles

Type of Authorizations

State

• Control U.S.-origin sensitive technology & equipment• Promote regional stability• Human rights• Prevent proliferation to problem end-users and international terrorists• Comply with international arms control and technology transfer

commitments

ForeignPolicy

Countryof Origin Destination

TechnologySensitivity Recipient

Commerce Other

27

Export Control Legislation

Arms Export Control Act• Authority to promulgate regulations governing commercial exports

of defense articles and services was delegated to the Secretary of State

• Implemented by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)• Legal basis for the United States Munitions List (USML) – defense

articles and services

Export Administration Act• Authority to implement given to the Department of Commerce• Implemented by the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)• Legal basis for the Commerce Control List (CCL) – dual-use items,

“600 Series” items transferred from USML and “Country Chart”

28

USG Export Control System

• Federal Regulations: ITAR – Defense Articles and Services

EAR – “Dual Use” Articles and Services

• Key Organizations :– State Department -- Directorate of Defense Trade

Controls (DDTC)– Commerce Department – Bureau of Industry and

Security (BIS)– DoD – Defense Technology Security Administration

(DTSA)

29

Export Examples

• Shipment to Foreign Destinations (Including Canada)

• Shipment to Foreign Entities in U.S. (e.g., Embassies)

• Foreign Travel

• Hand-carry

• Technical Services

• Electronic Transmission

• Symposia Presentations

• Published Articles

• Computer Networks (Internet, Intranet, Web Sites) … Laptops

• Conversation

• Business Meetings

• International Mail

• Telephone Conversations

• Foreign Visitors: Facility Tours Meetings

• Foreign Employees

• Trade Shows (U.S. & Overseas)

30

ECR USML to CCL “Migration”

Four Reform Major Areas: (See http://export.gov/ecr )– Single export control enforcement coordination center (established)– Single USG IT system for export control (nearing completion)– Single export control list (USML to CCL migration)– Single licensing agency (requires legislation – very unlikely to occur)

• International Traffic in ArmsRegulations (ITAR)

• Military Items

State Department

US Munitions List (USML)Categories

• Export AdministrationRegulations (EAR)

• Commercial & Dual Use Items

Commerce Department

Commerce Control List (CCL)600 Series

Less Sensitive Items

31

Export License vs Disclosure Process

N2

OSD/StateNavy

Some Decisions Delegated to the Navy

Balance of Decisions Retained by OSD

Arms Transfer Policy Review Group (ATPRG) -- Precedent

Setting Issues

NDPC -- Transfer of ClassifiedInformation/Material

LO/CLO Tri-Service Committee and EXCOM

Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) -- COMSEC

TTSARBPrecedent

SettingIssues

Decisions

Request for

Exceptionas

required

NIPO

DASN(IP)

Signals Intelligence Committee EW Parametric Data

D

E

C

I

S

I

O

N

Disclosure Authorities

Disclosure Policy Process

ASN(RD&A)

N6/N7

N/AUnified CMDs -- SATCOM

N2

1-2 years

INDUSTRY

DTSA

MIL SERVICES

STATE

Up to 120 days

Traditional Industry View

Not Well Understood by Industry

Disclosure Approval Precedes Export License Submission

Start

32

Export ControlPlanning for ICPs

• Technology Release Roadmap (TRR) − Prepared if a substantial amount of ICP activity is envisioned− Provides early planning for technology releases to foreign industry− Describes when the critical events regarding TSFD planning and

implementation should be addressed − Projection of when U.S. industry export approvals may be required

to support initial ICP efforts

• TRR sections− Timeline of key projected export approvals against the program

acquisition schedule− Definition of the technologies involved in each export approval− List of U.S. contractors (exporters) as well as foreign entities (end

users) for each export approval

33

International Acquisition & Exportability (IA&E)

DefenseExportability

Sales & Transfers

Technology Security & Foreign Disclosure

InternationalCooperative

Programs

34

Program Protection

“Program protection also supports international partnership building and cooperative opportunities objectives by enabling the export of capabilities without compromising underlying U.S. technology advantages.” Program managers will describe in their [Program Protection Plan] PPP the program’s critical program information and mission-critical functions and components … [including] planning for exportability and potential foreign involvement. Countermeasures should include anti-tamper, exportability features, security … and other mitigations …”

DoDI 5000.02 (Enclosure 3, paragraph 13) New

35

Systems Engineering

• Protect Critical Technology• Enhance the Exportability of Defense Systems• Facilitate International Cooperative Programs• Promote Allied and Friendly Nation

Interoperability

36

Critical Program Information

CPI is defined as the elements or components of an RD&A program that, if compromised, could:

– Cause significant degradation in mission effectiveness– Shorten expected combat-effective life of the system– Significantly alter program direction– Enable an adversary to overcome the technology

CPI includes:– Critical information, elements, or components– Classified or unclassified technology– “Crown jewels” requiring extraordinary protection

37

Program Protection Plan (PPP)

• Single source document• Comprehensive protection• Objective: Prevent exploitation of U.S.

technology or the development of countermeasures to U.S. defense systems

• When: As soon as CPI is identified, should be approved at Milestone A; must be updated at subsequent Milestones

• Responsibility: PM• Approval: MDA

38

DEF Dimensions

Differential Capability• Design, develop, and test

modifications to the DoD configuration that incorporate partner/customer nation unique capabilities and remove (and confirm the removal of) U.S.-only capabilities/CPI to create one or more exportable versions of the system

Anti-Tamper (AT)• System engineering activities

designed into the system architecture to protect CPI against:− Unwanted technology transfer− Countermeasure development − Capability/performance

degradation through unauthorized system intrusion/modification

• Deter, impede, detect, and respond to exploitation of CPI in DoD systems resulting from combat losses or export sales

39

Anti-Tamper (A-T)

• A-T and FMS– ATEA coord. on LOR responses for systems containing CPI– A-T mechanisms and costs must be included in the LOA– Compliance with A-T requirements certified to DSCA– ATEA must approve A-T Plan prior to LOA offer– Satisfactory V&V testing completed before export

• A-T Disclosure Guidelines– Fact of A-T implementation should be unclassified– Advising foreign partners that system contains A-T

measures is usually best course of action– Measures used to implement A-T will normally be classified

and should not be disclosed

40

Defense Exportability Features(DEF) Pilot Program

• FY11 NDAA directed SECDEF to “carry out a pilot program to develop and incorporate technology protection features in a designated system during the R&D phase of such system.”

• Program Scope/Status– Identify MDAPs for which there is significant anticipated export demand and whose

technical aspects are amenable to DEF– Pilot program to provide funding to evaluate exportability and facilitate planning for,

design, and incorporation of exportability features during RDT&E– AT&L selects candidate programs from MILDEP nominations

• FY12 NDAA change– Industry to share at least half the cost of developing and implementing program

protection features

• FY14 NDAA extended pilot program through October 2020• FY15 NDAA gives SECDEF flexibility to determine cost share

Defense Exportability is Part of BBP 2.0

41

Developing Exportable Configurations

• At the Development RFP Release Decision and Milestone B, the MDA should determine if one or more exportable configurations should be developed

− Informed by feasibility studies; requirements included in RFP− Funding sources must be identified

• Most Programs Employ a Combination of Funding Sources

• ICP funding (various alternatives)

• Industry (various alternatives)• FMS or DCS customer nation funding• DSCA Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF)• Title 10 funding (specific authorization & appropriation)

OUSD(AT&L) International Cooperation

FY12 DEF Pilot Programs

42

Programs MILDEP Contractor Milestone

Joint Proximity/Height of Burst Fusing (HOBF)

Army Picatinny Arsenal Non-MDAP

Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (AIAMD)

Army Northrop Grumman Post-B

Indirect Fires Protection Capability, Increment 2 – Intercept (IFPC2-I) Army AoA Pre-A

Common Infrared Counter Measures (CIRCM)

Army BAE SystemsNorthrop Grumman

Pre-B

MQ-4C Triton (formerly Broad Area Maritime Surveillance, BAMS)

Navy Northrop Grumman Post-B

Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radar (3DELRR)

Air Force RaytheonLockheed Martin

Northrop GrummanPre-B

OUSD(AT&L) International Cooperation

FY13-14 DEF Pilot Programs

43

Programs MILDEP Contractor Milestone

Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) Navy Source Selection Post-A

Air & Missile Defence Radar (AMDR)

Navy Source Selection Post-B

P-8A Poseidon Navy Boeing Post-C

E2D Advanced Hawkeye Navy Northrop Grumman

Post-FRP

Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II) Air Force Raytheon Post-B

MQ-9 Reaper Air Force General Atomics Post-C

Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)

Air Force Lockheed Martin Post-C

Joint Ground to Air Missile (FY14) Army Lockheed Martin (LM)

Pre-B

Armed Aerial Scout and Ground Combat Vehicle

Army N/A N/A

44

How Many Configurations?

Few• Simpler design and test• Simpler production and

logistics• Easier upgrades• More affordable

Many• Greater customer choice• Treats countries differently• Tailored logistics and

upgrades• More expensive

DoD and partner/customer nations must compromise to achieve optimal outcomes for all (easy to say, hard to do)

45

Defense Exportability Activities

IOCA CB

LRIPTechnology Maturation &

Risk Reduction.

Production & Deployment

DRFPRD

MaterielSolutionAnalysis

CDD-V

CDDICD Draft

CDD

Operations & SupportMateriel

DevelopmentDecision

FRP

Decision

Sustainment

DisposalFOC

Engineering & Manufacturing Development

CDRCPDPDR

Exportability Assessment

• Projected sales

• Technology complexity

Exportability Feasibility Studies

• Conducted with program contractor

• Included in TMRR contract

• Funded by program or DEF PE

• Industry provides 50%

Exportable Designs

• Funded by program, cooperative program or customer, or industry (or combination)

• May be multiple configurations

Exportable Version Production

• Funded by customer• May be multiple

configurations

Exportable Version Depot &

Spares • Funded by

customer

Activities Require MDA Approval

46

Int’l Acquisition TransactionsLooking Forward -- Macro View

USStrategy & Policy

Foreign Strategy & Policy

Capabilities & Tech

Willing to Transfer

Desired Capabilities

& Tech

Inquiry, Partnership

Discussion or Request for Purchase

?

FMS

DCS

ICP

Other

TSFD Export Control

Int’lAcquisition

Transactions

Defense

InitialTSFD& DEF

Add

EngageEarlier Acquisition System

47

The Dilemma

Will these new TSFD/DEF initiatives help?

Provide required capabilities

quickly to allies and friends

Protect the “crown jewels” of U.S. defense

technology

48

Reference Charts

49

USG/DoD TSFD Processes

• TSFD process approvals are normally required for DoD-related gov’t and industry international acquisition activities

• TSFD processes run independently under leadership of different USG/DoD Departments, Agencies & organizations

• PMs/IPT members should work with DoD Component Foreign Disclosure Offices (FDOs) to identify/initiate required actions

Consult/Coordinate with Local/DoD Component FDOs

Normally Requires Coordination with

Multiple Organizations

NDP

DoD Lead: OUSD

(P)

EO 12356

NDP- 1

DoDI5230.11

DoDI5200.39

Primary Process

LO/CLO

DoD Lead: AT&L

EO 12968

EO 13526

DoDI S-5230.28

Primary Process

SAP

DoD Lead: AT&L

EO 12968

EO 13526

DoDD 5205.07

DoDI S-5230.8

DoDI S-5230.28

Primary Process

COMSEC

DoD Lead: NSA &

NII

DoDD C-

5200.5

NSD 42

DoDI8523.01

CJSI 6510.06

A

Primary Process

DSC

DoD Lead: AT&L

DSD Memo 10/27/0

8

AT&L SP &

DUSD TSP& NDP

Memo 2/26/09

Specialized Process

MTCR

DoD Lead: DSCA/ Policy

MTCR

ITAR 121.16

DoD 5101.38

- M

Specialized process

Intel

DoD Lead: USD(I)

DODD 5240.01

DIA DPR-

00 - 217 -99

JP 2- 01

DoDI S-3200.17

DCID 6/7

DoDD C-

5230.23

ICD-113

Specialized process

Data Links

DoD Lead:

NII

DoDD4630.09

Specialized process

PNT/

GPS

DoD Lead:

NII

DODI 4650.06

NSPD #39

DoDD4650.05

Specialized process

MNIS CENTRIX

DoD Lead:

JS

DODI 8110.1

Specialized process

Geo- spatial

Products

DoD Lead: NGA

DoDD5105.60

DoDI5030.59

DCID 1/8

No documented

process

EW

DoD Lead: TBD

DoDD 3222.4

DoDI O-3600.02

No documented

process

MILDEP

Processes

§DoD Lead:

Various

§ MILDEP-specific various

Various documented

process

50

NDPC Membership

General Members

State

Defense

Army

Navy

Air Force

CJCS

Special Members

Director, National IntelligenceDirector, Central IntelligenceDepartment of EnergyDepartment of Defense:• OUSD(P)• OUSD(I)• OUSD(AT&L)• CIO• OATSD (NCB)• Defense Intelligence Agency• National Geospatial-

Intelligence Agency• National Security Agency• Missile Defense Agency

51

Country Charts Annex to NDP-1

Military Materiel and Munitions

Applied Research and Development Info and Materiel

Production Information

Combined Military Operations, Planning, and Readiness

U.S. Order of BattleNorth American DefenseMilitary Intelligence

Country A

Country B

Country C

1

2

3

4

5

67

8

S

S

C

C

C

TS S

Organization, Training, and Employment of Military Forces

52

Defense Visit Offices

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)Defense Foreign Liaison (PO-FL)

Department of the Air Force Foreign Disclosure and Technology Transfer Division

(SAF/IAPD)

Department of the Navy Navy International Programs Office (NIPO-10)

Department of the ArmyDeputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Directorate of International Relations (DAMI-IR)

CognizantForeign

DisclosureOffice

DoD/Commercial

VisitLocation

Approval/DenialNon-Sponsor

Approval/DenialNon-Sponsor RecommendationRecommendation

Visit Request Process –Foreign Visits System (FVS)

VisitRequest

VisitRequest

ForeignEmbassy

53

Foreign Personnel Assignments

• All visit requirements apply

• Additional requirements also apply

• Three basic types of assignments:– Foreign Liaison Officer (FLO) Program – national

representatives, usually for FMS or operations– Defense Personnel Exchange Program (DPEP) –

reciprocal personnel exchange to familiarize– Cooperative Program Personnel (CPP) Program –

assigned in support of a cooperative program

54

U.S. Visits Overseas

U.S. DoD Personnel …• Follow DoD Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG) • Submission normally 30 days in advance• Submission of appropriate clearances:

– Theater Clearance – U.S. military facility – Country Clearance – Host Govt. or contractor facility– Special Area Clearance – restricted visits

U.S. Contractor Personnel …• Per the FCG for DoD-sponsored visits• Per the ITAR and NISPOM• DISCO procedures apply

55

Program Security Instruction (PSI)

• Details the security arrangements for an ICP− Harmonizes security requirements of participants’

national laws and regulations− Implements security-related international

agreement provisions

• Format contained in Multinational IndustrialSecurity Working Group (MISWG) Document #5

• Forming a PSI working group and preparing the PSI in parallel with agreement negotiation/signature is recommended

• Security Classification Guide (SCG) may be attached to the PSI

CUI Markings

• Information that has been determined to qualify for CUI status shall be indicated by markings

• Marking information FOUO does not automatically qualify it for exemption from public release pursuant to the FOIA

• CUI disseminated outside the DoD shall also bear a marking that states that the information may be exempt from mandatory disclosure in accordance with the FOIA

Arms Export Control Act

• Encourages restraint but recognizes that nations have valid defense requirements

• Recognizes most nations need help in acquiring defense capabilities and the need for defense cooperation among U.S. friends and allies

• Authorizes arms exports under direction of the President; Secretary of State shall administer or control

• Recipients must adhere to U.S. terms regarding:– Transfer– Use – Protection

ITAR – “Parts & Pieces”

• Part 120 Definitions• Part 121 U.S. Munitions List (USML)• Part 122 Registration• Part 123 Defense Articles• Part 124 Agreements and Defense Services• Part 125 Technical Data and Classified Defense

Articles• Part 126 General Policies and Provisions• Part 127 Violations and Penalties• Part 128 Administrative Procedures• Part 129 Registration and Licensing of Brokers• Part 130 Political Contributions, Fees and

Commissions

ITAR Export Authorizations

• Numbered License (DSP-5, DSP-83, etc.)

• Agreement (MLA, TAA, DLA)

• Exemption (Self-executing or Triggered)

– Can be revoked, suspended, or amended by DDTC for a variety of reasons

– Identifies the export, the article/technical data, any intermediate consignee, the end-user, and the end use

– License is valid for 4 years; agreement normally 10 years; records must be maintained for 5 years

60

What is an Export? (120.17)

• Sending/taking defense articles out of U.S. in any manner

• Transferring registration, control, or ownership to a foreign person of any aircraft, vessel, or satellite covered by the USML in U.S. or abroad

• Disclosing (including orally and visually) or transferring any defense article or technical data:– To an embassy, agency or subdivision of a

foreign government in U.S.– To a foreign person in U.S. or abroad

• Performing a defense service on behalf of or for the benefit of a foreign person whether in U.S. or abroad

61

Defense Article (120.6)

• Any item (hardware, services, technical data) identified in Part 121 (the United States Munitions List (USML))

• The USML contains 21 categories of articles, services and related technical data that are designated as defense articles and thus subject to export controls

• Department of State (DoS) designates with Department of Defense (DoD) concurrence

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Technical Data (120.10)

• Information which is required for the design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance or modification of defense articles

• Can include:– Classified Information– Information covered by invention secrecy order– Software defined in Part 121.8

• Does not include:– General scientific, mathematical or engineering data taught

in schools, or otherwise in the public domain; or– Basic marketing information on function or purpose or

general system descriptions of defense articles

How?

Why?

USG Export Control Reform

• Launched by the President in August 2009– Major overhaul of U.S. export control process– System rooted in Cold War era

• Basic principles … “simple yet comprehensive,” and higher walls around fewer items

• Challenge is balancing foreign policy with technology security priorities

• State of the Union and QDR, early 2010• Secretary Gates’ speech (April 2010)

– “We need a system that dispenses with the 95% of ‘easy’ cases and concentrate our resources on the remaining 5%”

http://export.gov/ecr

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Defense Service (120.9)

The furnishing of technical assistance, including training, to foreign persons,

whether in the United States or abroad, in the design, development, engineering,

manufacture, production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, modification, operation, demilitarization, destruction, processing or

use of defense articles

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Export Control Websites

• ECR General Information– http://export.gov/ecr – About ECR – Areas of Reform – For Exporters

• State Department (DDTC)– http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ECR – Background – ECR Announcements – ECR

Implementation Status – Decision Tools – FAQs

• Commerce Department (BIS)– http://www.bis.doc.gov – Reform tab … ECR Teleconference – Decision

Tree Tools – ECR FAQs

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System Security Engineering

• Integrating process for mitigating and managing risks to advanced technology and mission-critical system functionality

• Provides the functional discipline within SE to ensure that security requirements are included in the engineering analysis

• Should include an assessment of security criteria that sets limits for:– International Cooperative Programs– Foreign Military Sales– Direct Commercial Sales

• From this assessment; engineering, hardware, and software alternatives (i.e. export variants and anti-tamper provisions) should be identified that would permit such transactions

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Program Protection Plan (PPP)-- DAG Chapter 13.2. --

• System development document focused on identification and

protection of CPI as well as mission critical functions and components

• Milestone A and B PPPs should include areas such as:− Program’s potential for ICP efforts (including S&T) and future foreign sales− Initial TSFD and defense exportability activities including:

Candidate CPI identification for domestic and export configurations Potential defense exportability system security design risk mitigation measures

(anti-tamper, differential capabilities) Summaries of threats/risks/cost using format contained in OUSD(AT&L) Memo of

July 18, 2011

• S&T Community may participate in system development-related:– IAC and ICP S&T activities that support system development objectives– Defense Exportability Features (DEF) feasibility study efforts

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PPP Template

• Introduction• Program Protection

Summary• CPI and Critical

Components• Horizontal Protection• Threats, Vulnerabilities &

Countermeasures• Other System Security

Related Plans/Documents

• Program Protection Risks• Foreign Involvement• Processes for Mgmt and

Implementation of PPP• Processes for Monitoring

and Reporting Compromises

• Program Protection Costs• Appendices A – E

DAG Chap. 13 provides additional guidance on PPP development

Per USD(AT&L) Memo of July 18, 2011 …

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EMD Exportable Design & Development

No Standard Approach

PMs Should Pursue All Available Alternatives

• Exportable configurations should be developed during EMD or LRIP if there is a firm commitment such as:

− One or more signed ICP international agreements− One or more signed FMS LOAs − A USG-approved export of proposed U.S. industry DCS

transactions − DSCA use of Special Defense Acquisition Funding (SDAF) in

anticipation of FMS cases (under consideration)− Title 10 funding specifically authorized/appropriated for

exportable D&D work

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Handouts

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USG/DoD TSFD ProcessesMILDEP Processes

DoD Lead: Various

MILDEP-specific various

MILDEP Process

Other DoD Processes

DoD Lead: Various

Org.-specific various

Few documented processes

Interagency process

LO/CLO AT&L Primary

AT AT&L Primary

SAP SAPCO Specialized

DSC AT&L + Policy Specialized

Intel USD(I) Specialized

Data Links/WF DoD CIO Specialized

PNT/GPS DoD CIO Specialized

COMSEC NSA & DoD CIO Primary

GEOINT NGA Specialized

MTCR Policy Specialized

NDP Policy Primary

EW None No single process

NVD/INS DTSA Specialized

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TSFD “Macro-Process”

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Developing Exportable Configurations

• At the Development RFP Release Decision and Milestone B, the MDA should determine if one or more exportable configurations should be developed

− Informed by feasibility studies; requirements included in RFP− Funding sources must be identified

• Most Programs Employ a Combination of Funding Sources

• ICP funding (various alternatives)

• Industry (various alternatives)• FMS or DCS customer nation funding• DSCA Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF)• Title 10 funding (specific authorization & appropriation)